Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, "Armour Plates" to "Arundel, Earls of"
40. _Compulsory Service._--Universal liability to service (_allgemeine
820 words | Chapter 48
Wehrpflicht_) draws into the active army all, or nearly all, the men of
military age for a continuous period of short service, after which they
pass successively to the reserve, the second and the third line troops
(_Landwehr, Landsturm_, &c.). In this way the greatest number of
soldiers is obtained at the cheapest rate and the number of trained men
in reserve available to keep the army up to strength is in theory that
of the able-bodied manhood of the country. In practice the annual levy
is, however, not exhaustive, and increased numerical strength is
obtained by reducing the term of colour-service to a minimum. This may
be less in a hard-worked conscript army than in one which depends upon
the attractions of the service to induce recruits to join. In conscript
armies, training for war is carried out with undeviating rigour. In
these circumstances the recruits are too numerous and the time available
is too limited for the work of training to be committed to a few
selected instructors, and every officer has therefore to instruct his
own men. The result is usually a corps of officers whose capacity is
beyond question, while the general staff is composed of men whose
ability is above a high general average. As to the rank and file, the
men taken for service are in many respects the best of the nation, and
this superiority is progressively enhanced, since increase of population
is not often accompanied by a corresponding increase in the military
establishments. In Germany in 1905, it is stated, nearly half the
contingent was excused from serving in peace time, over and above the
usual numbers exempted or medically rejected. The financial aspect of
compulsory service may be summed up in a few words. The state does not
offer a wage, the pay of the soldier is a mere trifle, and, for a given
expenditure, at least three times as many men may be kept under arms as
under any known "voluntary" system. Above all, the state has at its
disposal for war an almost inexhaustible supply of trained soldiers.
This aspect of compulsory service has indeed led its admirers sometimes
to sacrifice quality to quantity; but, provided always that the regular
training is adequate, it may be admitted that there is no limit to the
numbers which are susceptible of useful employment. There are, however,
many grave defects inherent in all armies raised by compulsory levy (see
CONSCRIPTION, for a discussion of the chief economical and social
questions involved). Most of the advantages of universal service result,
not from the compulsory enlistment, but from the principle of short
service and reserves. But the cost of maintaining huge armies of the
modern European type on the voluntary system would be entirely
prohibitive, and those nations which have adopted the _allgemeine
Wehrpflicht_ have done so with full cognizance of the evil as well as of
the good points of the system.
The chief of these evils is the doubtful element which exists in all
such armies. Under the merciless discipline of the old regime the most
unwilling men feared their officers more than the enemy. Modern short
service, however, demands the good-will of all ranks and may fail
altogether to make recalcitrants into good soldiers, and it may be taken
for granted that every conscript army contains many men who cannot be
induced to fight. Herein lies the justification of the principle of
"masses," and of reduced colour-service; by drawing into the ranks the
maximum number of men, the government has an eventual residuum of the
bravest men in the nation left in the ranks. What has been said of the
officers of these armies cannot be applied to the non-commissioned
officers. Their promotion is necessarily rapid, and the field of
selection is restricted to those men who are willing to re-engage, i.e.
to serve beyond their compulsory term of two or three years. Many men do
so to avoid the struggles of civil life, and such "fugitive and
cloistered virtue" scarcely fosters the moral strength required for
command. As the best men return to civil life, there is no choice but to
promote inferior men, and the latter, when invested with authority, not
infrequently abuse it. Indeed in some armies the soldier regards his
officer chiefly as his protector from the rapacity or cruelty of his
sergeant or corporal. A true short-service army is almost incapable of
being employed on peace service abroad; quite apart from other
considerations, the cost of conveying to and from home annually
one-third or one-half of the troops would be prohibitive. If, as must be
the case, a professional force is maintained for oversea service many
men would join it who would otherwise be serving as non-commissioned
officers at home and the prevailing difficulty would thus be enhanced.
When colonial defence calls for relatively large numbers of men, i.e. an
army, home resources are severely strained.
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