CHAPTER XI.

THE KINGDOM OF THE SOUL. [Sidenote: Man a part of the universe.] =262.= From the contemplation of the universe as a whole, both from the purely scientific standpoint in the study of physics, and from the more imaginative point of view in the dogmas of religion, we now pass on to the more intimate study of the individual man, consisting of body and soul. In its main outlines the Stoic theory has already been sketched. Thus it follows from the monistic standpoint that man is not ultimately an ‘individual’ or unit of the universe; for the universe itself is the only true unit, and a man is a part of it which cannot even for a moment break itself off completely from the whole. It is therefore only in a secondary and subordinate sense, and with special reference to the inculcation of ethics, that we can treat Zeno or Lucilius as separate and independent beings. Again, when we say that man ‘consists of body and soul,’ we are merely adopting popular language; for body and soul are ultimately one, and differ only in the gradation of spirit or tone which informs them. Then we have already learnt in dialectics that the highest power of man is that of ‘assent’ or free choice, which is displayed in every exercise of reason; and the same power, though in a different aspect, is at work in every moral act. The doctrine of the universe is based upon the postulate that it is a living rational being on the largest scale; and it follows, that each man is a ‘microcosm,’ and contains in himself a complete representation of the universe in miniature. Lastly, we see that man takes his place in the universe, a little lower than gods and daemons, and as greatly higher than animals as these in their turn surpass plants and inanimate objects; and that his nature, considered as composite, includes all the varying gradations of spirit to which these orders correspond within the universe. In all his parts alike the divine element is immanent and it binds them together in a coherent unity (συμπάθεια τῶν μέρων). It remains for us to put together from these and like points of departure a complete picture of human nature. [Sidenote: The soul’s kingdom.] =263.= To indicate the general trend of Stoic thought on this subject we propose the title ‘the kingdom of soul.’ Starting with the popular distinction between body and soul, we find that the biologist and the physician alike are preoccupied with the study of the body, that is, of physiology. Only as an afterthought and supplement to their work are the functions of soul considered; and they are treated as far as possible by the methods suggested by the study of the body. All this is reversed in the Stoic philosophy. The study of the soul stands in the front, and is treated by methods directly suggested by observation of the soul’s functions. The body is not entirely ignored, but is considered of comparatively small importance. Further, the soul itself is manifold, and is likened to a State, in which all is well if the governing part have wisdom and benevolence proportionate to its power, and if the lower parts are content to fulfil their respective duties; but if the balance of the State is upset, all becomes disorder and misery[1]. Lastly, this kingdom is itself a part of a greater whole, namely of the Cosmopolis or universal State. By the comparison with a kingdom we are also directed towards right moral principle. For as the citizen of Corinth or Sparta ought not to repine because his city is of less grandeur than Athens, so no man should be anxious because his external opportunities are limited. He has a kingdom in his own mind and soul and heart. Let him be content to find his happiness in rightly administering it. [Sidenote: Man a picture of the universe.] =264.= The doctrine that man is a representation or reflection of the universe is of unknown antiquity. It seems to be clearly implied by the teaching of Heraclitus, in so far as he lays it down that both the universe and man are vivified and controlled by the Logos[2]. The technical terms ‘macrocosm’ (μέγας κόσμος) and ‘microcosm’ (μικρὸς κόσμος), are, as we have seen, employed by Aristotle[3]. But even if we suppose that this conception is a commonplace of Greek philosophy, it is in Stoicism alone that it is of fundamental importance, and knit up with the whole framework of the system. And accordingly we find that all the Stoic masters laid stress upon this principle. The words of Zeno suggest to Cicero that ‘the universe displays all impulses of will and all corresponding actions just like ourselves when we are stirred through the mind and the senses[4].’ Cleanthes used the dogma of the soul of the universe to explain the existence of the human soul as a part of it[5]. Chrysippus found a foundation for ethics in the doctrine that man should study and imitate the universe[6]. Diogenes of Babylon says boldly that God penetrates the universe, as soul the man[7]; and Seneca that the relation of God to matter is the same as that of the soul to the body[8]. It is little wonder therefore if by Philo’s time the analogy had become a commonplace, and philosophers of more than one school were accustomed to say that ‘man is a little universe, and the universe a big man[9].’ God is therefore the soul of the universe[10]; on the other hand the soul is God within the human body[11], a self-moving force encased in relatively inert matter, providence at work within the limitations of natural necessity. [Sidenote: Soul and body.] =265.= The dualism of body and soul appears in a sharply defined shape in Persism, and upon it depends the popular dogma of the immortality of the soul, which (as we have already noticed) reached the Greco-Roman world from a Persian source[12]. It appears to be rooted in the more primitive ways of thinking termed ‘Animism’ and ‘Spiritism,’ in which men felt the presence both in natural objects and within themselves of forces which they conceived as distinct beings. According to this system a man’s soul often assumes bodily shape, and quits his body even during life, either in sleep or during a swoon; sometimes indeed it may be seen to run away and return in the shape of a mouse or a hare. At death it is seen to leave the man as a breath of air, and to enter the atmosphere. But besides his soul a man possesses a shadow, a likeness, a double, a ghost, a name; and all these in varying degrees contribute to form what we should call his personality. In the animistic system the soul survives the man, and why not? But this survival is vaguely conceived, and only credited so far as the evidence of the senses supports it. Its formulation in the doctrine of immortality belongs to a more advanced stage of human thought[13]. [Sidenote: Soul and body are one.] =266.= This dualistic conception could be and was incorporated in the Stoic system to the same extent as the dualism of God and matter, but no further. Ultimately, as we have already learnt, soul and body are one; or, in the language of paradox, ‘soul is body[14].’ This follows not only from the general principles of our philosophy, but also specifically from observation of the facts of human life. ‘The incorporeal,’ argued Cleanthes, ‘cannot be affected by the corporeal, nor the corporeal by the incorporeal, but only the corporeal by the corporeal. But the soul is affected by the body in disease and in mutilation, and the body by the soul, for it reddens in shame and becomes pale in fear: therefore the soul is body[15].’ And similarly Chrysippus argues: ‘death is the separation of soul from body. Now the incorporeal neither joins with nor is separated from body, but the soul does both. The soul therefore is body[16].’ This doctrine is commonly adduced as evidence of the ‘materialism’ of the Stoics: yet the Stoics do not say that ‘soul is matter,’ and (as we shall see) they explain its workings upon principles quite different to the laws of physics or chemistry. The essential unity of body and soul follows also from the way in which we acquire knowledge of them. For we perceive body by the touch; and we learn the workings of the soul by a kind of touch, called the inward touch (ἐντὸς ἁφή)[17]. [Sidenote: Mind, soul and body.] =267.= Having realised that the division of man into soul and body is not ultimate, we may more easily prepare ourselves to make other divisions. A division into three parts, (i) body, (ii) soul or life (ψυχή, _anima_), and (iii) mind (νοῦς, _animus_), was widely accepted in Stoic times, and in particular by the school of Epicurus; the mind being that which man has, and the animals have not[18]. The Stoics develope this division by the principle of the microcosm. Mind is that which man has in common with the deity; life that which he has in common with the animals; growth (φύσις, _natura_), that which he has in common with the plants, as for instance is shown in the hair and nails[19]. Man also possesses cohesion (ἕξις, _unitas_) but never apart from higher powers. Further these four, mind, soul, growth, and cohesion, are not different in kind, but all are spirits (πνεύματα) which by their varying degrees of tension (τόνος, _intentio_) are, to a less or greater extent, removed from the divine being, the primal stuff. In this sense man is not one, nor two, but multiple, as the deity is multiple[20]. [Sidenote: The soul is fire and air.] =268.