CHAPTER X.

RELIGION. [Sidenote: Philosophy crystallized.] =239.= We now turn from the supreme problems of philosophy to the formulation of religious belief and practice. A complete change comes over the spirit of our study. Until now we have been reaching out to observe, to define in words, to coordinate in a monistic system every object, every statement, every generalisation of which the human mind can rightly take account. We have kept eyes and ears open to learn from the East and from the West, from the idealist and the materialist, from the poet and from the critic. At last we have reached our highest point in the dogmas of the providential ordering of the universe and the moral obligation of the individual man; dogmas which, as we have seen, are expounded in logical form, but are essentially such as logic can neither establish nor refute. Stoicism, having once breathed in the mountain air of supreme principles, now begins to descend to the plains of common life, and to find the due application of its theories in the ordering of practical affairs. The theory of religion is treated as the first stage in this downward path; it is the adaptation of philosophy to the language of social life and individual aspiration. By ‘religion’ we mean here the theory of the existence and character of the gods; the practice of ceremonies in their honour and of prayers for their favour; and further, the theory and practice of divination. Upon all these questions philosophy sits as the supreme judge: external authority, embodied in the traditions of Greece and Rome respectively, may claim consideration, but not submission, from the intellect. [Sidenote: Historical changes of view.] =240.= In this attitude of the Stoics towards religion we can easily distinguish certain historical changes. Zeno represents in the main the critical temper; his tone is revolutionary and atheistic; he contemplates the entire subversion of existing religious practices to make room for a purer system. The principles of Cleanthes are the same, but finer expression in a more cheerful spirit; he has no bitterness as to the present, and much confidence in the future. With Chrysippus there sets in a tide of reconciliation; the ingenuities of etymology and allegorical interpretation are set to work to prove that the old religion contains, at least in germ, the substance of the new. The practical dangers of this method are obvious, and have not escaped the notice of the critics of Stoicism. It may be well to smoothe the path of the convert by allowing him to use old formulas and practices with a new meaning; it is not so easy to excuse the acceptance of a purely formal conversion, by which philosophy enrols as its nominal adherents men who give it no real submission, and increases its numbers at the cost of its sincerity. Posidonius stands out as the type of this weakness; with him begins the subordination of philosophic principle to religious sentiment. In the first period of Roman Stoicism the struggle was acute; many of the Stoics had the courage to defy the inherited prejudices of their fellow-countrymen, others bowed before the storm. Those who condemn the Stoics in a body as having sacrificed their convictions, in order that they might hold the honoured and lucrative positions of defenders of the national religion[1], show a lack both of sympathy and of critical discernment. All through the Roman period the Stoics held in theory a definite and consistent position, which will be expounded in this chapter; in the application of their principles to practical problems they showed that variation of standard and temperament which history has always to record even of societies of honourable and intelligent men. But it must be admitted that as the Stoics increase in numbers, their devotion to vital principles grows weaker, till at last we recognise in Marcus Aurelius both the most critical of Stoic thinkers, and the man in whom the powers of thought are most definitely subjected to the play of old associations and prejudices. [Sidenote: Dogmas of natural religion.] =241.= The theoretic teaching of the Stoics upon theology follows a very definite programme. Four dogmas need to be established: (i) that gods exist; (ii) that they are living, benevolent, and immortal; (iii) that they govern the universe; and (iv) that they seek the good of men. To each of these dogmas is attached a series of ‘proofs,’ such as are still in vogue as ‘evidences of natural religion[2].’ The whole of this body of teaching may be treated by us as an exposition in popular language of the central dogma that ‘the universe is ordered by providence.’ We have therefore first to consider whether the language used is really appropriate to the philosophic position, or whether it concedes too much to accepted beliefs. Secondly we have to consider whether the ‘proofs’ employed really correspond to the monistic point of view as understood by the Stoics, or whether dualisms abandoned in principle are regaining their old position in connexion with practical problems. Now the third and fourth dogmas, so far as they add to the first two, import nothing more than the general doctrine of providence. The first two dogmas, taken together, substitute for the abstract term ‘providence’ the more concrete, and (as we should phrase it) the more personal conception of a ‘god’ or ‘gods.’ The supreme question of the Stoic religion is therefore whether these terms are rightly used; and it falls into two parts, the use of the singular ‘god,’ carrying with it associations derived from Persism and Judaism; and the use of the plural ‘gods,’ which carries with it a qualified approval of the polytheism of the Greek and Roman pantheons. In accordance with the general principles of our philosophy, the wider question must be first determined. [Sidenote: The ‘nature’ of gods.] =242.= The ‘gods,’ according to the Stoics, form a ‘natura,’ a department of the universe, a category including one or more individuals. Hence the title of Cicero’s work, ‘de natura deorum’; that is, ‘of the class of beings called gods.’ Each department of philosophy, according to the Stoic interpretation, brings us in the end into touch with this world of deities. In dialectics we are led up to the supreme Reason, the Logos or Word, whose divine being permeates the universe[3]. Metaphysics point us to Body in the purest form[4]; to Spirit which reaches from end to end of the universe[5]; to a first Cause, a Cause of causes, the initial link in the unending chain of events[6]. If we look to the elements in their unceasing interchange, we find deity in all things that shift and suffer metamorphosis, in water, in earth, and in air[7]; how much more then in fire, which in one aspect is the purest of the elements, and in another is the creative rational substance from which the whole universe issues[8]? God is indeed the universe, and all that is in it, though not in the pantheistic sense that he is evenly diffused throughout all things[9]. Look towards this earth, which lies at the centre of the world-order; even in its most repulsive contents, in its grossest matter, there is deity[10]. Lift up your eyes to the heavens; God is the all-encircling sea of fire called Aether[11]; he is sun[12] and stars[13]. Consider the universe in its history; God is its creator[14], its ruler, its upholder[15]. Analyze it; he is its soul[16], its mind[17]. Strain your sight to perceive the meaning of all things: he is fate[18]; he is nature[19]; he is providence; he is necessity[20]. And if we look forward to the problems of politics and ethics, we must say that God is the Universal Law that calls for the reverence of gods and men as a community[21], and equally demands, under the name of conscience, the unhesitating obedience of the individual[22]. Lastly, in the history of mankind, in its great men and useful discoveries, the Stoic masters recognised the element of divinity[23]. In the language of to-day, God is the pole in which all the parallels of human inquiry merge, the _x_ of the problem of the universe, the unknown that is known in his works. [Sidenote: Unity of God.] =243.= That God is one is a doctrine which the Stoics take over from the Cynics[24] (who therein follow Socrates), and from the general opinion; without making this a formal dogma, they constantly assume it tacitly by using the term ‘God’ (ὁ θεός, _deus_). With equal readiness they accept in use plural and abstract nouns for the same conception, as _di immortales_, _vis divina_. The interpretation of this apparent conflict of language must be found in the general principles of the Stoic monism. Just as the elements are four, and yet are all the creative fire in its changing shapes: just as the virtues are many, and yet there is but one Virtue appearing under different circumstances: so there is but one Deity, appearing under many names[25]. This view the assailants of Stoicism reduce to the absurdity that some Stoic gods are created and mortal, whilst others are uncreated[26]; and again that Zeus is worse than a Proteus, for the latter changed into a few shapes only and those seemly, whilst Zeus has a thousand metamorphoses, and there is nothing so foul that he does not in turn become[27]. No one however who is familiar with the many points of view from which Greek philosophers approach the problem of ‘the one and the many’ will be readily disturbed by this rather superficial criticism. [Sidenote: Zeus.] =244.= In its practical application the belief in the one-ness of God assimilated itself to the worship of the Greek Ζεύς and the Latin Jove or Juppiter. It would be impossible within the limits of this work to trace the growth of monotheistic feeling in the Greco-Roman world in connexion with the names of these two deities, which in the mythologies are members of societies. We have already suggested that the most direct impulse came from Persism: but in connexion with Roman history it is important to notice that a similar impulse arrived through the Tuscan religion[28]. The nature of the Stoic worship of Zeus is abundantly illustrated by the _Hymn_ of Cleanthes[29]; the intimate sense of companionship between Zeus and his worshipper comes to light, perhaps with a tinge of Cynic sentiment, in all the discourses of Epictetus. A special emphasis is laid on the fatherhood of Zeus. This attribute could be traced back to the poems of Homer, and is prominent throughout Virgil’s _Aeneid_[30]. It can be explained in connexion with the growth of all living substances[31], but has a more lofty meaning in that man alone shares with the gods the inheritance of reason[32]. But the Homeric association of Zeus with mount Olympus entirely disappears in Stoicism in favour of the Persian conception of a god dwelling in heaven[33]. Further the Stoics agree with the Persians that this god must not be thought of as having the form of any animal or man[34]; he is without form[35], but capable of assuming all forms[36]. [Sidenote: Definition of ‘god.’] =245.= In the Stoic system the conception of godhead as one and supreme much exceeds in importance the conception of a multiplicity of gods. We may therefore reasonably consider at this point the four dogmas of the Stoic theology. The first point to be examined is the definition of the word ‘god.’ As adopted by the Stoic school generally it runs thus: ‘a rational and fiery spirit, having no shape, but changing to what it wills and made like to all things[37].’ This definition corresponds satisfactorily to the Stoic system of physics; but even so we must notice that the statement ‘God is necessity[38]’ is an exaggeration, since ‘necessity’ is entirely devoid of the qualities of reasonableness and plasticity. We find a different definition in Antipater of Tarsus, which is emphasized by the Stoics of the transition period generally:—‘God is a living being, blessed, imperishable, the benefactor of mankind[39].’ This definition points clearly the way to the Stoic system of religion. The difference between the two definitions marks then the step that has here to be taken. There is an accentuation of the property of personality; we pass from a ‘rational spirit’ to a ‘living being.’ There is the addition of a moral quality; we pass from a plastic substance to a beneficent will. The existence of deity in the first sense has been displayed to us by our whole analysis of the universe; it is with regard to the existence of deity in the second sense that we need the constant support of the dogma of providence, expounded in the technical proofs which we now proceed to examine. [Sidenote: Gods exist: the proof from consent.] =246.= The first Stoic dogma is ‘that gods exist’; and of this the first and most familiar ‘proof’ is that which depends upon common consent. Amongst all men and in all nations there is a fixed conviction that gods exist; the conception is inborn, indeed we may say graven on the minds of all men[40]. To this proof the Stoics attach the highest possible importance; but its justification, as we have seen, presents great difficulties[41]. Cleanthes, the most religiously minded of the early Stoics, had not troubled to conceal his contempt for the opinions of the crowd[42]; and the ridiculous belief in Tartarus[43] is as widespread as that in the gods. Here then we must distinguish; it is not sufficient that a conception should be universal, if it appeals most to foolish folk, and even so is decaying[44]. We must not however at this moment inquire into the causes of this belief[45]; for this is to pass from the question at issue to other proofs of the dogma. It seems clear that the value of this particular proof depends upon the Stoic doctrine of ‘inborn conceptions,’ which we have already discussed[46]. Without going over the whole ground again, the substance of the argument as applied to the present question may be thus stated. The mind of each individual man is by descent akin to the universal reason (κοινὸς λόγος, _universa ratio_)[47]. Therefore all men carry with them from their birth predispositions in favour of certain preconceptions; and the fact that these preconceptions are common to all is evidence of their divine origin. These predispositions by the growth and training of the individual on the one hand, by his contact with the outer world on the other hand through the organs of sense, ripen into reason. Now all men are born with a predisposition to explain what is beyond their own reasoning powers by the hypothesis of a living and reasoning agent. The belief in gods is therefore a ‘preconception’; and if it is confirmed by growth and experience, it must be of divine origin and therefore self-proving. In the language of our own times, the belief in deity cannot be dispensed with as a working hypothesis; its omission lames human reason. [Sidenote: The proof of the ‘higher Being.’] =247.