Part 2 of 2

+----------------------------------------------------+ | COST. | +---------+-------------+-------------+--------------+ | Country | Army. | Navy. | Total. | +---------+-------------+-------------+--------------+ | Germany | $86,000,000 | $10,000,000 | $96,000,000 | | Russia | 146,000,000 | 20,500,000 | 166,500,000 | | Austria | 58,500,000 | 3,500,000 | 62,000,000 | | Italy | 41,000,000 | 10,000,000 | 51,000,000 | | France | 119,250,000 | 41,000,000 | 160,250,000 | | England | 78,000,000 | 53,750,000 | 131,750,000 | +---------+-------------+-------------+--------------+ A rough analysis of these figures shows that in strength of army Russia is first, France second, Germany third, Austria fourth, Italy fifth, and England sixth; and that in naval strength England is first, France second, Russia third, Italy fourth, Germany fifth, and Austria sixth. The cost of each nation’s navy is in direct proportion to its strength of _personnel_; but in armies England, though last in numbers, changes place with Italy, which supports its forces with the least expenditure. It may be added that in total cost England, with next to the smallest force, pays more than Germany, with the third largest in numbers. The percentage of expenditures is as follows: +---------------------------------+-------------------+--------------+ | | | Taxation per | |SERVICE PER CAPITA OF POPULATION.| COST PER MAN. | Inhabitant | | | | to Support | +---------+-------+-------+-------+---------+---------+ the Peace | | Country.| Army. | Navy. | Total.| Army. | Navy. |Establishment.| +---------+-------+-------+-------+---------+---------+--------------+ | Germany | 0.94 | 0.02 | 0.96 | $201.00 | $900.00 | $2.12 | | Russia | 0.97 | 0.04 | 1.01 | $192.00 | $707.00 | $2.13 | | Austria | 0.77 | 0.02 | 0.79 | $204.75 | $411.75 | $1.65 | | Italy | 0.73 | 0.05 | 0.78 | $194.75 | $664.25 | $1.75 | | France | 1.37 | 0.11 | 1.48 | $230.00 | $931.00 | $4.25 | | England | 0.57 | 0.16 | 0.73 | $391.50 | $924.75 | $3.76 | +---------+-------+-------+-------+---------+---------+--------------+ An examination of _Lloyd’s Universal Register of Shipping_ for 1887 shows that the present condition of European navies may be popularly stated in this manner: England has 6 guns capable of penetrating 36 inches of unbacked iron, and 16 others which can penetrate 28 inches of the same material; Italy has 20 guns which can penetrate 33 inches of iron; France has 14 guns which can pierce 27 inches, and 14 others able to penetrate 25 inches of unbacked iron. Russia has 20 guns and Spain 2 which can pierce 24 inches of iron. No other power has any guns capable of equivalent results. In other words, of guns able to penetrate 24 inches of unbacked iron, France has 28, Italy 20, Russia 20, Spain 2, and Great Britain 22. In war-ships of 20 knots and above, England has 1, France 1, Italy 10, Spain 2, and other European nations 4; of 19 knots speed, England has 11 ships, France 10, Germany 3, Italy 2, and other nations 9; of 18-knot ships, England has 5, France 7, Germany 2, Italy 6, and other nations 6. English supremacy is, however, chiefly seen in 17-knot ships, of which she has 25, mounting 181 guns; France, 4 with 20 guns; Italy, 5 with 40 guns; and other nations 4 with 19 guns. England has 11 ships of 90 guns that can steam 16 knots, whereas France has 3 only of 58 guns. At 15 knots, France has 16 ships of 214 guns, and England 12 ships of 126 guns; and at 14 knots, France has 28 ships of 334 guns, and England 15 ships of 252 guns. Summarizing these figures, it appears that with speeds above 14 knots England has 80 ships of 795 guns, France 69 of 699 guns, Germany 35 of 285 guns, and Italy 41 of 201 guns. Out of a total mercantile tonnage now afloat of 20,943,650, Great Britain and her colonies own 10,539,136. The total steam mercantile tonnage of the world is 10,531,843, and of this Great Britain and her colonies own 6,595,871, or nearly two-thirds of the whole. THE UNITED STATES NAVY. IN TRANSITION. BY REAR-ADMIRAL EDWARD SIMPSON, U.S.N. The condition of the navy of the United States is not such as any citizen of the country would desire. Pride in their navy was one of the earliest sentiments that inspired the hearts of the people when the United States took their place as a nation, and the memory of its deeds has not faded during the subsequent years of the country’s aggrandizement. Time was when that section of the country most remote from the sea-coast was indifferent to it, owing to the more immediate demand on its attention for the development of internal resources; but the rapid settlement of our Western lands, and the annihilation of distance produced by rapid communication, have tended to preserve the unity of interests of the separate sections, and the happy system that obtains through which officers are appointed to the navy keeps it an object of personal concern to all the States of the Union. The present condition of the navy is not such as to satisfy the desire of the people that it should be sustained on a footing commensurate with the position of the nation, and in keeping with its ancient reputation. For many years circumstances have intervened to prevent a judicious rehabilitation of the navy, notwithstanding that its needs have been faithfully presented to Congress year after year. The country has been wonderfully favored with peace at home and abroad, and no urgent call to arms has roused the nation to prepare for war. The rapidity with which a large fleet of cruising ships for blockading purposes was extemporized during our civil war has left a hurtful impression on the public mind that in an emergency a similar effort might prove equally efficacious—disregarding altogether the difference in circumstances of contending with an enemy