Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, "Armour Plates" to "Arundel, Earls of"
42. _Voluntary Service._--Existing voluntary armies have usually
838 words | Chapter 50
developed from armies of the old regime, and seem to owe their continued
existence either to the fact that only comparatively small armaments are
maintained in peace, other and larger armies being specially recruited
during a war (a modification of the "enlistment system"), or to the
necessities of garrisoning colonial empires. The military advantages and
disadvantages of voluntary service are naturally the faults and merits
of the opposite system. The voluntary army is available for general
service. It includes few unwilling soldiers, and its resultant advantage
over an army of the ordinary type has been stated to be as high as 30%.
At all events, we need only examine military history to find that with
conscript armies wholesale shirking is far from unknown. That loss from
this cause does not paralyse operations as it paralysed those of the
18th century, is due to the fact that such fugitives do not desert to
the enemy, but reappear in the ranks of their own side; it must not
therefore be assumed that men have become braver because the "missing"
are not so numerous. In colonial and savage warfare the superior
personal qualities of the voluntary soldier often count for more than
skill on the part of the officers. These would be diminished by
shortening the time of service, and this fact, with the expense of
transport, entails that a reasonably long period must be spent with the
colours. On the other hand, the provision of the large armies of modern
warfare requires the maintenance of a reserve, and no reserve is
possible if the whole period for which men will enlist is spent with the
colours. The demand for long service in the individual, and for trained
men in the aggregate, thus produces a compromise. The principle of long
service, i.e. ten years or more with the colours, is not applicable to
the needs of the modern _grande guerre_; it gives neither great initial
strength nor great reserves. The force thus produced is costly and not
lightly to be risked; it affords relatively little opportunity for the
training of officers, and tends to become a class apart from the rest of
the population. On the other hand, such a force is the best possible
army for foreign and colonial service. A state therefore which relies on
voluntary enlistment for its forces at home and abroad, must either keep
an army which is adaptable to both functions or maintain a separate
service for each.
In a state where relatively small armaments are maintained in peace,
voluntary armies are infinitely superior to any that could be obtained
under any system of compulsion. The state can afford to give a good
wage, and can therefore choose its recruits carefully. It can thus have
either a few incomparable veteran soldiers (long-service), or a fairly
large number of men of superior physique and intelligence, who have
received an adequate short-service training. Even the youngest of such
men are capable of good service, while the veterans are probably better
soldiers than any to be found in conscript armies. This is, however, a
special case. The raw material of any but a small voluntary army usually
tends to be drawn from inferior sources; the cost of a larger force,
paid the full wages of skilled labourers, would be very great, and
numbers commensurate with those of an army of the other model could only
be obtained at an exorbitant price. The short-service principle is
therefore accepted. Here, however, as recruiting depends upon the
good-will of the people, it is impossible to work the soldiers with any
degree of rigour. Hence the voluntary soldier must serve longer than a
conscript in order to attain the same proficiency. The reserve is thus
weakened, and the total trained regular force diminished. Moreover, as
fewer recruits are required annually, there is less work for the
officers to do. In the particular case of Great Britain it is
practically certain that in future, reliance will be placed upon the
auxiliary forces and the civil population for the provision of the
enormous reserves required in a great war; this course is, however, only
feasible in the case of an insular nation which has time to collect its
strength for the final and decisive blow overseas. The application of
the same principle to a continental military power depends on the
capacity for stern and unflagging resistance displayed by the _corps de
couverture_ charged with the duty of gaining the time necessary for the
development and concentration of the national masses. In Great Britain
(except in the case of a surprise invasion) the place of this corps
would be taken by "command of the sea." Abroad, the spirit of the
exposed regiments themselves furnishes the only guarantee, and this can
hardly be calculated with sufficient certainty, under modern conditions,
to justify the adoption of this new "enlistment system." Voluntary
service, therefore, with all its intrinsic merits, is only applicable to
the conditions of a great war when the war reserve can be trained _ad
hoc_.
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