CHAPTER II.

HERACLITUS AND SOCRATES. [Sidenote: Greek thought.] =31.= We have seen already that the great problems of which Stoicism propounds one solution were agitated during the millennium which preceded the Christian era alike in India, Persia and Asia Minor on the one hand, and in Greece, Italy and the Celtic countries on the other. To the beginnings of this movement we are unable to assign a date; but the current of thought appears on the whole to have moved from East to West. But just at the same time the influence of Greek art and literature spreads from West to East; and it is to the crossing and interweaving of these two movements that we owe almost all the light thrown on this part of the history of human thought. The early history of Stoicism has reached us entirely through the Greek language, and is bound up with the history of Greek literature and philosophy[1]. But long before Stoicism came into existence other movements similar in kind had reached Greece; and the whole of early Greek literature, and especially its poetry, is rich in contributions to the discussion of the physical and ethical problems to which Stoicism addressed itself. From the storehouse of this earlier literature the Stoics drew many of their arguments and illustrations; the speculations of Heraclitus and the life of Socrates were especially rich in suggestions to them. The study of Greek literature and philosophy as a whole is therefore indispensable for a full appreciation of Stoicism; and the way has been made easier of late by excellent treatises, happily available in the English language, dealing with the general development of philosophic and religious thought in Greece[2]. Here it is only possible to refer quite shortly to those writers and teachers to whom Stoicism is most directly indebted. [Sidenote: Homer.] =32.= Although the HOMERIC POEMS include representations of gods and men corresponding to the epoch of national gods and to other still earlier stages of human thought, nevertheless they are pervaded by at least the dawning light of the period of the world-religions. Tales of the gods that are bloodthirsty or coarse are kept in the background; and though heroes like Agamemnon, Achilles, and Ajax move in an atmosphere of greed, bloodshed, and revenge, yet all of them are restrained both in word and in act by a strong feeling of self-respect, the αἰδώς or shamefastness which entirely differentiates them from the heroes of folk-lore; in particular, the typical vices of gluttony, drunkenness, and sexual unrestraint are amongst the things of which it is a shame to speak without reserve. The gods are many, and in human shape; yet they are somewhat fairer than men, and something of the heavenly brilliance in which the Persian archangels are wrapped seems to encircle also the heights where the gods dwell on mount Olympus[3]. Gradually too there comes to light amidst the picture of the many gods something resembling a supreme power, sometimes impersonally conceived as Fate (αἶσα, μοῖρα), sometimes more personally as the Fate of Zeus, most commonly of all as Zeus himself, elevated in rank above all other gods[4]. Thus Zeus is not only king, but also father of gods and men[5]; he is the dispenser of happiness to men, ‘to the good and the evil, to each one as he will[6],’ and the distributor of gracious gifts[7], unbounded in power[8] and in knowledge[9]. The gods again, in spite of the many tales of violence attached to their names, exercise a moral governance over the world. ‘They love not froward deeds, but they reverence justice and the righteous acts of men[10]’; ‘in the likeness of strangers from far countries, they put on all manner of shapes, and wander through the cities, beholding the violence and the righteousness of men[11].’ Whilst therefore the philosophers of later times could rightly object to Homer that he told of the gods tales neither true nor worthy of their nature, there was on the other hand much in the _Iliad_ and _Odyssey_, and particularly in the latter, which was in harmony with philosophical conceptions. It was not without reason that the Stoics themselves made of Ulysses, who in Homer plays but little part in fighting, an example of the man of wisdom and patience, who knows men and cities, and who through self-restraint and singleness of purpose at last wins his way to the goal[12]. From this starting-point the whole of the _Odyssey_ is converted into a ‘Pilgrim’s Progress’; the enchantress Circe represents the temptations of gluttony, which turns men into swine[13]; the chant of the Sirens is an allegory of the enticements of sensual pleasure. [Sidenote: Hesiod.] =33.= In HESIOD (8th century B.C.) we find the first attempt to construct a history of the universe; his _Theogony_ is the forerunner of the Cosmology which later on is a recognised part of philosophy. Here in the company of the personal gods we find not only the personified lights of heaven, Sun and Moon, but also such figures as those of Earth and Ocean, Night and Day, Heaven and Hell, Fate, Sleep, and Death, all bearing witness to the emergence of the spirit of speculation. In Hesiod again we first find the description of the ‘watchmen of Jove,’ who are no longer the gods themselves as in Homer, but an intermediate class of beings, corresponding to the Persian angels and the δαίμονες of later Greek. ‘Thrice ten thousand are the servants of Zeus, immortal, watchmen over mortal men; these watch deeds of justice and of wickedness, walking all ways up and down the earth, clothed in the mist[14].’ But it is in his ethical standards that Hesiod is more directly a forerunner of the Stoic school: for neither the warlike valour nor the graceful self-control of the hero appeals to him, but the stern sense of justice and the downright hard work of the plain man. ‘Full across the way of Virtue the immortal gods have set the sweat of the brow; long and steep is the path that reaches to her, and rough at the beginning; but when you reach the highest point, hard though it is, in the end it becomes easy[15].’ [Sidenote: The Orphic poems.] =34.= Between Epic and Attic literature stands the poetry of the ‘Orphic’ movement, belonging to the sixth century B.C., and exercising a wide influence over various schools of philosophy in the succeeding centuries. For an account of this movement the reader must look elsewhere[16]; here we can only notice that it continued the cosmological speculations of Hesiod’s _Theogony_, and in particular developed a strain of pantheism which is echoed in the Stoic poets. According to an Orphic poet ‘Zeus is the first and the last, the head and the foot, the male and the female, Earth and Heaven, Night and Day; he is the one force, the one great deity, the creator, the alluring power of love; for all these things are immanent in the person of Zeus[17].’ Here amidst the fusion of poetry and theology we first see the budding principle of philosophic monism, the reaching after a unity which will comprehend all things. To the same school is attributed the doctrine that ‘the human soul is originally and essentially divine[18].’ [Sidenote: The Hylozoists.] =35.= To the sixth century B.C. belong also the earliest Greek philosophers who are known to us by name. In all of these the early polytheism is either abandoned or becomes so dim in its outlines that the origin and governing force of the universe is sought in quite other directions. The philosophers of Ionia busied themselves with the problem of the elements. THALES of Miletus was a man of many attainments; he had travelled both in Egypt and in Babylon, and was an active political reformer. To him water was the primary substance, from which all others proceeded and to which they returned[19]. ANAXIMANDER of the same town was the first who undertook to give the Greeks a map of the whole known world. To him it seemed that the primary matter could not be the same as any visible substance, but must be a protoplasm of undefined character (ἄπειρον), capable of assuming in turn all shapes[20]. ANAXIMENES (once more of Miletus) assumed air as the first principle, and derived the other elements from it by processes of condensation (πύκνωσις) and rarefaction[21]. But on one point all the Ionian philosophers were agreed: the primary substance was the cause of its own motion; they were ‘hylozoists,’ since they hold that matter (ὕλη) is a living thing (ζῷον). They are from the standpoint of physics ‘monists,’ as opposed to those who hold matter and life, or matter and force, to be two things eternally distinct, and are therefore ‘dualists’ in their theory[22]. [Sidenote: Pythagoras.] =36.= To the same sixth century belong two other notable philosophers. PYTHAGORAS, born in Samos about 575 B.C., and like Thales, one who had travelled widely, left his native land rather than submit to the rule of a tyrant, and founded in Croton in Lower Italy a community half religious and half political, which in its original form was not long-lived. But a widespread tradition remained as to his doctrines, in which the theory of Numbers held a leading position. Pythagoras appears to have been a good mathematician and astronomer, and followers of his school were at an early date led to the doctrines of the rotation of the earth on its axis and the central position of the sun in the planetary system[23]. His name is also connected with the theory of the transmigration of souls, which we may suppose him to have derived ultimately from some Indian source; and to the same country we must look as having suggested to him and his followers the practice of abstaining from animal food[24]. [Sidenote: Xenophanes.] =37.= If we looked merely to the theories of the philosophers, it might seem as if the old mythologies and theogonies were already dead. But in fact the battle was yet to come. XENOPHANES of Colophon (born circ. 580 B.C.) witnessed in his youth the fall of Ionia before the conquering progress of Cyrus king of Persia. Rather than submit to the power of the invader he adopted the life of a wandering minstrel, and finally settled in Elea, in Lower Italy, where he became the founder of the Eleatic school. But in his religious convictions he was whole-heartedly on the Persian side. ‘There is one God, greatest amongst gods[25] and men, not like mortal men in bodily shape or in mind[26].’ Thus the worship of many gods and that of images of the deity are alike condemned; and it is probable that in this false worship he found the cause of his country’s fall. With the lack of historic sense which is characteristic of the zealous reformer, he condemned Homer and Hesiod as teachers of immorality, since they ‘ascribed to the gods theft, adultery, and deceit, and all acts that are counted shame and blame amongst men[27].’ With keen criticism he pointed out that myths as to the birth of the gods dishonoured them just as much as if they related their deaths; for on either supposition there is a time when the gods do not exist[28]. The conception of the deity formed by Xenophanes seems to approach Pantheism or Nature-worship, and so far to foreshadow the Stoic deity; but the fragments that survive of his works are insufficient to make this point clear[29]. The successors of Xenophanes did not inherit his religious zeal, but they emphasized all the more the philosophic principle of an ultimate Unity in all things. [Sidenote: Heraclitus.] =38.= With the opening of the fifth century B.C. we reach HERACLITUS of Ephesus, a philosopher of the highest importance to us, since the Stoics afterwards accepted his teaching as the foundation of their own system of physics. The varied speculations of the sixth century were all examined by Heraclitus, and all found wanting by him; his own solutions of the problems of the world are set forth in a prophetic strain, impressive by its dignity, obscure in its form, and lending itself to much variety of interpretation. For the opinions of the crowd, who are misled by their senses, he had no respect[30]; but even learning does not ensure intelligence[31], unless men are willing to be guided by the ‘Word,’ the universal reason[32]. The senses shew us in the universe a perpetual flowing: fire changes to water (sky to cloud), water to earth (in rainfall), which is the downward path; earth changes to water (rising mist), and water to fire, which is the upward path[33]. Behind these changes the Word points to that which is one and unchanging[34]. Anaximander did well when he pointed to the unlimited as the primary stuff, but it is better to describe it as an ‘ever-living fire[35].’ Out of this fire all things come, and into it they shall all be resolved[36]. Of this ever-living fire a spark is buried in each man’s body; whilst the body lives, this spark, the soul, may be said to be dead[37]; but when the body dies it escapes from its prison, and enters again on its proper life. The ‘Word’ is from everlasting[38]; through the Word all things happen[39]; it is the universal Law which holds good equally in the physical world and in the soul of man. For man’s soul there is a moral law, which can be reached only by studying the plan of the world in which we live[40]. But of this law men are continually forgetful; they live as in a dream, unconscious of it; it calls to them once and again, but they do not hear it[41]. Most of all it is needed in the government of the state; for ‘he who speaks with understanding must take his foothold on what is common to all; for all human laws are nourished by the one divine law[42].’ [Sidenote: The Word.] =39.