CHAPTER IV.

THE PREACHING OF STOICISM. [Sidenote: The companions of Zeno.] =88.= During the later years of his life Zeno gathered round him a number of men of practical and speculative capacity, not unworthy of comparison with the companions of Socrates. His death dissolved the immediate tie between them. Some took an active part in the work of government; others followed their teacher’s example, and became the founders of independent schools of thought; a few devoted themselves to strengthening and extending Zeno’s system; and many were doubtless engaged in useful employment of which no record has reached us. Zeno’s work had not yet been exposed to the test of time, and another century was to pass before it could be seen that the Stoic school was to be of permanent importance. Towards the schools of the Cynics, the Megarians, and the Academics, from which its principles were so largely derived, the attitude of the hearers of Zeno was that of a friendly interchange of opinions, in which sharp controversy stopped short of enmity; the followers of Aristotle (the Peripatetics) continued to be but slightly distinguished from the Academics. But all these schools appear to have united in opposition to the Cyrenaics and Epicureans; the champions of virtue could hold no communings with the advocates of pleasure. Individual teachers who practically reverted to Cynic or Academic teaching still called themselves Stoics: but the only one of Zeno’s hearers who adopted Cyrenaic views was contemptuously branded as ‘the deserter[1].’ [Sidenote: Persaeus.] =89.= The most intimate companion[2] of Zeno was PERSAEUS of Citium (circ. 300-243 B.C.). He was the fellow-townsman of Zeno, and, as good authorities assert, at first his personal servant (οἰκέτης)[3] and afterwards his fellow-lodger. On the recommendation of Zeno he took service, together with Aratus the poet, with Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedonia[4]. Here he was often twitted as to the Stoic paradoxes. King Antigonus sent him messengers announcing the loss of his wife, child, and property, and found that he was not entirely indifferent to external circumstances[5]. He adapted himself easily to court life, and is said to have written a treatise on the theory of the banquet, in which he did not rise above the moral standard of his neighbours[6]. Nor did he disdain to hoax Aristo of Chius, who held strongly to the paradox that ‘the wise man never opines’; he first sent him money by one of two twins, and then sent another to demand it back[7]. Another Socratic paradox, that ‘the wise man is sure to be a good general,’ he endeavoured to maintain by his personal example[8]. Antigonus placed him in command of the acropolis at Corinth, which was nevertheless taken by Aratus of Sicyon in 243 B.C. According to one account, Persaeus was wounded in the attack, and afterwards put to death by the conqueror[9]; others relate that he escaped to Cenchreae[10]. As a philosopher he is of little importance; but Cicero mentions that he not only maintained that amongst the gods were men raised to the sky for their services to mankind (which was an accepted Stoic doctrine), but also that objects useful to man had been deified[11]. [Sidenote: Aratus.] =90.= Two other companions of Zeno also took service under Antigonus, apparently at the same time. Of these PHILONIDES of Thebes[12] is otherwise unknown to us. The other was ARATUS of Soli in Cilicia, author of the well-known poem _The Phaenomena_, an astronomical treatise afterwards translated into Latin by Cicero, and largely used by Virgil in his _Georgics_. The poems of Aratus had a wide influence, and were probably the source from which so many Stoic conceptions reached Virgil. The most interesting part for us is the Introduction, in which he interprets Zeus in Stoic fashion as the deity who dwells in sea and land, in markets and streets: whose family is mankind; and whose providence has set the stars in the heaven to regulate the seasons of the year and to be a guide to the farmer and the sailor[13]. The spirit of this poem is closely akin to that of the hymn of Cleanthes. [Sidenote: Sphaerus.] =91.= Still another hearer of Zeno took a prominent part in political life. SPHAERUS from the Bosphorus (circ. 250 B.C.) was attracted to Cleomenes III, king of Sparta, who under his influence reintroduced the laws of Lycurgus in his city, and particularly those which referred to the education of the youth and the taking of meals in common[14]. With these he combined the plan of a monarchy after the Stoic model, in which the sovereign was to side with the poor against the rich[15]. But in 221 B.C. Cleomenes suffered a crushing defeat, and was compelled to take refuge with Ptolemy III (Euergetes), king of Egypt. Sphaerus found his way to the same court. The death of Ptolemy III left Cleomenes in the position of a disregarded suppliant[16]; but Sphaerus appears to have found a congenial home in Alexandria, now the centre of Hellenistic learning, and doubtless introduced the Stoic philosophy in the circle that gathered round the Museum[17]. He gained a special reputation by the excellence of his definitions[18]. From an anecdote related of him we must infer that whilst adhering to Zeno’s doctrine that the wise man will not opine, he accepted reasonable assurance (τὸ εὔλογον) as a sufficient guide in daily life[19]. He appears to have laid special stress upon the unity of virtue, maintaining that the separate virtues are but appearances of virtue or knowledge in different spheres of action[20]. [Sidenote: Herillus.] =92.= HERILLUS of Carthage (circ. 250 B.C.) is frequently referred to by Cicero as teaching doctrines hardly distinguishable from those of the Academy, in that he made knowledge the highest good[21], and taught that separate from it, yet with claims of their own, there existed inferior ends of action (ὑποτελίδες)[22]. It does not, however, appear clearly that he differed much from Zeno. Sphaerus, as we have seen, had defined the virtues as being ‘knowledge displayed in different spheres of action,’ and the aim of Herillus, ‘to live according to the standard of life accompanied by knowledge[23],’ points in the direction of practical rather than of speculative wisdom. His ‘subordinate aims’ appear also to correspond with Zeno’s ‘things of high degree’ (προηγμένα), and are defined as being the first states to which an animal is attracted upon birth, as food, life, strength (πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν)[24]; they serve only for ‘ends’ (τέλη) for men who have not yet attained to wisdom[25]. This doctrine corresponds closely to the Stoic doctrine as developed somewhat later[26]. [Sidenote: Aristo.] =93.