CHAPTER IX.

THE SUPREME PROBLEMS. [Sidenote: The ‘mauvais pas.’] =217.= In the preceding chapter we have discussed the universe from the scientific standpoint. ‘Such,’ say the Stoics, ‘we find that the universe is; such and such it was in the beginning, and such it will be to the end.’ Their conclusions are reached by observation, classification, and analysis; and yet not entirely by these, for we must admit that there is also employed that power of scientific imagination which the ancients call ‘divination.’ Still on the whole the investigation has been that of the student, and the method that of speculation or contemplation dissociated from any consideration of the usefulness of the results attained. In the study we now undertake all this is changed. Our philosophy proceeds to assert that the universe is good, that it is directed by wise purpose, and that it claims the reverence and obedience of mankind. It calls upon its adherents to view the world with moral approval, and to find in it an ethical standard. Such conclusions cannot be reached by purely discursive reason; but they are such as are everywhere sought by practical men. They appeal to a side of human nature different from that which passes judgment on the conclusions previously reached. From the first position ‘the universe is’ to the second ‘the universe is good’ the step is slippery. We are on the dizzy heights of philosophical speculation, where the most experienced climbers find their way they know not how, and can hardly hold out a hand to help those who are in distress. The Stoic teachers did not perhaps always follow the same track, and now and again they stumbled on the way. Reasoning often proved a weak support, but resolution carried them through somehow to the refuges on which their eyes were all along set. [Sidenote: Fate, providence, and fortune.] =218.= To the problem of the meaning and government of the universe three answers were current in the epoch with which we are dealing. Either all things take place by fate; or the world is ruled by a divine providence; or else fortune is supreme[1]. These three terms are not always mutually exclusive: Virgil speaks commonly of the ‘fates of the gods[2]’; and ‘fortune’ is frequently personified, not only in common speech, as when the Romans spoke of the ‘fortune of the city,’ but even by a philosopher like Lucretius, who speaks of ‘Fortune the pilot[3],’ with a half-humorous abandonment of exactitude. The Stoics have the merit of not only recognising fully these three powers, but also of using the terms with relative consistency. By fate then we mean an abstract necessity, an impersonal tendency, according to which events flow; by providence a personal will; by fortune the absence of both tendency and purpose, which results in a constant shifting to and fro, as when a man stands upon a ball, and is carried this way and that[4]. All explanations, both of general tendencies and of particular events, must ultimately resolve themselves into one or other of these three; every constructive system must necessarily aim at shewing that the three ultimately coincide, and that philosophy is the guardian and guide of mankind in the understanding of their relations one to another[5]. [Sidenote: Fate.] =219.= The Stoics hold that ‘all things happen by fate[6].’ To this conclusion they are brought by the same reasoning that moved the Chaldaeans. The visible universe is, and has motion. The heavenly bodies move incessantly in their orbits; there is no force either within or without them that can turn them aside a hair’s breadth, or make their pace quicker or slower. No prayers of men, no prerogatives of gods can make them change[7]. Without cause there is no effect; and each effect is in its turn a new cause. Thus is constructed an endless chain, in which all things living and inanimate are alike bound. If a man knew all the causes that exist, he could trace out all the consequences. What will be, will be; what will not be, cannot be. This first Stoic interpretation of the universe is that of Determinism; it reiterates and drives home the principle that is here our starting-point, ‘the universe is.’ ‘Chrysippus, Posidonius, and Zeno say that all things take place according to fate; and fate is the linked cause of things that are, or the system by which the universe is conducted[8].’ This ‘fate’ is only another name for ‘necessity[9]’; fates cannot be changed[10]. [Sidenote: The ‘fallacies’ of determinism.] =220.= The doctrine of fate appears to contradict directly the belief in human free will, and to lead up to the practical doctrine of laziness (ἀργὸς λόγος, _ignava ratio_). Once we allow it to be true that ‘what will be, will be,’ it becomes useless to make any effort. As at the present time, this argument was familiar in cases of sickness. One says to the sick person, ‘if it is your fate to recover, then you will recover whether you call in the physician or not; and if it is your fate not to recover, then you will not recover in either case. But it is your fate either to recover or not to recover; therefore it will be useless to call in the physician.’ To which another will reply: ‘you may as well argue that if it is your fate to beget a son, you will beget one equally whether you consort with your wife or not; therefore it will be useless to consort with your wife[11].’ With such verbal disputes Chrysippus delighted to deal; his reply to the ‘lazy argument’ was that certain things go together by fate (_iuncta fato, confatalia_)[12]. Thus in the above cases it may be determined by fate that you should both call in a physician and recover, both consort with your wife and beget a son. So once more when Nestor says to the watchmen by his ships: Keep watch, my lads: let sleep seize no man’s eyes, Lest foes, loud laughing, take us by surprize[13]. Some one then replies, ‘No, they will not, even if we sleep, if it is predestined that the dock be not seized.’ To such an objection any one can give the right answer: ‘all these things are equally predestined, and go together by fate. There is no such thing as a watch kept by sleepers, a victory won by runaways, or a harvest reaped except after sowing good clean soil[14].’ [Sidenote: Logic of possibility.] =221.= The doctrine of fate also seems to conflict with some of the commonest forms of speech. For if it is correct to say ‘Either this will happen, or it will not happen,’ it seems incorrect to say ‘it may happen’; and still more of the past, since we must admit of any event that ‘it has happened’ or ‘it has not happened,’ there seems no room for the statement ‘it might have happened.’ Chrysippus however maintains that the words ‘may’ and ‘might’ are correctly used, or (in other words) that we may assert that it is or was ‘possible’ for things to happen, whether or not they will happen or have happened. For example, the pearl here is breakable, and may be broken, though fate has ordained that it never will be broken. Cypselus might not have been tyrant of Corinth, though the oracle at Delphi declared a thousand years before the time that he would be[15]. This view had been sharply contested by Diodorus the Megarian; and the controversy was summed up in the ‘master argument.’ This is stated as follows: there are three propositions in conflict with one another in the sense that if any two of them are true, the third is false. They are these: (i) every past event is necessary; (ii) the impossible cannot follow on the possible; (iii) there are things possible that neither are nor will be true. Diodorus accepted the first two; he therefore drew the conclusion that there is nothing possible except that which is or will be true; or in other words he denied the existence of any category of ‘things possible’ distinct from that of facts past or future. Cleanthes and Antipater accepted the second and third propositions: Chrysippus accepted the first and third, but denied the second[16]; that is he admitted that the possible thing (e.g. the breaking of the pearl) might become the impossible because fate had decided to the contrary. The choice intimates much; it shows that the Stoics, however strongly they assert the rule of fate or necessity, intend so to interpret these terms as to reconcile them with the common use of words, that is, with the inherited belief in divine and human will, breaking through the chain of unending cause and effect[17]. [Sidenote: Definitions of fate.] =222.= The next step is professedly taken by way of definition of the word ‘fate’ (εἱμαρμένη, _fatum_). Exactly as the stuff of the universe, fire, has been explained to be no mere passive or destructive element, but one possessed of creative force and reason, so is fate declared to be no blind or helpless sequence of events, but an active and wise power which regulates the universe. Fate is in fact but another name for the Logos or World-reason. On this point all Stoic teachers are in the main agreed. ‘Fate,’ said Zeno, ‘is a power which stirs matter by the same laws and in the same way; it may equally well be called providence or nature[18].’ Chrysippus gives us several alternative definitions: ‘the essence of fate is a spiritual force, duly ordering the universe[19]’; it is ‘the Logos of the universe[20],’ or ‘the law of events providentially ordered in the universe[21]’; or, ‘the law by which things that have been have been, that are are, that will be will be[22].’ But an important difference appears between the views of Cleanthes and Chrysippus. They are agreed that all that happens by providence also happens by fate. But Cleanthes will not allow, as Chrysippus is prepared to do, that all things that happen by fate happen providentially[23]. With Cleanthes the conception of fate is wider than that of providence, just as in Virgil the fates are more powerful than Jove. Cleanthes, being deeply conscious of the evil existing in the universe, refused to hold providence responsible for it. Chrysippus on the other hand identifies fate with the deity[24]. [Sidenote: Providence.] =223.= Providence (πρόνοια, _providentia_) differs from fate, if at all, by including an element of personality. It is a principal dogma of the Stoics that ‘the universe is ruled by providence.’ Cicero indeed assures us that the word ‘providence’ is merely an abbreviation for ‘the providence of the gods,’ and that the dogma really asserts that ‘the universe is ruled by the gods with foresight’; and Balbus, the Stoic advocate, in his treatise, rebukes his opponent Cotta for having travestied the Stoic doctrine by speaking of providence as ‘a fortune-telling hag,’ as though she were some kind of goddess governing the world[25]. But the travesty is at least as instructive as the exposition. If ‘providence’ is on the one hand interpreted as God’s providence[26], it is on the other hand equivalent to Nature[27], and again to the Mind of the universe; it is the Logos, the universal Law, the creative force[28]; not merely an attribute, but a manifestation and bodily presentment of deity. After the final conflagration three joining in one will be left, Zeus, providence, and the creative fire[29]. Lastly, if we consider the process of logical demonstration, it is from the reality of providence that the Stoics deduce the existence of the gods; only from the standpoint of dogmatic instruction is the order reversed. [Sidenote: Beauty of the universe.] =224.