= The general import of the physical teaching of Heraclitus, and the indebtedness of the Stoics to it, have long been recognised: the bearing of this teaching upon religion, ethics and politics is a more disputable matter. Does Heraclitus by the ‘Logos’ which he so often names mean merely his own reasoning and message? is he speaking of the common reason of mankind? or does the term suggest to him a metaphysical abstraction, a divine power through which the world is created and governed? For the fuller meaning we have analogies in the beliefs of Persism before Heraclitus, and of Stoics, Judaists, and Christians afterwards. The latest commentator, adopting this explanation, sums it up in three propositions: first, the ‘Logos’ is eternal, being both pre-existent and everlasting, like the world-god of Xenophanes; secondly, all things both in the material and in the spiritual world happen through the ‘Logos’; it is a cosmic principle, ‘common’ or ‘universal’; and in the third place, it is the duty of man to obey this ‘Logos,’ and so to place himself in harmony with the rest of nature. And accordingly, in agreement with many recent writers, he adopts the translation ‘the Word’ as on the whole the most adequate[43]. Even the Romans found it impossible to translate λόγος by any single word, and they therefore adopted the phrase _ratio et oratio_ (reason and speech); in modern language it seems clearly to include also the broad notion of ‘Universal Law’ or the ‘Laws of Nature.’ If we can rightly attribute to Heraclitus all that is thus included in the interpretation of this one word, he certainly stands out as a great creative power in Greek philosophy, harmonizing by bold generalizations such diverse provinces as those of physics, religion, and ethics; ‘he was the first [in Greece, we must understand] to build bridges, which have never since been destroyed, between the natural and the spiritual life[44].’ It is to the Stoics almost alone that we owe it that teaching so suggestive and so practical was converted into a powerful social and intellectual force. [Sidenote: Zarathustra and Heraclitus.] =40.= The prominence given to fire in the system of Heraclitus has very naturally suggested that his doctrine is borrowed from that of Zarathustra[45]. The historical circumstances are not unfavourable to this suggestion. Ionia was conquered in turn by Cyrus and Darius, and definitely annexed by Persia about 496 B.C., that is, at the very time at which Heraclitus taught. Moreover the Persian invasion was akin to a religious crusade, and had for a principal aim the stamping out of the idle and superstitious habit of worshipping images, by which (according to the Persians) the true God was dishonoured. The elevated character of the Persian religion could hardly fail to attract learned Greeks, already dissatisfied with the crude mythology of their own people. Further, the resemblance between the teaching of Zarathustra and that of Heraclitus is not restricted to the language used of the divine fire; the doctrines of an all-creating, all-pervading Wisdom, the λόγος or Word, and of the distinction between the immortal soul and the corruptible body, are common to both. But the differences between the two systems are almost equally striking. Heraclitus is a monist; according to him all existences are ultimately one. Zarathustra taught a principle of Evil, everywhere opposed to the Good Spirit, and almost equally powerful; his system is dualist[45a]. Zarathustra is not free from nationalism, Heraclitus is cosmopolitan. In the Ephesian system we find no trace of the belief in Judgment after death, in Heaven, or in Hell. We may in fact well believe that Heraclitus was acquainted with Zoroastrianism and influenced by it, but we have not the means to determine what the extent of that influence was. It is related of him that he received (but declined) an invitation to the court of Darius; and that his dead body was given up to be torn to pieces by dogs in the Persian fashion[45b]. [Sidenote: The tragedians.] =41.= The development of philosophic thought at Athens was, as we have noticed, much complicated by the political relations of Greece to Persia. Although the Persian empire had absorbed Asia Minor, it was decisively repulsed in its attacks on Greece proper. Athens was the centre of the resistance to it, and the chief glory of the victories of Marathon (490 B.C.) and Salamis (480 B.C.) fell to Athenian statesmen and warriors. By these successes the Hellenes not only maintained their political independence, but saved the images of their gods from imminent destruction. A revival of polytheistic zeal took place, as might have been expected. The wealth and skill of Greece were ungrudgingly expended in the achievement of masterpieces of the sculptor’s art, and their housing in magnificent temples. But even so religious doctrines strikingly similar to those of the Persians gained ground. The same Aeschylus who (in his _Persae_) celebrates the defeat of the national enemy, a few years later (in his _Agamemnon_) questions whether the Supreme Ruler be really pleased with the Greek title of Zeus, and the Greek method of worshipping him[46]. His more conservative successor Sophocles was contented, in the spirit of the Homeric bards, to eliminate from the old myths all that seemed unworthy of the divine nature. Euripides adopts a bolder tone. Reproducing the old mythology with exact fidelity, he ‘assails the resulting picture of the gods with scathing censure and flat contradiction[47].’ With equal vigour he attacks the privileges of noble birth, and defends the rights of the slave; he has a keen sympathy for all the misfortunes that dog man’s life; but his ethical teaching in no way derives its sanction from any theology. The Hellenes have lost confidence in their inherited outlook on the world. [Sidenote: The Sophists.] =42.