= ARISTO of Chios (circ. 250 B.C.) departed more decidedly from Zeno’s teaching, falling back generally on Cynic views. He was no favourite of Zeno, who called him a chatterbox[27]: and in later life he was accused of becoming a flatterer of Persaeus when the latter was in power[28], and of luxury in his personal habits[29]. But his success as a teacher was great, and he formed a body of followers who called themselves Aristonians. He appears to have supported Zeno vigorously as to the doctrine of ‘comprehension’; and if on this subject he was worsted for the moment by Persaeus[30], he retaliated on some Academic by asking: ‘do you see who is sitting next you?’ The Academic replied ‘I do not.’ ‘Are you blind, then,’ said Aristo; ‘where are your eyes[31]?’ Still he considered any systematic study of dialectics to be a mere waste of time; like spiders’ webs, which seem to display much skill, but are of no use[32]. With regard to physics he was openly agnostic[33]; of the nature of the gods he thought we could know nothing, not even whether the deity were animate or no[34]. Ethics alone remained; but this part of philosophy he reduced by omitting all practical precepts, as introducing the element of uncertainty[35]. In ethics proper he rejects the theory of ‘things of high degree’ (προηγμένα), observing that this term does not harmonize with the treatment of advantages as ‘indifferent,’ but comes dangerously near to calling them ‘good[36].’ Virtue, or rather knowledge, is, as he maintains, the only good; and all that lies between good and evil is alike indifferent[37]. The highest good may therefore be defined as a state of indifference (ἀδιαφορία) towards all such things[38]. Aristo was however once more in agreement with Stoic doctrine when he maintained the unity of virtue. ‘The soul,’ he said, ‘has one power only, that of reasoning; one virtue only, the knowledge of good and evil. When we need to choose the good and avoid the evil, we call this knowledge Soberness; when we need to do good and not evil, we call it Wisdom; Courage, when it is bold and cautious at the right moments; and when it gives every man his due, Justice[39].’ But in deciding his action the wise man will be bound by no theories: he can do whatever comes into his head, provided only he keep himself free from distress, fear and greed[40]. The popularity of these views was repressed by the activity of Chrysippus; in Cicero’s time they were, in cultivated society, extinct[41]. But from the numerous references to Aristo in literature it is clear that his teaching was by no means forgotten; and when there took place the revival of the Cynic tone which we see illustrated in the writings of Epictetus and M. Aurelius, Aristo is again treated with high respect[42]. [Sidenote: Eratosthenes.] =94.= An eminent pupil of Aristo was ERATOSTHENES of Cyrene, the grammarian, whom he won over from the Cyrenaic school. Eratosthenes undoubtedly represented the spirit of his teacher and of the Cynic school towards which he inclined, when he vehemently repudiated the prejudice which then divided mankind into Hellenes and barbarians[43]. He was invited by Ptolemy III (Euergetes) to be chief librarian of the Museum at Alexandria, and tutor to the crown-prince, and has left us an epigram in honour of this great patron of learning and philosophy[44]. Amongst other followers of Aristo we hear specially of APOLLOPHANES of Antiochia[45]. [Sidenote: Dionysius.] =95.= Alone amongst the hearers of Zeno DIONYSIUS of Heraclea abandoned his principles, and went over from the camp of virtue to that of pleasure. A painful disease of the eyes had made him abandon the doctrine that ‘pain is no evil[46].’ His secession was used by Antiochus as an argument against the doctrine of comprehension or certain knowledge[47]. That his life after he became a Cyrenaic was openly scandalous[48] we need not too readily believe: such accusations may easily be mere deductions from his supposed philosophic principles. Dionysius appears to have been a particular friend and admirer of the poet Aratus[49]. Of the less important hearers of Zeno we have the names of, amongst others, ATHENODORUS of Soli[50], CALLIPPUS of Corinth[50], POSIDONIUS of Alexandria[50], and ZENO of Sidon[50]. The last, if he existed, must be kept distinct from other Zenos, such as Zeno of Tarsus the pupil of Chrysippus, and Zeno of Sidon the Epicurean philosopher. [Sidenote: Cleanthes.] =96.= We come last amongst Zeno’s hearers to CLEANTHES of Assos in Asia Minor (331-232 B.C.), who succeeded Zeno as head of the school when already advanced in years, and presided over it for a whole generation. In personal character he was a worthy successor of Socrates, Diogenes, and Zeno. He was trained in hardship and willing endurance[51]; and if he did not quickly understand, yet all he learnt was deeply impressed upon him[52]. He studied Zeno’s life even more attentively than his doctrines; lived with him, watched his hours of retirement, inquired whether his actions corresponded to his teaching[53]. Himself a man of the people, he ardently desired to spread his convictions amongst the many, and chose verse as the best means to express clearly his meaning and win access to men’s ears[54]. He remained constant to Zeno’s teaching[55], but he inspired it with a fresh enthusiasm and developed it in more consistent detail. He is before all things the theologian of Stoicism. The belief in the deity, which in the fragments of Zeno’s teaching appears merely formal and argumentative, becomes in the verse of Cleanthes ardent and dominating. God is the creator and the director of the world; his Logos gives it order and harmony. In God’s designs it is the privilege and duty of man to cooperate; but since he is possessed of free will, it is also within his power to make a futile opposition. In this way the good and the bad stand in definite contrast. Finally, right knowledge and right action are only possible by association with the deity through praise and prayer. [Sidenote: His poetry.] =97.