= The work and functions of Providence are open to our view, for it has an aim and pathway of its own[30]. Its first aim is to create a universe capable of enduring; next, it makes that universe complete; thirdly, it endows it with every beauty and excellence[31]. The beauty of the world is a favourite theme upon which Stoic orators discourse at length; this is, in their view, the best world that could possibly have been created[32]. This sense of beauty appears to be derived from two sources, the admiration and awe felt in contemplating the sky, the sun moon and stars moving in it, lofty mountains, rushing rivers, and deep caves[33]; and the gentler delight stirred by the sight of the fertile field, the vine-clad hill, the river-pathway, the flocks and herds, which all subserve the convenience of man. Thus from beauty we pass to usefulness, and the Stoics now maintain that the world has been created and is maintained for the use of man[34]. In strict language, however, we must say that the universe is made for the use of rational beings, that is, for gods and men[35], that it is a home or city in which gods and men alike have a share[36]. From the protection of providence the animals, according to the Stoic view, are in principle entirely excluded. Yet it did not escape notice that nature has often provided for their comfort in particulars, giving them instincts that enable them to maintain life, and an outward shape conformable to the conditions of their existence[37]. And Seneca especially found that man was apt to swell himself too greatly, as if that world were made for him, of which only a small part is adapted for him to dwell in, and where day and night, summer and winter would continue of themselves, even if no man observed them[38]. On the other hand zealots like Chrysippus worked out the detailed application of this theory in a way that provoked the amusement of their critics[39]. [Sidenote: Particular providence.] =225.= Providence cares for mankind in general, and therefore for the parts of mankind, the various continents, nations, and cities. The Stoics are also inclined to hold that it cares for the individual[40]. The difficulty of this belief is great. Busy cities are overthrown by the earthquake; the crops of the careful farmer are blasted by the hailstorm; Socrates is condemned to death by the Athenians; Pythagoras, Zeno and Antiphon meet with violent ends. Yet we may not think that in any of these cases the sufferers were hated or neglected by the gods; it is rather an inevitable necessity that has worked their ruin. The gods who have great things in their charge, must sometimes overlook small matters; they must save the community by sacrificing the individual[41]. The storm may rage in the valley, yet there is peace on the mountain heights[42]. The philosopher who is absorbed in contemplating the great whole cannot even see the flaws in its details. ‘If the gods care for all men,’ says Cicero’s authority, ‘it follows logically that they care for each single man[43].’ ‘Nothing occurs on earth, nor in the heaven above, nor in the sea, apart from thee, O God,’ sings Cleanthes[44]. ‘It is impossible,’ says Chrysippus, ‘that even the least of particulars can fall out otherwise than in accordance with the will of God, with his Word, with law, with justice, and with providence[45].’ [Sidenote: Existence of evil.] =226.= The doctrine of providence, carried to a logical extreme, leads to the denial of the existence of evil. But the Stoics did not draw this conclusion; had they done so, their whole treatment of ethics would have become futile. We have therefore to scrutinize carefully the language that they employ. If we meet with the paradox that ‘this is the best of all possible worlds,’ we must remember that all paradoxes need for their interpretation some sense of humour, and that the ‘best possible’ is not the same as the ‘best imaginable.’ Somewhere or other there is, in a sense, a limitation to the sphere of providence. If again in poetical passages we learn that ‘nothing occurs without God,’ we must not forget the doctrine that good and evil are alike brought in the end into harmony with the divine nature. The most exact statement of Stoic doctrine would seem to be that evil exists indeed, but is not the equal of the good either in intensity or in duration; it is an incident, not a first principle of the universe[46]. From this point of view it becomes possible to ‘plead the cause of the gods,’ to defend providence from the heavy accusations men bring forward against it[47]. Thus the Stoics set about to prove that, in spite of the existence of evil, the universe is ruled by the foresight of a beneficent deity. [Sidenote: Logical solutions.] =227.= The first argument for the defence is logical, and is pressed by Chrysippus. Good implies its opposite, evil. ‘There could be no justice, unless there were also injustice; no courage, unless there were cowardice; no truth, unless there were falsehood[48].’ Just in the same way we find coarse wit in a comedy, which is objectionable in itself, and yet somehow contributes to the charm of the poem as a whole[49]. The second argument is based upon the doctrine of ‘necessary consequence’ (παρακολούθησις). The general design of the human head required that it should be compacted of small and delicate bones, accompanying which is the inevitable disadvantage that the head may easily be injured by blows[50]. War is an evil, but it turns to good by ridding the world of superfluous population[51]. In many other cases there may be explanations that are beyond our present knowledge, just as there are many kinds of animals of which we do not yet know the use[52]. [Sidenote: Moral solutions.] =228.= More important are those arguments which introduce moral considerations. In the first place the generous intentions of providence are often thwarted by the perverseness of wicked men[53], just as many a son uses his inheritance ill, and yet his father in bequeathing it to him did him a service[54]. The Deity treats good men as a Roman father his children, giving them a stern training, that they may grow in virtue[55]; those that he loves, he hardens[56]. Earthquakes and conflagrations may occur on earth, and perhaps similar catastrophes in the sky, because the world needs to be purified from the wickedness that abounds[57]. The punishment of the wicked, for instance by pestilence and famine, stands for an example to other men, that they may learn to avoid a like disaster[58]. Often, if the wicked have gone unpunished, the penalty descends on their children, their grandchildren, and their descendants[59]. [Sidenote: Divine power limited.] =229.= The very multiplicity of these explanations or excuses betrays the weakness of the case, and the Stoics are in the last resort driven to admit that the Deity is neither all-knowing nor all-powerful, and that the sphere of providence is limited by an all-encircling necessity. Thus Chrysippus explains blunders in divination by saying that ‘the Deity cannot know everything[60],’ and though he ascribes to the Deity all power, yet when hard pressed he admits that he cannot do everything, and that ‘there is a good deal of necessity in the matter[61].’ In this way he is forced back to the position which the shrewder Cleanthes had taken from the first[62]. After we have taken away from fate all that has life or meaning, there remains a residuum, which we can but vaguely assign to some ‘natural necessity[63].’ This point once granted, we realize that it includes many of the detailed explanations previously given. Thus it is by ‘natural necessity’ that good cannot exist without evil; that the past cannot be altered; that the one must suffer for the many[64]; that the good cannot always be separated from the bad[65]; that character grows by the defiance of pain; that the individual is everywhere exposed to disaster from tyranny, war, pestilence, famine, and earthquake. [Sidenote: God and men allied.] =230.= The recognition of the limitations of divine power creates a new tie between gods and men. Men are no longer the mere instruments of providence, they are its fellow-workers; we may even go further, and boldly call them its fellow-sufferers[66]. God has given man what he could, not what he would[67]; he could not change the stuff on which he had to work[68]; if anything has not been granted to us, it could not have been granted[69]. Under such circumstances a sensible man will not find fault with the gods, who have done their best[70]; nor will he make appeals to them to which they cannot respond[71]. Even less will he quarrel with a destiny that is both blind and deaf[72]. [Sidenote: Fortune.] =231.= In the Stoic explanation of the universe fortune plays no part; it has no existence in the absolute sense of the term[73]. But in practical life, and from the limited point of view of the individuals concerned, fortune is everywhere met with. Her actions are the same as we have just seen to be ascribed to ‘natural necessity’; storms, shipwrecks, plagues, wars, and tyranny[74]. Fortune therefore by no means excludes causality, but includes all events which are without meaning from the point of view of the individual[75]; all advantages or disadvantages which he has not personally merited, and which are not designed for his individual discipline. So great is the sphere of Fortune, that it appears at first that she is mistress of human life; and we may picture her as a tyrant, mocking and merciless, without principle and without policy[76]. The further consideration of Fortune belongs to the department of Ethics. [Sidenote: Has God or man free will?] =232.= The supreme problems of philosophy, in their relation to gods and men, the fellow-citizens of this universe, centre in the question of free will. If we grant that the divine power is to some extent less in range than the power of necessity, does it still remain open to us to attribute to it within that range some real choice between alternatives, something of that individual power which common opinion attributes to kings? or must we on the other hand regard the divinity as a mere symbol of an unchanging law, girt with the trappings of a royalty from which all real share in government has been withdrawn? Is man again a mere puppet under the control either of fate or of fortune, or has he too some share in creating the destiny to which he must submit? Supposing him to have this power of will, is it bound up with his privilege of reason, or do the animals also possess it? [Sidenote: The Stoics incline towards free will.] =233.