possessed of a naval force and with one possessed of none. The economists have suggested that as all that relates to ships, guns, and motive forces was being rapidly developed by others, it would be a saving of the people’s money to await results, and to benefit by the experience of others; and, again, party rivalry and contentions have assisted to postpone action. It has never been the intention that the navy should die from neglect and be obliterated. Yearly appropriations have been faithfully passed for the support of the _personnel_, and for such repairs as were found to be indispensable for the old ships that have been kept in commission; but it is now seen that this system of temporizing has been the poorest kind of economy. This money has been invested necessarily in perishable material, the amounts have been insufficient to compass new constructions, whether in ships or guns, and the only use that could be made of them was to repair wooden ships and convert cast-iron guns, whereas the work needed was to construct steel ships and to fabricate steel guns. In referring to the navy of the past, it is impossible to avoid recalling the feeling of pride with which an American seaman—officer or man—walked the deck of his ship. This feeling was common to the naval and commercial marine. Our wooden ships that sailed the ocean from 1840 to 1860 were the finest in the world. The old frigate _Congress_ in 1842 was the noblest specimen of the frigates of the day, and the sloop-of-war _Portsmouth_ was unsurpassed as a corvette. The clipper ships of that period need no eulogy beyond their own record. These ships were the models for the imitation of all maritime nations, and among the constructors of the period can be recalled, without detriment to many others omitted, the names of Lenthall, Steers, Pook, and Delano. The poetry of sailing reached its zenith during this period. But there is no sentiment in progress; its demands are practical and imperative, and the great motive power, steam, was being crowded to the front even during this the greatest development in the era of sails. Advanced ideas could not be resisted, and steam was admitted as an auxiliary; but our development in naval construction still stood us in good stead, and enabled us to supply ships with auxiliary steam-power, which continued to be prominent for many years as standards to which others found it to their advantage to conform. Before the final abandonment in the navy of sailing-ships, pure and simple, an effort at a compromise was made by limiting steam to side-wheel vessels, and a number of fine ships were built in the forties which did good service, and were a credit to the country, answering as they did the demands of the time. The _Mississippi_, _Missouri_, _Susquehanna_, _Saranac_, and _Powhatan_ carried the flag to all parts of the world for many years, some of them enduring to bear their share in the late war, while the _Powhatan_ was borne on the list of vessels of the navy until within a few months. [Illustration: U. S. SIDE-WHEEL STEAMER “POWHATAN.”] This vessel was built at Norfolk, Virginia, in the year 1850. Her length was 250 feet, beam 45 feet, draught of water 19.6 feet. She had a displacement of 3980 tons, and attained a speed of 10.6 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 1172. The capacity of her coal-bunkers was 630 tons. Her battery consisted of sixteen 9-inch smooth-bore guns. She was built of seasoned live-oak, and though frequently under repairs, retained so much of the strength of her original construction that she escaped the sentence of condemnation until recently. The _Princeton_, of great fame, and the _San Jacinto_, were the only ships with screw-propellers that appeared in the period under consideration, the screw then being considered of such doubtful propriety as to need the test of tentative experiments. These ships have long since disappeared, but the screw remains, and side-wheels are mainly relegated to boats for inland waters. Confidence being established in the screw-propeller, construction on the principle of auxiliary steam-power was decided on, and ships of different classes were added to the navy in such numbers as the varied duties required. There were those at that time who, wise beyond their generation, recognized the full meaning of the advent of steam, and saw that it must supplant sails altogether as the motive power for ships. These advocated that new constructions should be given full steam-power, with sails as an auxiliary. But the old pride in the sailing-ship, with her taunt and graceful spars, could not be made to yield at once to the innovation; nor could the old traditions pointing to the necessity of full sail-power be dispelled; so it was considered a sufficient concession to admit steam on any terms, and thus the conservative and temporizing course was adopted of retaining full sail-power, and utilizing steam as an auxiliary. The United States government was not alone in this policy. It was the course pursued by all other maritime nations, and for some years the United States retained the lead in producing the most perfect types in this new phase of naval construction. In 1854 Congress passed an act authorizing the construction of the _Merrimac_ class of frigates. The famous ships immediately built under this act were the _Merrimac_, _Wabash_, _Minnesota_, _Roanoke_, and _Colorado_. All of these vessels got to sea during 1856 and 1857, and were followed, at an interval of ten years, by the _Franklin_, which was a larger ship, and an improvement on the original type. The _Franklin_ was built at Kittery, Maine. Her length is 266 feet, beam 54 feet, draught of water 24 feet. She has a displacement of 5170 tons, and attains a speed of 10 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 2065. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 860 tons. Her frames are of seasoned live-oak, and she is in use as a receiving-ship. [Illustration: U. S. FRIGATE “FRANKLIN,” OF THE “MERRIMAC” CLASS.] The _Merrimac_ was the first vessel of this type which got to sea. She was sent to European waters, and on her arrival in England, early in 1856, she became at once the object of the closest scrutiny, resulting in the unqualified approval of foreign naval architects. The English Admiralty proceeded to imitate the type, and many keels were soon laid in order to reproduce it. The ships built after this model were the crack ships of the time in the English navy, and carried the flags of the commanders-in-chief of fleets. In 1858, 1859, and 1860, the _Hartford_ class of large corvettes appeared. These are full-rigged ships. The class comprises the _Hartford_, _Brooklyn_, _Pensacola_, _Richmond_, and _Lancaster_. [Illustration: U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “HARTFORD.”] The _Hartford_ was built at Boston in 1858. Her length is 225 feet, beam 44 feet, draught of water 18.3. She has a displacement of 2900 tons, and attains a speed of 10 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 940. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 241 tons. Her battery consists of one 8-inch muzzle-loading rifle (converted) and 12 9-inch smooth-bores. These ships were built of live-oak, and endure to the present day. They were reproduced by England and France when they made their appearance, and are now, except the _Trenton_, the only ships in service which can accommodate a commander-in-chief of a squadron. They are kept constantly employed showing the flag abroad, but it is with difficulty that they are retained in suitable repair for service. [Illustration: U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “BROOKLYN.”] This class of ships has good speed under sail, with the wind free, but their light draught prevents them from being weatherly on a wind. Much of their cruising is done under sail, which tends to lengthen their existence. Under the late act of Congress prohibiting repairs on wooden ships when the expense shall exceed twenty per cent. of the cost of a new vessel, these ships must soon disappear from the navy list. When that time shall arrive, and steel cruisers shall be substituted, the name of the _Hartford_ should be preserved as closely associated with the glory that Farragut shed upon the navy. In 1859 a new type of sloop-of-war was introduced, of which the _Kearsarge_ will serve as an example. This ship was built at Kittery, Maine; her length is 199 feet, beam 33 feet, draught of water 15.9 feet. She has a displacement of 1550 tons, and attains a speed of 11 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 842. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 165 tons. Her battery consists of two 8-inch muzzle-loading rifles (converted), four 9-inch smooth-bores, and one 60-pounder. This has proved a very handy class of vessel, and for the year in which they were built were considered as having very fair speed under steam, the proportion of space occupied by boilers and engines being more than had been assigned in previous constructions. Several ships of this class were launched and put in commission before the war, and gave a new impetus to construction. [Illustration: U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “KEARSARGE.”] The types of vessels that were built during the war were selected for special purposes. The effort was made to multiply ships as rapidly as possible to blockade the coast and to enter shoal harbors; the “ninety-day gun-boats” and the “double-enders” were added to the navy list, and merchant-steamers were purchased, and were armed with such batteries as their scantling would bear. All of these vessels have disappeared, with the exception of the _Tallapoosa_. The _Juniata_ and _Ossipee_, of the _Kearsarge_ type, but of greater displacement, were launched in 1862, and are still in service; and at about the close of the war several vessels of large displacement and great speed were launched which were never taken into service, have been disposed of since, and form no part of our present navy. The _New Ironsides_ and the _Monitor_ represented the two features of construction which, produced in that period of emergency, have continued to impress naval architecture. [Illustration: U. S. IRON-CLAD “NEW IRONSIDES.”] As a sea-going iron-clad the _New Ironsides_ was, for the time and service required, a success. She was built at the yard of Mr. Cramp, in Philadelphia, in 1862. Her length was 230 feet, beam 56 feet, draught of water 15 feet. She had a displacement of 4015 tons, and attained a speed of six knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 700. The capacity of the coal-bunkers was 350 tons. Her battery consisted of twenty 11-inch smooth-bore guns. She was built of wood, and was covered with armor four inches in thickness, which, with the inclination given to her sides, made her impervious to the artillery that was used against her during the war. In one engagement with the batteries on Sullivan’s Island, Charleston Harbor, lasting three hours, she was struck seventy times, but at the end of the action, except some damage to a port shutter or two, she withdrew in as perfect fighting condition as when the fight commenced. This ship does not appear on the navy list, as she was destroyed by fire off the navy-yard at League Island, Pennsylvania. The _Monitor_ was, without doubt, the most remarkable production of the constructive art that appeared during the war. The original _Monitor_ was lost at sea, but our illustration presents the _Passaic_ class of Monitors, which quickly followed the original of this type. [Illustration: U. S. MONITOR “PASSAIC.”] The _Passaic_ was built of iron, and was launched in 1862. Her length is 200 feet, beam 46 feet, draught of water 11.6 feet. She has a displacement of 1875 tons, and attains a speed of seven knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 377. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 140 tons. Her battery consists of one 15-inch smooth-bore and one 11-inch smooth-bore. Her sides are protected by five inches of laminated iron, and her turret by eleven inches of the same. This vessel and eleven others of her class constitute the entire armored fleet of the United States. Too much credit cannot be awarded to Captain Ericsson for his brilliant conception of this floating battery, and the navy must be ever grateful to him for preserving it from the dire disaster which was averted by the appearance of the original _Monitor_ at the moment of a great crisis. These vessels bore themselves well through the storms of elements and battle during the war, proving capable of making sea-voyages, and of resisting the effects of the artillery that was in use during the period of their usefulness; but an interval of more than twenty years has produced such a change in artillery as to make the protection afforded by a few laminated plates of one-inch iron but a poor defence against weapons which have robbed this fleet of its once formidable character. Although many of the features of the original design may be retained in new constructions, most of the details will be changed, notably in the turret, in consequence of the greater weight resulting from the increased thickness of armor. The central spindle around which the Ericsson turret revolves must disappear, and the turret must turn on rollers under the base. The effect produced abroad by the success of Ericsson’s _Monitor_ is so familiar to all that it hardly needs more than a passing allusion here. There is no doubt that the _Monitor_ was the progenitor of all the turreted vessels in the fleets of the world, though the essential principle of the vessel, however, was never viewed with favor. This principle consists in the low freeboard, which, besides reducing the size of the target, is intended to contribute to the steadiness of the hull as a gun-platform by offering no resistance to the waves that are expected to wash freely over the vessel’s deck: the horizontal overhang of the _Passaic_ class is intended to contribute to resisting a rolling motion. The vessel was designed to be as a raft on the water, constantly submerged by the passing waves, hermetically sealed to prevent the admission of water, and artificially ventilated by means of blowers drawing air down through the turret. This was the most startling feature about the construction. The protection afforded to the battery by a circular turret having the form best suited to deflect projectiles, the employment of machinery to point the guns by the rotation of the turret, the protection to motive power, to anchoring apparatus, etc., all presented admirable points of advantage, but the almost perfect immersion of the hull, and the absence of motion due to the _great stability_, are the essential features in the construction. [Illustration: U. S. DOUBLE-TURRETED MONITOR “TERROR.”] The double-turreted Monitors, of which the _Terror_ indicates the class, were built with a sponson, and it would have been better for the navy if this had been the only deviation made from the original design of Captain Ericsson. But it was not; the great mistake was made of building this class of Monitors of wood—a style of construction which had been already condemned abroad, in consequence of the impossibility of repairing an armored vessel so constructed, it being necessary to remove the armor for that purpose. The _Miantonomoh_, _Monadnock_, and _Terror_ were completed and put in commission. The _Miantonomoh_ made a cruise to European waters, spreading the fame of Ericsson, and proving the ability of a vessel of this type to navigate the high seas; the _Monadnock_ made the voyage to the Pacific, passing through the Strait of Magellan; and the _Terror_ was for a time on service on our eastern coast; but their lifetime was of short duration, and they are now being rebuilt, or rather new vessels, three of which bear their names, are now under construction of iron, which will serve to make them efficient and durable. It will hardly be a digression at this point to call attention more particularly to these double-turreted Monitors now under construction. They bear the following names, _viz._, _Puritan_, _Terror_, _Amphitrite_, _Miantonomoh_, and _Monadnock_. There was much contention about the completion of these vessels, and imaginary defects were ventilated in the newspapers. It may be that these attacks and erroneous statements prejudiced the public mind, and that the idea was entertained by some whose opinion is valued that there were grounds for the doubts that had been expressed of their sea-worthiness. The practical effect of these statements was to prevent Congress from appropriating money for the completion of the vessels, and this course on the part of Congress might have confirmed some in their doubts. Several boards of officers, most competent experts, however, reported upon them, recommending their completion; of these that made by the Advisory Board may be regarded as a final decision, for it was accepted without question. The Advisory Board reported as follows: “It is our opinion that it would be wise and expedient to finish these vessels at once, and for the following reasons, _viz._: “1. The hulls, as they are at present, are of excellent workmanship, fully up to the present standard condition of iron