1835. 1885.

Area governed in square miles 520,000 7,000,000 Population of European stock 1,800,000 9,500,000 Population, colored 2,100,000 8,000,000 State revenues £5,000,000 £51,000,000 That is to say, in fifty years England has added 7,260,000 square miles to her territory, and nearly trebled the population she controls in India and her colonies. Is it necessary to add that with all this at stake the ocean highways which her ships traverse must be held toll free; that the nations which she has peopled and owns must be protected; that the enemy’s squadrons which will seek to cut off her food supply, destroy her commerce, and burn her coaling stations, must be chased and captured; or that in the line of battle her ships must meet his and conquer? Sea-going and sea-keeping fleets and their auxiliaries must always be ready; transferable forts for protection abroad, and coast-defence ships for safety at home, must be kept afloat; and, in a word, every means must be employed which, through successful sea-war, will maintain her integrity as a nation. Her navy must be eclectic in types, the exact instrument for any expected operation being always at hand; her maritime administration must be comprehensive; and her preparation ever such as will anticipate and surpass that of all her rivals. Enormously armored battle-ships may be economically wrong, but while other countries build them so must she; for her immunity depends not upon treaties nor the friendly but false protestations of rivals, but upon the fear of her unassailable superiority. A mistaken naval policy is to any nation a grave disaster, but to England it means ruin. “We cannot allow,” wrote Lord Brassey, “any foreign power to possess vessels which we cannot overhaul, or to carry guns at sea which may inflict a damaging blow to which it is impossible for us to reply. We must have ships as fast as the fastest, and guns at least equal to the most powerful which are to be found in the hands of any possible enemy.” Knowing, then, the interests imperilled, English designers are keen to achieve the best results; and when, as they believe, this has been accomplished, is it a wonder that they fall tooth and nail in a white-heat of positive assertion and flat contradiction upon all who differ from them? All are striving so honestly for the common good of the great country which they love with such intense and insular patriotism that even their imbittered differences of belief command the respect of right-thinking men everywhere. But in these variant faiths where is the truth? The question has run the gamut of experiment without being solved, the pendulum has swung from side to side and found no point of rest, and to-day there is a fixed agreement only as to the dangers which threaten. The most marked tendencies, however, in all modern design are the diminution of side armor, the increase of deck protection, and the development of speed. The public mind is so familiar with the great speed of the large mail-boats that a common question, often put as an inquiry of disparaging comparison, is why war-vessels do not steam as fast. The simplest answer to this is that they do, and in types which, like the big steamers, are special, the boasted achievements have been surpassed. Of course the number of vessels that can make nineteen knots is limited, because the man-of-war is hampered by necessities of space, weight, and safety, which do not obtain with the others. Mr. White, who has been so often, and, it is to be hoped, so advantageously, quoted in this editing, says: “The necessity for giving protection to the engines and boilers of war-ships introduces special restrictions and difficulties in the design which are not known in merchant-ships, wherever in war-ships the overshadowing necessities of fighting power compel the acceptance in many cases of limited space and other inconveniences.... Merchant-steamers of all classes are built and engined for the purpose of steaming continuously at certain maximum speeds, and making fairly uniform passages; they consequently possess a considerable reserve of boiler power to meet adverse conditions of wind and sea. War-ships, on the contrary, ordinarily cruise at very low speeds, and yet must be capable of reaching very high speeds when required in action or chasing. A war-ship, for instance, that attained about sixteen knots on the measured mile, and could steam continuously at sea, as long as her coal lasted, at a speed of about fifteen knots, would ordinarily have to cruise at from nine to ten knots. At this low speed she would require, say, only _one-seventh_ of the indicated horse-power which would be developed at her full sea speed, or say _one-tenth_ of what would be developed on the measured mile. This obviously introduces conditions of a character entirely different from those of the merchant-ship. The war-ship’s machinery must be so designed that the power necessary to give her high speed at long intervals and for short periods should be secured with the least expenditure of weight consistent with insuring the maximum performance when required, and with the provision of proper strength and durability.” The very vague ideas existing as to the cost of increased speed may be illustrated by a statement of the penalty this imposes in a 10,000 ton armored vessel. If at 10 knots this ship develops 1700 horse-power, there will be required at 15 knots, not one-third more, but 6200 horse-power—that is, over three times as much—and for 17 knots 12,000 horse-power, or an increase of 10,300 must be developed. This also demonstrates how much the ratio between speed and power falls; because if at 2000 horse-power 2.3 knots are gained for an increase of 1000 horse-power, at 12,000 for a similar increment of 1000 only one-quarter of a knot is obtained. In 1830 the steam pressure carried was from two to three pounds, and the coal expenditure each hour for every horse-power reached nine pounds; in 1886 the pressure had increased to 150 pounds, and the fuel consumption had fallen to 1.5 pounds, and to-day pressures of 200 pounds are to be utilized. As the swifter vessel with the higher economy is enabled to choose its range and position, and keep the sea for longer periods, it is easily seen that this question of speed is universally accepted as vital. A parliamentary statement made in February shows that the following additions to the English fleet will be passed this year into the first-class reserve, and held ready for sea service at forty-eight hours’ notice. Thick armor battle-ship (_Hero_) 1 Partially armored ships of the _Admiral_ class (_Rodney_, _Howe_, and _Benbow_) 3 Partially armored cruisers (_Warspite_, _Orlando_, _Narcissus_, _Australia_, _Galatea_, and _Undaunted_) 6 Partially protected cruisers (_Severn_ and _Thames_) 2 Torpedo cruisers—six of the _Archer_ class, one of the _Scout_ class (_Fearless_) 7 Torpedo gun-boats of the _Rattlesnake_ class 3 Composite gun-boats and sloops of the _Buzzard_ and _Rattler_ class 3 -- Total 25 At the end of 1887-88 one armored ship, the _Camperdown_, and one protected cruiser, the _Forth_, will be nearly finished, the _Anson_ will be approaching completion, and the new belted cruisers of the _Orlando_ class will be far advanced. The armored battle-ships _Victoria_ and _Sanspareil_, of 10,470 tons displacement, are to be delivered according to contract in October, 1888, and the _Trafalgar_ and _Nile_, the largest war-vessels yet laid down in England, are being pushed rapidly. Out of the thirty-seven ships building or incomplete at the commencement of 1887-88, twenty-six will be completed by the end of the year, thus leaving only nine of those specified, and two others not ordered, in the programme of 1885 to be finished subsequently. The ships projected for this year include: 20-knot steel-bottomed partially protected cruisers (_Medea_, _Medusa_) 2 19¾-knot copper-bottomed partially protected cruisers (_Melpomene_, _Marathon_, _Magicienne_) 3 Composite sloops of the _Buzzard_ class (_Nymphe_, _Daphné_) 2 Composite gun-boats, improved _Rattlers_, (_Pigmy_, _Pheasant_, _Partridge_, _Plover_, _Pigeon_, _Peacock_) 6 Torpedo gun-boat of the _Grasshopper_ class (_Sharpshooter_) 1 -- Total 14 Besides the ships that have been or will be finished in 1886-87, it is believed that thirty-five of the fifty-five first-class torpedo-boats (125 to 150 feet in length) will be added to the twenty which were completed in June. In addition to the vessels mentioned above there are others not described nor noticed in the text. The two battle-ships referred to upon page 55 are the _Sanspareil_ and the _Victoria_, the latter formerly known as the _Renown_, but named anew in April last. These ships are to carry 1180 tons of coal, and under forced draught are expected to develop 12,000 horse-power and a speed of 16.75 knots. The 9.2-inch 18-ton stern pivot gun originally intended for these vessels has been replaced by a 10-inch 26-ton rifle, and the secondary battery now includes twenty-one 6 and 3-pounder rapid fire guns. The other prominent departures from the central-citadel type are the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_. These 11,940-ton ships are the largest war machines ever laid down for the British service. They are to carry revolving turrets on the fore and aft line amidships, and will have an intermediate broadside battery mounted in a superstructure which covers the full width of the ship between the turrets. A water-belt line 230 feet in length rises in the waist for a distance of 193 feet, and both belt and citadel are covered by a three-inch steel deck, which is curved forward and aft to strengthen the ram and protect the steering gear. The armor is compound—eighteen inches thick on the turret and twenty inches thick as a maximum on the water-line—and to support the backing there is an inner skin two inches thick. The armament consists of four 13½-inch 68-ton breech-loading rifles, two in each turret; of eight 5-inch guns in broadside on a covered deck protected by three inches of vertical armor, and of eight 6-pounder rapid fire, ten 3-pounder Maxim, and four Gardner guns. The horse-power under forced draft is to be 12,000, and the estimated speed is 16½ knots. The main battery originally designed for these ships included only one 68-ton breech-loading rifle for each turret; subsequently this plan was rejected, and the armament stated above was adopted. “The economy of mounting the heavy guns in pairs arises not only from the increased power thus obtained from a given weight of guns, but from the fact that it requires but little more armor to protect two guns than to protect one. It also requires more machinery to work two guns separately than in pairs, and the magazine and ammunition supply arrangements of guns mounted separately are necessarily more complicated, and require more men to operate them than those mounted in pairs. “The French idea in mounting their heavy guns singly in three or four armored barbettes is evidently so to distribute the gun-power as to leave a reserve of heavy guns in event of damage to one or more. But the demands for economy in weight are so great that two armored structures widely separated would seem to furnish as satisfactory a scattering of the heavy gun-power as is justifiable. Guns mounted on the middle line suffer less disturbance in rolling than those mounted either in the waist or _en échelon_, and their fire should be correspondingly more accurate.”[18] The _Impérieuse_ and _Warspite_ have powerful ram bows, a steel protective deck, and a belt of compound armor which is 139 feet in length on the water-line, 8 feet in width, and 10 inches thick. The engines were designed to develop 7500 horse-power and a speed of 16 knots, but on her trial the _Impérieuse_ attained with forced draft a maximum speed of 18.2 knots and 10,344 horse-power, and a mean speed, after four runs on the measured mile, of 17.21 knots. In September, 1886, with all guns and stores in place, and with 900 tons of coal in the bunkers, the _Impérieuse_ developed a mean speed of 16 knots. The armament is composed of four 9.2-inch guns, mounted in four 8-inch plated circular barbettes, and situated one forward, one aft, and two in the waist; on the gun-deck there are six 6-inch guns, and the secondary battery is made up of twelve 6-pounder rapid fire, ten 1-inch Nordenfeldt, and four Gardner guns, and of four above-water and two submerged torpedo-tubes. Owing to the increased weights of the armament, stores, machinery, and equipments put in these vessels since they were first designed, the draught of water is now found to be nearly three feet greater than was intended. It is only fair to state that they were originally expected to carry but 400 tons of coal, though curiously enough, when this fuel capacity was subsequently increased to 1200 tons, no allowance was made for the additional armored surface required. The armored free-board was to have been 3 feet 3 inches at a draught of 25 feet, but the supplementary weights increased the draught 11½ inches and reduced this free-board