= The same problems which the poets discussed in the city theatre were during the fifth century B.C. the themes of a class of men now becoming so numerous as to form the nucleus of a new profession. These were the ‘sophists,’ who combined the functions now performed partly by the university professor, partly by the public journalist[48]. Dependent for their livelihood upon the fees of such pupils as they could attract, and therefore sensitive enough to the applause of the moment, they were distinguished from the philosophers by a closer touch with the public opinion of the day, and a keener desire for immediate results. Their contribution to philosophic progress was considerable. Cultivating with particular care the art of words, they created a medium by which philosophic thought could reach the crowd of men of average education; eager advocates of virtue and political progress, they gave new hopes to a people which, in spite of its material successes, was beginning to despair because of the decay of its old moral and civic principles. In PRODICUS of Ceos we find a forerunner of the popular Stoic teachers of the period of the principate[49]: ‘A profound emotion shook the ranks of his audience when they heard his deep voice, that came with so strange a sound from the frail body that contained it. Now he would describe the hardships of human existence; now he would recount all the ages of man, beginning with the new-born child, who greets his new home with wailing, and tracing his course to the second childhood and the gray hairs of old age. Again he would rail at death as a stony-hearted creditor, wringing his pledges one by one from his tardy debtor, first his hearing, then his sight, next the free movement of his limbs. At another time, anticipating Epicurus, he sought to arm his disciples against the horrors of death by explaining that death concerned neither the living nor the dead. As long as we live, death does not exist; as soon as we die, we ourselves exist no longer[50].’ To Prodicus we owe the well-known tale of Hercules at the parting of the ways, when Virtue on the one hand, and Pleasure on the other, each invite him to join company with her[51]. This tale we shall find to be a favourite with the Roman philosophers. The same Prodicus introduced a doctrine afterwards taken up by the Cynics and the Stoics in succession, that of the ‘indifference’ of external advantages as distinct from the use to which they are applied. He also propounded theories as to the origin of the gods of mythology, explaining some of them as personifications of the powers of nature, others as deified benefactors of the human race[52]; theories which later on were adopted with zeal by the Stoic Persaeus[53]. To another sophist, HIPPIAS of Elis, we owe the doctrine of the ‘self-sufficiency’ of virtue, again adopted both by Cynics and Stoics[54]. ANTIPHON was not only the writer of an ‘Art of Consolation,’ but also of a treatise of extraordinary eloquence on political concord and the importance of education. ‘If a noble disposition be planted in a young mind, it will engender a flower that will endure to the end, and that no rain will destroy, nor will it be withered by drought[55].’ [Sidenote: The Materialists.] =43.= Amongst the sophists of Athens was counted ANAXAGORAS, born at Clazomenae about 500 B.C., and a diligent student of the Ionic philosophers. But in his explanation of nature he broke away from ‘hylozoism’ and introduced a dualism of mind and matter. ‘From eternity all things were together, but Mind stirred and ordered them[56].’ More famous was his contemporary EMPEDOCLES of Agrigentum, whose name is still held in honour by the citizens of that town. In him we first find the list of elements reaching to four, earth, air, fire, and water; and the doctrine that visible objects consist of combinations of the elements in varying proportions, first brought together by Love, then separated by Hatred. Just in so far as Empedocles abandoned the quest after a single origin for all things, his conceptions became fruitful as the basis of the more limited study now known as Chemistry. His work was carried further by LEUCIPPUS and DEMOCRITUS, both of Abdera, who for the four elements substituted invisible atoms, of countless variety, moving by reason of their own weight in an empty space. This simple and powerful analysis is capable of dealing effectively with many natural phenomena, and with comparatively slight alterations is still held to be valid in chemical analysis, and exercises a wide influence over the neighbouring sciences of physics and botany. When however (as has frequently been the case both in ancient and modern times) the attempt is made to build upon it a general philosophical system, its failure to explain the cohesion of matter in masses, the growth of plants and animals, and the phenomena of mind, become painfully apparent. Such attempts roughly correspond to the attitude of mind now called _materialism_, because in them the atoms, endowed with the material properties of solidity, shape, and weight alone, are conceived to be the only true existences, all others being secondary and derivative. This materialism (with some significant qualifications) was a century later the central doctrine of Epicurus, and is of importance to us by reason of its sharp contrast with the Stoic system of physics. [Sidenote: Socrates.] =44.= The value of these scientific speculations was not for the time being fully recognised at Athens. It was in the atmosphere of sophistic discussion, not free from intellectual mists, but bracing to the exercise of civic and even of martial virtue that SOCRATES of Athens (circ. 469-399 B.C.) grew to maturity. He set to his fellow-citizens an example of the vigorous performance of duty. As a soldier he was brave almost to rashness, and took an active part in three campaigns. As a magistrate he discharged his duty unflinchingly. After the battle of Arginusae the ten Athenian generals were said to have neglected the duty of succouring certain disabled ships and the people loudly demanded that all should be condemned to death by a single vote. Socrates was one of the presiding senators, and he absolutely refused to concur in any such illegal procedure[56a]. Again, when Athens was under the rule of the Thirty, Socrates firmly refused to obey their unjust orders[57]. But when himself condemned to death, he refused to seize an opportunity for flight which was given him; for this, he said, would be to disobey the laws of his country[58]. His private life was marked by a firm self-control. Athens was now wealthy, and its leading citizens frequently gathered together for festive purposes. Socrates joined them, but showed the greatest moderation in eating and drinking: such a course, he said, was the better for health and also produced more real pleasure. Over the grosser temptations of the senses he had won a complete victory[59]. His temper was calm and even; he was not put out by the violences of his wife, nor did he allow himself to break out into rage with his slaves. His personal habits, though simple, were careful: he did not approve any neglect either of bodily cleanliness or of neatness in dress. Thus Socrates gave an example of a life of activity and self-control (ἰσχὺς καὶ κράτος); and by his character, even more than by his speculation, exercised an influence which extended widely over many centuries. [Sidenote: His teaching.] =45.