= The second proof ‘that gods exist’ is particularly associated with the name of Chrysippus; it may be summed up by saying ‘there must be a Being higher than man.’ We begin by assuming that reason is the highest power in the universe[48]; an axiom which is always subject to limitation on account of the existence of ‘natural necessity.’ According to the Stoics, reason is common to gods and men; if, for the sake of argument, this is denied, then reason is possessed by men alone, for we can certainly find no better name than ‘god’ for higher reasoning beings[49]. If then there exists something greater than human reason can produce, it must be the work of some reasoning being greater than man, that is, it must be the work of the gods. But the heavenly constellations are such a work; therefore they are the work of the gods, and therefore gods exist[50]. To this argument two others are supplementary. First, human reason itself must be derived from some source, and what other can we name but the deity[51]? Secondly, if there are no gods, man must be the supreme being; but such a claim is an arrogant infatuation[52]. The same arguments are attributed in substance to Zeno[53]; nay, so cogent are they that they are in part accepted even by Epicurus[54]. [Sidenote: The proofs from the elements and the universe.] =248.= There follow two proofs connected with gradations in the scale of being. Earth and water are the two lower and grosser elements; and since temperament depends greatly upon climate, we find that men and the animals are all of somewhat heavy character. Air and fire are the higher and more refined elements; how then can we think otherwise than that they are the home of more lofty beings[55]? Then again the universe is either a simple or a composite body. That it is not composite is shown by the harmony (συμπάθεια, _concentus_) of its parts; it is therefore simple. A simple body must be held together by spirit in some one of its grades, either as unity, growth, or soul. Bodies held together merely by unity, like stones or logs, admit of very simple changes only; but the universe admits of every kind of change and development, and yet keeps together; it must therefore be held together by spirit in its highest grade, that is by soul and by reason. Being a whole, it must be greater than its parts, and include all that its parts possess. But a nature greater than man, and possessing soul and reason, is god[56]. [Sidenote: The proof from providence.] =249.= The proof from the good gifts of providence has been already given in substance; we may however notice the sharp reply given to Epicurus, who maintains that the wondrous contrivances of the Creator for the benefit of man result from the chance clashings of particles. ‘As well contend,’ replies the Stoic, ‘that words and verses come from the chance shifting of the twenty-one letters of the alphabet, and that the poems of Ennius could be produced by shaking together a sufficient quantity of these in a box, and then pouring them out on the ground! Chance would hardly produce a single verse[57].’ The terrors of the universe, its storms, earthquakes, deluges, pestilences and wars, which seem to militate against this proof, are themselves turned into a fourth proof[58]. A further proof, which depends on the contemplation of the movements of the heavenly bodies[59], we have sufficiently considered in connexion with the influence of Chaldaean and Persian thought. [Sidenote: The proof from worship.] =250.= There remain two proofs, which at first sight may appear singular, but are nevertheless very strongly urged, the proofs from worship and divination; which according to the Stoics are practices that must be justified, but cannot be justified without the postulate of the existence of gods. The proof from worship is best known in the paradoxical form, ‘if there are altars, there are gods,’ which is attributed to Chrysippus[60]. This proof is fused by Seneca with the proof from general consent[61]; but its true character seems to be different. ‘Without gods there can be no piety, for piety is the right worship of the gods. Without gods there can be no holiness, for holiness is a right attitude towards the gods. Without gods there can be no wisdom, for wisdom is the knowledge of things human and divine[62]. But without piety, holiness, and wisdom a reasonable philosophy cannot be constructed. Therefore gods exist.’ The argument in its simplest form is attributed to Zeno himself. ‘It is reasonable to honour the gods. But it is not reasonable to honour the non-existent. Therefore gods exist[63].’ [Sidenote: The proof from divination.] =251.= The final argument is that from divination; which is remarkable in view of the close association between divination and astrology, and the derivation of the latter from a scientific system which finds no place for divine interpositions. But both in Greece and Rome the forecasting of the future had long been reconciled with theology, upon the hypothesis that the gods warn men for their good of coming events. In accepting the truth of divination the Stoics were following the Socratic tradition[64]. This belief was accepted by all the great Stoic masters, and was a ‘citadel’ of their philosophy[65]. It is true that on this point Panaetius exercised the privilege of a suspense of judgment[66]; but all the more did his pupil, the pious Posidonius, lay stress upon the subject, on which he composed five books[66], of which the spirit is preserved to us in Cicero’s books _de Divinatione_[67]. To Roman writers their inherited State practice of augury, with its elaborate though half-forgotten science, was long a motive for maintaining this belief[68]; but the ancient reputation of the oracle at Delphi maintained its hold still more persistently, and was abandoned with even greater reluctance[69]. Nevertheless the whole group of beliefs was quietly pushed aside by the Romans of the times of the empire, if we may judge from the words of Epictetus—‘what need have I to consult the viscera of victims and the flight of birds, and why do I submit when he (the diviner) says “it is for your interest?” Have I not within me a diviner[70]?’ [Sidenote: Divine qualities.] =252.= Our next enquiry is ‘of what kind are the gods?’ ‘what are their qualities?’ Here the Stoics break more decidedly with tradition. Antipater of Tarsus, as we have seen, defined the deity as ‘a living being, happy, immortal and benevolent towards men[71].’ It is clear that this description can only be applied in its fulness to the supreme deity, for all other gods are destined to pass away in the general conflagration[72]. That the supreme deity is possessed of life and of reason has already been assumed in the proofs of his existence; but we have here a reaffirmation of Stoic doctrine as against those that hold that the world is governed by blind destiny and chance. In stating that the gods are happy the Stoics agree with Epicurus; but according to them this happiness consists not in rest, but in activity. In this distinction the whole difference between the Stoic and Epicurean ideals of happiness, that is, between their ethical ends, comes into sight. The Stoics affirm that the gods are occupied, and that with matters of the greatest concern: and that any other conception is unworthy of them[73]. That the activity of the gods has for its aim the happiness of men is plainly the doctrine of providence; and in making benevolence an attribute of deity[74] the Stoics turn their backs for ever upon the belief in gods that are greedy, jealous, mischievous, and haughty; that is, not merely on such deities as were still a part of the creed of the rustic[75], but also such as had provided the problems of the whole of Greek tragedy, and given the opportunity for the stinging attacks of Epicurus on religion[76]. In examining these attributes of the gods we have anticipated the enquiries which belong to the third and fourth categories; namely as to the disposition and the relativity of the gods. Incidentally we have obtained an excellent illustration of the logical importance of definition and the four categories. Definition implies in advance what is contained in each of the categories, and each category contains implicitly what is contained in the other three; but the logical mechanism enables us so to express the doctrine that it is for ever fixed on the memory. Nor can we easily imagine that the world will ever forget this conception of a Supreme God, in his essence a living all-wise Being; in his attributes immortal, immutable[77], active and benevolent; in his disposition occupied in contemplating and controlling his great work the universe, and in his relation to his creatures constantly concerned for their comfort and happiness. [Sidenote: Stoicism and the old mythology.] =253.= It must by this time be plain that the whole atmosphere of Stoic religion was alien to that in which the gods of the Greek and Roman mythology had taken root. The nominal absorption of these gods in the Stoic system has therefore no theoretical importance; it was a work of political adaptation. The Stoics themselves doubtless believed that they were restoring the original meaning of the pantheon, and freeing it from corruptions for which the poets were responsible. The original meaning was also, in their judgment, the true meaning. Public opinion was already in revolt against the old theology, both on scientific and on moral grounds. The current tales of the gods were both incredible and revolting[78]; the worship of them too often an attempt to silence the voice of conscience[79]. The Stoics proposed to make the myths symbols of scientific truths, and the ritual an incentive to honest living. Their interpretation was in the main physical; the gods represent respectively the heavenly bodies, the elements, the plants; the amours of the gods represent the continuous work of the great creative forces of nature. To a lesser extent explanations are found in society and in history. These interpretations are greatly assisted by etymologies, according to the doctrine of dialectics that wisdom lies hid in words. The whole process may seem to the modern critic puerile, because the practical occasion for it has passed away; but there are still to be found thinkers who hold that by such processes alone it is possible for human thought to progress without civil society being disrupted. [Sidenote: The Stoic metamorphoses.] =254.= According to this system Juppiter becomes the fiery heaven, the chief of the elements, the source of all life[80]; Juno is the softer air, into which the fire enters to become the germinating seed[81]. Thus she is called sister as a fellow-element[82], and wife as an instrument in the creative process. From a slightly different point of view Chrysippus interpreted Zeus as God, and Hera as matter; and their union as the commencement of the Creation, when God spread throughout matter the seed Logoi[83]. So again Hephaestus (Vulcan) represents fire; Poseidon (Neptune) is the sea; Dis (Pluto) and Rhea alike stand for the earth[84]. Demeter (Ceres) again is the corn-land[85], and Persephone (Proserpine) the growing crop; as such she is lost to her mother and lamented by her for six months in every year[86]. Apollo is the sun, Luna or Diana the moon[87]; Cronus, son of Earth and Heaven, is Chronos (χρόνος) or Time, and he is said to devour his children, because all that is begotten of time is in turn consumed by time[88]. Athene or Minerva is the daughter of Zeus, to whom he has given birth without a partner, because she is the divine Reason by which he made the universe[89]. Chrysippus wrote at length on the allegorical interpretation of the three Graces[90]; and the work of Cornutus entirely consists of expositions of this system. Other gods are recognised by the Stoics as personifications of actions or feelings; Eros (Cupid), Aphrodite (Venus) and Pothos (regret) of feelings; Hope (Ἐλπίς, _Spes_), Justice (Δίκη, _Iustitia_) and Wise Law (Εὐνομία) of actions[91]. So in particular Ares (Mars) stands for war, or the setting of array against array. [Sidenote: Minor deities.] =255.