= It is our good fortune to possess several complete poems of Cleanthes, which are of more value to us towards appreciating his standpoint than a hundred detached sentences would be. The _hymn to Zeus_[56] is the most important, and its likeness to the opening of Aratus’ _Phaenomena_[57] will not escape notice. _Hymn to Zeus._ Supreme of gods, by titles manifold Invoked, o thou who over all dost hold Eternal dominance, Nature’s author, Zeus, Guiding a universe by Law controlled; 2 Hail! for ’tis meet that men should call on thee Whose seed we are; and ours the destiny Alone of all that lives and moves on earth, A mirror of thy deity[58] to be. 5 Therefore I hymn thee and thy power I praise; For at thy word, on their appointed ways The orbs of heaven in circuit round the earth Move, and submissive each thy rule obeys, 8 Who holdest in thy hands invincible So dread a minister to work thy will— The eternal bolt of fire, two-edged, whose blast Thro’ all the powers of nature strikes a chill[59]— 11 Whereby thou guid’st the universal force, Reason, through all things interfused, whose course Commingles with the great and lesser[60] lights— Thyself of all the sovran and the source: 14 For nought is done on earth apart from thee, Nor in thy vault of heaven, nor in the sea; Save for the reckless deeds of sinful men Whose own hearts lead them to perversity. 17 But skill to make the crookèd straight is thine, To turn disorder to a fair design; Ungracious things are gracious in thy sight, For ill and good thy power doth so combine 20 That out of all appears in unity Eternal Reason, which the wicked flee And disregard, who long for happiness, Yet God’s great Law can neither hear nor see; 24 Ill-fated folk! for would they but obey With understanding heart, from day to day Their life were full of blessing, but they turn Each to his sin, by folly led astray. 26 Glory would some thro’ bitter strife attain And some are eager after lawless gain; Some lust for sensual delights, but each Finds that too soon his pleasure turns to pain. 31 But, Zeus all-bountiful! the thunder-flame And the dark cloud thy majesty proclaim: From ignorance deliver us, that leads The sons of men to sorrow and to shame. 33 Wherefore dispel it, Father, from the soul And grant that Wisdom may our life control, Wisdom which teaches thee to guide the world Upon the path of justice to its goal. 35 So winning honour thee shall we requite With honour, lauding still thy works of might; Since gods nor men find worthier meed than this— The universal Law to praise aright. 39 _Translated by W. H. Porter._ =98.= Another short poem of Cleanthes identifies Zeus with fate, and points the same moral as to human duty: Lead me, O Zeus, and lead me, Destiny, What way soe’er ye have appointed me! I follow unafraid: yea, though the will Turn recreant, I needs must follow still[61]. In other poems characteristic Stoic doctrines are set forth with clearness and emphasis: ‘Look not at common opinion, and be not eager to be wise of a sudden; fear not the chatter of the many, in which there is no judgment and no modesty; for the crowd does not possess shrewd just and fair judgment, but amongst the few you may perchance find this[62].’ ‘Do you ask me of what kind the good is? Listen then. It is orderly, just, innocent, pious, self-controlled, useful, fair, necessary, severe, upright, always of advantage; fearless, painless, profitable, without smart; helpful, pleasing, sure, friendly, honourable, consistent; noble, not puffed up, painstaking, comforting, full of energy, biding its time, blameless, unchanging[63].’ ‘He who abstains from some disgraceful action yet all the while has desire for it, will some day do it, when he gets opportunity[64].’ In the last of the passages we are introduced to an ethical paradox of the highest importance to Stoicism: that good and evil are set in the will and the intention, and are not dependent upon the action[65]. [Sidenote: Originality of Cleanthes.] =99.= To the ancients Cleanthes was the faithful disciple of Zeno. Persaeus, Aratus, and others had turned aside from the direct pursuit of philosophy, and their contact with science and politics might easily sully the purity of their philosophic creed. Herillus had adopted Academic doctrine, Aristo had fallen back into Cynism, Dionysius had actually seceded to the party of pleasure. It might seem that the far-reaching sweep of Zeno’s intellect had no real hold on his companions. But Cleanthes at least stood firm by the old landmarks. We must not suppose from this that he was a man of no originality[66]; his language and his style at least are his own. Nor on the other hand can we go all the way with some recent writers, who attribute to him exclusively large parts of the Stoic system[67]. Our authorities commonly refer either to Zeno alone, or to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus jointly, as vouching for accepted Stoic doctrine; and we are hardly entitled to lay great stress on the comparatively few fragments of which the authorship is assigned exclusively to Cleanthes, as evidence for the independence of his teaching; especially as we can in many instances see that our authorities delight in attributing a difference of meaning to the Stoic masters, when in reality there is nothing more to be found than a difference of phrasing[68]. It is however clear that Stoicism did not assume its complete form in the hands of its first propagator; and to a limited extent we can see the directions in which his teaching was amplified by his successors. [Sidenote: Physics of Cleanthes.] =100.= Cleanthes took a special interest in the physical speculations of Heraclitus, on whose writings he composed four books[69], and in particular in the bearing of his speculations upon the nature of the deity. The belief in the dualism of God and matter, of the Word and the world, is attributed to Cleanthes as distinctly as to Zeno[70]; but on the other hand the conception of an overruling unity is much more pronounced in the later writer[71]. Hence from the first Cleanthes endeavours to give a wider meaning to the primary fire of Heraclitus, the creative fire of Zeno. For this fire he proposed the new term ‘flame’ (φλόξ)[72]; at other times he identified it with the sky[73], with the sun[74], and with the principle of heat[75]; and finally adopted the term ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα, _spiritus_), which has ever since held its place in the discussion of natural theology. This term appears to have been at first intended to combine the conceptions of the creative fire and of the Logos[76], but it gradually came to have distinctive associations of its own. Like fire, ‘spirit’ is to the Stoics a substance, stuff, or body akin to the element of air, but associated with warmth and elasticity; it is conceived as immanent in the universe and penetrating it as the deity; immanent in the human body and penetrating it as the soul[77]. The elasticity of spirit is measured by its ‘tension’ (τόνος, _intentio_), by means of which its creative power pushes forward from the centre to the circumference: as for instance in the human body walking is effected by ‘spirit exercising tension towards the feet[78].’ The theory of ‘tension’ has an immediate application to ethics. When the soul has sufficient tension to perform its proper work, it operates according to the virtues of Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness; but when the tension is relaxed, the soul becomes disordered and is seized upon by the emotions[79]. [Sidenote: Theology of Cleanthes.] =101.= To Cleanthes also it fell to explain more fully the government both of the universe and of the individual. Zeno indeed is said to have used the term ἡγεμονικόν (_principale_, _principatus_)[80], which we may translate by ‘ruling power,’ or shortly (following the Latin) by ‘principate[81],’ for the highest power of the human soul; Cleanthes sought a similar principle in the universe also, and is said to have found it in the sun[82]. By thus using the term in a double sense he implies the analogy which is expressed by the correlative terms ‘macrocosm’ and ‘microcosm,’ and which leads up to the definition of God as the ‘soul of the universe[83].’ Cleanthes further speaks of the universe itself as god[84]; but before describing him as a pantheist it is well to consider that this is only one form out of many in which he expresses his creed. He was also the first to give the four proofs of the existence of the deity upon which all discussions of the ‘evidences of Natural Religion’ have been based down to the present day, and which we shall further discuss in a later chapter[85]. The pious zeal of Cleanthes was not without a touch of bigotry, destined to have serious consequences in the final developments of Stoicism, and to reappear in the history of the middle ages with distressing intensity; he was bitterly opposed to the novel heliocentric theory of the universe as an impiety[86]. [Sidenote: Weakness of Stoicism.] =102.= Thus even though we can no longer discriminate sharply between the teaching of Zeno and that of Cleanthes, we have every reason to suppose that the latter was possessed of originality of thought and vigour and copiousness of expression. We cannot easily believe that a man of such powers failed to attract hearers or to retain a hold upon them. But in his extreme old age it seems that the majority were drawn aside either to the ingenious arguments of Arcesilaus the Academic, or to the more independent teaching of Aristo of Chios. The continued existence of Stoicism seemed threatened; its critics were not to be contented with rhetoric or poetry, but insistently demanded proofs. In this crisis it was saved and established by a younger man, CHRYSIPPUS of Soli (280-206 B.C.), who was far inferior in original power, but equally zealous and more in harmony with the tastes and demands of the younger generation. [Sidenote: Chrysippus.] =103.= Chrysippus was a fellow-townsman of Aratus of Soli, and his appearance is doubtless a sign of the active interest in philosophy which for some centuries marks the neighbourhood of the important town of Tarsus. Born in 280 B.C. he found in his early manhood three prominent teachers at Athens, Arcesilaus, Aristo, and Cleanthes. Of these Aristo seems to have been the most popular, and surprise was expressed that Chrysippus did not join his school. ‘Had I followed the many,’ he replied, ‘I should not have become a philosopher[87].’ His convictions drew him to Cleanthes, but he felt much impatience with his methods. This state of mind he must have expressed freely, for in after life he reproached himself that he had not behaved more kindly towards his teacher in his old age[88]. Confident in his own powers, he desired to relieve Cleanthes of the burden of replying to the many attacks made upon his doctrines, especially as to dialectics[89]. It is well known that he asked his master to supply him with his dogmas only, saying that he himself would find the proofs[90]. Chrysippus probably outlived his opponents, and during the time when he was head of the school (232-206 B.C.) only found himself opposed by men of mediocre talents. He devoted his whole energies to strengthening and systematizing Stoic doctrine. He not only gave its proofs, but used every art of the dialectician to recommend it to his hearers[91]. From his facile pen there poured an endless stream of writings, not remarkable either for originality or for style, but of the highest importance as fixing definitely the standard of Stoic orthodoxy. He gathered numerous hearers round him, and before his death it could truly be said that he had saved the Stoa[92]. [Sidenote: Dialectic of Chrysippus.] =104.= In his method of exposition Chrysippus made great use of the syllogism, thus reverting to the practice of Zeno as opposed to the more poetical style of Cleanthes. As to the value of this syllogistic reasoning very contrary opinions were expressed in antiquity. By his contemporaries he was greatly admired, so that it was said that ‘if the gods had needed a dialectic, they would have taken that of Chrysippus[93].’ On the other hand members of his own school complained that he often stated his opponents’ case more forcibly than his own[94]. The Romans mix their praise with censure, and find that he sometimes entangles himself in the threads of his own argument[95]; and we ourselves cannot fail to notice that when his major and minor premisses are compared, the meaning of the common term has usually shifted[96]. But if Chrysippus did not provide a final solution to great problems, he at least adapted the Stoic system to the taste of his age, alike by his use of syllogisms and by the attention he paid to the solution of fallacies[97]. [Sidenote: Opposition of the Academy.] =105.