to 2 feet 3½ inches; and later, when the full bunker capacity of 900 tons was utilized, the draught was again increased 14 inches, and the free-board lowered to 1 foot 1½ inches. Finally it was for a time determined to carry 1200 tons of coal, though this would result, when the ship was fully equipped for sea, in bringing the top of the armored belt nearly flush with the water. “As four of the torpedo tubes are above water, and have ports cut through the armor-belt, this decrease of free-board rendered them useless, it having been shown during an experimental cruise on the _Impérieuse_ in December, 1886, with but 800 tons of coal on board and in a calm sea, that in attempting to discharge the broadside torpedoes they jammed in the tubes, and altered shape to a dangerous degree. In order to make them of any use they will have to be restored to their intended height above the water-line. It is believed this can be accomplished by removing part of the superstructure, by dispensing with all top-hamper and its attendant supply of stores, equipments, etc., and by limiting the maximum coal supply to the bunker capacity of 900 tons. The masts are accordingly being removed from both vessels, leaving them but one signal mast stepped between the funnels, and fitted with a military top.”[19] In May, 1886, the _Warspite_, when very light, developed with natural draft 7451 horse-power and a speed of 15½ knots on a consumption of 2.69 pounds of coal each hour per horse-power; and with forced draft 10,242 horse-power and a speed of 17¼ knots were obtained on a similar consumption of 2.9 pounds of coal. In the minority report of the 1871 Committee on Designs Admiral Elliot and Rear-Admiral Ryder “strongly advocated the use of a protective deck in conjunction with other features, instead of side-armor, for protection to stability. The idea as regards cruisers was first carried out in the full-rigged ships of the English _Comus_ class of 2380 tons displacement and 13 knots speed, launched in 1878, in which the engines, boilers, and magazines were covered by a horizontal 1½-inch steel deck placed below the water-line, the space immediately above containing cellular subdivisions. “Then followed, in 1882, the _Leander_ and her three sister bark-rigged vessels, which are a compromise between the speed of the _Iris_ and the protection of the _Comus_. They are of 3750 tons displacement and 17 knots maximum speed; they carry ten 6-inch 4-ton B. L. R., and 725 tons of coal, and have a ‘partial protective deck,’ covering engines, boilers, and magazines, which is 1½ inches thick, and which bends down below the load water-line at the sides. Our new cruisers, the _Chicago_, _Boston_, and _Atlanta_, bear a closer resemblance to this type than they do to any other in respect of their protection. About this time the Chilian cruiser _Esmeralda_, of 3000 tons, appeared, having a protective deck complete from stem to stern-post, carrying an exceptionally heavy battery and coal supply, and withal attaining the unprecedented speed of 18.28 knots. Italy was not slow to perceive the advantages of this type, and accordingly bought an improved _Esmeralda_, the _Giovanni Bausan_, and at once commenced to build four others, the _Vesuvio_, _Stromboli_, _Etna_, and _Fieramosca_, each of 3530 tons. Japan ordered two improved _Esmeraldas_, the sister ships _Naniwa-Kan_ and _Tacachiho-Kan_, from Armstrong, in England, and a similar vessel, the _Unebi_, in France, while England laid down a similar class, the _Mersey_ and three others, and France a similar cruiser, the _Sfax_, of 4400 tons.”[20] The _Unebi_ was a bark-rigged, twin-screw, protected steel cruiser of 3651 tons. Her armament consisted of four 9.45-inch breech-loaders on sponsons, six 5.9-inch breech-loaders in broadside, one 5.9-inch bow pivot, twelve rapid fire and two Nordenfeldt machine guns, and a supply of Whitehead torpedoes. In September, 1886, she developed with forced draft 7000 horse-power and an average speed of 18.5 knots during four runs over the measured mile. She sailed for Japan in November, 1886, with a French crew numbering seventy-eight men, left Singapore for Yokohama on December 3, 1886, and has never been seen nor heard of since. She is said to have been top-heavy, and to have rolled dangerously in a sea way. The _Naniwa-Kan_, a steel cruiser, 300 feet in length and 46 feet in beam, has on an extreme draught of 19 feet 6 inches a displacement of 3730 tons; the steel hull is fitted with a double bottom under the engines and boilers, and has a strong protective deck, two to three inches thick, which extends from the ram to the stern-post, and carries its edges four feet below, and its crown one inch above, the load water-line. There are ten complete transverse and several partial water-tight bulkheads; the space between the protective and the main deck is minutely subdivided into compartments, which are utilized as coal-bunkers, store-rooms, chain-lockers, and torpedo-rooms; the conning-tower is protected by two inches of steel armor; and two ammunition hoists, three inches thick, lead from the shell-rooms to the loading towers at the breech of the two heavy guns. The armament consists of two 10-inch 28-ton breech-loading rifles on central pivots, with 2-inch steel screens, and of six 6-inch guns, with a secondary battery of two 6-pounder rapid fire, eight 1-inch Nordenfeldt, four Gardner guns, and four above-water torpedo tubes. The engines are of the horizontal compound type, situated in two compartments, one abaft the other, and there are six single-ended locomotive three-furnace boilers in two separate compartments, with athwartship fire-rooms; the indicated horse-power under a forced draft was 7650, and the maximum speed 18.9 knots. This has since been exceeded. The _Mersey_ and her class—the _Severn_, _Thames_, and _Forth_—like the _Naniwa_ are unarmored steel cruisers, with a complete protective deck, the horizontal portion of which is one foot above, and the inclined three inches below, the water-line. The main battery of these ships consists of two 8-inch guns, mounted on central pivots forward and abaft a covered deck which carries ten 6-inch guns; the secondary battery has ten 1-inch Nordenfeldt and two Gardner machine guns, and there are six above-water torpedo-tubes in broadside. “The development of the _Mersey_ design has resulted in the new English ‘belted cruisers,’ in which, to satisfy the demand for a water-line belt of armor, the displacement has been increased to 5000 tons.” The five originally projected—the _Orlando_, _Narcissus_, _Australia_, _Galatea_, and _Undaunted_—together with the _Immortalité_, subsequently laid down, have already been launched, and an additional cruiser of the same type, the _Aurora_, is well advanced. The general construction is similar to the _Naniwa_ and _Mersey_, the larger tonnage being given in order to carry a water-line belt, which is ten inches thick, stretches for 190 feet amidships, and was intended to extend from 1½ feet above to four feet below the load water-line. The armored deck is from two to three inches thick, and the conning-tower is thirteen inches. The triple-expansion engines are planned to develop 8500 horse-power and a speed of 18 knots. Like the _Impérieuse_ and _Warspite_, these vessels are found to draw much more water than was originally proposed. When designed in 1884 they were expected to have, with all weights on board, a mean draught of twenty-one feet, and to carry above water eighteen inches of the five feet six inch armor-belt. But a fever for improvement set in so valorously that the changes made in armament and machinery added one hundred and eighty-six tons to the displacement and increased the draught seven inches—that is, an amount which left the top of the protective belt only eleven inches above the smooth water-line. This submersion did not, however, cool the ardor of the Admiralty officials, for it has been decided that the nine hundred tons of coal originally fixed as the fuel supply must be carried; the immediate result of this is said to be an increase in the draught of eighteen inches, and a disappearance of the armor-belt to a point nearly six inches _below_ the water-line. Subsequent improvements will be awaited with great interest, especially by those American journalists of inquiring tendencies who envyingly detect between the promise and performance of these ships opportunities which, had they occurred at home, would have enabled them to swamp our naval service and its administration in billows of pitiless ink. The most popular naval event of the year was the review in July of the British fleet assembled at Spithead. The one hundred and twenty-eight war-vessels participating included three squadrons of armored vessels and cruisers, aggregating thirty-four ships, seventy-five torpedo-boats and gun-boats, divided into five flotillas, six training brigs, and thirteen troop-ships. Besides these there were the troop-ships appointed to carry the distinguished visitors, and the small vessels and dockyard craft allotted to the corporation of Portsmouth. The war-ships were drawn up in four lines, facing up channel, the starboard column lying opposite the Isle of Wight, and the port column off Portsmouth. The ships were two cables and the columns three cables apart. The flotillas were ranged in double columns between the port line of the armored vessels and the main-land, and the troop-ships were placed in single column between the starboard line and the Isle of Wight. This made four lines of vessels on one side of the channel and three on the other, extending from South Sea Castle to the Rye Middle Shoals, or a distance of two miles. No such fleet was ever seen before in time of peace, for every class of the British navy was so well represented that the review of the Crimean fleet by the Queen and the Prince Consort, thirty-one years ago, suffered by comparison. Some of the wooden ships which figured at that time were present, and the wide differences in everything bore strong testimony to the developments which have been made within a generation. Nelson’s old ship, the _Victory_, was a conspicuous object, and her timbers echoed again and again with cheers as boat after boat passed her. More than that, the old ship mounted a gun or two and joined in the universal salute to the Queen. Shortly after two o’clock the _Euphrates_, _Crocodile_, and _Malabar_ hove to off Osborne as an escort to the royal yachts when the Queen embarked. The Queen left Osborne House a few minutes before three o’clock, went aboard the royal yacht _Victoria and Albert_, and left the buoy in the bay promptly at the hour fixed. She was preceded by the _Trinity_ yacht and followed by the royal yachts _Osborne_ and _Alberta_, and by the war-vessels _Enchantress_, _Helicon_, _Euphrates_, _Crocodile_, and _Malabar_. The royal procession proceeded straight to its destination and passed between the lines, leaving the coast-defence ships, gun-boats, and torpedo-boats on the port hand. After steaming as far as the Horse Elbow buoy the _Victoria and Albert_ turned to starboard, passed between the two columns of large ships, and then between the lines of the foreign war-vessels. As the yacht steamed slowly by the war-ships the crews cheered loudly, but it was not until the Queen had gone through the double line that the royal salute was fired. On board such vessels as had no masts the turrets, breastworks, and decks were lined with the crews, and the spectacle was as splendid as it was potent with an earnest evidence of mighty power. Altogether the fleet extended over four miles, and even this length was added to by the great troop-ships which steamed into line and saluted the Queen as she made her progress. The jubilee week was not without its accidents, for the _Ajax_ and _Devastation_ collided at the rendezvous, and subsequently the _Agincourt_ and _Black Prince_ had a similar experience. These mishaps evoked much hostile criticism, and among other things gave currency to an extract from a speech made by Lord Randolph Churchill several weeks before. Speaking of the navy, he had declared that, “In the last twelve or thirteen years eighteen ships have been either completed or designed by the Admiralty to fulfil certain purposes, and on the strength of the Admiralty statements Parliament has faithfully voted the money. The total amount which either has been or will be voted for these ships is about ten millions, and it is now discovered and officially acknowledged that in respect of the purposes for which these ships were designed, and for the purposes for which these ten millions either have been or will be spent, the whole of the money has been absolutely misapplied, utterly wasted and thrown away.” Sir Charles Dilke does not agree with this pessimism of his political opponent, though he, too, has something to say of the British fleet, in relation to its influence upon the present position of European politics, which is well worth quoting. “There is less to be said in a hostile sense with regard to the present position of the