Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, "Armour Plates" to "Arundel, Earls of"
83. The last half of the 17th century is a brilliant period in the
825 words | Chapter 91
annals of the French armies. Thoroughly organized, animated by the
presence of the king, and led by such generals as Conde, Turenne,
Luxembourg, Catinat and Vendome, they made head against coalitions which
embraced nearly all the powers of Europe, and made France the first
military nation of Europe. The reverses of the later part of Louis
XIV.'s reign were not of course without result upon the tone of the
French army, and the campaigns of Marlborough and Eugene for a time
diminished the repute in which the troops of Louis were held by other
powers. Nevertheless the War of the Spanish Succession closed with
French victories, and generals of the calibre of Villars and Berwick
were not to be found in the service of every prince. The war of the
Polish Succession in Germany and Italy reflected no discredit upon the
French arms; and the German general staff, in its history of the wars of
Frederick the Great, states that "in 1740 the French army was still
regarded as the first in Europe." Since the death of Louvois very little
had changed. The army was still governed as it had been by the great war
minister, and something had been done to reduce evils against which even
he had been powerless. A royal regiment of artillery had come into
existence, and the engineers were justly regarded as the most skilful in
Europe. Certain alterations had been made in the organization of both
the guard and the line, and the total strength of the French in peace
was somewhat less than 200,000. Relatively to the numbers maintained in
other states, it was thus as powerful as before. Indeed, only one
feature of importance differentiated the French army from its
contemporaries--the proportion of officers to men, which was one to
eleven. In view of this, the spirit of the army was necessarily that of
its officers, and these were by no means the equals of their
predecessors of the time of Turenne or Luxembourg. Louvois' principle of
employing professional soldiers for command and wealthy men for
colonelcies and captaincies was not deliberately adopted, but inevitably
grew out of the circumstances of the time. The system answered fairly
whilst continual wars gave the professional soldiers opportunities for
distinction and advancement. But in a long peace the captains of
eighteen and colonels of twenty-three blocked all promotion, and there
was no work save that of routine to be done. Under these conditions the
best soldiers sought service in other countries, the remainder lived
only for pleasure, whilst the titular chiefs of regiments and companies
rarely appeared on parade. Madame de Genlis relates how, when young
courtiers departed to join their regiments for a few weeks' duty, the
ladies of the court decked them with favours, as if proceeding on a
distant and perilous expedition.
On the other hand, the fact that the French armies required large drafts
of militia to bring up their regular forces to war strength gave them a
vitality which was unusual in armies of the time. Even in the time of
Louis XIV. the military spirit of the country had arisen at the threat
of invasion, and the French armies of 1709 fought far more desperately,
as the casualty lists of the allies at Malplaquet showed, than those of
1703 or 1704. In the time of the Revolution the national spirit of the
French army formed a rallying-point for the forces of order, whereas
Prussia, whose army was completely independent of the people, lost all
power of defending herself after a defeat in the field. It is difficult
to summarize the conduct of the royal armies in the wars of 1740-63.
With a few exceptions the superior leaders proved themselves
incompetent, and in three great battles, at least, the troops suffered
ignominious defeat (Dettingen 1743, Rossbach 1757, Minden 1759). On the
other hand, Marshal Saxe and others of the younger generals were
excellent commanders, and Fontenoy was a victory of the first magnitude.
The administration, however, was corrupt and inefficient, and the
general reputation of the French armies fell so low that Frederick the
Great once refused an important command to one of his generals on the
ground that his experience had been gained only against French troops.
Under Louis XVI. things improved somewhat; the American War and the
successes of Lafayette and Rochambeau revived a more warlike spirit.
Instruction was more carefully attended to, and a good system of drill
and tactics was elaborated at the camp of St Omer. Attempts were made to
reform the administration. Artillery and engineer schools had come into
existence, and the intellectual activity of the best officers was
remarkable (see Max Jahns, _Gesch. der Kriegswissenschaften_, vol. iii.
passim). But the Revolution soon broke over France, and the history of
the royal army was henceforward carried on by that revolutionary army,
which, under a new flag, was destined to raise the military fame of
France to its greatest height.
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