= Whilst the works of Chrysippus cover the whole range of the Stoic philosophy, their special colour is largely due to the interests of his own time. The stress laid by Zeno on the certainty of knowledge had produced a reaction in the Academic school. Arcesilaus, who had succeeded Polemo as its leader, leaving on one side the positive teaching of Plato’s later years, reverted to the sceptical attitude which had been one characteristic of Socrates, and which is so prominent in most of the Platonic dialogues[98]. He attacked with the utmost vigour Zeno’s doctrine of ‘comprehension’; and further argued that certain knowledge is unnecessary for practical life, of which probability, that is, such action as can find reasonable justification, is the sufficient guide[99]. Chrysippus defended with the utmost energy the dogma of the certainty of knowledge, based upon the perspicuity of true mind pictures[100]; but the teaching of Arcesilaus obtained a hold upon him, and (as we shall see) was ultimately allowed by him a place within the Stoic system. [Sidenote: Spread of Epicureanism.] =106.= Chrysippus meanwhile had a more dangerous enemy to meet than the Academy. During the weakness which befel the Stoic school in the middle of the third century B.C., the rival school of Epicurus had won an enormous popularity. Yet its ethical standard, which it had inherited from the Cyrenaics, offended not only the followers of Zeno but all sober-minded philosophers. For Epicurus had set up Pleasure as the queen of life, and had converted the virtues into her handmaidens[101]; and so far was he from taking interest in model states, that he advised his hearers to hold aloof altogether from public life. Worst of all, his followers only smiled at the reproofs that were showered upon them. They formed among themselves a cheerful, affectionate, and united society; their simple pleasures created no public scandal, though their entertainments were often enlivened by tales of the moral lapses of their self-righteous rivals. The bracing morality of Cynism seemed to be quite gone out of fashion, and even the Aristonians had ceased to exist. [Sidenote: Alliance of the three schools.] =107.= Under these circumstances the remaining schools began to look one to another for support, and were even brought into a kind of alliance. The adherents of the Academy and the Porch, in particular, began to meet in friendly discussion, and sometimes defined anew their doctrines so as to minimize points of difference, sometimes directly modified them by way of concession to opposed arguments. This process resulted in a toning down of Stoicism in every part of its system. The Stoic teachers began to disregard or push into the background those characteristic doctrines which had been embodied in the Socratic paradoxes and enforced by the Cynic propaganda. Thus their teaching gave less offence to the lax crowd, and at the same time (it must be admitted) less support to the striving few; but its tone was now so modest that men of gentle and judicious temperament were attracted to Stoicism for the first time. Stoicism began now to shew itself receptive of literary influences, especially as regards the works of Plato and Aristotle, and even appreciative of artistic ideals. Such was the tendency of the system during both the second and the first centuries B.C.; but it is more difficult to estimate the extent of the deviation. Terms like εὐκρασία ‘well proportioned mixture[102],’ εὔροια ‘even flow[103],’ εὐτονία ‘due tone[104],’ συμφωνία ‘harmony[105],’ are attributed even to the earliest masters: whilst it is abundantly clear that the Socratic and Cynic paradoxes formed at all times part of the generally accepted view of Stoic doctrine. [Sidenote: Chrysippus inclines to the Academy.] =108.= It is an interesting question, which perhaps needs further investigation, to what extent this approximation between the doctrines of the Academy and the Porch can be traced in the writings of Chrysippus. On the one hand we must remember that Chrysippus was a man of distinctly orthodox temperament; he firmly opposed the Cynizing heresies of Aristo, and strongly defended the Stoic theory of knowledge against the Academy. But our knowledge of the teaching of Chrysippus, abundant in volume, is lacking in precision. Our authorities, as we have seen, very imperfectly distinguish, and very inadequately record, the teaching of the two earlier masters; and the doctrines which are regarded as common to all Stoics must be assumed to be generally stated in the language of Chrysippus, whose works remained for centuries the recognised standard of orthodoxy. Even so there are few distinctive doctrines of Chrysippus which do not seem to be foreshadowed in expressions attributed to some earlier teacher. Yet we may fairly assume that in his ethical teaching there was a substantial sacrifice of the forcefulness of the Socratic character, and a corresponding approach to Academic views. This appears when he defines the supreme good as ‘a life according to nature, that is, both general nature and our individual human nature[106],’ and adds, ‘for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the all[107].’ This approaches the doctrine of ‘virtue appropriate to the individual’ (οἰκεία ἀρετή), as taught by the Academics[108]. A still more striking concession is his permission to men engaged in practical life to describe advantages as ‘good things,’ provided they are carefully distinguished from the supreme good[109]. [Sidenote: Successors of Chrysippus.] =109.= The weakening hold of the Stoics upon the principles of their founder first becomes evident in the department of physics. Thus it is an essential part of the theory which the Stoics borrowed from Heraclitus, that as the whole universe has proceeded from the all-creative fire, so it must in due course be re-absorbed in it, this periodical re-absorption being technically known as the ‘conflagration’ (ἐκπύρωσις). On the other hand the followers of Aristotle, following dualistic principles, placed God and the universe in eternal contrast, and held both to be immortal. Ingenious controversialists now pressed the Stoics to explain how their deity exercised his providence during the periodic intervals in which the universe had no separate existence. This and like arguments had an immediate effect. BOËTHUS of Sidon, a contemporary of Chrysippus, abandoned altogether the Stoic theory on this subject[110]; ZENO of Tarsus, who had been with his father DIOSCORIDES a pupil of Chrysippus, and who succeeded him as head of the school, discreetly ‘suspended his judgment’ upon the point[111]. But whatever its theoretical embarrassments, the Stoic school continued to prosper. Zeno of Tarsus wrote but few books, but had more disciples than any other[112]; he was succeeded by SELEUCUS of the Tigris[113], and he in turn by Diogenes[114], Antipater, and Panaetius. The last of these maintained Zeno’s ‘suspense of judgment[115]’ on the question of the conflagration; but after his death the Stoics quietly returned to the older opinion. [Sidenote: Diogenes and Antipater.] =110.