navy,” he concedes, “than may be said, or must be said, about the army. Clever German officers may write their ‘Great Naval War of 1888,’ and describe the destruction of the British fleet by the French torpedo-boats, but on the whole we are not ill-satisfied with the naval progress that has been made in the last three years. There is plenty of room for doubt as to whether we get full value for our money; but at all events our navy is undoubtedly and by universal admission the first navy in the world, and relatively to the French we appear to show of ships built and building a number proportionate to our expenditure. The discovery of the comparative uselessness of automatic torpedoes is an advantage to this country, and no great change in the opposite direction has recently occurred. M. Gabriel Charmes has pointed out to France the manner to destroy our sea-borne trade, but excellent steps have been taken since his book appeared to meet the danger which he obligingly made clear to us. It remains a puzzle to my civilian mind how Italy can manage to do all that in a naval sense she does for her comparatively small expenditure, and how, spending only from a fourth to a sixth what we spend upon our navy, she can nevertheless produce so noble a muster of great ships. But our naval dangers are, no doubt, dangers chiefly caused rather by military than by naval defects. Our navy is greatly weakened for the discharge of its proper duties by the fact that duties are thrown upon it which no navy can efficiently discharge. As Admiral Hoskins has said, it is the duty of the commander of the British fleet to drive the hostile squadrons from the seas, and to shut up the enemy’s ships in his different ports; but, on the other hand, he has a right to expect that our own ports and coaling stations shall be protected by batteries and by land forces. This is exactly what has not yet been done, although the defence of our coaling stations by fortresses and by adequate garrisons is essential to the sustaining of our maritime supremacy in time of war. “It is only, however, by comparison with our army that I think our navy in a sound position. In other words, our military situation is so alarming that it is for a time desirable to concentrate our attention upon that, rather than upon the less pressing question of the condition of the navy. I must not be thought, however, to admit, for one single instant, that our navy should give us no anxiety. As long as France remains at peace, and spends upon her navy such enormous sums as she has been spending during the last few years, she will be sufficiently near to us in naval power to make our position somewhat doubtful; make it depend, that is, upon how the different new inventions may turn out in time of war. Our navy is certainly none too large (even when the coaling stations and commercial ports have been fortified, and made for the first time a source of strength rather than of weakness to the navy) for the duties which it has to perform. It would be as idle for us, with our present naval force, to hope to thoroughly command the Mediterranean and the Red Sea against the French without an Italian alliance, as to try to hold our own in Turkey or in Belgium with our present army. Just as the country seems now to have made up its mind to abandon not only the defence of Turkey against Russia, but also the defence of the neutrality of Belgium, so it will have to make up its mind, unless it is prepared to increase the navy, to resort only to the Cape route in time of war. Italy being neutral, and we at war with France, we could not at present hope to defend the whole of our colonies and trade against attack, and London against invasion, and yet to so guard the Mediterranean and the Red Sea as to make passage past Toulon and Algiers, Corsica and Biserta, safe. Our force is probably so superior to the French as to enable us to shut up their iron-clads; but it would probably be easier to shut in their Mediterranean iron-clads by holding the Straits of Gibraltar than to attempt to blockade them in Toulon. I confess that I cannot understand those Jingoes who think that it is enough to shriek for Egypt, without seeing that Egypt cannot be held in time of war, or the Suez route made use of with the military and naval forces that we possess at present. “As against a French and Russian combination of course we are weaker still. Englishmen are hardly aware of the strength of Russia in the Pacific, where, if we are to attack at all, we must inevitably fight her, and where, if we are to adopt the hopeless policy of remaining only on the defensive, we shall still have to meet her for the protection of our own possessions. Just as the reduction of the horse artillery, comparatively unimportant in itself, has shown that the idea of the protection of Belgian neutrality has been completely given up, so the abandonment of Port Hamilton, instead of its fortification as a protection for our navy, seems to show that we have lost all hope of being able to hold our own against Russia in the North Pacific. On the 1st of August Russia will have upon her North Pacific station—cruising, that is, between Vladivostock and Yokohama—three new second-class protected ships—the _Vladimir_, _Monomakh_, and the _Dmitri Donsköi_, of nearly six thousand tons apiece, and the _Duke of Edinburgh_, of four thousand six hundred tons; one older protected ship, the _Vitiaz_, of three thousand tons; four fast-sailing cruisers—the _Naïezdnik_, the _Razboïnik_, the _Opritchnik_, and the _Djighite_; and four gun-boats, of which two are brand-new this year. While talking about their European fleets, the Russians are paying no real attention to them, and are more and more concentrating their strength in the North Pacific.” “The British navy,” says another writer,[21] “is not in danger, and the British navy, whatever its shortcomings, is relatively far stronger than its thoughtless detractors would have us believe. Our ships do steer and our ships do steam—at least as well as those of other powers; and, what is more, our ships will ‘fight’ and our ships will ‘win,’ in spite of the dismal forebodings of interested panic-mongers. “With the resources at our command, our armaments afloat admit of a rapid development, in which no other country can compete with us. A French writer has truly said, ‘La puissance d’une marine est moins dans son matériel à flot, que dans l’outillage de ses arsenaux, et dans la puissance productive de ses chantiers.’ “As a maritime power we are unequalled, and if we be true to ourselves we shall remain so.” In 1886 the fighting-ships of the British navy were summarized as follows: +--------------------------------+-----+------+---------+---------+ | SHIPS. | No. | Guns.| Displac-| Horse- | | | No. | Guns.| ment. | power. | +--------------------------------+-----+------+---------+---------+ | ARMORED. | | | Tons. | | |In commission and in reserve | 50 | 508 | 339,750 | 241,390 | |Deduct ships of doubtful value | 7 | 137 | 50,780 | 30,970 | | +-----+------+---------+---------+ | Total reliable armored ships | 43 | 371 | 288,970 | 210,420 | | | | | | | | UNARMORED. | | | | | |In commission and in reserve | 197 | 1121 | 221,957 | 245,692 | |Deduct ships of doubtful value | 15 | 76 | 27,760 | 27,470 | | +-----+------+---------+---------+ | Total reliable unarmored ships| 182 | 1045 | 194,197 | 218,222 | | | | | | | |Armored ships building | 12 | 148 | 89,660 | 114,000 | |Unarmored ships building | 21 | 112 | 24,650 | 53,250 | | +-----+------+---------+---------+ | Total | 33 | 260 | 114,310 | 167,250 | | | | | | | |Armored ships being completed | 10 | 93 | 84,880 | 84,750 | |Unarmored ships being completed | 10 | 90 | 26,790 | 41,800 | | +-----+------+---------+---------+ | Total | 20 | 183 | 111,670 | 126,550 | | | | | | | |Total armored ships | 72 | 749 | 514,290 | 440,140 | |Total unarmored ships | 228 | 1323 | 273,397 | 340,742 | | +-----+------+---------+---------+ | Grand total of ships | 300 | 2072 | 787,687 | 780,882 | +--------------------------------+-----+------+---------+---------+ During the last year thirty-seven vessels of the following classes were stricken from the list, viz., five armored ships, seven cruisers of the third class, sixteen gun-vessels, one despatch-boat, and eighteen special service gun-boats. The total net value, excluding ordnance equipments, of the fleet when it is kept at a normal war strength is $191,568,720, and the annual ship-building expenditures required to sustain this standard of efficiency is $8,793,440. This is a very cheap insurance upon the property, material and moral, which is at stake. The following table shows the armored and partially protected ships now under construction or lately finished: +------------+--------+--------+-------+----------+--------------------+ | NAME OF | Tons. | Horse- | Speed.| Total | Armament. | | SHIP. | | power. | | Cost. | | +------------+--------+--------+-------+----------+--------------------+ | TURRETS. | | | | | |Trafalgar | 11,940 | 12,000 | 16.5 | £844,318 | 4 67-ton, 8 5-in. | |Nile | 11,940 | 12,000 | 15.5 | 889,421 | 4 67-ton, 8 5-in. | |Victoria | 11,470 | 12,000 | 16.75 | 829,979 | 2 110-ton. | |Sanspareil | 11,470 | 12,000 | 16.75 | 825,468 | 1 10-in., 12 6-in. | |Edinburgh | 9,150 | 7,500 | 15.4 | 683,609 | 4 45-ton, 5 6-in. | |Hero | 6,200 | 6,000 | 15.5 | 421,500 | 2 45-ton, 4 6-in. | | | | | | | | | BARBETTES. | | | | | |Anson | 10,000 | 12,500 | 17.5 | 752,288 | 4 67-ton, 6 6-in. | |Camperdown | 10,000 | 11,700 | 17.5 | 743,074 | 4 67-ton, 6 6-in. | |Benbow | 10,000 | 10,850 | 17.5 | 810,633 | 2 110-ton, 10 6-in.| |Howe | 9,700 | 11,500 | 17.0 | 720,771 | 4 67-ton, 6 6-in. | |Rodney | 9,700 | 11,500 | 17.0 | 726,482 | 4 69-ton, 6 6-in. | |Collingwood | 9,150 | 9,570 | 16.5 | 670,752 | 4 44-ton, 6 6-in. | |Impérieuse | 8,500 | 10,344 | 17.21 | 559,901 | 4 9.2-in., 6 6-in. | |Warspite | 8,500 | 10,242 | 17.25 | 558,449 | 4 22-ton, 6 6-in. | | | | | | | | | BELTED CRUISERS. | | | | | |Immortalité | 5,000 | 8,500 | 18.0 | 302,920 | 2 22-ton, 10 6-in. | |Aurora | 5,000 | 8,500 | 18.0 | 308,585 | 2 22-ton, 10 6-in. | |Australia | 5,000 | 8,500 | 18.0 | 290,613 | 2 9.2-in., 10 6-in.| |Galatea | 5,000 | 8,500 | 18.0 | 290,300 | 2 9.2-in., 10 6-in.| |Narcissus | 5,000 | 8,500 | 18.0 | 290,751 | 2 9.2-in., 10 6 in.| |Orlando | 5,000 | 8,500 | 18.0 | 299,905 | 2 9.2-in., 10 6-in.| |Undaunted | 5,000 | 8,500 | 18.0 | 299,525 | 2 9.2-in., 10 6-in.| | | | | | | | | PARTIALLY PROTECTED | | | | | | CRUISERS. | | | | | |Mersey | 3,500 | 6,000 | 18.0 | 236,435 | 2 8-in., 10 6 in. | |Severn | 3,500 | 6,000 | 18.0 | 234,282 | 2 8-in., 10 6-in. | |Thames | 3,500 | 5,700 | 18.0 | 227,980 | 2 8-in., 10 6-in. | |Forth | 3,500 | 5,700 | 18.0 | 221,913 | 2 8-in., 10 6-in. | +------------+--------+--------+-------+----------+--------------------+ In the notes upon the next chapter, additional data referring to gun-boats and torpedo-boats will be found. THE FRENCH NAVY. BY SIR EDWARD J. REED. We have now to pass under review that vast array of naval constructions which the Continental navies of Europe offer to our observation. It is not at all surprising that the introduction of steam-engines, of iron and steel hulls, and of armor-plating has been attended throughout Europe by even greater diversity of thought and practice than has characterized our naval progress—“our progress” here signifying that of both the United States and Great Britain. And this may, I think, truthfully be said without in any degree neglecting the striking originality of the American Monitors, to which I endeavored to do justice. As regards two of the three great changes just adverted to, the only differences of opinion that have arisen have been in the nature of competitions rather than of conflicts. No one, so far as I am aware, has ever proposed to revert to sail-power or to wooden hulls in important ships-of-war. On the contrary, the powers have been in continual competition in the effort to reduce the weights of the hulls of war-ships (apart from armor) by the extended use, first of iron, and afterwards of steel, and to apply the savings of weight thus effected to the development of engine-power, speed, and steaming endurance. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the development of armor has been pursued with less constancy and less earnestness, the result being that marked contrasts are exhibited by European navies. It may be said, with little or no qualification, that all other European naval powers followed, in the first place, the example set by the late Emperor Napoleon III., in _La Gloire_, by covering the whole of the exposed part of the war-ship’s hull with armor-plating. All the early iron-clads of Russia, Italy, Austria, and Germany were protected from stem to stern, and from a few feet below water to the upper deck. England did the same in the cases of a few ships, although she began, as we saw before, with the _Warrior_ type, in which the armor was limited to the central part of the ship. But the system of completely covering the exposed ship with armor has now entirely and properly passed away from European practice, and has been succeeded by varied arrangements of armor. The importance of giving effectual protection to the hull “between wind and water,” as it is called (signifying from a few feet below the water-line to a few feet above that line), has been steadily recognized by Continental governments, with but the rarest exceptions. Nothing corresponding to that wholesale abandonment of armor for about a hundred feet at each end of the ship which has been practised in the British ships of the _Inflexible_ and _Admiral_ types is displayed in the line-of-battle ships of the Continent. In France, indeed, two such ships were laid down under some temporary influence, _viz._, the _Brennus_ and the _Charles Martel_, but they appear to have soon fallen under suspicion, and there has not been, to my knowledge, any great disposition to complete them for service. A return made by the Admiralty to the order of the House of Commons has been printed, and says of the _Brennus_ and _Charles Martel_: “Though these vessels still appear in the list of the French navy, but little money has been voted for their construction in 1886, and all work on them is now reported to have been stopped.” I know not what significance is to be attached to the fact, but I observe that these two ships were omitted altogether from the iron-clad ships of France published so recently as May, 1886, in the _Universal Register_ of shipping, which _Lloyd’s Register_ Committee “believe will be found the most complete list that has yet been published.” It seems not improbable, therefore, that the dangerous system of exposing two-thirds of the ship’s length to destruction from all kinds and every system of naval guns, even the smallest, which prevailed in the British navy for more than twelve years, and which has now happily been superseded in the powerful new ships _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_, obtained but little more than momentary approval in France, and is likely to have led to the condemnation of the only two ships in which it was attempted—a result which is creditable alike to French science and to French sagacity. In Italy the _Inflexible_ system (which has met in France with the fate we have just seen) obtained temporary favor, and was adopted in the _Duilio_ and the _Dandolo_, two very large ships, of 11,000 tons each, of a speed exceeding fifteen knots, and each carrying four 100-ton guns in turrets. Although these ships are 340 feet in length, even the armored belt amidships (if “belt” in any sense so short a strip of armor may be called[22]) is but 107 feet long, leaving therefore 233 feet of the ship at the ends wholly devoid of water-line protection. As the author of the “citadel system,” I cannot regard such an arrangement as this as a fair and reasonable embodiment of it, the discrepancy between the armored and unarmored portions being greater in these two ships than even in the _Ajax_ and _Agamemnon_, which are perhaps the worst examples of the abuse of the citadel system in the British navy. It is to the credit of the Italian government that ships of this type were not repeated in their navy; and it is but right to point out that there were excuses (which probably ranked in the minds of the designers as _reasons_) for a more extreme proportionate limitation of the citadels being adopted in the _Duilio_ and _Dandolo_ than in the _Ajax_ and _Agamemnon_. Among these were the possession by the Italian ships of heavier armaments, and of far greater steam-power and speed than the British ships possessed—a matter to which further reference will be made hereafter—and probably, also, the adoption of somewhat finer water-lines as a means of attaining the superior speed. In this connection it may be well to observe that the question of leaving so-called armored line-of-battle ships without armor at the extremities is first one of principle, and afterwards one of degree. The principle (which should be observed in the design of every armored vessel which is intended for the line of battle, or for those close and severe contests of ship with ship which will probably supersede in a great degree the system of fighting in lines of battle) is this: the proportion which the armored citadel bears to the unarmored ends must always be such as to enable the ship to keep afloat all the time the armor itself holds out against the attack of the enemy; so that injuries to the unarmored ends, however great or multiplied, shall not alone suffice to destroy the ship. Whatever may occur in the future to interfere with the application of this principle—and I do not deny that such interferences may arise under certain perfectly conceivable circumstances—nothing has yet happened to justify its abandonment, or to even justify the remotest chance of its being violated. If a ship is not intended to close with an enemy, or to fight her anyhow and anywhere on the open sea—which certainly has been the dominant idea of the British navy, in so far as its great line-of-battle ships are concerned—if, for example, a combination of immense speed with one or two extremely powerful and well-protected guns should serve a particular object better than a slower and more fully protected ship would serve it—then even great destructibility in the ship itself may justifiably be incurred. But for general naval service, and in every case in which a ship is intended to accept battle with a powerful antagonist and fight it out, or to force an action when she encounters such an enemy, it cannot be wise to leave her so exposed that that enemy may almost certainly sink her or cause her to capsize by merely pouring any kind of shot or shell into her unarmored parts. But even the observance of the above general principle is not alone all that is desirable in armored line-of-battle ships. It is not well to leave even so much of the ends of such ships wholly exposed as may lead to the speedy loss in action of her steaming or steering powers. The armor-belt should be of sufficient length to fairly guarantee the ship against prompt disablement in action, and to do this it must be carried very much nearer to the bow and stern than it has been in the cases of the Italian ships (_Duilio_ and _Dandolo_) now under notice. On the other hand, where ships are formed with fine water-lines, and the two opposite sides are consequently very near to each other for many feet, it is quite unnecessary to cover them with armor. The buoyancy comprised between the two sides aft such parts is very