= We have already noticed that the gods that are borrowed from the popular mythology do not possess the divine attribute of immortality; and in some of them the attribute of benevolence is not prominent. There was thus a constant tendency to assign them to an order of nature of lower rank than the deity. Such an order was already constituted by the popular belief, adopted by the Stoics, that the whole universe is full of spirits or daemons, some kindly, others mischievous. Highest in the former class stand the divine messengers, who everywhere throughout the universe keep watch over the affairs of men and bring report thereof to God[92]. This was a widespread belief, most in harmony with the principles of Persism, but also met with in the Rigveda[93] and in the poems of Hesiod[94]. These watchmen are however not the spies of a cruel tyrant, but the officers of a benevolent sovereign; we find them early in Roman literature identified with the stars[95], and this may account for the special recognition of the twins Castor and Pollux, as kindly daemons that protect sailors from shipwreck[96]. There are also spirits which are careless, idle, or mischievous[97]; these the deity may employ as his executioners[98]. A daemon which is solely the embodiment of an evil or mischievous principle, such as the Druh of Persism or the Satan of Judaism, is however not to be found in the Stoic system. Amongst daemons are also to be recognised the souls of men parted from their bodies, some good and some evil[99]. All beliefs of this kind are specially characteristic of the type of Stoicism introduced by Posidonius[100]. We may specially note the belief in the Genius which accompanies each man from his birth to his death, (and which closely corresponds to the guardian angel of Persism,) because of the special vogue it obtained in the Roman world[101]. [Sidenote: Deified men.] =256.= The Stoics never failed to close their list of deities with the recognition of men raised to the sky for their services to their fellow-men. Such were Hercules, who rid the earth of monsters; Castor and Pollux; Aesculapius the inventor of medicine; Liber the first cultivator of the vine, and (amongst the Romans) Romulus the founder of the city. These are deities established by the laws of each city[102]. The Stoics do not raise their own leaders to this position, but (as we shall see in dealing with the question of the ‘wise man’) they assign to them almost equal honours. This part of their theory appears to open the door to great practical abuses, since it might be used to justify the claims of the sovereigns of Egypt to be honoured as gods during their lifetime, and those of the Roman emperors that their predecessors should be worshipped as such after their death. But it does not seem that such an abuse actually occurred; and this part of the theory of gods always seems to have been regarded by the Stoics rather as an explanation of historical facts than as a principle of civic submission. [Sidenote: Worship.] =257.= Questions as to the worship of the gods belong strictly to the department of politics, so far as public worship is concerned, and of ethics, so far as individuals are concerned. It may however be convenient to anticipate the discussion of them, since we cannot properly appreciate the Stoic views of religion apart from their practical application. We must therefore notice that Stoicism in its beginnings, in accordance with its Cynic origin, was revolutionary, unorthodox, in the popular language atheistic. Not only did it follow the principles of Persism in condemning altogether the worship of images, but it also poured scorn upon the building of temples and the offering of sacrifices. Thus Zeno in his book on ‘the State’ forbids the making of temples and images, because they are unworthy of the deity[103]; an idea which the Romans recognised as not altogether strange to their own history, seeing that for a hundred and seventy years (presumably during the Etruscan supremacy) no images had been known at Rome[104]. The Stoic condemnation of sacrifice is mostly expressed by silence, but it finds words in Seneca[105]. Although they thus denounced in principle the whole existing system of public worship, the Stoics did not feel themselves prevented from taking part in it as a seemly and ancient custom[106]; and the Roman Stoics took a special pride in the reputation of the city for attention to ‘religion,’ that is to say, to the ritual observances due to the gods[107]. [Sidenote: Stoic hymnology.] =258.= Meanwhile the Stoics actively developed their own ideal of worship, namely the rendering of praise and honour to the gods by means of hymns. ‘It is reasonable,’ said Zeno, ‘to honour the gods[108].’ The hymn of Cleanthes shows the form in which this honour could find expression, and though in the main it is an outburst of individual conviction, yet it contains the germ of public hymnology[109]. The value of music in public worship was recognised by Diogenes of Babylon[110]. Posidonius laid it down that the best and most pious worship of the gods is to honour them with pure mind and voice[111]. Epictetus speaks continually in this spirit, and gives us examples of prose hymnology: ‘great is God, who has given us implements with which we shall cultivate the earth[112]’; ‘I give thee all thanks that thou hast allowed me to join in this thy assemblage of men, and to see thy works, and to comprehend this thy administration[113].’ Thus ought we ‘to sing hymns to the deity, and bless him, and tell of his benefits[114].’ [Sidenote: Prayer.] =259.= Prayer to the gods may be taken as more characteristic of private and individual worship, though the paradox is worthy of attention that men should ask nothing of the gods that they cannot ask publicly[115]. The whole problem of prayer is so fully and admirably treated upon Stoic lines by Juvenal in his Tenth Satire, that nothing can be added to his exposition but the evidence that his teaching is in fact Stoic. Let us then enter the temples and listen to men’s prayers. First they beg the doorkeeper for admission, though the deity is equally near to them outside; then they raise their hands to the sky, or press their mouths close to the ear of an image[116]. To the unlistening deity they pour out wishes so shameful that they could not let a fellow-man share their secret[117]. Decrepit old men babble prayers for long life, and make themselves out younger than they are[118]. Another prays for riches[119], or for some other thing that will do him harm[120]. Undertakers pray for a busy season[121]. Parents and nurses (and these are the nearest to innocence) pray for the success of their children in life[122]. They may be excused, but the thoughtful man should know that the advantages for which friends have prayed have often in the end proved a man’s destruction[123]. He should examine his own heart, and recognise that his prayers till now have been unworthy and foolish[124]. Since the gods wish us well, let us leave it to them to choose what is best for us[125]. ‘Look up to God, and say:—deal with me for the future as thou wilt: I am of the same mind as thou art. I am thine, I refuse nothing that pleases thee[126].’ ‘Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you wish; but wish the things that happen to be as they are: and you will have a tranquil flow of life[127].’ [Sidenote: Self-examination.] =260.