ship construction, whilst the flotation of the _Puritan_ and the behavior of the _Miantonomoh_ at sea confirm the correctness of the calculations of the designs. “2. It is easily possible to complete the vessels by taking advantage of the recent developments in armor, guns, and machinery, without making any radical changes in the designs, so that their speed, endurance, battery power, protection, and sea-going qualities shall be fully equal to those of any foreign iron-clad of similar dimensions designed previous to 1879. “3. The vessels may be finished so as to develop all the above-mentioned advantages without making their total cost, when completed, in any way exorbitant, compared with the results obtained; again, the interests of our sea-coast defence require a force at least equal to that which would be represented by these vessels. “We take the liberty of calling your attention to a certain erroneous impression which now exists with regard to these vessels. In one of the reports of these hulls a doubt was thrown on the correctness of the calculations of the _Puritan_. This doubt has spread in the public mind until it includes all the ships. The actual flotation of the _Puritan_ and the _Miantonomoh_ proves beyond question not only the reliability of the calculations, but also that the hulls of these vessels are lighter in proportion to the total displacement than those of any iron-clad low freeboard hulls afloat, with two exceptions. “It has been the unfortunate custom, in arguments as to the value of the results to be obtained, to compare these vessels with such foreign ships as the _Inflexible_ and the _Duilio_, to the evident disadvantage of the Monitors, no account whatever being taken of the fact that these vessels are double the size of the Monitors. If these hulls be compared with foreign ones of similar dimensions, no such disparity will appear.” These vessels, with the exception of the _Monadnock_, have their machinery in place; the _Miantonomoh_ has her side armor on; the others are finished as to their hulls, except the interior fittings, side armor, and turrets. The estimated cost to complete them is about four millions of dollars. When we consider the very slight defence that the country now possesses in the single-turreted Monitors before alluded to, it would seem imperative to complete with all despatch these vessels, which would represent a force of real power. These vessels are of iron as to the hulls, but they will be armored with steel or compound armor, and will be armed with the most powerful modern artillery that can be accommodated in their turrets. Their names appear in the navy list as “building.” They were launched in 1883. [Illustration: U. S. FRIGATE “TENNESSEE.”] The double-decked ship _Tennessee_ was the only frigate, or “first-rate,” borne, up to within a few months, on the list of vessels of the navy as available for sea service. She was for many years in commission as the flag-ship of the North Atlantic Station, but this year she reached that condition when the twenty per cent. law consigned her to “ordinary,” from which she has lately been removed under the operation of the hammer of the auctioneer. She was launched in 1865. Her length was 335 feet, beam 45 feet, draught of water 21.8 feet. She had a displacement of 4840 tons, and attained a speed of 11 knots with an indicated horse-power of 1900. The capacity of her coal-bunkers was 381 tons. Her battery consisted of two 8-inch muzzle-loading rifles (converted), sixteen 9-inch smooth-bores, and four 80-pounders. The vessels next in order of construction are those of the _Adams_ class, small sloops-of-war, which were launched in 1874. [Illustration: U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “ADAMS.”] These vessels were built of wood. They are convenient and handy, and perform the duty required of a cruiser in time of peace. Engine-power is developed in them to a higher degree than in those preceding them, but in all else they are merely a repetition of earlier constructions. The _Adams_ was launched in 1874. Her length is 185 feet, beam 35 feet, draught of water 14.3 feet. She has a displacement of 1375 tons, and attains a speed of 11.3 knots with an indicated horse-power of 715. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 140 tons. Her battery consists of one 11-inch and four 9-inch smooth-bores, and one 60-pounder. [Illustration: U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “MARION.”] The _Marion_ class of sloops, launched about the same period, are of an increased displacement and speed, and built of wood. The length of the _Marion_ is 216 feet, beam 37 feet, draught of water 16.6 feet. She has a displacement of 1900 tons, and attains a speed of 12.9 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 966. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 135 tons. Her battery consists of one 8-inch muzzle-loading rifle (converted), six 9-inch smooth-bores, and one 60-pounder. [Illustration: U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “ALERT” (IRON).] The _Alert_ is one of three vessels that were built of iron in 1874, the exceptional and spasmodic indication of an effort to change the material for construction, much induced by pressure from the iron interests of the country. This effort was made in a very mild and tentative manner, and was limited to this small class of diminutive vessels. The length of the _Alert_ is 175 feet, beam 32 feet, draught of water 12.9 feet. She has a displacement of 1020 tons, and attains a speed of ten knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 655. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 133 tons. Her battery consists of one 11-inch and four 9-inch smooth-bores, and one 60-pounder. [Illustration: U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “TRENTON.”] The shock attending the first step towards a change in the material for construction was so great as to cause a suspension of the effort, and in 1876 was launched the _Trenton_, built of wood, which represents the latest of that type on the list of the navy. The length of this ship is 253 feet, beam 48 feet, draught of water 20.6 feet. She has a displacement of 3900 tons, and attains a speed of 12.8 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 2813. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 350 tons. Her battery consists of ten 8-inch muzzle-loading rifles (converted). The above is a fair presentation of our old navy. Of such vessels we have, larger and smaller, twenty-five which are fit for service as cruisers, exclusive of the old single-turreted Monitors. These cruisers are built of wood, have low speed, and are armed with smooth-bore guns, with a sprinkling of rifled cannon, converted on the Palliser system from smooth-bore cast-iron guns. Of what service is this force, this relic of a past age? The duties of a navy, apart from the consideration of war, are manifold. As stated by the first Advisory Board, it is required for “surveying, deep-sea sounding, the advancement and protection of American commerce, exploration, the protection of American life and property endangered by wars between foreign countries, and service in support of American policy in matters where foreign governments are concerned.” With such a poor force it must be evident that it was impossible to discharge in an efficient manner all the duties of a navy. Our work in foreign surveys is limited to that of one small vessel on the west coast of North America; our deep-sea soundings are few and far between, dotted along the tracks pursued by our ships while going to and returning from distant stations; our commerce is protected; but we are unable to support any positive policy that the government might decide to declare in reference to, for example, the Monroe doctrine. To say nothing of European naval armaments, it is only necessary to point to some of the smaller powers in our own hemisphere that possess ships-of-war with which we have nothing fit to cope. Our people cannot desire to assume a position in the society of naval powers without supporting the position with dignity; they cannot wish their navy to be cited as a standard of inefficiency; they cannot wish to force their representatives (the officers of the navy) into a position of humiliation and mortification such as is imposed by being called on to deprecate criticism by labored explanations. Better abolish the navy and lower our pretensions. But the fact seems to be that the rapidity of naval development has not been properly appreciated, and it is after a long interval of indifference that, attention being at last centred on the subject, it is seen how rapid its strides have been, and how utterly we are distanced in the race. There is evidently now in the country a growing desire to repair the effects of the past oversight, and we see Congress has moved in the matter. As all political parties now unite in the necessity of effort in this direction, the hope is inspired that the subject is to be separated from those of a partisan character, and that the rehabilitation of the navy will be put on its proper level, and accepted as a national question in which all are alike interested. Possessed as we are now of a navy such as has been indicated, the change that was instituted involved a most violent transition. In reviewing our work of construction for over thirty years we saw no new type of cruiser. The only types of ships that we produced were those that date before the war; since which we but reproduced the same in classes of differing dimensions. From the sailing-ship with auxiliary steam-power we passed to the steamer with auxiliary sail-power; but we had no full-powered steamers, with or without sails. As long as it was considered necessary to spread as much canvas as was used, the space assigned to boilers and engines was limited, and we failed to achieve full power; and a reduction to the minimum of sail-power had to be accepted before we could present a type of a full-powered steamer. With the exception of two vessels of the _Alert_ class built of iron, we had nothing but wooden hulls. We had continued to build in perishable material, requiring large sums to be spent in repairs, and ignoring the manufactures of the country which could have been aided in their development by the contrary course. We permitted the age of steel to reach its zenith without indicating that we were aware of its presence. In these ships, with the exception of a few converted rifles of 8-inch calibre, our armaments consist of smooth-bore cast-iron guns which have composed our batteries for thirty years. These are now to be discarded, and their places to be filled with modern steel cannons. Torpedoes, movable torpedoes, of which we know nothing practically, are to be brought to the front, and are to form part of our equipment. Torpedo-boats are to be brought into use, and details innumerable are now to be studied and worked out. Conceive, then, a high-powered steamer with a minimum of canvas, built of steel, armed with modern steel artillery, and a secondary battery of Hotchkiss guns, fitted for launching movable torpedoes, with protective deck over boilers and engines, divided into many water-tight compartments giving protection to buoyancy, and compare such a ship with the old type of the United States cruiser, and an idea may be formed of the violence of the transition through which we had to pass. And there was nothing intermediate to break the suddenness of this change; there was no connecting