Treatise on Poisons by Sir Robert Christison
6. The next article of the moral evidence relates to suspicious conduct
1229 words | Chapter 35
on the part of the prisoner during the illness of the person poisoned.
Under this head it is necessary merely to state what I conceive to be,
with reference to the present branch of the proof, the duty of the
medical practitioner who happens to attend a case of poisoning.
In such a conjuncture he is undoubtedly placed in a situation of some
delicacy. But on considering the matter attentively, good reasons will
appear why he should adopt the course, which, I believe, our courts of
justice will expect of him, and keep some watch over the actions of any
individual who is suspected of having committed the crime. On the one
hand, no one else is by education and opportunities so capable of
remarking the motions of the different members of the family
dispassionately, without officiousness, and without being observed. And
on the other hand, it is undoubtedly a part of his private duty as
practitioner, to protect his patient against any farther criminal
attempts, as well as part of his public duty to prevent the vomited
matter and other subjects of analysis from being secretly put away or
destroyed. No one can be so occupied without many accessary particulars
coming under his notice. And certain it is, that on several trials the
practitioner has contributed, with great credit to himself, a
considerable part of the pure moral proof. For an example of discreet
and able conduct under these trying circumstances, the reader will do
well to refer to that of Dr. Addington, the chief crown witness, both as
to medical and moral facts, in the case of Miss Blandy.[134] It is
almost unnecessary to add, that in acting as now recommended, the
physician must conduct himself with circumspection, in order to avoid
giving unnecessary offence, or alarming the guilty person.
7, and 9. On the seventh article, which respects the conduct of the
prisoner after the death of the deceased, and on the ninth, which
relates to the existence of a motive or inducement to the crime, nothing
need be said here. But on the
8th article of the moral evidence,—comprehending the death-bed
declaration of the deceased, his state of mind, his personal
circumstances and other points which prove the possibility or
impossibility of voluntary poisoning—a few remarks are required, because
an important and little understood part of the practitioner’s duty is
connected with this branch of the proof.
The question as to the possibility of the poisoning being voluntary is
one upon which the medical attendant will be expected to throw some
light, and into which he will also naturally inquire for his own
satisfaction. In doing so his attention will be turned to circumstances
purely moral, which may not only decide that question, but may also
criminate a particular individual. His inquiries must therefore be
conducted with discretion, and for obvious reasons should be confined as
much as possible to the patient himself. They are to be conducted not so
much by putting questions, as by leading him to disburden his mind of
his own accord; and it is well to be aware, that there is no one of whom
a patient is so ready to make a confident on such an occasion as his
medical attendant.
If disclosures of consequence are made, and the attendant should feel it
his duty to look forward to the future judicial proceedings and to the
probability of his appearing as a witness, he ought to remember the
general rule is, that his account of what the patient told him is not
evidence in the eye of the law, unless it was told under the
consciousness of the approach of death. Of late, however, the rigour of
this principle in law has been occasionally departed from in Scottish
practice; and in regard to medical facts ascertained in the way here
mentioned, many strong reasons might be assigned for such relaxation.
Evidence of the kind is technically called the death-bed declaration of
the deceased, and is justly accounted very important.
Here it is right to take notice of a part of the death-bed evidence,
although it does not properly belong to the question of suicide, because
it should always be collected if possible by the medical attendant, and
with much greater care than is generally bestowed on it even by him—I
mean the history of the symptoms previously to his being called in. On
this part of the history, including particularly the time and manner in
which the illness began, medical conclusions of extreme consequence are
often subsequently founded: On a single fact or two may depend the fate
of the prisoner. It is not enough, therefore, in my opinion, that such
evidence formed a part of the death-bed declaration. If a fact derived
at second hand from the deceased, and stated too by him from memory, is
a material element of any of the medical opinions on the trial, it is of
much importance that the information be procured by a medical man; and
that the person who procured it, whether professional or not, was aware
at the time of the probability of its becoming important. Such evidence,
although not collected with these precautions, is admissible; but I have
so often had occasion to witness the carelessness with which the
previous history of cases is inquired into both in medical and
medico-legal practice, that I do not see how it is possible to put trust
in evidence of the kind, unless it bear marks of having been collected
with care, and under an impression of its probable consequence. These
statements are well illustrated by the following example:—On the trial
of Mrs. Smith for poisoning her maid-servant with arsenic, it was proved
that some drug was administered by the prisoner in a suspicious manner
on a Tuesday evening. Now it appeared at the trial improbable that this
drug contained a fatal dose of arsenic, because to her fellow-servants,
of whom one slept with her, and others frequently visited her, the
deceased did not appear to be ill at all for eight hours after, or
seriously ill for nearly a day. On the contrary, however, a surgeon, who
was called to see her on the following Saturday, a few hours before her
death, deposed that, according to information communicated by herself,
she had been ill with sickness, vomiting, purging, and pain in the
stomach and bowels since the Tuesday evening. This evidence, if it could
have been relied on, would have altered materially the features of the
case, as it would have gone far to supply what all the medical witnesses
considered defective, namely, proof of the administration. But at the
time the surgeon made his inquiries, he did not even suspect that the
girl laboured under the effects of poison. Neither he therefore nor his
patient could have been impressed with that conviction of the importance
of the information communicated, which was necessary to insure its
accuracy, particularly as it related to a matter usually of so little
consequence in ordinary medical practice as the precise date of the
commencement of an illness; and it would consequently have been rash to
adopt it in face of more direct and contrary evidence. Any one who
examines the details of this trial as I have reported them, will at once
see how much the case turned on the point now alluded to.[135]
Reading Tips
Use arrow keys to navigate
Press 'N' for next chapter
Press 'P' for previous chapter