= To such questions the Stoics do not give the direct answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ The critics who wish to tie them down to one or other of the opposing views complain that they wriggle and grow flushed and excited about their answer[77]. They accept apparently both views as dogmas, asserting that ‘all things take place by destiny’ and that ‘something rests with us[78].’ To the first dogma the whole of their treatment of physics points; but the second is required as a postulate for any science of ethics[78a]. The Stoics were in no way disposed to cut the knot by sacrificing one or the other of the principal parts of their philosophy. They go back upon the terms in which the questions are propounded, and endeavour by fresh investigation and more precise definition to do away with the obvious contradiction. In this work they were observed to have a bias in favour of free will[79]. The first sign of this bias we have already noticed in the vindication of the word ‘possible[80].’ If our eyes are fixed merely on the movement of the heavenly bodies, we shall hardly need a term which prints on future events a character which it denies to those that are past. The astronomer can describe to us with equal precision an eclipse taking place a thousand years before the battle of Salamis or a thousand years after. But the word ‘possible’ opens the door to the emotions of hope and fear, to the sense of right and wrong, with regard to the whole range of future events. However delicately the doctrine may be shaded, the main issue is determined when we say of gods and men that they ‘can[81].’ [Sidenote: Proximate and principal causes.] =234.= In order to reconcile the doctrines of causality and possibility, we must first distinguish between outer and inner compulsion, between ‘proximate’ and ‘principal’ causes. If a boy starts a cylinder rolling down hill, he gives it an opportunity without which it could not have rolled; this is the proximate cause (προκαταρκτική, _proxima_). But the cylinder would not continue rolling except by an inner compulsion, a law within itself, by which it is the nature of cylinders to roll downwards[82]. This is the leading or principal cause (προηγουμένη, _antecedens_ or _principalis_). So neither in thought nor in action can a man form a judgment, unless there be a picture (φαντασία, _visum_) presented to his mind. The picture is a proximate cause[83]. But assent to the picture rests with the man himself; the man himself, his reason, his will, is the principal cause. Here we touch on the dogma which is the foundation of ethics: ‘assent is in our power.’ Upon this rests the right of the philosopher to praise or blame, the right of the lawgiver to reward and punish. [Sidenote: The divine nature immutable.] =235.= We have to investigate further the inner compulsion, the principal cause. With regard to the gods their own disposition is a law to them, their character holds them to their purpose, their majesty makes their decrees immutable[84]. This is the final answer of philosophy, even though men cannot content themselves with it. Even amongst those most disposed to accept Stoic principles, there is a wish that the gods should be allowed a little _play_, a choice at any rate in small matters not hampered by considerations of destiny and morality[85]; and upon this issue the poet may deviate a little from the sterner creed of the philosopher[86]. Nor must we so interpret the wisdom and benevolence of the gods as to deny the efficacy of prayer[87]. [Sidenote: Man’s wickedness.] =236.= In the case of men free will comes accompanied by a heavy burden of responsibility; for by its exercise men have defied the gods and brought evil into the world. In vain they accuse the gods and destiny, when their own perverseness has exaggerated their destiny, as Homer bears witness: ‘Lo you now, how vainly mortal men do blame the gods! For of us they say comes evil, whereas they even of themselves, through the blindness of their own hearts, have sorrows beyond that which is ordained[88].’ ‘Through the blindness of their own hearts they perished, fools[89].’ Equally in vain it is that they protest against the penalties prescribed by the lawgiver for acts to which they allege fate has drawn them[90]. Of their wrongdoing the ‘principal cause’ lies in their own natures; if these are from the first wholesome, the blows of fate are deadened; if they are boorish and undisciplined, they rush of themselves into sin and error[91]. Into the further question, whether a man is responsible for his own nature, our authorities do not enter. It is sufficient that in ethics a way will be pointed out, by which all men, if only they consent to undergo the necessary training, may bring their wills into harmony with the will of the universe. As to the animals, they act upon impulse, but cannot be said in a strict sense to possess will, nor are they proper subjects for praise and blame. [Sidenote: No result without cause.] =237.= Thus free will, which at first sight appears equivalent to the negation of cause, is by the Stoics identified with the highest type of cause. Action without cause (τὸ ἀναίτιον), effect which is self-caused (τὸ αὐτόματον), are totally denied[92]. Even if a man be given the choice between two actions which appear exactly equivalent, as when he must begin walking either with the right or with the left foot, there is always a cause which determines between them, though (as in all cases of ‘chance’) it is not discernible by human reasoning[93]. In this way destiny, cause, will are all brought into harmony; the dualism (which after all cannot be entirely avoided) is thrust out of sight. ‘All things take place according to destiny, but not all things according to necessity[94]’; thus is saved the principle of free choice (τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν). In other words, the Stoic fixes his attention on the pulsating, living, willing powers of the universe, and refuses to dwell upon any blind non-moral unbending ‘necessity’ of things, even whilst he admits that such necessity is there. [Sidenote: Pons Stoicus.] =238.