= The teaching of Socrates is not easily reduced to the set formulae of a philosophic school. But clearly it was focussed upon the life of men in the city and in the home, and was no longer chiefly concerned with the phenomena of the sky or the history of the creation of the universe. So Cicero well says of him that ‘Socrates called philosophy down from the heavens to earth, and introduced it into the houses and cities of men, compelling men to enquire concerning life and morals and things good and evil[60]’; and Seneca that he ‘recalled the whole of philosophy to moral questions, and said that the supreme wisdom was to distinguish between good and evil[61].’ He had no higher object than to send out young men, of whose good disposition he was assured, to take an active part in the affairs of the community, and to this course he urged them individually and insistently[62]. But it must not be supposed that he put on one side problems concerned with the acquirement of truth, or with the constitution and government of the universe. His views on these points carried perhaps all the more weight because they were stated by him not as personal opinions, but as points upon which he desired to share the convictions of his neighbours, if only they could assure him that reason was on their side. [Sidenote: Reason the guide.] =46.= Socrates more than any other man possessed the art of persuasive reasoning, thereby making his companions wiser and better men. First he asked that terms should be carefully defined, so that each man should know what the nature is of each thing that exists[63], and should examine himself and know well of what he speaks. Next he introduced the practice of induction (ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι), by which men make larger the outlook of their minds, understand one thing by comparison with another, and arrange the matter of their thought by classes[64]. By induction we arrive at general truths: not however by any mechanical or mathematical process, but (at least in the higher matters) by the use of Divination, that is, by a kind of divine enlightenment[65]. He who has accustomed himself to think with deliberation, to look on the little in its relation to the great, and to attune himself to the divine will, goes out into the world strengthened in self-restraint, in argumentative power, and in active goodwill to his fellow-men. Most directly this method appeals to the future statesman. Of those who seek the society of Socrates many intend to become generals or magistrates. Let them consider well what these words mean. Is not a pilot one who knows how to steer a ship? a cook one who knows how to prepare food? must we not then say that a statesman is one who knows how to guide the state? And how can he know this but by study and training? Must we not then say generally that all arts depend on knowledge, and knowledge on study? Do we not reach the general truths that ‘virtue is knowledge’ and that ‘virtue can be taught’? We may hesitate as to how to apply these principles to our individual actions, and Socrates will accuse none on this point; but for himself he has a divine monitor which never fails to warn him when his mind is turned towards a course which the gods disapprove. [Sidenote: His dualism in physics.] =47.= In the speculations of the Ionian philosophers Socrates could find no satisfaction. But one day he discovered with pleasure the words of Anaxagoras: ‘it is mind that orders the world and is cause of all things[66].’ Thus he was attracted to a dualistic view of the universe, in which matter and mind are in fundamental contrast. In the beginning there existed a chaos of unordered dead meaningless matter, and also mind, the principle of life, meaning, and order. Mind touched matter, and the universe sprang into being. Mind controls matter, and thus the universe continues to exist. The proof is found in the providential adaptation of the world for the life and comfort of mankind: for it is only consistent to suppose that things that exist for use are the work of mind[67]. He that made man gave him eyes to see with, ears to hear with, and a mouth conveniently placed near to the organs of sight and smell; he implanted in him a love of his offspring, and in the offspring a love of its parents; and lastly endowed him with a soul capable of understanding and worshipping his maker. For the divine power Socrates uses quite indifferently the words ‘god’ and ‘gods’: but his belief is essentially monotheistic. In the gods of the city of Athens he has ceased to believe, although he still makes sacrifices upon their altars in good-humoured conformity with the law, and even adopts the popular term ‘divination[68],’ though in a sense very different to that in which the official priesthood used it. In the analysis of human nature Socrates adopts a similar dualism. Man consists of body and soul: the soul is lord and king over the body, and indeed may rightly be called divine, if anything that has touch with humanity is such[69]. [Sidenote: His pietism.] =48.= The practical teaching of Socrates was entirely dominated by his religious principles. The gods, he held, know all things, our words, our deeds, and the secrets of our hearts: they are everywhere present and give counsel to men concerning the whole of life[70]. The first duty of man is therefore to enter into communion with the gods by prayer, asking them to give us the good and deliver us from the evil, but not qualifying the prayer by any instruction to the gods as to what is good or evil; for this the gods themselves know best[71]. In these words then we may pray: ‘Zeus our king, give us what is good for us whether we ask for it or not; what is evil, even though we ask for it in prayer, keep far from us[72].’ In this spirit of what we should to-day call ‘pietism’ we must interpret his principle that ‘virtue is knowledge[73].’ This not only asserts that no one can rightly practise any art unless he has studied and understands it, but also that no one can rightly understand an art without practising it. We say that there are men who know what is good and right, but do not perform it; but this is not so; for such men in truth think that some other course is good for them. Only the wise and pious man has a right understanding; others cannot do good even if they try[74]; and when they do evil, even that they do without willing it[75]. In its application to politics the teaching of Socrates came into collision with the democratic sentiments prevalent at Athens. To say the least, Socrates had no prejudice against the rule of kings. He distinguished sharply between kingship and tyranny, saying that the rule of one man with the assent of his subjects and in accordance with the laws was kingship, but without such assent and according to the man’s arbitrary will was tyranny. But under whatever constitutional form government was carried on, Socrates asserted that those who knew the business of government were alone the true rulers, and that the will of the crowd, if conflicting with that of the wise, was both foolish and impious[76]. [Sidenote: Why Socrates was condemned.] =49.