= The soul in its substance or stuff is fire, identical with the creative fire which is the primal stuff of the universe[21]. But the popular conception, according to which the soul is air or breath, and is seen to leave the body at death, is also not without truth[22]. There is a very general opinion that the soul is a mixture of fire and air, or is hot air[23]. By this a Stoic would not mean that the soul was a compound of two different elements, but that it was a variety of fire in the first stage of the downward path, beginning to form air by relaxation of its tension: but even so this form of the doctrine was steadily subordinated to the older doctrine of Heraclitus, that the soul is identical with the divine fire. Formally the soul is defined, like the deity himself, as a ‘fiery intelligent spirit[24]’; and in this definition it would seem that we have no right to emphasize the connexion between the word ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα) and its original meaning ‘breath,’ since the word has in our philosophy many other associations. It is further a Stoic paradox that ‘the soul is an animal,’ just as God is an animal. But the soul and the man are not on that account two animals; all that is meant is that men and the brutes, by reason of their being endowed with soul, become animals[25]. [Sidenote: The temperaments.] =269.= According to another theory, which is probably not specifically Stoic, but derived from the Greek physicians, the soul is compounded of all four elements in varying proportion, and the character of each soul (subject, in the Stoic theory, to the supreme control of reason[26]) is determined by the proportion or ‘temperament’ (κρᾶσις, _temperatura_) of the four elements. There are accordingly four temperaments, the fervid, the frigid, the dry, and the moist, according to the preponderance of fire, air, earth, and water respectively[27]. Dull and sleepy natures are those in which there is an excess of the gross elements of earth and water[28]; whilst an excess of cold air makes a man timorous, and an excess of fire makes him passionate[29]. These characters are impressed upon a man from birth and by his bodily conditions, and within the limits indicated above are unalterable[30]. The ‘temperaments’ have always been a favourite subject of discussion in popular philosophy[31]. [Sidenote: The soul’s parts.] =270.= The characteristic attribute of the soul is that it is self-moved (αὐτοκίνητον)[32]. Although in this point the Stoics agree with Plato, they do not go on to name life as another attribute, for they do not agree with the argument of the _Phaedo_ that the soul, having life as an inseparable attribute, is incapable of mortality. We pass on to the dispositions of the soul, which correspond to its ‘parts’ in other philosophies, and are indeed often called its parts. But the soul has not in the strict sense parts[33]; what are so called are its activities[34], which are usually reckoned as eight in number, though the precise reckoning is of no importance[35]. The eight parts of the soul are the ruling part or ‘principate[36],’ the five senses, and the powers of speech and generation. The seven parts or powers other than the principate are subject to it and do its bidding, so that the soul is, as we have called it, a kingdom in itself. These seven parts are associated each with a separate bodily organ, but at the same time each is connected with the principate. They may therefore be identified with ‘spirits which extend from the principate to the organs, like the arms of an octopus[37],’ where by a ‘spirit’ we mean a pulsation or thrill, implying incessant motion and tension. The principate itself, that is the mind, is also a spirit possessed of a still higher tension; and the general agreement of the Stoics places its throne conveniently at the heart and in the centre of the body[38]. Accordingly Posidonius defined the soul’s parts as ‘powers of one substance seated at the heart[39].’ [Sidenote: Aspects of the principate.] =271.= If we now fix our attention on the principate itself, we find it no more simple than the universe, the deity, the man, or the soul. In particular it resembles the deity in that, although essentially one, it is called by many names. It is the soul in its reasoning aspect, the reason, the intellect (λογικὴ ψυχή, νοῦς, διάνοια)[40]; it is also the ‘ego,’ that is, the will, the energy, the capacity for action[41]. It is in one aspect the divinity in us, world-wide, universal; in another the individual man with his special bent and character; so that we may even be said to have two souls in us, the world-soul and each man’s particular soul[42]. The principate becomes also in turn each of the other functions or parts of the soul, for each of them is an aspect of the principate (ἡγεμονικόν πως ἔχον)[43]. In addition the principate has many titles of honour, as when Marcus Aurelius terms it the Pilot[44], the King and Lawgiver[45], the Controller and Governor[46], the God within[47]. [Sidenote: The principate as reason.] =272.= Although for the purpose of discussion we may distinguish between reason and will, they are in fact everywhere intermingled. Thus the principate as the reasoning part of the soul includes the powers of perception, assent, comprehension, and of reason in the narrower sense, that is, the power of combining the various conceptions of the mind, so as ultimately to form a consistent system[48]. But amongst these powers assent is equally an act of the will; and on the other hand the judgments formed by the reasoning mind are not purely speculative, but lead up to action; so that it is the reasoning power which must be kept pure, in order that it may duly control the soul’s inclinations and aversions, its aims and shrinkings, its plans, interests and assents[49]. If in the Stoic theory the greater emphasis always appears to be laid on the reason, it is the more necessary in interpreting it to bear in mind that we are speaking of the reason of an active and social being. [Sidenote: The principate as will.] =273.= The maintenance of the principate as will in a right condition is the problem of ethics; and it is important to understand what this right condition is. The answer is to be found in a series of analogies, drawn from all departments of philosophy. Thus from the standpoint of physics the right condition is a proper strain or tension, as opposed to slackness or unsteadiness[50]. In theology it is the agreement of the particular will with the divine or universal will[51]. From the point of view of the will itself it is the strength and force (ἰσχὺς καὶ κράτος) of the will, the attitude that makes a man say ‘I can[52].’ Again it is that state of the soul which corresponds to health in the body[53]; and in a quiet mood the Stoic may describe it as a restful and calm condition[54]. Finally, if the soul as a whole is compared to a State, the principate in its function as the will may at its best be compared to a just and kind sovereign; but if this aim is missed, it may turn into a greedy and ungovernable tyrant[55]. [Sidenote: The principate, divine and human.] =274.= The principate, as it is of divine origin[56], and destined, as we shall see, to be re-absorbed in the deity, may rightly be called god: it is a god making its settlement and home in a human body[57]: it keeps watch within over the moral principle[58]. In the language of paradox we may say to each man, ‘You are a god[59].’ Of this principle we see the proof in that man interests himself in things divine[60], and in it we find the first incentive to a lofty morality[61]. As however the deity is not conceived in human form, and is not subject to human weaknesses, there comes a point at which, in the study of the human principate, we part company with the divine; and this point we reach both when we consider the principate with regard to its seven distinctly human manifestations, and when we consider its possible degradation from the standard of health and virtue. We now turn to the seven parts or powers of the human soul which are subordinate to the reasoning faculty. [Sidenote: Powers of the principate.] =275.= The first five powers of the principate are those which are recognised in popular philosophy as the ‘five senses.’ To materialistic philosophers nothing is plainer than that these are functions of the body; is it not the eye which sees, and the ear which hears[62]? This the Stoic denies. The eye does not see, but the soul sees through the eye as through an open door. The ear does not hear, but the soul hears through the ear. Sensation therefore is an activity of the principate, acting in the manner already described in the chapter on ‘Reason and Speech[63].’ The soul is actively engaged, and sends forth its powers as water from a fountain; the sense-organs are passively affected by the objects perceived[64]. Subject to this general principle, sensation (αἴσθησις, _sensus_) may be variously defined. It is ‘a spirit which penetrates from the principate to the sensory processes’; it includes alike the mind-picture (φαντασία, _visum_), that is, the first rough sketch which the mind shapes when stimulated by the sense-organ; the assent (συγκατάθεσις, _adsensus_), which the mind gives or refuses to this sketch; and the final act of comprehension (κατάληψις, _comprehensio_) by which this assent is sealed or ratified[65]. Of these the middle stage is the most important, so that we may say paradoxically ‘sense is assent[66].’ Only in a secondary and popular way can we use the word sensation to denote the physical apparatus of the sensory organs (αἰσθητήρια), as when we say of a blind man ‘he has lost the sense of sight[67].’ [Sidenote: The five senses.] =276.= The nature of sensation is more particularly described in the case of sight and hearing. In the first case there proceed from the eyes rays, which cause tension in the air, reaching towards the object seen[68]; this tension is cone-shaped, and as the distance from the pupil of the eye increases, the base of the cone is increased in size, whilst the vigour of the sight diminishes. This human activity effects vision of itself in one case; for we say ‘darkness is visible,’ when the eye shoots forth light at it, and correctly recognises that it is darkness[69]. But in complete vision there is an opposing wave-motion coming from the object, and the two waves become mutually absorbed: hence Posidonius called sight ‘absorption’ (σύμφυσις)[70]. Similarly, in the case of hearing, the pulsation (which, as we have seen, comes in the first instance from the principate) spreads from the ear to the speaker, and (as is now more distinctly specified) from the speaker to the hearer; this reverse pulsation being circular in shape, like the waves excited on the surface of a lake by throwing a stone into the water[71]. Of the sensations of smell, taste and touch we only hear that they are respectively (i) a spirit extending from the principate to the nostrils, (ii) a spirit extending from the principate to the tongue, and (iii) a spirit extending to the surface of the body and resulting in the easily-appreciated touch of an object[72]. [Sidenote: Other activities.] =277.= The Stoic account of the functions of the soul displayed in the ordinary activities of life is either defective or mutilated; for even a slight outline of the subject should surely include at least breathing, eating (with drinking), speech, walking, and lifting. We need not however doubt that these, equally with the five senses, are all ‘spirits stretching from the principate’ to the bodily organs. This is expressly stated of walking[73]. Of all such activities we must consider voice to be typical, when it is described as the sixth function of the soul. Voice is described as ‘pulsating air[74],’ set in motion by the tongue[75]; but we can trace it back through the throat to some source below, which we can without difficulty identify with the heart, the seat of the principate[76]. The voice is indeed in a special relationship to the principate, since the spoken word is but another aspect of the thought which is expressed by it[77]. [Sidenote: Procreation.] =278.= The seventh and last of the subordinate powers of the soul, according to the Stoics, is that of procreation. This part of their system is of great importance, not only for the study of human nature, but even in a higher degree for its indirect bearing upon the question of the development of the universe through ‘procreative principles’ (σπερματικοὶ λόγοι), or, as we have termed them above, ‘seed powers[78].’ That all things grow after their kind is of course matter of common knowledge; no combination of circumstances, no scientific arrangement of sustenance can make of an acorn anything but an oak, or of a hen’s egg anything but a chicken. But in the common view this is, at least primarily, a corporeal or material process; whereas the Stoics assert that it is not only a property of the soul, but one so primary and fundamental that it must be also assumed as a first principle of physical science. Before approaching the subject from the Stoic standpoint, it may be well to see how far materialistic theories, ancient and modern, can carry us. [Sidenote: Heredity.] =279.= Lucretius finds this a very simple matter: ‘Children often resemble not only their parents, but also their grandparents and more remote ancestors. The explanation is that the parents contain in their bodies a large number of atoms, which they have received from their ancestors and pass on to their descendants. In the chance clashing of atoms in procreation Venus produces all kinds of effects, bringing about resemblances between children and their forebears, not only in the face and person, but also in the look, the voice, and the hair[79].’ This account has a generally plausible sound until we bear in mind that it is the fundamental property of atoms that, though their own variety is limited, they can form things in infinite variety by changes in their combination and arrangement. They are like the letters out of which words, sentences, and poems are made up; and we can hardly expect to reproduce the voice or the spirit of an Aeschylus by a fresh shuffling of the letters contained in the _Agamemnon_. On the contrary, seeing that the atoms contained in the bodies of parents have largely been drawn from plants and animals, we could confidently reckon upon finding the complete fauna and flora of the neighbourhood amongst their offspring. Lucretius in effect postulates in his theory that particular atoms have a representative and creative character, passing from father to child in inseparable association with the marks of the human race, and endowed with a special capacity of combining with other like atoms to form the substratum of specifically human features. In giving his atoms these properties he is insensibly approximating to the Stoic standpoint. [Sidenote: Modern theories.] =280.= Modern biologists deal with this subject with the minuteness of detail of which the microscope is the instrument, and with the wealth of illustration which results from the incessant accumulation of ascertained facts. But they are perhaps open to the criticism that where they reach the borders of their own science, they are apt to introduce references to the sciences of chemistry and physics as explaining all difficulties, even in regions to which these sciences do not apply. The following account is taken from one of the most eminent of them: ‘Hertwig discovered that the one essential occurrence in impregnation is the coalescence of the two sexual cells and their nuclei. Of the millions of male spermatozoa which swarm round a female egg-cell, only one forces its way into its plasmic substance. The nuclei of the two cells are drawn together by a mysterious force which we conceive as a _chemical sense-activity akin to smell_, approach each other and melt into one. So there arises through the sensitiveness of the two sexual nuclei, _as a result of erotic chemotropism_, a new cell which unites the inherited capacities of both parents; the spermatozoon contributes the paternal, the egg-cell the maternal characteristics to the primary-cell, from which the child is developed[80].’ In another passage the same author sums up his results in bold language from which all qualifications and admissions of imperfect knowledge have disappeared: ‘Physiology has proved that all _the phenomena of life may be reduced to chemical and physical processes_. The cell-theory has shown us that all the complicated phenomena of the life of the higher plants and animals may be deduced from the simple physico-chemical processes in the elementary organism of the microscopic cells, and the material basis of them is the plasma of the cell-body[81].’ [Sidenote: Their inadequacy.] =281.= These utterances may be considered typical of modern materialistic philosophy in its extreme form. We may nevertheless infer from the references to a ‘mysterious force,’ ‘chemical sense-activity akin to smell,’ and ‘erotic chemotropism,’ that the analogies to biological facts which the writer finds in chemical science stand in need of further elucidation. We may notice further that the ‘atom’ has entirely disappeared from the discussion, and that the ‘material basis’ of the facts is a ‘plasma’ or ‘plasmic substance,’ something in fact which stands related to a ‘protoplasm’ of which the chemical and physical sciences know nothing, but which distinctly resembles the ‘fiery creative body’ which is the foundation of the Stoic physics. Further we must notice that the old problem of ‘the one and the many’ reappears in this modern description; for the cell and its nucleus are neither exactly one nor exactly two, but something which passes from two to one and from one to two; further the nuclei of the two cells, being drawn together, coalesce, and from their union is developed a ‘new cell’ which unites the capacities of its ‘parents.’ Modern science, therefore, although it has apparently simplified the history of generation by reducing it to the combination of two units out of many millions that are incessantly being produced by parent organisms, has left the philosophical problem of the manner of their combination entirely unchanged. In these microscopic cells is latent the whole physical and spiritual inheritance of the parents, whether men, animals or plants, from which they are derived; just as the atoms of Epicurus possess the germ of free will[82], so the cells of Haeckel smell and love, struggle for marriage union, melt away in each other’s embrace, and lose their own individuality at the moment that a new being enters the universe. [Sidenote: Creation and procreation.] =282.= If then the phenomena of reproduction are essentially the same, whether we consider the relations of two human beings or those of infinitesimal elements which seem to belong to another order of being, we are already prepared for the Stoic principle that the creation of the universe is repeated in miniature in the bringing into life of each individual amongst the millions of millions of organic beings which people it. From this standpoint we gain fresh light upon the Stoic theory of creation, and particularly of the relation of the eternal Logos to the infinite multitude of procreative principles or ‘seed-powers.’ Again, it is with the general theory of creation in our minds that we must revert to the Stoic explanation of ordinary generation. This is to him no humble or unclean function of the members of the body; it is the whole man, in his divine and human nature, that is concerned[83]. The ‘procreative principle’ in each man is a part of his soul[84]; ‘the seed is a spirit’ (or pulsation) ‘extending from the principate to the parts of generation[85].’ It is an emanation from the individual in which one becomes two, and two become one. Just as the human soul is a ‘fragment’ of the divine, so is the seed a fragment torn away, as it were, from the souls of parents and ancestors[86]. [Sidenote: Motherhood.] =283.= In the seed is contained the whole build of the man that is to be[87]. It is therefore important to know whether the procreative principle in the embryo is derived from one or both parents, and if the latter, whether in equal proportion. The Stoics do not appear to have kept entirely free from the common prepossession, embodied in the law of paternal descent, according to which the male element is alone active in the development of the organism; and so they allege that the female seed is lacking in tone and generative power[88]. On the other hand observation appeared to them to show that children inherit the psychical and bodily qualities of both parents, and the general tendency of their philosophy was towards the equalization of the sexes. On the whole the latter considerations prevailed, so that the doctrine of Stoicism, as of modern times, was that qualities, both of body and soul, are inherited from the seed of both parents[89]; wherein the possibility remains open, that in particular cases the debt to one parent may be greater than to the other[90]. [Sidenote: Impulses.] =284.= The Stoic psychology is in its fundamental principles wholly distinct from that of Plato; which does not at all prevent its exponents, and least of all those like Panaetius and Posidonius who were admirers of Plato, from making use of his system as an auxiliary to their own. Plato divided the soul into three parts; the rational part, the emotional (and volitional) part, and the appetitive[91]. Both the two latter parts need the control of the reason, but the emotional part inclines to virtue, the appetitive to vice[92]. The rational part, as with the Stoics, is peculiar to man; the other two are also possessed by the animals, and the appetitive soul even by plants. The Stoics do not however seriously allow any kinship between virtue and the emotions, and they deal with this part of the subject as follows. Nature has implanted in all living things certain impulses which are directed towards some object. An impulse towards an object is called ‘appetite’ (ὁρμή, _appetitus_ or _impetus_); an impulse to avoid an object is called ‘aversion’ (ἀφορμή, _alienatio_)[93]. In man appetite should be governed by reason; if this is so, it becomes ‘reasonable desire’ (ὄρεξις εὔλογος, _recta appetitio_)[94]; if otherwise, it becomes ‘unreasonable desire’ (ὄρεξις ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ) or ‘concupiscence’ (ἐπιθυμία, _libido_). To living things lower in the scale than man terms that are related to reason can of course not apply. [Sidenote: Will and responsibility.] =285.= Practical choice is, according to the Stoics, exactly analogous to intellectual decision. Just as the powers of sensation never deceive us[95], so also the impulses are never in themselves irrational[96]. An impulse is an adumbration of a course of action as proper to be pursued[97]; to this the will gives or refuses its assent[98]. It is the will, and the will only, which is liable to error, and this through want of proper tone and self-control. If there is this want, it appears in a false judgment, a weak assent, an exaggerated impulse; and this is what we call in ethics a perturbation[99]. A healthy assent leads up to a right action: a false assent to a blunder or sin. Hence we hold to the Socratic paradox that ‘no one sins willingly’ (οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει); for the true and natural will cannot sin; it must first be warped to a false judgment and weakened by slackness of tone. We can equally use the paradox that ‘every voluntary action is a judgment of the intellect,’ or (in few words) that ‘virtue is wisdom’ (φρόνησις ἡ ἀρετή). In such views we find a starting-point for dealing with the problems of ethics, including those of the ethical ideal or supreme good, its application to daily duties, and its failure through ignorance or weakness of soul. [Sidenote: The body.] =286.= We pass on to consider the body, but at no great length; partly because many functions often considered as bodily are by the Stoics treated as belonging to the soul (as sensations and impulses), partly because the study of the body is rather the task of the physician than of the philosopher. In the body we may notice separately (i) the bones, sinews, and joints, constituting the framework on which the whole is built up; (ii) the surface, including beauty of outline and features, and (iii) the complexion, which suffuses a glow over the surface and most attracts the attention[100]. No absolute distinction can be made between body and soul. Generally speaking, we may say that body is composed of the two grosser elements, earth and water, whilst soul (as we have seen) rests on the two higher elements of air and fire[101]; of the gradations of spirit body possesses distinctively (but not exclusively) that of coherence (ἕξις), whilst it shares with the soul the principle of growth (φύσις)[102]. Yet these contrasts are after all only secondary. As surely as soul is body so body is soul, and divinity penetrates into its humblest parts. In its practical applications Stoicism dwells so little on the body that the wise man seems hardly conscious of its existence. [Sidenote: ‘The flesh.’] =287.= Side by side with the strictly Stoic view of the body we find in all the Roman literature another conception which is strongly dualistic, and which we cannot but think to be drawn from some non-Stoic source[103]. According to this view the body, often called the ‘flesh,’ is essentially evil[104]; it is the prison-house of the soul[105], the source of corruption of the will[106], the hindrance to a clear insight of the intelligence. In the language picturesquely adopted in the _Pilgrim’s Progress_ (after St Paul), it is a burden which the enlightened man longs to shake off[107]. For the body so understood we find abusive names; it is the husk in which the grain is concealed[108], the ass from which the owner should be ready to part at any moment[109]. This language tends to be exaggerated and morbid, and leads in practice to asceticism[110]. It appealed in ancient as in modern times to a widespread sentiment, but is not reconcileable with the main teaching of the Stoic philosophy. [Sidenote: Dignity of the body.] =288.= According to the true Stoic view, the body is a dwelling-place or temple inhabited for a time by the principate, its divinity[111]. Therefore the body as such is deserving of respect, even of veneration[112]. In particular the erect form of the human body is a mark of divine favour, by which it is hinted that man is fitted to contemplate the operations of the heavens[113]. The whole framework of the body, from the organs of sensation to those by which we breathe, swallow, and digest, is a masterpiece of divine skill, and an evidence of the care of providence for man[114]. And even as an architect provides that those parts of the house which are offensive to sight and smell should be out of sight, so has nature hidden away those parts of the body which are necessarily offensive, at a distance from the organs of sense[115]. The Stoic conception of the dignity of the body is symbolized in practical ethics by the culture of the beard, in which is latent the broad principle of attention to the cleanliness and healthy development of every part of the body. It is a mark of the Oriental associations of Stoicism that this respect for the body is never associated with the Hellenic cult of the body as displayed in art and gymnastics. [Sidenote: Junction of soul and body.] =289.