= Now that the various steps have been decided upon, by which our philosophy progresses from physics to ethics, it remains to connect them by a pathway in the form of a chain of reasoning. We cannot affirm that the steps have been reached by any logical process, or that the show of reasoning makes them any safer to tread in. But the logical form is a convenient method of impressing dogmatic instruction on the memory, and if it cannot remove difficulties inherent in the subject-matter, it at least so distributes them that they may be overlooked by the zealous and defied by the adventurous. Thus then the argument runs:— ‘If all things are determined by fate, then the ordering of the universe must be smooth and unhindered; if this is so, there must be an ordered universe; and if so, there must be gods. Now if there are gods, the gods are good; and if they are good, goodness exists; and if goodness exists, so also does wisdom. And goodness and wisdom are the same for gods and for men[95]. If this is so, there must be a science of things to be done and to be avoided, that is of right actions and of sins. But right actions are praiseworthy, and sins blameable. Things praiseworthy deserve reward, and things blameable deserve punishment. Therefore if all things are determined by fate, there must be rewards and punishments[96].’ All this chain of argument is convincing to the man who is already a Stoic; to his opponent it seems to display its weakness at every joint. FOOTNOTES [1] The three explanations are very clearly stated by Seneca; ‘dicet aliquis—quid mihi prodest philosophia, si fatum est? quid prodest, si deus rector est? quid prodest, si casus imperat?... quicquid est ex his, Lucili, _vel si omnia haec sunt_, philosophandum est; sive nos inexorabili lege fata constringunt, sive arbiter deus universi cuncta disponit, sive casus res humanas sine ordine impellit et iactat, philosophia nos tueri debet’ Sen. _Ep._ 16, 4 and 5. [2] e.g. _Aen._ vi 376. [3] ‘quod procul a nobis flectat Fortuna gubernans’ _R. N._ v 108. [4] ‘vaga volubilisque Fortuna’ Cic. _Milo_ 26, 69; ‘fortuna ... amica varietati constantiam respuit’ _N. D._ ii 16, 43. [5] Seneca as in note 1. [6] Diog. L. vii 149; ‘[Stoici] omnia fato fieri dicunt’ Cic. _de Fato_ 15, 33. [7] ‘et hoc secundum Stoicos, qui omnia dicunt fato regi et semel constituta nec a numinibus posse mutari’ Comment. in Lucan. ii 306 (Arnim ii 924). [8] So Diog. L. vii 149. Cicero and Seneca describe with admirable clearness the conception of fate: ‘fieri omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci εἱμαρμένην, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causa causae nexa rem ex se gignat’ Cic. _Div._ i 55, 125; ‘quid enim intellegis fatum? existimo necessitatem rerum omnium actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 36; cf. _Ep._ 19, 6 and _N. Q._ ii 35, 2. [9] Χρύσιππος μὴ διαφέρειν [εἶπε] τοῦ εἱμαρμένου τὸ κατηναγκασμένον Aët. _plac._ i 27, 2. [10] ‘Stoicorum dogma [Vergilius] ostendit, nulla ratione posse fata mutari’ Serv. _ad Verg. Aen._ i 257 (Arnim ii 923). [11] Orig. _cont. Cels._ ii 20 (Arnim ii 957). [12] Cic. _de Fato_ 12, 28 to 13, 30. [13] Hom. _Il._ xi 192 and 193. [14] Plut. fr. 15, 3 (Stob. ii 8, 25). [15] Cic. _de Fato_ 7, 13. [16] Epict. _Disc._ ii 19, 1 sqq. [17] Cicero gives a humorous comment on this contention: ‘περὶ δυνατῶν me scito κατὰ Διόδωρον κρίνειν; quapropter si venturus es, scito necesse esse te venire: sin autem non es, τῶν ἀδυνάτων est te venire. nunc vide, utra te κρίσις magis delectet, Χρυσιππείαne, an haec, quam noster Diodotus non concoquebat. sed de his etiam rebus, otiosi cum erimus, loquemur; hoc etiam κατὰ Χρύσιππον δυνατόν est’ _ad Fam._ ix 4. [18] Aët. _plac._ i 27, 5. [19] _ib._ i 28, 3. [20] εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος _ib._ [21] ἤ, λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων Aët. _plac._ i 28, 3. [22] ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γινόμενα γίνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται _ib._ [23] ‘ex quo fieri, ut quae secundum fatum sunt etiam ex providentia sint, eodemque modo quae secundum providentiam ex fato, ut putat Chrysippus. alii vero, quae quidem ex providentiae auctoritate, fataliter quoque provenire, nec tamen quae fataliter ex providentia, ut Cleanthes’ Chalc. _in Timaeum_ 144 (Arnim ii 933). [24] ‘Chrysippus ... deum dicit esse ... fatalem vim et necessitatem rerum futurarum’ Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 39. [25] ‘a te dictum est anum fatidicam πρόνοιαν a Stoicis induci, id est providentiam. quod eo errore dixisti, quod existimas ab his providentiam fingi quasi quandam deam singularem, quae mundum omnem gubernet et regat. plene autem et perfecte sic dici existimato, providentia deorum mundum administrari’ _ib._ ii 29, 73 and 74. [26] Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων ὑπέθεντο ... διὰ πάντων διήκειν τήν πρόνοιαν αὐτοῦ Hippolyt. _Philos._ 21, 1 (Arnim i 153). [27] ἥντινα [τὴν εἱμαρμένην] μὴ διαφέρειν πρόνοιαν καὶ φύσιν καλεῖν Aët. _plac._ i 27, 5. [28] ‘talis igitur mens mundi cum sit, ob eamque causam vel prudentia vel providentia appellari recte possit (Graece enim πρόνοια dicitur) ...’