= So teaching and influencing men Socrates lived in Athens till his seventieth year was past, and then died by the hands of the public executioner. This fate he might so easily have avoided that it seemed almost to be self-chosen. His disciple Xenophon expresses amazement that the jurors should have condemned a man so modest and so wise, and so practical a benefactor of the Athenian people[77]. Modern historians, with a wider knowledge of human nature, wonder rather that Socrates was allowed to live so long[78]. The accusers complained that Socrates offended by disbelieving in the gods of the city, introducing new deities, and corrupting the youth of Athens. From the point of view of conservatively-minded Athenians, the charges were amply justified. Clearly Socrates disbelieved, not merely in the official gods of the city, but also in the deities it worshipped most earnestly, democracy and empire. Not only did he introduce new deities, but it might fairly be argued that he was introducing the most essential parts of the religion of the national enemy, Persia. Daily inculcating these heretical doctrines upon young men of the highest families in Athens, he might well be the cause that the Athenian state was less unquestioningly served than before. That the heresies of Socrates were soundly founded on wide observation and general truths could not be considered to make them less dangerous. Athens had already passed the time when its political power could be of service to its neighbours; it had not reached that when it could be content with intellectual influence; Socrates, just because he was in harmony with the future of Athens, was a discordant element in its present. [Sidenote: The companions of Socrates.] =50.= It is with difficulty, and not without the risk of error, that we trace even in outline the positive teaching of Socrates. The severe self-repression with which he controlled his senses was exercised by him no less over his intelligence. In his expositions it took the shape of irony (εἰρωνεία), that is, the continual withholding of his personal convictions, and obstetrics (μαιευτική), the readiness to assist others in bringing their speculations to the birth. Thus he was a great educator rather than a great teacher. For whilst he held that virtue alone was worthy of investigation, and that virtue was essentially wisdom, he professed to be entirely at a loss where to find this wisdom for himself; he left it to his pupils to go out and discover the precious cup. Thus whilst men of all classes and with every variety of mental bias listened to his teaching, not one was content with his negative attitude. Of the various suggestions which Socrates threw out, without committing himself to any one, his pupils took up each in turn and endeavoured to construct out of it a system[79]. These systems were in the sharpest possible contrast one with another, but they have certain points in common. All the teachers retained a strong personal affection and loyalty towards their common master; each was convinced that he alone possessed the secret of his real convictions. All of them held aloof from the physical speculations of which the ripe fruit was already being gathered in by the Atomists. The portal of knowledge was to all of them the right use of the reasoning power; the shrine itself was the discipline of virtue, the attainment of happiness, the perfect ordering of social life. Such were the Socratic schools, in which philosophy was now somewhat sharply divided into the two branches of dialectics and ethics. Another century had yet to elapse before the rejected discipline of physics again established its importance. [Sidenote: The Cynics.] =51.= Of the Socratic schools three contributed directly to the Stoic system. Of these the Cynic school, founded by ANTISTHENES of Athens (circ. 440-365 B.C.) and developed by DIOGENES of Sinope, is its immediate precursor. The Cynic masters inherited most completely the moral earnestness[80] and the direct pietistic teaching of Socrates; and for this reason Antisthenes appears to have been the master’s favourite pupil. The lives both of these men and of their successors were marked by simplicity and self-abnegation, and they devoted themselves with true missionary zeal to the reformation of moral outcasts. The caricature of the figure of Diogenes which was promulgated by his opponents and still lives in literary tradition needs constantly to be corrected by the picture which Epictetus gives of him, and which (though not without an element of idealization and hero-worship) shews us the man as he appeared to his own disciples. The breach with the state-religion which was latent in Socrates was displayed without disguise by the Cynics. Antisthenes, following in the track of the ardent Xenophanes, declared that the popular gods were many, but the god of nature was one[81]; he denounced the use of images[82]; and he and his followers naturally acquired the reproach of atheism[83]. Equally offensive to the Athenians was their cosmopolitanism[84], which treated the pride of Hellenic birth as vain, and poured contempt on the glorious victories of Marathon and Salamis. Nor did the Cynics consider the civilization of their times as merely indifferent; they treated it as the source of all social evils, and looked for a remedy in the return to a ‘natural’ life, to the supposed simplicity and virtue of the savage unspoilt by education. Thus they formulated a doctrine which especially appealed to those who felt themselves simple and oppressed, and which has been well described as ‘the philosophy of the proletariate of the Greek world[85].’ [Sidenote: Cynic intuitionism.] =52.= The destructive criticism of the Cynics did not stop with its attack upon Greek institutions; it assailed the citadel of reason itself. Socrates had renounced physics; the Cynics considered that dialectic was equally unnecessary[86]. For the doctrine of general concepts and the exercise of classification they saw no use; they were strict Nominalists; horses they could see, but not ‘horsiness.’ In their ethics they held to the chief doctrines of Socrates, that ‘virtue is knowledge,’ ‘virtue can be taught’ and ‘no one willingly sins’; and they laid special stress on the ‘sufficiency’ (αὐτάρκεια) of virtue, which to produce happiness needs (according to them) nothing in addition to itself except a Socratic strength of character (Σωκρατικὴ ἰσχύς)[87]. But in reality they identified virtue with this will-power, and entirely dispensed with knowledge; virtue was to them a matter of instinct, not of scientific investigation. They appear therefore as the real founders of that ethical school which bases knowledge of the good on intuition, and which is at the present time, under ever-varying titles, the most influential of all. In practice, the virtue which specially appealed to the Cynics was that of ‘liberty,’ the claim of each man at every moment to do and say that which seems to him right, without regard to the will of sovereigns, the conventions of society, or the feelings of his neighbour; the claim made at all times by the governed against their rulers, whether these are just or unjust, reckless or farseeing. [Sidenote: Limits of Cynism.] =53.