= Having now studied man in all his parts, it is time to consider how those parts are compacted together, how man grows and decays, and what varieties of mankind exist. First then the principate is combined with the lower functions of the soul, and every part of the soul, by the process of interpenetration (σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖ)[116]; or (from a slightly different point of view) upon body which has cohesion (ἕξις) is overlaid growth, on growth soul, and on soul reason; so that the higher tension presupposes the lower, but not _vice versa_. In the act of generation the soul loses its higher tensions; and consequently the embryo possesses neither human nor animal soul, but only the principles of cohesion and growth. It is in fact a vegetable[117], but necessarily differs from other vegetables in having the potentiality of rising to a higher grade of spirit[118]. At the moment of birth its growth-power (φύσις) is brought into contact with the cold air, and through this chill it rises to the grade of animal life, and becomes soul (ψυχή from ψῦξις)[119]. This etymological theory provokes the ridicule of opponents, who do not fail to point out that soul, standing nearer to the divine fire than growth, ought to be produced by warmth rather than by coolness; but the Stoics probably had in mind that contact with either of the two higher elements must raise the gradation of spirit. The infant, according to this theory, is an animal, but not yet a man; it has not the gift of reason[120]. To attain this higher stage there is need both of growth from within, and of association with reasonable beings without; in these ways reason may be developed in or about the seventh year[121]. In the whole of its growth the soul needs continually to be refreshed by the inbreathing of air, and to be sustained by exhalations from the blood[122]. Here we touch upon one of those fundamental doctrines of the system, derived by Zeno from Heraclitus[123], which bind together the great and the little world. Just as the heavenly bodies are maintained by exhalations from the Ocean[124], so the soul is dependent upon the body for its daily food. Hence follows the important consequence that weakness and disease of the body react upon the soul; the philosopher must keep his body in health for the soul’s good, if for no other reason[125]. If the Stoics in discussing problems of ethics constantly maintain that the health of the soul is independent of that of the body, such statements are paradoxical and need qualification[126]. [Sidenote: Sleep and death.] =290.= The mutual action of body and soul is most readily illustrated by sleep. The Stoics do not hold, as the Animists do, that the soul quits the body in sleep; nor do they agree with another popular view, that the soul then quits the extremities of the body and concentrates itself at the heart[127]. Sleep is due to a relaxation, contraction, or weakening of the spirit[128]; a lowering of its grade, which nevertheless is clearly no sign of ill health. In old age there is often an imperfection of the reason, and this is also seen in the sick, the tired, and the anaemic[129]. In death there is a complete relaxation of tone in the breath that we can feel, that is, in such spirit as belongs to the body[130]; there follows the separation of soul from body. [Sidenote: The beyond.] =291.= We are thus brought to the critically important question of the existence of the soul after death. On this point we shall not expect to find that all Stoic teachers agree in their language. In Zeno himself we shall be sure to find that variety of suggestion which is accounted for by his eagerness to learn from all sources; and later writers will also differ according to their respective inclinations either to draw strictly logical conclusions from the Stoic physics, or to respect the common opinion of mankind and to draw from it conclusions which may be a support to morality[131]. These variations need not discourage us from the attempt to trace in general outline the common teaching of the school. We have already seen that the various parts of the Stoic system are not bound together by strictly logical processes; where two conclusions appear contradictory, and yet both recommend themselves to the judgment, the Stoics are not prepared to sacrifice either the one or the other, but always seek to lessen, if they cannot altogether remove, the difficulties which stand in the way of accepting both. On the other hand, we need not too readily admit the charge of insincerity, whether it is found in the candid admission of its temptations by Stoic teachers[132], or in the less sympathetic criticisms of ancient or modern exponents of the system[133]. [Sidenote: The Stoic standpoint.] =292.= On certain points all Stoic teachers seem to be agreed; first that the soul is, as regards its substance, imperishable; secondly, that the individual soul cannot survive the general conflagration[134]; lastly, that it does not of necessity perish with the body[135]. The first two dogmas follow immediately from the fundamental principles of the Stoic physics, and point out that every soul will find its last home by being absorbed in the divine being. The third dogma leaves play for ethical principles; subject to the monistic principle of an ultimate reconciliation, there is room for some sharp distinction between the destiny of good and bad souls, such as stands out in the Persian doctrine of rewards and punishments after death. And so we find it generally held that the souls of the good survive till the conflagration, whilst those of the wicked have but a short separate existence, and those of the lower and non-rational animals perish with their bodies[136]. If this difference in duration will satisfy the moral sense, the nature of the further existence of the soul may be determined on physical principles. [Sidenote: The released soul.] =293.= In the living man the soul, as we have already seen reason to suppose, derives its cohesion (ἕξις) and shape from its association with the body. Separated from the body, it must assume a new shape, and what should that be but the perfect shape of a sphere[137]? Again, the soul being compounded of the elements of air and fire must by its own nature, when freed from the body, pierce through this murky atmosphere, and rise to a brighter region above, let us say to that sphere which is just below the moon[138]. Here then souls dwell like the stars, finding like them their food in exhalations from the earth[139]. Here they take rank as daemons or heroes (of such the air is full), and as such are joined in the fulfilment of the purposes of divine providence[140]. Yet it must be admitted that this bright destiny, if substantiated by the laws of physics, is also subject to physical difficulties. Suppose for instance that a man is crushed by the fall of a heavy rock; his soul will not be able to escape in any direction, but will be at once squeezed out of existence[141]. To fancies of this kind, whether attractive or grotesque, we shall not be inclined to pay serious attention. [Sidenote: Tartarus.] =294.= In this general theory hope is perhaps held out before the eyes of good souls, but there is little to terrify the wicked, even if it be supposed that their souls neither survive so long, nor soar so high, as those of the good[142]. As against it we are told by a Church Father that Zeno accepted the Persian doctrine of future rewards and punishments, and with it the primitive belief in an Inferno in its crudest form[143]. We must agree with the first English editor of the fragments of Zeno that ‘it is hardly credible that Zeno can have attached any philosophical importance to a theory stated in these terms[144]’; they can at the best only have occurred in some narration in the style of the Platonic myths, intended to illustrate a principle but not to convey a literal truth[145]. For just as the whole Hellenistic world, including the Stoics, stood aloof from the Persian doctrine of a spirit of evil, so it firmly rejected the dogma of a hell. Lucretius makes it a principal argument in favour of the philosophy of Epicurus that it drives out of men’s hearts the fear of Tartarus[146]; but writers partly or wholly Stoic are not less emphatic. ‘Ignorance of philosophy,’ says Cicero, ‘has produced the belief in hell and its terrors[147].’ In the mouth of the representative of Stoicism he places the words ‘Where can we find any old woman so silly as to believe the old stories of the horrors of the world below?[148]’ ‘Those tales’ says Seneca ‘which make the world below terrible to us, are poetic fictions. There is no black darkness awaiting the dead, no prison-house, no lake of fire or river of forgetfulness, no judgment-seat, no renewal of the rule of tyrants[149].’ [Sidenote: Purgatory of Virgil.] =295.= Of far more importance to us is the theory of purgatory familiar through the description in Virgil’s _Aeneid_: ‘In the beginning the earth and the sky, and the spaces of night, Also the shining moon, and the sun Titanic and bright Feed on an inward life, and, with all things mingled, a mind Moves universal matter, with Nature’s frame is combined. Thence man’s race, and the beast, and the feathered creature that flies, 5 All wild shapes that are hidden the gleaming waters beneath. Each elemental seed has a fiery force from the skies, Each its heavenly being, that no dull clay can disguise, Bodies of earth ne’er deaden, nor limbs long destined to death. Hence their fears and desires, their sorrows and joys; for their sight, 10 Blind with the gloom of a prison, discerns not the heavenly light. Nor, when life at last leaves them, do all sad ills, that belong Unto the sinful body, depart; still many survive Lingering within them, alas! for it needs must be that the long Growth should in wondrous fashion at full completion arrive. 15 So due vengeance racks them, for deeds of an earlier day Suffering penance; and some to the winds hang viewless and thin, Searched by the breezes; from others the deep infection of sin Swirling water washes, or bright fire purges, away. Each in his own sad ghost we endure; then, chastened aright, 20 Into Elysium pass. Few reach to the fields of delight Till great time, when the cycles have run their courses on high, Takes the inbred pollution, and leaves to us only the bright Sense of the heaven’s own ether, and fire from the springs of the sky[150].’ Although we cannot accept Virgil as a scientific exponent of Stoic teaching, yet there is much reason to suppose that he is here setting forth a belief which met with very general acceptance in our school, and of which the principle is that the sufferings of the disembodied are not a punishment for past offences, but the necessary means for the purification of the soul from a taint due to its long contact with the body. [Sidenote: Probable Stoic origin.] =296.= The language in which Virgil first describes the creation and life of the universe closely resembles that of Stoicism; the phrases ‘elemental seed,’ ‘fiery force,’ ‘heavenly being’ might be used by any Stoic teacher. The conception of the body as a ‘prison-house,’ even though it does not express the most scientific aspect of Stoic physics, was nevertheless, as we have seen, familiar to Stoics of the later centuries. The ethical conception, again, of the doctrine of purgatory is exactly that of which the Stoics felt a need in order to reconcile the dualism of good and evil souls with the ultimate prevalence of the divine will. Again, we can have no difficulty in supposing that Virgil drew his material from Stoic sources, seeing that he was characteristically a learned poet, and reflects Stoic sentiment in many other passages of his works[151]. We have also more direct evidence. The Church Father whom we have already quoted not only ascribes to the Stoics in another passage the doctrine of purgatory, but expressly quotes this passage from Virgil as an exposition of Stoic teaching. And here he is supported to some extent by Tertullian, who says that the Stoics held that the souls of the foolish after death receive instruction from the souls of the good[152]. Finally, we have the doctrine definitely accepted by Seneca[153]. [Sidenote: Views of Greek Stoics.] =297.= We may now consider more particularly the views and feelings of individual Stoic teachers. It appears to us accordingly that Zeno left his followers room for considerable diversity of opinion, and quoted the Persian doctrine because of its suggestiveness rather than for its literal truth. Of Cleanthes we are told that he held that all souls survived till the conflagration, whilst Chrysippus believed this only of the souls of the wise[154]. Panaetius, although a great admirer of Plato, is nevertheless so strongly impressed by the scientific principle that ‘all which is born must die,’ that he is here again inclined to break away from Stoicism, and to suspend his judgment altogether as to the future existence of the soul[155]; the belief in a limited future existence was meaningless to a philosopher who disbelieved in the conflagration. Of the views of Posidonius we have the definite hint, that he taught that the ‘air is full of immortal souls[156]’; and this is in such harmony with the devout temper of this teacher that we may readily believe that he enriched the somewhat bare speculations of his predecessors by the help of an Oriental imagination, and that he introduced into Stoicism not only the doctrine of daemons but also that of purgatory, holding that souls were both pre-existent and post-existent. [Sidenote: View of Seneca.] =298.= In the period of the Roman principate the question of the future existence of the soul acquires special prominence. Seneca is criticized on the ground that he affects at times a belief which he does not sincerely entertain, partly in order to make his teaching more popular, partly to console his friends in times of mourning. The facts stand otherwise. At no time does Seneca exceed the limits of the accepted Stoic creed; he bids his friends look forward to the period of purgation[157], the life of pure souls in the regions of the aether, and the final union with the divine being. It is after purgation that the soul by the refinement of the elements of which it is built forces its way to higher regions[158]; it finds a quiet and peaceful home in the clear bright aether[159]; it has cast off the burden of the flesh[160]; it is parted by no mountains or seas from other happy souls[161]; it daily enjoys free converse with the great ones of the past[162]; it gazes on the human world below, and on the sublime company of the stars in its own neighbourhood[163]. At a later epoch all blessed souls will be re-absorbed in the primal elements[164], suffering change but not forfeiting their immortal nature[165]. The somewhat exuberant language of Seneca has frequently been adopted by Christian writers, to express a belief which is not necessarily identical[166]; but for the associations thus created Seneca must not be held responsible. [Sidenote: Personality cannot survive.] =299.= With the decay of interest in the Stoic physics there begins a tendency to overlook the intermediate stage of the soul’s life, and to dwell solely on its final absorption; whilst at the same time it is urged from the ethical standpoint that no possible opinion as to the soul’s future should disturb the calm of the virtuous mind. On one further, but important, point the Stoic teaching becomes clearer. In no case is the soul that survives death to be identified with the man that once lived. Cut off from all human relations, from the body and its organs, and from its own subordinate powers[167], it is no longer ‘you,’ but is something else that takes your place in the due order of the universe. In all this the Stoic doctrine remains formally unchanged; but its expression is now so chastened that it seems only to give a negative reply to the inherited hope, and the chief comfort it offers is that ‘death is the end of all troubles.’ This change of tone begins in Seneca himself; it is he who says to the mourner ‘your loved one has entered upon a great and never-ending rest[168]’; ‘death is release from all pain and its end[169]’; ‘death is not to be. I know all its meaning. As things were before I was born, so they will be after I am gone[170].’ ‘If we perish in death, nothing remains[171].’ In Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius this new tone rings out much more clearly; if we like so to speak, more unrelentingly. To the characteristic passages from these writers which are quoted above[172] may be added the following, perhaps the most precise of all: ‘If souls survive death, how can the air hold them from all eternity? How, we reply, does earth hold the bodies of generation after generation committed to the grave? Just as on earth, after a certain term of survival, change and dissolution of substance makes room for other dead bodies, so too the souls transmuted into air, after a period of survival, change by processes of diffusion and of ignition, and are resumed into the seminal principle of the universe, and in this way make room for others to take up their habitation in their stead. Such is the natural answer, assuming the survival of souls[173].’ Such are the last words of Stoicism, not wholly satisfying either to knowledge or to aspiration, but assuredly based on a wide outlook and a keen discrimination. [Sidenote: Men and women.] =300.= The whole nature of man, as discussed up to this point, is common to every individual born into the world, with some exceptions dependent on age or temperament which have been explained incidentally. It remains to discuss shortly the important differences which result from sex, nationality, and location. There seems every reason to believe that the equality of men and women, though at the time seemingly paradoxical, was generally accepted by the earlier Stoics, and adopted as a practical principle in Stoic homes. The whole treatment of human nature by the Stoics applies equally to man and woman, and points to the conclusion that as moral agents they have the same capacities and the same responsibilities[174]. Seneca in writing to a great lady of philosophical sympathies states this as his firm conviction[175], and the lives of many Stoic wives and daughters (to whom we shall refer in a later chapter)[176] showed it to have a firm basis in fact. We need attach no great importance to those more distinctively masculine views which Seneca occasionally expresses, to the effect that woman is hot-tempered, thoughtless, and lacking in self-control[177], or to the Peripatetic doctrine that man is born to rule, women to obey[178]; for these sentiments, however welcome to his individual correspondents, were not rooted in Stoic theory nor exemplified in the Roman society of his own days. [Sidenote: Class and race.] =301.= It follows with equal certainty from the early history of Stoicism, and in particular from the doctrine of the Cosmopolis, that differences of class and race were hardly perceived by its founders. For this there was further historical cause in the spread of Hellenistic civilisation, which was of an entirely catholic spirit and welcomed disciples from all nationalities[179]. The doctrine of Aristotle, that some nations are by nature fitted only for slavery, finds no echo in the Stoic world[180]. There we look in vain for any trace of that instinctive feeling of national difference, that sensitiveness to race and colour, which can easily be recognised in the early history of Greece and Rome, and which has become so acute in the development of modern world-politics. The Roman Stoics, as we shall see later, might individually be proud of advantages of birth, but they never associated this feeling with their philosophy. Here and there, however, we find signs of a scientific interest in the question of differences of national character, which are generally ascribed to the influences of climate. Seneca, for instance, remarks that the inhabitants of northern climates have characters as rude as their sky; hence they make good fighters, but poor rulers[181]. Yet when he contemplates the northern barbarians, his mind is mainly occupied by admiration; and, like other pro-Germans of the period, he foresees with prophetic clearness a danger threatening the Roman empire. ‘Should the Germans once lay aside their fierce domestic quarrels, and add to their courage reason and discipline, Rome will indeed have cause to resume the virtues of its early history[182].’ The roots of true greatness of soul, then, lie deeper than in literary culture or philosophic insight. It is a part of the irony of history that Stoicism, which aimed above all things at being practical, should diagnose so correctly the growing weakness of the Roman world, and yet fail to suggest any remedy other than a reversion to an epoch in which philosophy was unknown. FOOTNOTES [1] ‘rex noster est animus: hoc incolumi cetera manent in officio, parent, obtemperant; cum ille paullum vacillavit, simul dubitant. ubi vero impotens, cupidus, delicatus est, fit tyrannus; tunc eum excipiunt adfectus impotentes’ Sen. _Ep._ 114, 24. [2] See L. Stein _Psych._ i p. 206. [3] See above, § 68. [4] ‘natura mundi omnes motus habet voluntarios conatusque et appetitiones, quas ὁρμάς Graeci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic adhibet ut nosmetipsi, qui animis movemur et sensibus’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 22, 58. [5] τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν δι’ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου διήκειν, ἧς μέρος μετέχοντας ἡμᾶς ἐμψυχοῦσθαι Hermias _irris. gent. phil._ 7 (Arnim i 495). [6] ‘ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 14, 37. [7] τὸν κόσμον περιέχειν τὸν Δία καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ψυχήν Philod. _piet._ 15 (Arnim iii _Diog._ 33). [8] ‘quem in hoc mundo locum deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus; quod est illic materia, id in nobis corpus est’ Sen. _Ep._ 65, 24. [9] Philo _rer. div._ i 494 M (Stein _Psych._ i 207). [10] See above, § 242. [11] See below, § 274. [12] See above, § 11. [13] On the whole subject see Tylor, _Anthropology_, ch. xvi; _Primitive Culture_, chs. xi-xvii; Jevons, _Introd. to the history of Religion_, ch. v. [14] See above, § 174. [15] Nemes. _nat. hom._ ii 85 and 86 (Arnim i 518). [16] _ib._ 99 (Arnim ii 790). [17] Here we come into close touch with modern ways of thinking. The soul is the self as known subjectively and from within, as appealed to in the argument of Descartes ‘cogito, ergo sum.’ The body is the self as known objectively and from without, first in our neighbours who obstruct our efforts (‘officium quod corporis exstat, | officere atque obstare’ Lucr. _R. N._ i 337, 8), and then by analogy in ourselves. The Stoic theory then asserts that subjective and objective knowledge are ultimately the same, both being activities of the same Logos. See above, § 149. [18] The distinction is most clearly made by Juvenal: ‘sensum a caelesti demissum traximus arce, | cuius egent prona et terram spectantia. mundi | principio indulsit communis conditor illis | tantum animas, nobis animum quoque, mutuus ut nos | adfectus petere auxilium et praestare iuberet’ _Sat._ xv 146-150. [19] See above, § 206. [20] See above, § 203. [21] ‘Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 10, 19. [22] ‘spiritum quippe animam esse Zenon quaerit hactenus; quo recedente a corpore moritur animal, hoc certe anima est. naturali porro spiritu recedente moritur animal; naturalis igitur spiritus anima est’ Chalc. _in Tim._ 220 (Arnim i 138). [23] ‘probabilius enim videtur, tale quiddam esse animum, ut sit ex igni atque anima temperatum’ Cic. _N. D._ iii 14, 36; cf. Arnim ii 786. This view was accepted by Panaetius: ‘is animus ... ex inflammata anima constat, ut potissimum videri video Panaetio’ _Tusc. disp._ i 18, 42. The ‘fire’ and ‘air’ here referred to are not the ordinary elements: οὐ γὰρ πᾶν πῦρ οὐδὲ πᾶν πνεῦμα ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν. μετά τινος οὖν ἔσται εἴδους ἰδίου καὶ λόγου καὶ δυνάμεως καί, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν, τόνου Alex. Aphr. _de anima_ p. 115, 6 (Arnim ii 785). See further Stein _Psychologie_ i pp. 101 to 103. [24] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ πνεῦμα νοερὸν θερμόν [τὴν ψυχήν] Aët. _plac._ iv 3, 3. [25] ‘animum constat animal esse, cum ipse efficiat, ut simus animalia; et cum ab illo animalia hoc nomen traxerint’ Sen. _Ep._ 113, 2; ‘et animus meus animal est et ego animal sum; duo tamen non sumus. quare? quia animus mei pars est’ _ib._ 5. [26] Tertullian deals with this point as against Valentinian heretics; _de an._ 21. [27] ‘cum elementa sint quattuor, ignis aquae aeris terrae, potestates pares his sunt, fervida frigida arida atque umida; eadem animalium hominumque discrimina sunt’ Sen. _Dial._ iv 19, 1 and 2; ‘cuius [in homine] elementi portio praevalebit, inde mores erunt’ _ib._ 2. [28] ‘languida ingenia et in somnum itura inertibus nectuntur elementis’ _ib._ i 5, 9. [29] ‘iracundos fervida animi natura faciet; frigidi mixtura timidos facit’ _ib._ iv 19, 2. [30] ‘quaecunque adtribuit condicio nascendi et corporis temperatura, haerebunt’ _Ep._ 11, 6. [31] For a treatment of the subject on modern lines see Ribot, _The emotions_, chs. xii and xiii; and the works of Fouillée, Paulhan, and other French writers. For the earlier history see Summers on Sen. _Ep._ 11, 3, and Stein _Psych._ i p. 175. [32] ψυχή ἐστι κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς σῶμα λεπτομερὲς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους Galen _def. med._ 29 (Arnim ii 780); ‘nosmetipsi qui animis movemur’ Cic. _N. D._ ii 22, 58; ‘humanus animus agilis est et pronus ad motus’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 2, 11. [33] μία ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις, ὡς τὴν αὐτήν πως ἔχουσαν ποτὲ μὲν διανοεῖσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ ὀργίζεσθαι [qu. ὀρέγεσθαι?] ποτὲ δ’ ἐπιθυμεῖν παρὰ μέρος Alex. Aph. _de anima_ p. 118 (Arnim ii 823). [34] ‘huiusmodi autem non tam partes animae habebuntur quam vires et efficaciae et operae’ Tert. _de an._ 14. They may also be called the soul’s qualities: οἱ ἀπὸ Χρυσίππου καὶ Ζήνωνος φιλόσοφοι τὰς μὲν δυνάμεις ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ποιότητας συμβιβάζουσι, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ὡς οὐσίαν προϋποκειμένην ταῖς δυνάμεσι τιθέασι Stob. i 49, 33. [35] See above, § 79; for other divisions Tert. _de an._ 14 (Arnim i 144), Cic. _Off._ i 28, 101, and generally Stein, _Psych._ i p. 123. [36] On this translation see § 101, note 81. [37] [ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ] ταῦτα πάντα ἐπιτέταται διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων προσφερῶς ταῖς τοῦ πολύποδος πλεκτάναις Aët. _plac._ iv 4, 4. [38] Arnim ii 838. Since many philosophers think the mind seated in the head, Chrysippus collects many arguments to the contrary; for instance that women say, when they don’t agree with a statement, ‘it won’t go down,’ pointing all the while to the heart, Galen _plac. Hipp. et Plat._ iii 5, p. 323 K (Arnim ii 892). Further that καρδία is derived from κράτησις, the heart being the seat of government _ib._ (Arnim ii 896). He could support his view by thousands of quotations from the poets. On the other hand we find the suggestion that the principate resides in our spherical heads, as in a universe (Aët. _plac._ iv 21, 4). This latter view may be due to Academic influence (Schmekel, p. 259). [39] δυνάμεις μιᾶς οὐσίας ἐκ τῆς καρδίας ὁρμωμένης Galen _plac. Hipp. et Plat._ p. 51 K. [40] τὸ λογιστικὸν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, ὃ καὶ ἰδίως ἡγεμονικὸν καλεῖται Alex. Aphr. _de an._ p. 98, 24 (Arnim ii 839). In this direction Epictetus defines the rational faculty as ‘that which contemplates both itself and all other things’ _Disc._ i 1, 4. [41] τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν κατὰ τοῦτο [τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν] δεικνύντες Galen _plac. Hipp. et Plat._ ii 2 p. 215 K. [42] ‘intellegendum est etiam, duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis, quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis; altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa’ Cic. _Off._ i 30, 107. [43] Arnim ii 823. [44] _To himself_ vii 64. [45] _ib._ iv 12. [46] _ib._ v 27. [47] _ib._ iii 5, v 10, xii 1; so too Epictetus ‘God is within, and your daemon is within’ _Disc._ i 14, 14. [48] See above, §§ 146-156. [49] ἔργα δὲ ψυχῆς ὁρμᾶν, ἀφορμᾶν, ὀρέγεσθαι, ἐκκλίνειν, παρασκευάζεσθαι, ἐπιβάλλεσθαι, συγκατατίθεσθαι. τί ποτ’ οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἔργοις ῥυπαρὰν παρέχον αὐτὴν καὶ ἀκάθαρτον; οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὰ μοχθηρὰ κρίματα αὐτῆς Epict. _Disc._ iv 11, 6 and 7. [50] ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχὺς τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ κρίνειν καὶ πράττειν ἢ μή Stob. ii 7 5b 4; ‘quaerimus quomodo animus semper secundo cursu eat’ Sen. _Dial._ ix 2, 4; ‘quidam se domi contrahunt, dilatant foris ac extendunt; vitium est haec diversitas et signum vacillantis animi ac nondum habentis tenorem suum’ _Ep._ 20, 3. [51] See above, § 96. [52] ‘satis natura homini dedit roboris, si illo utamur; nolle in causa est, non posse praetenditur’ Sen. _Ep._ 116, 8. [53] ‘animi motus eos putemus sanissimos validissimosque, qui nostro arbitrio ibunt, non suo ferentur’ _Dial._ iv 35, 2. [54] ‘hanc stabilem animi sedem Graeci εὐθυμίαν vocant, ego tranquillitatem voco’ _ib._ ix 2, 3. [55] _Ep._ 114, 24 (see above, § 263, note 1). [56] ‘non est [mens] ex terreno et gravi concreta corpore, ex illo caelesti spiritu descendit’ _Dial._ xii 7, 7; ‘ratio nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa’ _Ep._ 66, 12. [57] ‘animus, sed hic rectus bonus magnus ... quid aliud voces hunc quam deum in corpore humano hospitantem?’ _ib._ 31, 11. [58] ‘sacer inter nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator [et] custos’ _ib._ 41, 2. [59] ‘deum te igitur scito esse: si quidem deus est qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit’ Cic. _Rep._ vi (_Somn. Scip._) 24, 26. [60] Physics, and in particular astronomy, is meant: ‘[animus] hoc habet argumentum divinitatis suae, quod illum divina delectant; nec ut alienis sed ut suis interest’ Sen. _N. Q._ i Prol. 12; cf. Horace _Ep._ i 12, 14-19. [61] ‘When you are in social intercourse, when you are exercising yourself, when you are engaged in discussion, know you not that you are nourishing a god, that you are exercising a god? Wretch, you are carrying about a god with you, and you know it not.’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 8, 12. [62] ‘dicere porro, oculos nullam rem cernere posse, | sed per eos animum ut foribus spectare reclusis, | difficile est’ Lucr. _N. D._ iii 360-362; cf. Arnim ii 862. See also Cic. _N. D._ iii 4, 9, and Mayor’s valuable note. Modern psychologists side with the Stoics. [63] See above, § 146, note 18. [64] τὰ μὲν πάθη ἐν τοῖς πεπονθόσι τόποις, τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεις ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ Aët. _plac._ iv 23, 1. [65] See above, § 146, note 18. [66] αἰσθητικῇ γὰρ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσίς ἐστιν ἡ αἴσθησις Porph. _de anima_ (Arnim ii 74); ‘dicunt Stoici sensus ipsos adsensus esse’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 33, 108. [67] αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται ... καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια κατασκευή, καθ’ ἥν τινες πηροὶ γίνονται Diog. L. vii 52. [68] ‘Stoici causas esse videndi dicunt radiorum ex oculis in ea, quae videri queunt, emissionem aerisque simul intentionem’ Gell. _N. A._ v 16, 2; ‘Stoici videndi causam in nativi spiritus intentione constituunt, cuius effigiem coni similem volunt’ Chalc. _Tim._ 237 (Arnim ii 863). [69] Arnim ii 869. [70] Ποσειδώνιος γοῦν αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν ὄψιν) σύμφυσιν ὀνομάζει Aët. _plac._ iv 13, 3. [71] Diog. L. vii 158. [72] Arnim ii 836. [73] ‘Cleanthes [ambulationem] ait spiritum esse a principali usque in pedes permissum’ Sen. _Ep._ 113, 23. [74] ‘vocem Stoici corpus esse contendunt, eamque esse dicunt ictum aera’ Gellius _N. A._ v 15, 6. [75] ‘quid enim est vox nisi intentio aeris, ut audiatur, linguae formata percussu?’ Sen. _N. Q._ ii 6, 3. [76] ὁ λόγος ἐκεῖθεν ἐκπέμπεται, ὅθεν καὶ ἡ φωνή. ἡ δὲ φωνὴ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν κεφαλὴν τόπων ἐκπέμπεται, ἀλλὰ φανερῶς ἐκ κάτωθεν μᾶλλον Galen. _plac. Hipp. et Plat._ ii 5 p. 205 Müller. [77] See above, § 161. [78] See above, § 178. [79] Lucr. _R. N._ iv 1214-1220. [80] E. Haeckel, _Welträthsel_ (Volksausg.) p. 30. The italics are those of the author of this book. [81] _ib._ _Anmerkungen_, p. 158. [82] Though Lucretius laughs at the idea of attributing laughter and tears to the elements (‘hac ratione tibi pereunt primordia rerum: | fiet, uti risu tremulo concussa cachinnent, | et lacrumis salsis umectent ora genasque’ _R. N._ i 917-919), yet he attributes to them the essential power of free-will: ‘si ... nec declinando faciunt primordia motus | principium quoddam, quod fati foedera rumpat, | unde est haec, inquam, fatis avolsa voluntas?’ _R. N._ ii 253-257. [83] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ὅλου καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς φέρεσθαι τὰ σπέρματα Aët. _plac._ v. 11, 3; ‘When you consort with your wife ... you are carrying about a god with you’ Epict. _Disc._ ii 8, 12. [84] μέρη δὲ ψυχῆς λέγουσιν ... τοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν σπερματικοὺς λόγους Diog. L. vii 157. [85] τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν [μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς] τὸ μὲν λέγεται σπέρμα, ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸ πνεῦμά ἐστι διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι τῶν παραστατῶν Aët. _plac._ iv 21, 4; cf. Diog. L. vii 159. [86] τὸ δὲ σπέρμα φησὶν ὁ Ζήνων εἶναι ψυχῆς μέρος καὶ _ἀπόσπασμα_ καὶ τοῦ σπέρματος τοῦ τῶν προγόνων κέρασμα καὶ μῖγμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν συνεληλυθός Euseb. _pr. ev._ xv 20, 1 (Arnim i 128). That the separation or ‘tearing away’ (ἀπόσπασμα) is not complete or absolute seems to follow from the general principles of Stoic physics: see above § 262. [87] ‘in semine omnis futuri hominis ratio comprehensa est’ Sen. _N. Q._ iii 29, 3. [88] ‘utrum ex patris tantummodo semine partus nascatur, ut ... Stoici scripserunt’ Censor. _di. nat._ 5; cf. Diog. L. vii 159, Aët. _plac._ v 5, 2. [89] The evidence for this is mainly indirect. [ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης] οὐ μόνον, φησίν, ὅμοιοι τοῖς γονεῦσι γινόμεθα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν Nemes. _nat. hom._ ii 85 and 86 (Arnim i 518); ‘quod declaret eorum similitudo, qui procreentur; quae etiam in ingeniis, non solum in corporibus appareat’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ i 32, 79. [90] προΐεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα σπέρμα· κἂν μὲν ἐπικρατήσῃ τὸ τῆς γυναικός, ὅμοιον εἶναι τὸ γεννώμενον τῇ μητρί, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἀνδρός, τῷ πατρί Aët. _plac._ v 11, 4. [91] See above, § 63. [92] ‘inrationalis pars animi duas habet partes, alteram animosam ambitiosam impotentem positam in adfectionibus, alteram humilem languidam voluptatibus deditam’ Sen. _Ep._ 92, 8. [93] ‘appetitio (eam enim esse volumus ὁρμήν), qua ad agendum impellimur, et id appetimus quod est visum’ Cic. _Ac._ ii 8, 24. [94] This is termed by Panaetius ὄρεξις simply; the term ἐπιβολή is also used: see § 272, note 49. [95] See above, § 146. [96] Zeller (_Stoics_, p. 243) states that man has irrational as well as rational impulses. This seems to be incorrectly expressed. [97] φαντασία ὁρμητικὴ τοῦ καθήκοντος Stob. ii 7, 9. [98] ‘omne rationale animal nihil agit, nisi primum specie alicuius rei inritatum est, deinde impetum cepit, deinde adsensio confirmavit hunc impetum. quid sit adsensio dicam. oportet me ambulare: tunc demum ambulo, cum hoc mihi dixi et adprobavi hanc opinionem meam’ Sen. _Ep._ 113, 18. [99] δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος Diog. L. vii III; ‘omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et opinione’ Cic. _Tusc. disp._ iv 7, 14; ἀσθενῆ δὲ λέγουσι συγκατάθεσιν, ὅταν μηδέπω πεπεικότες ὦμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς Galen _de peccatis_ ii 1 p. 59 K (Arnim iii 172); ἔστι δ’ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ... ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα Diog. L. vii 110. [100] ‘in corpore nostro ossa nervique et articuli, firmamenta totius et vitalia, minime speciosa visu, prius ordinantur; deinde haec, ex quibus omnis in faciem adspectumque decor est. post haec omnia qui maxime oculos rapit, color, ultimus perfecto iam corpore adfunditur’ Sen. _Dial._ iv 1, 2. [101] See above, § 268. [102] ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν Galen _plac. Hipp. et Plat._ iii 1 p. 251 M, quoting Chrysippus (Arnim ii 885). [103] Schmekel traces the introduction of this doctrine to Posidonius, and finds in it the starting-point of the later mysticism, _Philos. d. mittl. Stoa_, pp. 400 sqq. See also L. Stein, _Psych._ i 194. [104] ‘nos corpus tam putre sortiti’ Sen. _Ep._ 120, 17; ‘inutilis caro et fluida, receptandis tantum cibis habilis, ut ait Posidonius’ _ib._ 92, 10. [105] ‘haec quae vides ossa circumiecta nobis, nervos et obductam cutem, voltumque et ministras manus, et cetera quibus involuti sumus, vincula animorum tenebraeque sunt. obruitur his animus, effocatur, inficitur, arcetur a veris et suis in falsa coniectus. omne illi cum hac carne grave certamen est’ Sen. _Dial._ vi 24, 5; ‘corpusculum hoc, custodia et vinculum animi’ _ib._ xii 11, 7. [106] ‘What am I? a poor miserable man with my wretched bit of flesh. Through this kinship with the flesh, some of us become like wolves’ Epict. _Disc._ i 3, 5 and 7. [107] ‘corpus hoc animi pondus et poena est’ Sen. _Ep._ 65, 16; ‘quantum per moras membrorum et hanc circumfusam gravem sarcinam licet’ _Dial._ xii 11, 6; ‘corporis velut oneris necessarii non amator sed procurator est’ _Ep._ 92, 33. [108] ‘Epicurus placed the good in the husk’ Epict. _Disc._ i 23, 1. [109] ‘You ought to possess your whole body as a poor ass loaded. When the body is an ass, all the other things are bits belonging to the ass, pack-saddles, shoes, barley, fodder’ _ib._ iv 1, 79 and 80. [110] In particular to the practice of self-mutilation, with which Seneca is disgusted: ‘cottidie comminiscimur, per quae virilitati fiat iniuria ... alius genitalia excidit’ Sen. _N. Q._ vii 31, 3. [111] ‘nec domum esse hoc corpus, sed hospitium et quidem breve hospitium’ Sen. _Ep._ 120, 14; ‘hoc [corpus] natura ut quandam vestem animo circumdedit’ _ib._ 92, 13. [112] ‘inter me teque conveniet corpus in honorem animi coli’ _ib._ 92,