link. The structure of to-day was placed in direct contrast with that of twenty-five years ago. This is the position in which we stood, and we could only accept a situation from which there was no escape. From all appearances the navy is now to be given an opportunity of asserting itself, and the steps already taken to remedy the existing state of things can be stated in a few words. The origin of the effort dates from June, 1881, when the first Advisory Board was appointed to consider and to report on the need of appropriate vessels for the navy. This Board, in its report of November 7, 1881, decided that the United States navy should consist of seventy unarmored cruisers of steel; it reported that there were thirty-two vessels in the navy fit for service as cruisers, and it indicated the character of the new vessels to be built. This Board confined itself to the consideration of unarmored vessels, as it did not consider that the orders under which it acted required that it should discuss the subject of armored ships, though it expressed the opinion that such vessels were indispensable in time of war. Some time elapsed before any practical results followed from the action of this Board, but in an act of Congress approved March 3, 1883, the construction of three steam-cruisers and a despatch-boat was authorized. These vessels, the _Chicago_, _Boston_, _Atlanta_, and _Dolphin_, are, with the exception of the _Chicago_, now in commission. In an act of Congress approved March, 1885, five additional vessels were authorized, and these, the _Charleston_, _Baltimore_, _Newark_, and gun-boats No. 1 and 2, are under construction.[49] Up to the time of the inception of these cruisers no steel for ship-plates had been rolled in the United States. Construction in American iron plates had been extensively carried on, but if steel plating was required it had to be imported at great cost to the builder. Those who contemplated bidding on the proposals issued by the government for the first four vessels had to consider this matter. Mr. John Roach, of New York and of Chester, Pennsylvania, undertook the manufacture of this material, and finding that success attended his experiment, he was able to direct extensively the steel-works at Thurlow, Pennsylvania, to this line of business, and when the bids were opened it was found that this new industry, introduced through his enterprise, enabled him to underbid all competitors. After receiving the contracts for the ships, Mr. Roach contracted with the Phœnix Iron Company, of Phœnixville, with Messrs. Park Brothers, of Pittsburgh, and the Norway Iron and Steel Works, of South Boston, for supplies of similar material: thus the first step in this effort to rehabilitate the navy resulted in introducing a new industry into the country. The still more extensive development of industries that will attend the work of rehabilitation as it advances will be treated further on. Before presenting the types of cruisers which are now to be introduced into the navy, it may be well to refer to an error that exists, or has existed, in the popular mind as to the signification of a steel cruiser. To many who are uninformed in technical language the word steel, in connection with a vessel of war, implies protecting armor, and such misapprehension would convey the idea that a cruiser of steel is able to contend with an armored vessel. This is a mistake; there is protection obtained by constructing a vessel of steel, but not such as is provided by armor. The destructive effect of shell-firing and the development in modern artillery have made armor necessary for all vessels which can carry it, and has also made it necessary to provide all other protection possible to vessels that cannot carry armor. Although this protection cannot be given absolutely to the hull of such ships and to the _personnel_, it is provided to the _buoyancy_ by the introduction of water-tight compartments and protective decks, which limit the destructive effect of the fire of the enemy and localize the water that may enter through shot-holes. With a wooden hull it would not be possible to combine this precaution because of the difficulty in making joints water-tight between wood and metal, and in consequence of the weight that would be added to a wooden hull, which is already from sixteen per cent. to twenty per cent. heavier than if constructed of steel. The only defensive advantage possessed by a steel unarmored cruiser over a wooden one is derived from this system of construction. [Illustration: U. S. FRIGATE “CHICAGO” (STEEL).] The _Chicago_ is a steam-frigate, built throughout of steel of domestic manufacture, the outside plating being 9/16 inch thick. Her length is 325 feet, beam 48.2 feet, draught of water 19 feet. She has a displacement of 4500 tons, and will attain a minimum speed of 14 knots per hour with an indicated horse-power of 5000. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 940 tons, and she carries a battery of four 8-inch steel breech-loading guns in half-turrets, and eight 6-inch and two 5-inch steel breech-loaders on the gun-deck. This ship has nine athwartships bulkheads, dividing the hull into ten main water-tight compartments, and the machinery and boilers are covered by a protective deck one and a half inches in thickness. When the bunkers are full of coal she has a coal protection nine feet thick from the water-line to eight feet above it. [Illustration: DECK PLANS OF THE U. S. FRIGATE “CHICAGO,” SHOWING BATTERY.] The deck plans show the arrangement of the main battery, in addition to which she carries a powerful secondary battery of Hotchkiss rapid-firing single-shot, and revolving cannons and Gatling guns. The bow of the vessel is strengthened for using the ram with which she