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 22, 58. The term ‘nature’ is used in the same sense by Epicurus also, though it does not harmonize very well with his theory; ‘natura gubernans’ _R. N._ v 78. [29] ὅταν οὖν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται, μόνον ἄφθαρτον ὄντα τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν, εἶτα ὁμοῦ γενομένους ἐπὶ μιᾶς τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος οὐσίας διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους Plut. _comm. not._ 36, 5. [30] ‘habet quasi viam quandam et sectam, quam sequatur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 22, 57. [31] _ib._ 22, 58. [32] ‘[mundi] quidem administratio nihil habet in se, quod reprehendi possit; ex iis enim naturis, quae erant, quod effici optimum potuit, effectum est’ _ib._ 34, 86. [33] _ib._ 39, 98. [34] ‘omnia hominum causa facta esse et parata’ _ib._ ii 61, 154. [35] ‘deorum et hominum causa factum esse mundum’ _ib._ 53, 133. [36] ‘est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum domus aut urbs utrorumque’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 62, 154; ‘intraturus es urbem dis hominibusque communem’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 18, 1. [37] Cic. _N. D._ ii 47, 122. [38] ‘neque enim omnia deus homini fecit. quota pars operis tanti nobis committitur?’ Sen. _N. Q._ vii 30, 3; ‘nimis nos suspicimus, si digni nobis videmur propter quos tanta moveantur’ _Dial._ iv 27, 2. [39] Thus ‘horses assist men in fighting, dogs in hunting: lions and leopards provide a discipline in courage: the sow is convenient for sacrifices to the gods, who have given her a soul to serve as salt, and keep the flesh from rotting. The peacock is created for his tail, and the peahen accompanies him for symmetry’s sake. The flea is useful to wake us out of sleep, and the mouse to prevent us from being careless in leaving the cheese about.’ All these particulars are attributed to Chrysippus (Arnim ii 1152, 1163). [40] ‘etiam singulis a dis immortalibus consuli et provideri solet’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 65, 164. [41] ‘nec vero si segetibus aut vinetis cuiuspiam tempestas nocuerit, ... eum, cui quid horum acciderit, aut invisum deo aut neglectum a deo [iudicabimus]. magna di curant, parva neglegunt’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 66, 167; ‘[universorum] maior dis cura quam singulorum est’ Sen. _Dial._ i 3, 1. See also note 64. [42] ‘lege deum minimas rerum discordia turbat, | pacem magna tenent’ Lucan _Phars._ ii 273. [43] ‘licet contrahere universitatem generis humani eamque gradatim ad pauciores, postremo deducere ad singulos’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 65, 164. [44] _Hymn_, vv. 15, 16. [45] Plut. _comm. not._ 34, 5; _Sto. rep._ 34, 10. [46] This appears to be the correct interpretation of the saying of Epictetus—‘as a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing the aim, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the world’ _Manual_ 27 (Long’s transl. ii p. 269, where see his note). [47] ‘faciam rem non difficilem, causam deorum agam’ Sen. _Dial._ i 1, 1. [48] Gell. _N. A._ vii 1, 4 and 5; ‘nulli vitium est, nisi cui virtus potest esse’ Sen. _Ep._ 124, 19. [49] Plut. _comm. not._ 14, 1; M. Ant. vi 42. [50] A. Gellius, _N. A._ vii 1, 9 to 11. [51] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 32, 2. [52] Lactantius _de ira_ 13 (Arnim ii 1172). [53] πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις Cleanthes _Hymn_ 18. [54] Cic. _N. D._ iii 28, 70. [55] ‘patrium deus habet adversus bonos viros animum et illos fortiter amat; operibus, inquit, doloribus, damnis exagitentur, ut verum colligant robur’ Sen. _Dial._ i 2, 6. [56] ‘deus quos probat, quos amat, indurat, recognoscit, exercet’ _ib._ 4, 7; ‘when a difficulty falls upon you, remember that God, like a trainer of wrestlers, has matched you with rough young men’ Epict. _Disc._ i 24, 1. [57] This view of Origen is conjecturally assigned to a Stoic source (Arnim ii 1174). See also Philo ap. Euseb. _praep. ev._ viii 13. [58] Plut. _Sto. rep._ 15, 2. [59] Cic. _N. D._ iii 38, 90; Sen. _Ben._ iv 32, 1. [60] Arnim ii 1183. [61] φησὶ δὲ πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης μεμῖχθαι Plut. _Sto. rep._ 37, 2. [62] See above, § 222. [63] Seneca uses the term ‘law of mortality’: ‘minime dis [irascamur]: non enim illorum, sed lege mortalitatis patimur quicquid incommodi accidit’ _Dial._ iv 28, 4. [64] ‘sciat illa ipsa, quibus laedi videtur, ad conservationem universi pertinere, et ex iis esse, quae cursum mundi officiumque consummant’ _Ep._ 74, 20. [65] ‘di multa ingratis tribuunt. sed illa bonis paraverunt: contingunt etiam malis, quia separari non possunt. excerpere singulos non potuerunt’ _Ben._ iv 28, 1. [66] ‘quicquid est quod nos sic vivere sic mori iussit, eadem necessitate et deos adligat’ _Dial._ i 5, 8. [67] ‘[God] has given me the things which are in the power of the will. How was he able to make the earthly body free from hindrance? [He could not], and accordingly he has subjected to the revolution of the whole possessions, household things, house, children, wife’ Epict. _Disc._ iv 1, 100. ‘What says Zeus? since I was not able to do for you what I have mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us’ _ib._ i 1, 10-12. [68] ‘non potest artifex