= DIOGENES of Seleucia (circ. 238-150 B.C.; often called ‘of Babylon,’ or simply _Diogenes Stoicus_), and ANTIPATER of Tarsus (circ. 200-129 B.C.), were both men of eminence in the history of Stoicism[116], but they were unequally matched against Carneades (218-128 B.C.), who was head of the Academic school about the same time, and who proclaimed the doctrine of a universal suspension of judgment. The many volumes of Chrysippus gave Carneades ample opportunities for the exercise of his critical powers; and Antipater, unable or unwilling to meet him in open argument, fell himself into the evil habit of book-writing[117]. Both these teachers specially interested themselves in questions of casuistry. Diogenes, who defined the good as ‘reasonableness in the choice of natural ends[118],’ adopted practically that interpretation of ‘reasonableness’ in which divine reason has the least part, and human plausibility the freest play[119]. Thus he discusses the problems whether the seller of a house ought to inform the purchaser of its defects, and whether a man upon whom false coins have been passed may transfer them to his neighbour[120]. Exactly as Carneades[121], he finds ‘reasonable excuse’ for the less scrupulous course. Antipater on the other hand holds that a man’s duty to his neighbour requires perfect frankness[122]; yet he is said to have abandoned the Socratic doctrine of the self-sufficiency of virtue, and to have held that external goods are a part (though only a small part) of the supreme good[123]. [Sidenote: Lesser Stoics.] =111.= We may now shortly mention some less important Stoic teachers, chiefly of the early part of the second century B.C., since their number alone is an indication of the wide influence of the sect. ARISTOCREON, said to have been the nephew of Chrysippus, set up a statue in his honour, as the man who could cut his way through the knots tied by the Academics[124]. ZENODOTUS was a pupil of Diogenes, and wrote an epigram on Zeno: he at least defended the ‘manly doctrine’ of the founder, and recalled the principle of the sufficiency of virtue[125]. APOLLODORUS of Seleucia on the Tigris[126] (sometimes called Ephillus[127]), another pupil of Diogenes, leant towards Cynic views; for he declared that ‘the wise man will be a Cynic, for this is a short cut to virtue[128]’; an opinion afterwards adopted by the Stoics generally[129]. He also wrote on physics. A third pupil of Diogenes was APOLLODORUS of Athens[130]. Closely associated with Antipater is ARCHEDEMUS of Tarsus; like his fellow-townsman, he was greatly devoted to dialectics[131]; in ethics he appears to have inclined strongly to Academic views, holding that the end of life was the regular performance of daily duties[132]. Just about the time we have now reached (the middle of the second century B.C.) Eumenes II founded the great library at Pergamus, intended to rival that of Alexandria. As librarian he installed a Stoic philosopher, CRATES of Mallos, who devoted much of his time to grammatical inquiries, and endeavoured to bring Homer into accord with the Stoic views on geography[133]; he is the first Stoic of whom we hear at Rome, which he visited about 159 B.C. Being detained there by an accident, he employed his time in giving lectures on literature[134]; and his pupil Panaetius was destined to introduce Stoicism to Roman society. Lastly we may mention HERACLIDES of Tarsus, a pupil of Antipater, said to have broken away from the teaching of the school by denying that all sins are equal[135]. Athenodorus of Tarsus, who held the same view, belongs to a later generation[136]. Of uncertain date are BASILIDES, who pushed his monism so far as to declare that all things, even statements, are bodies[137]; EUDROMUS, who wrote on the elements of ethics[138]; and CRINIS, who interested himself in logic[139]. FOOTNOTES [1] See below, § 95. [2] μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τῶν μαθητῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ἠγαπᾶτο ὁ Περσαῖος Ind. Sto. Herc. col. xii 3 (Arnim i 437). [3] ‘Zenonis Stoici servus, qui Persaeus vocatus est’ A. Gellius _N. A._ ii 18, 8. ἦν γὰρ ὄντως οἰκέτης γεγονὼς τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ὡς Νικίας ὁ Νικαεὺς ἱστορεῖ ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἱστορίᾳ καὶ Σωτίων ὁ Ἀλεξανδρεὺς ἐν ταῖς Διαδοχαῖς Athen. iv 54 (Arnim i 452). On the other hand ‘nullum [servum fuisse] Zenoni ... satis constat’ Sen. _Dial._ xii 12, 4. [4] Arnim i 439, 440. [5] _ib._ 449. [6] Athen. iv 54 (Arnim i 452). [7] Diog. L. vii 162. [8] Athen. as above. [9] Paus. ii 8, 4; vii 8, 3 (Arnim i 442). [10] Plut. _Arat._ 23, 3. According to Plutarch he afterwards admitted that he had been wrongly taught as to the ‘good general.’ [11] ‘Persaeus eos dicit esse habitos deos, a quibus magna utilitas ad vitae cultum esset inventa, ipsasque res utiles et salutares deorum esse vocabulis nuncupatas’ Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 38. Persaeus derived the theory from Prodicus; Philod. _de piet._ 9 (Arnim i 448), and above, § 42. [12] Diog. L. vii 9. [13] ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα, τὸν οὐδέποτ’ ἄνδρες ἐῶμεν | ἄῤῥητον· μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί, | πᾶσαι δ’ ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα | καὶ λιμένες· πάντῃ δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες. | τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν· ὁ δ’ ἤπιος ἀνθρώποισιν | δεξιὰ σημαίνει, λαοὺς δ’ ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει | μιμνῄσκων βιότοιο: Aratus, _Phaen._ Pref. [14] Plut. _Cleo._ 11, 2. [15] Mahaffy, _Empire of the Ptolemies_, p. 222. [16] _ib._ p. 245. [17] Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 44. [18] ‘Sphaeri, hominis in primis bene definientis, ut putant Stoici’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ iv 24, 53. [19] See below, § 332. [20] ‘fortitudo est ... conservatio stabilis iudici in iis rebus, quae formidolosae videntur ... [haec definitio erat] Sphaeri’ Cic. as above. The principle was accepted by all Stoics, see below, § 323. [21] ‘omitto ... Erillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum bonum ponit; qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo dissenserit, et quam non multum a Platone’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 42, 129. See also _Fin._ iv 14, 36. [22] ‘sin ea [quae virtus leget quaeque reiciet] non neglegemus neque tamen ad finem summi boni referemus, non multum ab Erilli levitate aberrabimus; facit enim ille duo seiuncta ultima bonorum’ _Fin._ iv 15, 40. [23] ζῆν ἀεὶ πάντα ἀναφέροντα πρὸς τὸ μετ’ ἐπιστήμης ζῆν Diog. L. vii 165. [24] ὑποτελὶς δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον τοῦ ζῴου πάθος, ἀφ’ οὗ κατήρξατο συναισθάνεσθαι τὸ ζῷον τῆς συστασέως αὑτοῦ, οὔπω λογικὸν [ὂν] ἀλλ’ ἄλογον Stob. ii 7, 3 c. [25] διαφέρειν δὲ τέλος καὶ ὑποτελίδα· τῆς μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ σοφοὺς στοχάζεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ μόνον τὸν σοφόν Diog. L. vii 165. [26] The best discussion is by Hirzel, _Untersuchungen_, ii 46 sqq. He considers the teaching of Herillus to have inclined to Cynism rather than to Platonism, and to have been substantially identical with that of Aristo. [27] λάλον ἐπέκαλει Diog. L. vii 18. [28] Athen. vi 58 (Arnim i 342). [29] _ib._ vii 14 (Arnim i 341). [30] See above, § 89. [31] Diog. L. vii 163. [32] _ib._ vii 161. [33] ‘nihil istorum [physicorum] sciri putat posse’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 39, 123. [34] ‘qui neque formam dei intellegi posse censeat, neque in dis sensum esse dicat; dubitetque omnino deus animans necne sit’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 37. [35] ‘Aristo moralem quoque ... quam solam reliquerat, circumcidit’ Sen. _Ep._ 89, 13. ‘hanc partem [quae dat propria cuique personae praecepta] levem existimat, et quae non descendat in pectus usque’ _ib._ 94, 2: in this letter the whole subject is very fully discussed. [36] ἴσον γάρ ἐστι τὸ προηγμένον αὐτὴν λέγειν ἀδιάφορον τῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀξιοῦν, καὶ σχεδὸν ὀνόματι μόνον διαφέρον Sext. _math._ xi 64 (Arnim i 361). [37] ‘Aristonis ... sententia, non esse res ullas praeter virtutes et vitia, inter quas quicquam omnino interesset’ Cic. _Fin._ iv 17, 47. [38] ‘huic [sc. Aristoni] summum bonum est, in his rebus neutram in partem moveri, quae ἀδιαφορία ab ipso dicitur’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 42, 130. [39] Galen, _Hipp. et Plat._ vii 2 (Arnim i 374). Chrysippus is said to have complained that he made the various virtues σχέσεις or variations of a single virtue (Plut. _Sto. rep._ vii 3); nevertheless the same doctrine frequently reappears in Stoic writers. [40] ‘vives, inquit Aristo, magnifice atque praeclare, quod erit cunque visum, ages: nunquam angere, nunquam cupies, nunquam timebis’ Cic. _Fin._ iv 25, 69. [41] ‘Aristonis ... iampridem explosa sententia est’ _Off._ i 2, 6; cf. _Fin._ iv 17, 47. [42] N. Saal, p. 37 sqq. For fuller discussions of Aristo see Hirzel, _Untersuchungen_, ii p. 44, and Dyroff, _Ethik_, pp. 43 sqq., 356 sqq. [43] Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, ii p. 161. [44] Mahaffy, _Empire of the Ptolemies_, p. 207. [45] Athen. vii 14 (Arnim i 408). [46] ‘nobis Heracleotes ille Dionysius flagitiose descivisse videtur a Stoicis propter oculorum dolorem; quasi vero hoc didicisset a Zenone, non dolere, cum doleret! illud audierat nec tamen didicerat, malum illud non esse, quia turpe non esset’ Cic. _Fin._ v 31, 94; τέλος εἶπε τὴν ἡδονὴν διὰ περίστασιν ὀφθαλμίας Diog. L. vii 166. [47] ‘[quaerebat Antiochus], Dionysius ille Heracleotes utrum comprehendisset, ... honestum quod esset, id solum bonum esse, an ... honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 22, 71. [48] Diog. L. vii 167; Athen. x 50 (Arnim i 428). [49] Diog. L. vii 167. [50] Diog. L. vii 38. [51] He drew water by night that he might study philosophy by day, according to Diog. L. vii 168. ‘Cleanthes aquam traxit et rigando horto locavit manus’ Sen. _Ep._ 44, 3. [52] Diog. L. vii 37. [53] ‘Zenonem Cleanthes non expressisset, si tantummodo audisset: vitae enim eius interfuit, secreta perspexit, observavit illum, an ex formula sua viveret’ Sen. _Ep._ 6, 6. [54] ‘sensus nostros clariores carminis arta necessitas efficit’ Sen. _Ep._ 108, 10. [55] ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔμεινε δογμάτων Diog. L. vii 168. [56] Stob. i 1, 12 (Arnim i 537). [57] See above, § 90. [58] I follow the reading γενόμεσθα, θεοῦ. The words γένος ἐσμέν in the text are surely a reminiscence of Aratus, _Phaen._ 5 (so Pearson, p. 276), and θεοῦ μίμημα is confirmed by Musonius ap. Stob. _Flor._ 117, 8 (see below, § 419). Mr Pearson now suggests to me that the MS reading ἤχου may represent the correction of a pious scribe, Ι̅Ϲ̅ Χ̅Υ̅, i.e. Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ for θεοῦ. See below, § 244. [59] The translation follows Pearson’s ἐρρίγασιν. Arnim reads ἔργα τελεῖται. Even the meaning is quite uncertain here. [60] μεγάλῳ μικροῖς τε (Diels) seems the nearest reading to the MS, so that the word ‘great’ above refers to the sun only. [61] ἄγου δέ μ’, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ’ πεπρωμένη, | ὅποι ποθ’ ὑμῖν εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος. | ὡς ἕψομαι γ’ ἄοκνος· ἢν δέ γε μὴ θέλω | κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι Epict. _Manual_ 53; ‘duc, o parens celsique dominator poli, | quocunque placuit; nulla parendi mora est. | adsum impiger. fac nolle, comitabor gemens, | malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono. | ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt’ Sen. _Ep._ 107, 11. The translation given above is by G. H. Rendall (_M. Aurel._ Introd. p. lxvii). [62] Clem. _Strom._ v 3, 17 (Arnim i 559). [63] Clem. _Protrept._ vi 72 (Arnim i 557). [64] Stob. iii 6, 3 (Arnim i 573). [65] See below, § 317. [66] As, for instance, Zeller does when he writes ‘Cleanthes was adapted to uphold his master’s teaching, but he was incapable of expanding it more completely, or of establishing it on a wider basis’ _Stoics_, p. 41. [67] Hirzel, _Untersuchungen_, ii pp. 134 sqq.; Stein, _Psychologie der Stoa_, i 65-72, 162-171, ii 