= Cynism is in morals what Atomism is in physics; a doctrine which exercises a widespread influence because of its extreme simplicity, which is extraordinarily effective within the range of ideas to which it is appropriate, and fatally mischievous outside that range. Nothing is more alien from Cynism than what we now call cynicism; the Cynics were virtuous, warm-hearted, good-humoured, and pious. In their willing self-abnegation they equalled or surpassed the example set by Buddhist monks, but they were probably much inferior to them in the appreciation of natural beauty and the simple pleasures of life. As compared with their master Socrates, they lacked his genial presence, literary taste, and kindly tolerance; and they were intensely antipathetic to men of the type of Plato and Aristotle, whose whole life was bound up with pride in their country, their birth, and their literary studies[88]. [Sidenote: Xenophon.] =54.= The Cynics themselves seem to have made no effective use of literature to disseminate their views; but in the works of XENOPHON of Athens (440-circ. 350 B.C.) we have a picture of Socrates drawn almost exactly from the Cynic standpoint. Xenophon was a close personal friend of Antisthenes, and thoroughly shared his dislike for intellectual subtleties. He was possessed of a taste for military adventure, and his interpretation of Socratic teaching entirely relieved him of any scruples which patriotism might have imposed upon him in this direction, leaving him free at one time to support the Persian prince Cyrus, and at another to join with the Spartan king Agesilaus against his own countrymen. From adventure he advanced to romance-writing, and his sketches of the expedition of the Ten Thousand Greeks (in which he took part in person) and of the life of Cyrus the Great have an interest which in no way depends upon their accuracy. The account which he gives of Socrates in his _Memorabilia_ (ἀπομνημονεύματα) is not always to be depended upon; it is at the best a revelation of one side only of the historic philosopher; but it is to a large extent confirmed by what we learn from other sources, and is of special interest to us because of the great influence it exercised over Latin literature. [Sidenote: The Cyrenaics.] =55.= In the opposite direction ARISTIPPUS of Cyrene shared the sympathetic tone of Socrates, but could not adopt his moral earnestness or his zeal for the good of others. He refused altogether the earnest appeal of Socrates that he should take part in politics. ‘It seems to me,’ he says, ‘to show much folly that a man who has quite enough to do to find the necessities of life for himself, should not be satisfied with this, but should take upon himself to provide his fellow-citizens with all that they want, and to answer for his action in the courts if he is not successful.’ Aristippus revolted altogether from the ascetic form in which the Cynics represented his master’s teaching, and held that the wise man, by self-restraint and liberal training, attained to the truest pleasure, and that such pleasure was the end of life. The Cyrenaics (as his followers were called) were the precursors in ethics of the school of Epicurus; and the bitter opposition which was later on to rage between Stoics and Epicureans was anticipated by the conflict between the Cynics and the Cyrenaics. [Sidenote: The Megarians.] =56.= The school of EUCLIDES of Megara swerved suddenly from these ethical interests and devoted itself mainly to the problems of dialectic. From the Socratic practice of classification it arrived at the doctrine of the One being, which alone it held to be truly existent, and which it identified with the One God proclaimed by Xenophanes and his followers of the Eleatic school. To the Megaric school we are therefore chiefly indebted for the assertion of the philosophical principle of monism; the same school drew the necessary logical consequence, that evil is not in any real sense existent. From the Eleatics the Megarians further derived an interest in logical speculation of all kinds, and they were greatly occupied with the solution of fallacies: amongst the followers of this school we first meet with the puzzles of ‘the heap’ (_Sorites_), ‘the liar’ (_Pseudomenos_), and others upon which in later times Chrysippus and other Stoics sharpened their wits[89]. DIODORUS the Megarian set out certain propositions with regard to the relation of the possible and the necessary which are of critical importance in connexion with the problem of free-will[90]. Finally STILPO, who taught in Athens about 320 B.C., and who made a violent attack upon Plato’s theory of ideas, adopted an ethical standpoint not unlike that of the Cynics[91], and counted amongst his pupils the future founder of Stoicism. Stilpo enjoyed amongst his contemporaries a boundless reputation; princes and peoples vied in doing him honour[92]; but we have scarcely any record of his teaching, and know him almost exclusively as one who contributed to form the mind of Zeno. [Sidenote: Advance of Philosophy.] =57.= With the school founded by Phaedo of Elis we are not concerned; the consideration of Plato and Aristotle and their respective followers we must leave to another chapter. We have already seen philosophy grow from being the interest of isolated theorists into a force which is gathering men in groups, and loosening the inherited bonds of city and class. So far its course has violently oscillated, both as regards its subject-matter and its principles. But its range is now becoming better defined, and in the period that is approaching we shall find determined attempts to reach a comprehensive solution of the problems presented to enquiring minds. FOOTNOTES [1] ‘Stoicism was the earliest offspring of the union between the religious consciousness of the East and the intellectual culture of the West’ Lightfoot, _Philippians_, p. 274. [2] Amongst the most important of these are Th. Gomperz’ _Greek Thinkers_ (transl. by L. Magnus and G. G. Berry, London, 1901-5), and J. Adam’s _Religious teachers of Greece_ (Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, 1908). [3] ‘Most clear air is spread about it cloudless, and the white light floats over it’ Hom. _Od._ 6, 46 (Butcher and Lang’s transl.). See also Adam, _Religious Teachers_, p. 31. [4] ‘It is not possible for another god to