mutare materiam’ Sen. _Dial._ i 5, 9; see also Plut. _comm. not._ 34, and Mayor on Cic. _N. D._ ii 34, 86. In technical language, the gods cannot control the ἐπακολουθήματα and συναπτόμενα. [69] ‘quicquid nobis negatum est, dari non potuit’ Sen. _Ben._ ii 29, 3. [70] ‘dementes itaque et ignari veritatis illis imputant saevitiam maris, immodicos imbres, pertinaciam hiemis’ _Dial._ iv 27, 2. [71] ‘frustra vota ac studia sunt; habebit quisque quantum illi dies primus adscripsit’ _ib._ vi 21, 6. [72] ‘accusare fata possumus, mutare non possumus: stant dura et inexorabilia’ _ib._ xi 4, 1. [73] See above, § 226, note 46. Fortune only has ultimate existence if identified with fate or providence; ‘sic nunc naturam voca, fatum, fortunam; omnia eiusdem dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate’ _Ben._ iv 8, 3. [74] ‘fortuna ceteros casus rariores habet, primum ab inanimis procellas, tempestates, naufragia, ruinas, incendia; deinde a bestiis ictus, morsus, impetus, etc.’ Cic. _Off._ ii 6, 19; ‘saepe ... optimorum virorum segetem grando percussit. fert sortem suam quisque’ Sen. _Ben._ ii 28, 3. [75] So Fortune is technically defined as ‘a cause not discerned by human reason’; οἱ Στωϊκοὶ [τὴν τύχην] αἰτίαν ἄδηλον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ Aët. _plac._ i 29, 7. [76] ‘in regnum Fortunae et quidem durum atque invictum pervenimus, illius arbitrio digna atque indigna passuri’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 10, 6; ‘hanc imaginem animo tuo propone, ludos facere fortunam’ _Ep._ 74, 7. [77] ‘Chrysippus aestuans laboransque quonam pacto explicet et fato omnia fieri et esse aliquid in nobis, intricatur hoc modo’ Gellius _N. A._ vii 2, 15. [78] ἐκεῖνο γὰρ δὴ τὸ καταγελαστότατον ἁπάντων, τὸ μίγμα καὶ ἡ σύνοδος τοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τι εἶναι, καὶ εἱρμὸν (seriem causarum) οὐδὲν ἧττον εἶναι Oenom. apud Euseb. _pr. ev._ vi p. 258 (Arnim ii 978); ‘manente fato aliquid est in hominis arbitrio’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 38, 3. [78a] ‘ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in nobis ipsis?’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 12, 39. [79] ‘mihi quidem videtur, cum duae sententiae fuissent veterum philosophorum, una eorum qui censerent omnia ita fato fieri ut id fatum vim necessitatis adferret ... altera eorum quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animorum motus voluntarii, Chrysippus tanquam arbiter honorarius medium ferire voluisse, sed adplicat se ad eos potius, qui necessitate motus animorum liberatos volunt’ Cic. _de Fato_ 17, 39. [80] See above, § 221. [81] It seems clear that so far as human thought goes ‘possibility’ is only an abstraction from that which ‘a man can do,’ reached by widening the subject ‘man’ so as to include both superhuman powers and half-personified unseen forces. In other words δυνατόν is derived from δύναται, _possibilitas_ from _potest_. Such a combination as _fortuna potest_, though quite common, is really a contradiction in terms. [82] ‘qui protrusit cylindrum, dedit ei principium motionis, volubilitatem autem non dedit’ Cic. _de Fato_ 19, 43. [83] ‘quamquam adsensio non possit fieri nisi commota viso, tamen id visum proximam causam [habet], non principalem’ _ib._ 18, 42. [84] ‘non externa cogunt deos, sed sua illis in legem aeterna voluntas est. statuerunt quae non mutarent, ... nec unquam primi consilii deos paenitet. vis sua illos in proposito tenet’ Sen. _Ben._ vi 23, 1 and 2; ‘[deus] scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. semper paret, semel iussit’ _Dial._ i 5, 8. So Lucan: ‘qua cuncta coercet se quoque lege tenens’ _Phars._ ii 9, 10. [85] ‘disco ... liceat illi [sc. deo] hodieque decernere et ex lege fatorum aliquid derogare, an maiestatis diminutio sit et confessio erroris mutanda fecisse?’ Sen. _N. Q._ i Prol. 3. [86] ‘illud te, nulla fati quod lege tenetur, | pro Latio obtestor’ Verg. _Aen._ xii 819, 820. [87] ‘nos quoque existimamus vota proficere, salva vi ac potestate fatorum’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 37, 2; ‘deos quorum notitiam nulla res effugit, rogamus; et illos vota non exorant, sed admonent’ _Ben._ v 25, 4. [88] Hom. _Od._ i 32-34 (Butcher and Lang’s translation). [89] _ib._ 7. [90] ‘propterea nocentium poenas legibus inique constitutas, si homines ad maleficia non sponte veniunt, sed fato trahuntur’ A. Gellius _N. A._ vii 2, 5. [91] ‘contra ea Chrysippus argute disserit: ingenia, inquit, ipsa proinde sunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietas eorum est ipsa et qualitas. nam si sunt per naturam primitus salubriter utiliterque ficta, omnem illam vim quae de fato extrinsecus ingruit, inoffensius tractabiliusque transmittunt. sin vero sunt aspera et inscita et rudia ... sua scaevitate et voluntario impetu in assidua delicta et in errores se ruunt’ A. Gellius _N. A._ vii 2, 6 to 8. [92] πρὸς τούτους ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀντιλέγων ... [εἶπε] τὸ ἀναίτιον ὅλως ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον Plut. _Sto. rep._ 23, 2 and 3. [93] τί γὰρ ἄλλο ποιοῦσιν οἱ τὴν τύχην καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον ὁριζόμενοι αἰτίαν ἄδηλον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ; Alex. Aph. _de fato_ 8 (Arnim ii 970). [94] _ib._ 10 (Arnim ii 960). [95] ὁ ἐκ τῆς ποικίλης χορός, οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ ἀλήθειαν ἀνδρὸς καὶ θεοῦ Them. _Or._ ii p. 27 c (Arnim iii 251). [96] Alex. Aphrod. _de fato_ 37 (Arnim ii 1005).