Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, "Armour Plates" to "Arundel, Earls of"
87. The German army, strictly speaking, dates only from 1871, or at
706 words | Chapter 95
earliest 1866. Before the unification of the German empire or
confederation, the several states possessed distinct armies, federal
armies when required being formed from the contingents which the members
of the union, like those of an ordinary alliance, engaged to furnish.
The armies of the Holy Roman Empire were similarly formed from "single,"
"double," or "treble" contingents under the supreme command of specially
appointed field marshals of the Empire. In the troubles of 1848 there
was witnessed the curious spectacle of half of a victorious army being
unable to pursue the enemy; this, being composed of "Prussian" as
distinct from "federal contingent" troops, had to stop at the frontier
of another state. The events of 1866 and 1870 put an end to all this,
and to a very great extent to the separate armies of the old
confederation, all being now remodelled on Prussian lines. The Prussian
army therefore is at once the most important and historically the most
interesting of the forces of the German empire. Its _debut_ (about 1630)
was not satisfactory, and in the Thirty Years' War troops of Sweden, of
the Emperor, of the League, &c., plundered Brandenburg unharmed. The
elector, when appealed to for protection, could but answer, "Que faire?
Ils ont des canons." The humiliations of this time, were, however,
avenged by the troops of the next ruler of Brandenburg, called the Great
Elector. The supposed invincibility of the Swedes did not prevent him
from inflicting upon them a severe defeat at Fehrbellin, and thereafter
the Prussian contingents which took part in the many European wars of
the time acquitted themselves creditably. One of their generals was the
famous Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, and the reckless gallantry of this
leader was conspicuous on many fields, from Blenheim to Malplaquet. But
Leopold's greatest work was done in the years of peace (1715-40), during
which Prussia was preparing the army with which Frederick the Great won
his battles. He had introduced (about 1700) iron ramrods into the
infantry service, and for over twenty years the Prussian infantry was
drilled to a perfection which gave it a superiority of five to three
over the best-drilled troops of the Austrian service, and still greater
predominance over the French, which was then accounted the best in
Europe. Frederick William I., king of Prussia, directed and supervised
the creation of the new Prussian army, and Leopold was his principal
assistant. In organization and methods of recruiting, as well as in
tactical efficiency, the army of 1740 was equally pre-eminent. Then came
the wars of Frederick the Great. It is not too much to say that the
infantry won his earlier battles; the cavalry had been neglected both by
Frederick William and by Leopold, and Frederick wrote that "it was not
worth the devil's while to fetch it away." But the predominance of the
infantry was so far indisputable that Frederick was able to devote
himself to the reorganization of the mounted arm, with results which
appeared in the splendid victories of Hohenfriedberg, Rossbach, Leuthen
and Zorndorf. But long before the close of the Seven Years' War the
incomparable infantry of the old army had disappeared, to be replaced by
foreigners, deserters and vagabonds of all kinds, not to mention the
unwilling Saxon and other recruits forced into the king's service. The
army of 200,000 men which Frederick bequeathed to his successor was
indeed superb, and deserved to be the model of Europe. But with
Frederick's death the genius which had animated it, and which alone gave
value to such heterogeneous materials, was gone. The long peace had the
customary effect of sapping the efficiency of the long-service troops.
They still retained their imposing appearance and precision of movement,
and overweening self-confidence. But in 1806, after two crushing defeats
and a series of humiliating surrenders, Prussia found herself at the
feet of the conqueror, shorn of half her territory, obliged to receive
French troops in all her towns and fortresses, and only existing on
sufferance. But in these very disasters were laid the seeds of her
future greatness. By the treaty of Tilsit the Prussian army was limited
to 43,000 men. This limitation suggested to Scharnhorst "universal
service" on the _Krumper_[2] system already described (see S 36 above).
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