small, and consequently penetration can let but little water into the ship, and do but little harm. It is a matter for the exercise of professional judgment where to draw the line between the armored and the unarmored parts. In the new British ships _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_, which have excited great admiration in England, there are about sixty feet of length at each end left without armor, and as the ships have fine lines, but are nevertheless of considerable breadth at sixty feet from the ends, it seems probable that good judgment has been shown by their designers in this matter. I have discussed this question at some length because it is one of primary consideration in the design of important armored ships, and because the abandonment of a long belt of armor is also one of the few features of construction respecting which the designers of the Continent have steadfastly refrained from following the example set by the Admiralty Office at Whitehall from the years 1870 to 1885. It will complete the consideration of this branch of the subject to say that there are numerous ships of the iron-clad type in foreign navies in which the armor (justifiably, as has just been shown) stops somewhat short of the ends, but very few indeed in which the length of the unarmored parts exceeds that of the armored. Among the last named may be mentioned a very questionable class of vessels (_Sachsen_ type) in the German navy, and a much smaller sea-going vessel belonging to the Argentine Republic, named the _Almirante Brown_, which is a well-designed vessel in other respects, but which, on account of her long defenceless bow and stern, would do better to avoid than to fight an enemy.[23] Having now dealt with the primary question of the defence of ships by means of armor-belts, we come to the greater or less defence bestowed upon them above water. The course taken by the French designers, when the increased thickness of armor made it impossible to repeat the complete protection adopted in _La Gloire_ and her compeers, was in some few cases that of belting the ship with armor, and giving great “tumble home” to the sides above water, excepting at the central armored battery, thus allowing that battery to project, and its guns to fire directly ahead and astern, past the inwardly inclined sides. This system has been strikingly carried out in the two sister ships _Courbet_ and _Dévastation_, the former of which is shown, stem on, in the cut on page 75, which is engraved from a photograph taken after her launch, and before she began to receive her armor-plating. A representation of the sister vessel, _Dévastation_ (forming one of the series of engravings given in this chapter from drawings specially executed for the purpose by Chevalier De Martino), forms our illustration on page 73. But generally in the French navy, and in nearly all but its earliest ships, direct head and stern fire has been obtained by means of elevated and projecting towers, armor-plated to a sufficient height to protect the gun machinery, but with the guns themselves unprotected, and firing _en barbette_. In the case of the two ships _Dévastation_ and _Courbet_ the main-deck projecting battery carries four guns, each commanding a full quadrant of a circle. The barbette batteries, standing up above the upper deck, carry a powerful gun on each side of the ship, with great range of fire. [Illustration: THE “DEVASTATION:” FRENCH ARMORED SHIP OF THE FIRST CLASS.] Having given these general indications of the system of attack and defence adopted in the French navy—by far the most important of all the Continental navies—it now becomes desirable to go more into particulars. It is not necessary to dwell upon the early iron-clads of France. The _Gloire_ and a dozen others of like character were all built of wood, without water-tight bulkheads, without rams or spurs, with armor-plates from four to six inches thick only, and with guns of small calibre and power. They may be left out of consideration in dealing with the present French navy. They were followed by six other vessels, also built of wood, but with upper works of iron, _viz._, the _Océan_, _Marengo_, _Suffren_, _Richelieu_, _Colbert_, _Trident_. They were armored with plates of a maximum thickness of 8½ inches, and carried four guns of 10¾ inches calibre, weighing 23 tons each, with four 16-ton guns, and half a dozen light ones. They varied in some particulars, ranging in tonnage from 7000 to 8000 tons, in horse-power from 3600 to 4600, and in speed from 13 to 14½ knots. The _Friedland_ is another vessel which is frequently classed with the previous six ships, the largest of which she generally resembles, but she is built of iron, and carries eight 23-ton guns, and none of the 16-ton. A committee which sat in 1879, and which had for its president and vice-presidents men no less eminent than the late M. Gambetta and MM. Albert Grévy and Jules Ferry, pronounced these seven ships to be the strongest armored ships of the French navy then in service. Such great advances have since been made, however, that it is only necessary to add respecting these vessels that they were nearly all single-screw ships, and that they carried their principal armament at broadside ports on the main-deck, and in raised barbette towers placed at the four corners of the central battery. The _Richelieu_ was the largest of these vessels. [Illustration: THE “COURBET” (FORMERLY THE “FOUDROYANT”): FRENCH ARMORED SHIP OF THE FIRST CLASS.] Not one of the foregoing French ships of the early period conformed to conditions which were laid down officially in 1872 as those requisite for first-class French iron-clads, _viz._, that they should be constructed of iron (or steel), with water-tight compartments, be armored with plates 12 inches thick, with decks from 2 to 2½ inches thick, armed with guns of 24 centimetres calibre, commanding certain prescribed ranges of fire, and furnished with spurs or ram stems. There were, however, four ships then under construction or trial which did conform to the prescribed conditions, _viz._, the two already spoken of—the _Courbet_ and _Dévastation_, and two others named the _Redoutable_ and the _Amiral Duperré_. With these powerful ships may be said to have commenced the era of iron and steel line-of-battle ships in France. We will now bring them, together with still more recent French ships of the first class, into a table in which their particulars may be conveniently grouped. TABLE A.—MODERN FRENCH ARMORED SHIPS OF THE FIRST CLASS.[24]