= Prayer so regarded becomes not merely an act of resignation, in which a man ceases to battle against a destiny that is too strong for him; it is a daily examination of his soul, to know whether it is in tune with the purposes of the universe. This examination is a religious exercise, never to be omitted before sleep. It is inculcated both by Seneca and Epictetus. ‘How beautiful’ says Seneca, ‘is this custom of reviewing the whole day! how quiet a sleep follows on self-examination! The mind takes its place on the judgment-seat, investigates its own actions, and awards praise or blame according as they are deserved[128].’ And Epictetus adopts the verses ascribed to Pythagoras: ‘Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes Before each daily action thou hast scanned; What’s done amiss, what done, what left undone; From first to last examine all, and then Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice[129].’ [Sidenote: Religious duty.] =261.= We are now in a position to sum up in technical language[130] the obligations of religion freed from superstition[131]. Our duty towards the gods is rightly to believe in them, to acknowledge their greatness and benevolence, to submit to them as the creators and rulers of the universe[132]. We may not light lamps in their honour on sabbath-days, nor crowd round their temples in the early hours of the morning; we may not offer Jove a towel nor Juno a mirror[133]. Our service to them is to make ourselves like to them; he who would win their favour, must be a good man[134]. Wheresoever they call us, we must follow with gladness, for they are wiser than we[135]. Without God we must attempt nothing, but we must always reflect, examine ourselves, and seek to learn the divine will[136]. We came here when it pleased God, and we must depart when he shall please[137]. ‘So live,’ says the Stoic teacher, ‘with your fellow-men, as believing that God sees you: so hold converse with God, as to be willing that all men should hear you[138].’ FOOTNOTES [1] e.g. Theodor Mommsen, _Roman History_ iii 432 (Dickson’s translation). [2] ‘omnino dividunt nostri totam istam de dis immortalibus quaestionem in partes quattuor. primum docent esse deos; deinde quales sint; tum, mundum ab iis administrari; postremo, consulere eos rebus humanis’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 1, 3. [3] ‘λόγον, quem deum [Zeno] nuncupat’ Lact. _ver. sap._ 9 (Arnim i 160); ‘rationem deum vocat Zeno’ Min. Felix 19, 10 (_ib._); ‘[Zeno] rationem quandam, per omnem naturam rerum pertinentem, vi divina esse adfectam putat’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 36. [4] ἀρχὴν θεὸν τῶν πάντων, σῶμα ὄντα τὸ καθαρώτατον, ὑπέθεντο ὅ τε Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων Hippol. _Phil._ 21 (Arnim ii 1029). [5] τὸ δι’ ὅλου κεχωρηκὸς πνεῦμα θεὸν δογματίζουσιν Theoph. _Autol._ i 4 (Arnim ii 1033). [6] ‘ille est prima omnium causa, ex qua ceterae pendent’ Sen. _Ben._ iv 7, 2; ‘hic est causa causarum’ _N. Q._ ii 45, 2. [7] ‘[Chrysippus ait] ea quae natura fluerent et manarent [divina esse], ut aquam et terram et aera’ Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 39. [8] ‘[Chrysippus] deum ait ignem praeterea esse’ _ib._; ‘et deum ipsum ignem putavit [Zeno]’ August. _adv. Ac._ iii 17, 38 (Arnim i 157); τὸν θεὸν πῦρ νοερὸν εἰπόντες Euseb. _pr. ev._ 15 (Arnim ii 1050). [9] οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνων μέν φησι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν Diog. L. vii 148; ‘Cleanthes ipsum mundum deum dicit esse’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 37; ‘vis illum vocare mundum? non falleris’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 45, 3; ‘quid est deus? quod vides totum et quod non vides totum; solus est omnia’ _ib._ i Prol. 13; ‘Iuppiter est quodcunque vides quocunque moveris’ Lucan _Phars._ ix 580. [10] Arnim ii 1037 and 1039. [11] ‘Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 41, 126. [12] ‘Cleanthes ... solem dominari et rerum potiri putat’ _ib._ [13] ‘[Zeno] astris idem [sc. vim divinam] tribuit’ _N. D._ i 14, 36; ‘[Cleanthes] divinitatem omnem tribuit astris’ _ib._ 14, 37. [14] ‘tibi licet hunc auctorem rerum nostrarum compellare’ Sen. _Ben._ iv 7, 1. [15] ‘rectorem custodemque universi’ _N. Q._ ii 45, 1; ‘stant beneficio eius omnia’ _Ben._ iv 7, 1. [16] Arnim i 532. [17] ‘[Chrysippus] ait vim divinam esse positam in universae naturae animo atque mente’ Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 39; ‘quid est deus? mens universi’ Sen. _N. Q._ i Prol. 13; cf. Arnim i 157. [18] Arnim iii Ant. 35; ‘hunc eundem et fatum si dixeris, non mentieris’ Sen. _Ben._ iv 7, 2. [19] ‘quid aliud est natura quam deus?’ _ib._ 1. [20] ‘[Chrysippus] deum dicit esse necessitatem rerum futurarum’ Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 39; cf. Arnim ii 1076. [21] οὔτε βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλο τι μεῖζον | οὔτε θεοῖς, ἢ κοινὸν ἀεὶ νόμον ἐν δίκῃ ὑμνεῖν Cleanthes _Hymn_ 38, 39; ‘naturalem legem [Zeno] divinam esse censet’ Cic. _N. D._ i 14, 36. [22] ‘[Chrysippus] legis perpetuae et aeternae vim, quae quasi dux vitae atque magistra officiorum sit, Iovem dicit esse’ _ib._ 15, 40. [23] ‘[Chrysippus] homines etiam eos, qui immortalitatem essent consecuti [deos dicit esse]’ _ib._ 15, 39; ‘Persaeus ... inventa ipsa divina dicit’ _ib._ 15, 38. [24] ‘Antisthenes populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse [dicit]’ _ib._ i 13, 32. [25] κύδιστ’ ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε ... Ζεῦ Cleanthes _Hymn_ 1 and 2; ‘Stoici dicunt non esse nisi unum deum et unam eandemque potestatem, quae pro ratione officiorum variis nominibus appellatur’ Servius _ad Verg. Georg._ i 5 (Arnim ii 1070). [26] οἱ μὲν γενητοὶ εἶναι καὶ φθαρτοὶ [λέγονται], οἱ δ’ ἀγένητοι Plut. _Sto. rep._ 38, 5 (quoting from Chrysippus). [27] Galen _qual. inc._ 6 (Arnim ii 1056). [28] ‘ne hoc quidem [illi altissimi viri] crediderunt, Iovem, qualem in Capitolio et in ceteris aedibus colimus, mittere manu fulmina, sed eundem quem nos Iovem intellegunt, rectorem custodemque universi, animum ac spiritum mundi, operis huius dominum et artificem, cui nomen omne convenit ... idem Etruscis visum est’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 45, 1 and 3. [29] See above, § 97. [30] ‘hominum sator atque deorum’ _Aen._ i 254, and so _passim_. [31] ‘tum pater omnipotens fecundis imbribus Aether | coniugis in gremium laetae descendit, et omnes | magnus alit, magno commixtus corpore, fetus’ Virgil _Georg._ ii 335-327. [32] This seems undoubtedly to be the meaning underlying the corrupt text of Cleanthes _Hymn_ 4; Pearson well compares κοινωνίαν δ’ ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους (scil. θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων) διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν Euseb. _praep. ev._ xv 15. See above, § 97. [33] οὐρανὸς δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐσχάτη περιφέρεια, ἐν ᾗ πᾶν ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον Diog. L. vii 138; ..., ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖ ἐστι τὸ κυριώτατον μέρος τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῆς Corn. _N. D._ 8. [34] [Χρύσιππός φησι] παιδαριωδῶς λέγεσθαι καὶ γράφεσθαι καὶ πλάττεσθαι θεοὺς ἀνθρωποειδεῖς, ὃν τρόπον καὶ πόλεις καὶ ποταμούς Philod. _de piet._ 11 (Arnim ii 1076); ‘est aliquid in illo Stoici dei, iam video; nec cor nec caput habet’ Sen. _Apoc._ 8, 1. [35] ‘Stoici negant habere ullam formam deum’ Lact. _de ira_ 18 (Arnim ii 1057). [36] In connexion with the association of God with the universe we may say (but only in a secondary sense) that God has spherical form; ἰδίαν ἔχει μορφὴν τὸ σφαιροειδές Frag. Herc. p. 250 (Arnim ii 1060); ‘quae vero vita tribuitur isti rotundo deo?’ Cic. _N. D._ i 10, 24. [37] πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες, οὐκ ἔχον μὲν μορφήν, μεταβάλλον δ’ εἰς ὃ βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον πᾶσιν Aët. _plac._ i 6, 1. [38] See above, § 242, note 20. [39] θεὸν νοοῦμεν ζῷον μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ εὐποιητικὸν ἀνθρώπων Plut. _Sto. rep._ 38, 3. A similar definition is given in Diog. L. vii 147 as indicating the view of the Stoics generally. [40] ‘inter omnes omnium gentium sententia constat; omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum, esse deos’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 4, 12; ‘nec ulla gens usquam est adeo extra leges moresque proiecta, ut non aliquos deos credat’ Sen. _Ep._ 117, 6. [41] See above, § 158. [42] οὐ γὰρ πλῆθος ἔχει συνετὴν κρίσιν οὔτε δικαίαν | οὔτε καλήν Cleanthes apud Clem. Al. _Strom._ v 3 (Arnim i 559). [43] See below, § 294. [44] ‘videmus ceteras opiniones fictas atque vanas diuturnitate extabuisse ... quae [enim] anus tam excors inveniri potest, quae illa quae quondam credebantur apud inferos portenta, extimescat? opinionum enim commenta delet dies’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 2, 5. [45] As for instance Cicero does (following Posidonius) _N. D._ ii 5, 13. [46] See above, § 158. [47] ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου Sext. _math._ ix 93, see § 149. [48] See the next note. [49] ‘si di non sunt, quid esse potest in rerum natura homine melius? in eo enim solo ratio est, qua nihil potest esse praestantius’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 6, 16. [50] ‘si enim’ inquit [Chrysippus] ‘est aliquid in rerum natura, quod potestas humana efficere non possit; est certe id, quod illud efficit, homine melius. atqui res caelestes ab homine confici non possunt. est igitur id, quo illa conficiuntur, homine melius. id autem quid potius dixeris quam deum?’ _ib._ [51] ‘et tamen ex ipsa hominum sollertia esse aliquam [mundi] mentem, et eam quidem acriorem et divinam, existimare debemus. unde enim haec homo arripuit? ut ait apud Xenophontem Socrates’ _ib._ 18. [52] ‘esse autem hominem, qui nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se putet, insipientis arrogantiae est’ _ib._ 16. [53] See above, § 83. [54] ‘placet enim illi [sc. Epicuro] esse deos, quia necesse sit praestantem esse aliquam naturam, qua nihil sit melius’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 17, 46. See however Mayor’s note. [55] ‘tantum vero ornatum mundi, tantam varietatem pulchritudinemque rerum caelestium ... si non deorum immortalium domicilium putes, nonne plane desipere videare? an ne hoc quidem intellegimus, omnia supera esse meliora, terram autem esse infimam, quam crassissimus circumfundat aer?’ etc. Cic. _N. D._ ii 6, 17. For the original argument of Chrysippus see Sext. _math._ ix 86 (Arnim ii 1014). [56] ‘haec ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 7, 19. Here cf. Sext. _math._ ix 78 to 85 (Arnim ii 1013). [57] Cic. _N. D._ ii 37, 93. [58] The third in the exposition of Cleanthes: ‘tertiam [causam dixit Cleanthes esse], quae terreret animos fulminibus tempestatibus ... pestilentia terrae motibus’ _ib._ 5, 14. [59] ‘quartam causam esse, eamque vel maximam, conversionem caeli’ _ib._ 5, 15. [60] Arnim ii 1019. [61] ‘[non] in hunc furorem omnes mortales consensissent adloquendi surda numina et inefficaces deos, nisi nossemus illorum beneficia’ Sen. _Ben._ iv 4, 2. [62] Sext. _math._ ix 123 (Arnim ii 1017). [63] _ib._ 133 (Arnim i 152). Pearson (Z. 108) describes the argument as a ‘transparent sophistry’; but at the present time there is a widespread tendency towards its revival; see Höffding, _Philosophy of Religion_, ch. iii. [64] Xen. _Mem._ i 1, 2. [65] Cic. _Div._ i 5, 9 and 6, 10. [66] _ib._ 3, 6; Diog. L. vii 149. [67] Divination is based upon the συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων (_continuatio coniunctioque naturae_), Cic. _Div._ ii 69, 142. See also Epict. _Disc._ i 14, and above, § 248. [68] ‘[Tuscis] summa est fulgurum persequendorum scientia’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 32, 2. [69] ‘non ullo saecula dono | nostra carent maiore deum, quam Delphica sedes | quod siluit’ Lucan _Phars._ v 111-113; cf. 86-96. [70] Epict. _Disc._ ii 7, 3 and 4. The Stoic belief in divination is very severely criticized by Zeller: ‘these vagaries show in Stoicism practical interests preponderating over science’ _Stoics_, etc. p. 280. But the belief in μαντική is traced back to Zeno and Cleanthes, who were hardly ‘practical’ men in the sense in which Zeller seems to use the word. [71] See above, § 245. [72] See above, § 209. [73] Cic. _N. D._ ii 30, 77. [74] ‘[di immortales] nec volunt obesse nec possunt. natura enim illis mitis et placida est’ Sen. _Dial._ iv 27, 1; ‘di aequali tenore bona sua per gentes populosque distribuunt, unam potentiam sortiti, prodesse’ _Ben._ vii 31, 4. [75] ‘Faune, Nympharum fugientum amator, | per meos fines et aprica rura | lenis incedas, abeasque parvis | aequus alumnis’ Hor. _C._ iii 18, 1-4. [76] ‘tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum’ Lucr. _R. N._ i 102. [77] ‘Does the Zeus at Olympia lift up his brow? No, his look is fixed as becomes him who is ready to say—Irrevocable is my word and shall not fail’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 8, 26 (quoting from Hom. _Il._ i 526). [78] ‘sic vestras hallucinationes fero quemadmodum Iuppiter ineptias poetarum, quorum alius illi alas imposuit, alius cornua; alius adulterum illum induxit et abnoctantem, alius saevum in deos, alius iniquum in homines, alius parricidam et regni alieni paternique expugnatorem’ Sen. _Dial._ vii 26, 6. [79] This feeling finds expression at Rome as far back as the times of Hannibal; ‘hoc scelesti illi in animum inducunt suum, | Iovem se placare posse donis, hostiis; | et operam et sumptum perdunt’ Plaut. _Rud._ 22 to 24. [80] ‘[Chrysippus] disputat aethera esse eum, quem homines Iovem appellarent’ Cic. _N. D._ i 15, 40. [81] ‘aer autem, ut Stoici disputant, Iunonis nomine consecratur ... effeminarunt autem eum Iunonique tribuerunt, quod nihil est eo mollius’ _ib._ ii 26, 66. [82] ‘quoniam tenuitate haec elementa paria sunt, dixerunt esse germana’ Serv. _ad Verg. Aen._ i 47 (Arnim ii 1066). [83] Rival