go beyond, or make void, the purpose of Zeus’ _Od._ 5, 103. [5] _Il._ 24, 308; _Od._ 14, 404. [6] _ib._ 6, 188. [7] _Od._ 8, 170. [8] _ib._ 4, 237. [9] _ib._ 20, 75. [10] _ib._ 14, 84. [11] _ib._ 17, 485. [12] See below, § 325. [13] So already Socrates understood it; Xen. _Mem._ i 3, 7. [14] Hesiod, _Works and Days_, 252-255; and see below, § 254. [15] _ib._ 289-292, quoted Xen. _Mem._ ii 1, 20. [16] For instance, to Adam, _Religious Teachers_, Lect. V; Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, bk. i, ch. ii. [17] Orphic Fragments, vi 10-12 (fr. 123 Abel). [18] Adam, p. 114. [19] Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, i pp. 46-48. [20] _ib._ 48-56. [21] _ib._ 56-59. [22] The terms ‘monism’ and ‘dualism’ have recently become the watchwords of opposing armies of popular philosophers, especially in Germany. In this book they stand for two aspects of philosophical thought which are not necessarily irreconcileable. For without such contrasts as life and matter, universe and individual, right and wrong, thought is impossible; so far we are all ‘dualists.’ Yet as soon as we fix our attention on these contrasts, we find that they are not final, but point towards some kind of ultimate reconciliation; and to this extent all diligent thinkers tend to become ‘monists.’ Similarly the broad monistic principle ‘all things are one’ is meaningless apart from some kind of interpretation in dualistic language. [23] See below, §§ 71, 195. [24] Gomperz, i 127. [25] This phrase does not express a belief in polytheism, see Adam, p. 204. [26] Xen. apud Euseb. _Praep. ev._ xiii 13. [27] Xenophanes apud Sext. _math._ ix 193. [28] Id. apud Arist. _Rhet._ ii 23. [29] On Xenophanes see Gomperz, i pp. 155-164; Adam, pp. 198-211. [30] ‘Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men, unless their souls have wit’ Heracl. _Fr._ 4 (Bywater), 107 (Diels). [31] ‘Much learning does not teach sense, else it had taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecataeus’ _Fr._ 16 B, 40 D. [32] ‘The Word is common, yet most men live as if they owned a private understanding’ _Fr._ 92 B, 2 D. [33] ‘All things move and nothing remains’ Plato _Crat._ 402 A. [34] ‘Listening not to me but to the Word it is reasonable to confess that all things are one’ _Fr._ 1 B, 50 D. [35] ‘All things change with fire and fire with all things, as gold with goods and goods with gold’ _Fr._ 22 B, 90 D; ‘neither God nor man created this World-order (κόσμος), which is the same for all beings: but it has been and shall be an ever-living fire’ _Fr._ 20 B, 30 D. [36] ‘The fire shall one day come, judge all things and condemn them’ _Fr._ 26 B, 66 D. [37] ‘Whilst we live, our souls are dead and buried in us; but when we die, our souls revive and live’ Sext. _Pyrrh. inst._, iii 230 (_Fr._ 78 B, 88 D). [38] ‘This Word is always existent’ _Fr._ 2 B, 1 D. [39] _ib._ [40] ‘There is but one wisdom, to understand the judgment by which all things are steered through all’ _Fr._ 19 B, 41 D. [41] ‘Men fail in comprehension before they have heard the Word and at first even after they have heard it.... Other men do not observe what they do when they are awake, just as they forget what they do when asleep’ _Fr._ 2 B, 1 D. [42] _Fr._ 91 B, 114 D. [43] Adam, pp. 217-222. [44] Gomperz, i p. 63. [45] See Gladisch, _Herakleitos und Zoroaster_; Ueberweg, _Grundriss_, p. 39; above, § 13. [45a] Gladisch traces this dualism in Heraclitus under the names of Zeus and Hades (see his p. 26, note 39). [45b] Clem. _Strom._ i 14; Suidas, s. v. Herakleitos. (Gladisch, pp. 65, 75). [46] _Agam._ 155-161, 167-171. [47] Gomperz, ii p. 13. [48] ‘Half professor and half journalist—this is the best formula that we can devise to characterise the sophist of the 5th century B.C.’ Gomperz, i p. 414. [49] See below, §§ 124, 130, and 131. [50] Gomperz, i p. 428. [51] Xen. _Mem._ ii 1, 21 to 34. [52] Gomperz, i p. 430. [53] See below, § 89. [54] Gomperz, i p. 433. [55] _ib._ p. 437. [56] Arist. _Phys._ viii 1; and see below, § 173. [56a] Xen. _Mem._ i 1, 18. [57] Plato, _Apol._ p. 32. [58] Plato, _Crito_, p. 44 sqq. [59] Gomperz, ii p. 48. [60] Cic. _Ac._ i 4, 15; _Tusc. disp._ v 4, 10. [61] Sen. _Ep._ 71, 7. [62] Xen. _Mem._ iii 7. [63] Xen. _Mem._ iv 6, 1; Epict. _Disc._ i 7, 11. [64] Xen. _Mem._ iv 5, 12; Arist. _Met._ xiii 4. [65] Xen. _Mem._ iv 7, 10. The Socratic μαντική must not be taken too seriously; it is only one of many tentative suggestions for explaining the process of reasoning, akin to our modern use of the term ‘genius’ in connexion with achievements in poetry and art. [66] Plato, _Phaedo_, p. 97 c. The passage gives the impression of a real reminiscence; at the same time its recognition as such implies that Socrates was not consistent in disregarding all physical speculations. [67] Xen. _Mem._ i 4, 4. [68] _ib._ i 4, 2. [69] _ib._ i 4, 9, and iv 3, 14; Cic. _N. D._ ii 6, 18. [70] _ib._ i 1, 19. [71] _ib._ [72] Plato, _Alc._ ii 143 A. [73] Xen. _Mem._ iii 9, 4 and 5. [74] _ib._ [75] οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει; see Plato _Prot._ p. 345 D, _Apol._ p. 25, Xen. _Mem._ iv 2, 20. No one is willingly ignorant, and no one does evil for any other reason than that he is ignorant of the good. [76] In accepting generally the statements of Xenophon as to the religious and practical teaching of Socrates I am glad to find myself in agreement with Adam; Gomperz on the other hand is more sceptical. It should however always be realized that Socrates himself veiled his positive opinions under the form of suggestions and working hypotheses or ‘divinations.’ [77] _Mem._ i 1, 1. [78] Grote, _History of Greece_, ch. lxviii. Gomperz gives a very dramatic representation of the attitude of an Athenian of the old school; _Greek Thinkers_, ii pp. 94-97. [79] ‘ex illius [Socratis] variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat’ Cic. _de Orat._ iii 16, 61. [80] παρὰ [Σωκράτους] τὸ καρτερικὸν λαβὼν καὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας Diog. L. vi 2. [81] ‘Antisthenes ... populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens’ Cic. _N. D._ i 13, 32. [82] οὐδεὶς [θεὸν] εἰδέναι ἐξ εἰκόνος δύναται Clem. Alex. _Protrept._ p. 46 C. [83] Epict. _Disc._ iii 22, 91. [84] See below, § 303. [85] Gomperz, ii p. 148, referring to Göttling’s book, _Diogenes der Cyniker oder die Philosophie des griechischen Proletariats_ (Halle 1851). [86] ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν Diog. L. vi 103. [87] _ib._ vi 11. [88] See Plato, _Theaet._ 155 E, _Soph._ 251 B; Aristotle, _Met._ vii 3, 7. [89] See below, § 163. [90] See below, §§ 220 and 221. [91] ‘hoc inter nos et illos [Stilbonem etc.] interest; noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit; illorum ne sentit quidem’ Sen. _Ep._ 9, 3. [92] Gomperz, ii p. 196.