316-332. [68] Sen. _Ep._ 113, 23. [69] Diog. L. vii 174. [70] _ib._ 134. [71] ‘Cleanthes ipsum mundum ... deum dicit esse’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 37. [72] Arnim i 497, 511. [73] ‘ultimum et altissimum et omnia complexum ardorem, qui aether nominetur’ Cic. as in note 71. [74] Cic. _N. D._ ii 15, 41. [75] ‘sic res se habet, ut omnia, quae alantur et quae crescant, contineant in se vim caloris, sine qua neque ali possent neque crescere’ _ib._ 9, 23. [76] ‘haec (quae Zeno dixit λόγον esse) Cleanthes in spiritum congerit quem permeatorem universitatis affirmat’ Tert. _Apol._ 21 (Arnim i 533). [77] The substance of this doctrine is attributed to Zeno also: Ζήνων ... πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν Diog. L. vii 157. [78] See below, § 277. [79] Pearson, _Introd._ p. 45; below, § 362. [80] Arnim i 143. [81] There is a slight inconvenience, but also a real advantage, in using this term both in its philosophic sense for the governing part of the soul, and historically for the system of government founded by Augustus. There is a genuine analogy between the two, though it is not developed by the Latin writers. Seneca uses _principale_ only. [82] ἡγεμονικὸν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου Κλεάνθει μὲν ἤρεσε τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι Euseb. _pr. ev._ xv 15, 7 (Arnim i 499); and see below, § 201. [83] Κλεάνθης [τὸν θεὸν] τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχήν Aët. i 7, 17 (Arnim i 532); ‘totius naturae menti atque animo tribuit hoc nomen [dei]’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 37. [84] ‘Cleanthes ipsum mundum deum dicit esse’ _ib._ [85] Cic. _N. D._ ii 5, 13-15; and see below, ch. x. [86] See below, § 195. [87] εἰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, εἶπε, προσεῖχον, οὐκ ἂν ἐφιλοσόφησα Diog. L. vii 182. [88] ἐγὼ δὲ τἄλλα μακάριος πέφυκ’ ἀνὴρ | πλὴν εἰς Κλεάνθην· τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ εὐδαιμονῶ Diog. L. vii 179. [89] _ib._ 182. [90] _ib._ 179. [91] ‘num contentus est [Chrysippus] docere, rem ostendere, definire, explorare? non est contentus: verum auget in quantum potest, exaggerat, praemunit, iterat, differt, recurrit, interrogat, describit, dividit, personas fingit, orationem suam alii accommodat’ Fronto, _ep. ad Ant._ p. 146 (Arnim ii 27). [92] ὅθεν φασὶν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ λεχθῆναι, εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος, οὐκ ἂν ἦν στοά Diog. L. vii 183. [93] Diog. L. vii 180. [94] ‘de quo queri solent Stoici, dum studiose omnia conquisierit contra sensus et perspicuitatem ... ipsum sibi respondentem inferiorem fuisse; itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneaden’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 27, 87; cf. Plut. _Sto. rep._ x 3 and 4. [95] ‘ab Chrysippo nihil magnum nec magnificum desideravi, qui suo quodam more loquitur, ut omnia verborum momentis, non rerum ponderibus examinet’ Cic. _Rep._ iii 8, 12; ‘ad Chrysippi laqueos revertamur’ _de Fato_ 4, 7; ‘Chrysippus, penes quem subtile illud acumen est et in imam penetrans veritatem, qui rei agendae causa loquitur et verbis non ultra quam ad intellectum satis est utitur, totum librum his ineptiis replet’ Sen. _Ben._ i 3, 8; ‘magnum mehercule virum, sed tamen Graecum, cuius acumen nimis tenue retunditur et in se saepe replicatur’ _ib._ 4, 1. [96] ‘quod est bonum, omne laudabile est; quod autem laudabile est, omne est honestum; bonum igitur quod est, honestum est’ Cic. _Fin._ iii 8, 27. [97] See below, §§ 162, 163. [98] ‘Arcesilas primum ... ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit’ Cic. _de Orat._ iii 18, 67. See above, § 71. [99] ὁ προσέχων τῷ εὐλόγῳ κατορθώσει καὶ εὐδαιμονήσει Sext. _math._ vii 158. [100] ‘cum Chrysippus, Academicos refellens, permulto clariora et certiora esse dicat, quae vigilantibus videantur, quam quae somniantibus’ Cic. _Div._ ii 61, 126; see further, § 147. [101] See below, § 346. [102] See Pearson, _Cle._ fr. 42. [103] According to Stob. ii 7, 6 e this term was used by all the Stoic teachers. [104] Used by Chrysippus, see Arnim iii 473. [105] Diog. L. vii 88. [106] φύσιν δὲ Χρύσιππος μὲν ἐξακούει, ᾗ ἀκολούθως δεῖ ζῆν, τήν τε κοινὴν καὶ ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην _ib._ vii 89. [107] μέρη γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ἡμέτεραι φύσεις τῆς τοῦ ὅλου _ib._ 87. [108] See above, § 71. [109] δίδωσι τοῖς βουλομένοις τὰ προηγμένα καλεῖν ἀγαθά Plut. _Sto. rep._ 30, 4. [110] Philo, _inc. mund._ 15, p. 248 (Arnim iii Boëth. 7). [111] τὸν μὲν γὰρ τούτου [sc. Chrysippi] μαθητὴν καὶ διάδοχον τῆς σχολῆς Ζήνωνά φασιν ἐπισχεῖν περὶ τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως τῶν ὅλων Ar. Did. fr. 36 Diels (Arnim iii Z. T. 5). [112] Diog. L. vii 35. [113] Ind. Sto. Herc. col. 48 (Arnim iii Z. T. 2). [114] See Zeller, _Stoics_ etc., p. 50. [115] See below, § 115. [116] ‘aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et gravi Stoico, aliud Antipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo’ Cic. _Off._ iii 12, 51; ‘Antipater inter magnos [Stoicae] sectae auctores’ Sen. _Ep._ 92, 5. [117] Plut. _de garr._ 23. [118] τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ Diog. L. vii 88; for the Academic view see § 71 above. [119] See below, §§ 159, 332. [120] Cic. _Off._ iii 13, 54; 23, 91. [121] _Rep._ iii 20, 30. [122] ‘tu cum hominibus consulere debeas, ... celabis homines’ _Off._ iii 13, 52. [123] ‘Antipater ... aliquid se tribuere dicit externis, sed exiguum admodum’ Sen. _Ep._ 92, 5. [124] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 2, 5. [125] Diog. L. vii 30. [126] Arnim iii p. 259; see also Pauly-Wissowa _sub voce_. [127] So Diog. L. vii 39, where however others read Ἀπολλόδωρος καὶ Σύλλος. [128] Diog. L. vii 121. [129] _ib._ vi 104. [130] Ind. Stoic. Herc. col. 53: also a pupil of Antipater; to be distinguished from an Apollodorus of Athens who was an Epicurean; Diog. L. vii 181. [131] ‘duo vel principes dialecticorum, Antipater et Archedemus, opiniosissimi homines’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 47, 143. [132] πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελοῦντα ζῆν Diog. L. vii 88. [133] Sandys, _Classical Scholarship_, i pp. 155, 156. [134] _ib._ p. 157. [135] Diog. L. vii 121. [136] See below, §§ 122, 123. [137] Arnim iii p. 268. [138] Diog. L. vii 39. [139] _ib._ 76.