philosophers in the earlier times, and the church fathers later, concurred in reviling Chrysippus because he extended this principle of interpretation to a ‘disgraceful’ representation found in Argos or Samos, in which Hera receives the divine seed in her mouth; yet Christian antiquity was about to absorb the similar notion of the conception of the Virgin Mary through the ear (‘quae per aurem concepisti’ in an old Latin hymn). Chrysippus of course rightly estimated the absurdity of criticising cosmic processes as if they were breaches of social decency, and by so doing relieved the pious souls of his own day from a real source of distress. See Arnim ii 1071-1074. [84] Cic. _N. D._ ii 26, 66. [85] _ib._ i 15, 40 and ii 26, 66. [86] ‘Proserpinam, quam frugum semen esse volunt absconditamque quaeri a matre fingunt’ _ib._ [87] _ib._ 27, 68. [88] καὶ ὁ χρόνος δὲ τοιοῦτόν τί ἐστι· δαπανᾶται γὰρ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τὰ γινόμενα ἐν αὐτῷ Cornutus _N. D._ 6. The castration of Uranus by Cronus is thus explained by the Stoics: ‘caelestem naturam, id est igneam, quae per sese omnia gigneret, vacare voluerunt ea parte corporis, quae coniunctione alterius egeret ad procreandum’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 24, 64. [89] Justin _Apol._ i 64 (Arnim ii 1096). [90] Sen. _Ben._ i 3, 9. [91] Aët. _plac._ i 6, 13. [92] φασὶ δὲ εἶναι καί τινας δαίμονας ἀνθρώπων συμπάθειαν ἔχοντας, ἐπόπτας τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων Diog. L. vii 151. [93] ‘ásya [váruṇasya] spáśo ná ní miṣanti bhūrṇayaḥ’ Rigv. ix 73, 4. [94] τρὶς γὰρ μυρίοι εἰσὶν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ | ἀθάνατοι Ζηνὸς φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων Hes. _Op. et Di._ 252, 253; see also § 33. [95] ‘et alia signa de caelo ad terram accidunt; | qui’st imperator divum atque hominum Iuppiter, | is nos per gentis hic alium alia disparat, | hominum qui facta mores pietatem et fidem | noscamus’ Plaut. _Rud._ 8-12. [96] καὶ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖ τὸ τοὺς Διοσκούρους ἀγαθούς τινας εἶναι δαίμονας “σωτῆρας εὐσέλμων νεῶν” Sext. _math._ ix 86 (Arnim ii 1014); ‘clarum Tyndaridae sidus ab infimis | quassas eripiunt aequoribus rates’ Hor. _C._ iv 8, 31 and 32. [97] φαύλους δαίμονας ἀπέλιπε Χρύσιππος Plut. _def. orac._ 17. [98] καθάπερ οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον οἴονται φιλόσοφοι φαῦλα δαιμόνια περινοστεῖν, οἷς οἱ θεοὶ δημίοις χρῶνται κολασταῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀνοσίους καὶ ἀδίκους ἀνθρώπους _qu. Rom._ 51. [99] Arnim ii 1101. [100] ‘Posidonius censet homines somniare, quod plenus aer sit immortalium animorum’ Cic. _Div._ i 30, 64. [101] ‘Genius, natale comes qui temperat astrum | naturae deus humanae, mortalis in unum | quodque caput’ Hor. _Ep._ ii 2, 187-189; ‘sepone in praesentia, quae quibusdam placent, uni cuique nostrum paedagogum dari deum, ex eorum numero quos Ovidius ait “de plebe deos”’ Sen. _Ep._ 110, 1; ‘Zeus has placed by every man a guardian, every man’s daemon, to whom he has committed the care of the man; a guardian who never sleeps, is never deceived’ Epict. _Disc._ i 14, 12. M. Aurelius identifies this daemon with the principate (_To himself_ v 27). [102] Aët. _plac._ i 6, 9 and 15; Cic. _N. D._ ii 24, 62. [103] Arnim i 264. The feeling is reflected by Lucan: ‘estne dei sedes, nisi terra et pontus et aër, | et caelum et virtus? superos quid quaerimus ultra?’ _Phars._ ix 578-9. [104] ‘Varro dicit antiquos Romanos plus annos centum et septuaginta deos sine simulacro coluisse: “quod si adhuc mansisset, castius di observarentur”’ August. _Civ. De._ iv 31. [105] ‘ne in victimis quidem deorum est honor’ Sen. _Ben._ i 6, 3. [106] ‘To make libations and to sacrifice and to offer first-fruits according to the custom of our fathers, purely and not meanly nor scantily nor above our ability, is a thing which belongs to all to do’ Epict. _Manual_ 31, 5. [107] ‘si conferre volumus nostra cum externis; ceteris rebus aut pares aut etiam inferiores reperiemur, religione, id est cultu deorum, multum superiores’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 3, 8. [108] See above, § 250. [109] ὄφρ’ ἂν τιμηθέντες ἀμειβώμεσθά σε τιμῇ, | ὑμνοῦντες τὰ σὰ ἔργα διηνεκές, ὡς ἐπέοικε _Hymn_ 36, 37. [110] περὶ τοίνυν τῆς διὰ τ(ῶν μου)σικῶν (τ)οῦ θείου τει(μῆς εἴρη)ται μὲν αὐτάρκως καὶ πρότερον Philod. _mus._ iv 66 (Arnim iii Diog. 64). [111] ‘cultus autem deorum est optimus idemque castissimus atque sanctissimus plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura integra incorrupta et mente et voce veneremur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 28, 71. [112] Epict. _Disc._ i 16, 17. [113] _ib._ iii 5, 10. [114] _ib._ i 16, 15. [115] See above, § 121. [116] ‘non sunt ad caelum elevandae manus, nec exorandus aedituus, ut nos ad aurem simulacri admittat; prope est a te deus’ Sen. _Ep._ 41, 1. [117] ‘turpissima vota dis insusurrant; si quis admoverit aurem, conticescent’ _ib._ 10, 5. [118] Sen. _Dial._ x 11, 1. [119] _ib._ xi 4, 2. [120] _Ben._ ii 14, 5. [121] _ib._ vi 38, 1. [122] _Ep._ 32, 4. [123] ‘etiamnunc optas, quod tibi optavit nutrix tua aut paedagogus aut mater? o quam inimica nobis sunt vota nostrorum!’ Sen. _Ep._ 60, 1. [124] ‘se quisque consulat et in secretum pectoris sui redeat et inspiciat, quid tacitus optaverit. quam multa sunt vota, quae etiam sibi fateri pudet! quam pauca, quae facere coram teste possimus!’ _Ben._ vi 38, 5. [125] This sentiment we can trace back to the time of Plautus: ‘stulti hau scimus frustra ut simus, quom quid cupienter dari | petimus nobis: quasi quid in rem sit possimus noscere’ Plautus _Pseud._ 683-5. [126] Epict. _Disc._ ii 16, 42. [127] _Manual_ 8. [128] Sen. _Dial._ v 36, 2. He describes his practice with naïve detail: ‘cum sublatum e conspectu lumen est et _conticuit uxor_ moris mei iam conscia, totum diem meum scrutor’ _ib._ 3. [129] Epict. _Disc._ iii 10, 2 and 3 (Long’s transl.). [130] ‘quomodo sint di colendi, solet praecipi’ Sen. _Ep._ 95, 47. [131] ‘non enim philosophi solum, verum etiam maiores nostri superstitionem a religione separaverunt’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 28, 71. [132] ‘primus est deorum cultus deos credere, deinde reddere illis maiestatem suam, reddere bonitatem, sine qua nulla maiestas est; scire illos esse, qui praesident mundo’ Sen. _Ep._ 95, 50. [133] _ib._ 95, 47. [134] ‘vis deos propitiare? bonus esto. satis illos coluit, quisquis imitatus est’ _ib._ 95, 50. [135] ‘You must believe that you have been placed in the world to obey them, and to yield to them in everything which happens, and voluntarily to follow it as being accomplished by the wisest intelligence’ Epict. _Manual_ 31, 1. [136] _Disc._ iii 22, 53 (compare Long’s transl. ii p. 83). [137] _ib._ iii 26, 30. [138] ‘sic vive cum hominibus, tanquam deus videat; sic loquere cum deo, tanquam homines audiant’ Sen. _Ep._ 10, 5.