is fitted. The rudder and steering-gear are under water. She has two screws—a subdivision of power which is given to all ships-of-war of over 3000 tons displacement—from which a great advantage is derived if one engine is broken down, as three-fourths of the speed can be maintained with the other. The advantage of this in a naval action is obvious. [Illustration: U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “ATLANTA” (STEEL).] The _Atlanta_, of which the _Boston_ is a counterpart, presents another type of a steel unarmored cruiser. She is a steam-corvette, or sloop-of-war, a single-decked ship. Her length is 276 feet, beam 42 feet, draught of water 16 feet 10 inches. She has a displacement of 3000 tons, and has attained a speed of 15.5 knots per hour with a maximum horse-power of 3482. The capacity of her coal-bunkers is 580 tons, and her battery consists of two 8-inch steel breech-loading guns and six 6-inch, besides a secondary battery of Hotchkiss and Gatling guns. [Illustration: DECK PLAN OF THE U. S. SLOOP-OF-WAR “ATLANTA,” SHOWING BATTERY.] In vessels of this class it is usual to have an open-deck battery, with a poop-deck and top-gallant forecastle at the extremities, but the effort has been made in this type to increase the effectiveness of the battery by giving the guns a more extended lateral train than is possible when a ship is arranged with a forecastle and poop-deck. These, with the accommodations which they provide, have been removed from the ends of the ship, and a superstructure has been erected amidships. This arrangement gives a clear sweep forward and aft for the powerful 8-inch guns, enabling the forward gun to cover an all-around fire of from 40° abaft the beam on the port side to 30° abaft the beam on the starboard side, the after 8-inch gun having a corresponding lateral sweep aft. Within the superstructure are mounted the six 6-inch guns, two on each side on the broadside, with a train of 60° before and abaft the beam, the other two being mounted at diagonally opposite corners in such a way as to admit of their use either on the broadside or for fire ahead or astern. This object is achieved by mounting the two 8-inch guns _en échelon_, the forward gun being on the port side of the centre line of the ship, and the after 8-inch gun on the starboard side of the same line. This is shown on the deck plan.[50] It does not require the discrimination of a professional eye to see the increased power given to the battery by this arrangement. It is an innovation that was very startling to the conservative mind; but the more familiar the idea becomes, the more favorable opinion grows to the change, and the more apparent becomes the increased offensive power of the ship. The extremities of this type of ship will not, of course, be so dry in heavy weather as if it had a forecastle and poop, but it must be remembered that every part of the spar-deck is from nine to ten feet above the water. The rig of the _Atlanta_ is that of a brig, but without head-booms; the fire ahead of the forward guns is thus unobstructed, and the ram with which she is fitted is always clear for use. The division of the hull into water-tight compartments by athwartship bulkheads, and a protective deck over engines and boilers, form a part of the construction. [Illustration: U. S. DESPATCH-BOAT “DOLPHIN.”] The _Dolphin_, though not regarded as a vessel for fighting purposes, is the type of a class that is needed in all navies for duty as a despatch-boat, or for the temporary accommodation of a commander-in-chief of a squadron who may desire to communicate rapidly with his ships at distant points. She is well fitted for the service, and is now in commission, demonstrating her ability to perform the work required of her. She could also be of service as a commerce destroyer, for which service she is equipped with one gun of long range. Her length is 240 feet, beam 32 feet, draught of water 14.25 feet. She has a displacement of 1485 tons, and attains a speed of 15 knots per hour. Her advent into the navy marks an epoch—the inauguration of the successful manufacture in the United States of American rolled steel ship-plating, equal to the best in the world, as shown by the most rigid government tests. The _Dolphin_, is the first vessel, whether for naval or commercial purposes, that is built entirely of steel of domestic manufacture, and is the pioneer representative of other similar industries which will be developed as the rehabilitation of the navy proceeds. She has proved herself eminently successful, and is the fastest sea-steamer of her displacement built in the United States, with perhaps the exception of the steam-yacht _Atalanta_. She is a stanch vessel of great structural strength, and does credit to the ship-building profession of the country. Of the additional cruisers authorized by the late acts of Congress, particulars will be found in the Notes. In one of the larger vessels the type of the _Atlanta_ will be reproduced on a larger scale, while the other vessel of the same class will be provided with a poop and top-gallant forecastle, and will carry her forward and after guns on sponsons, by which means fire ahead and astern will be secured. This will make it necessary to limit the power of the battery of the second vessel to 6-inch guns, as the 8-inch gun cannot conveniently be carried on sponsons in a vessel of 4000 tons displacement. The heavy gun-boat will carry six 6-inch guns, the forward and after ones on sponsons; and the light gun-boat will carry four of the same guns. In the construction of these additional vessels advantage has been taken of all our experience in our initial effort, and of whatever developments may have been made by others since the earlier vessels were designed. The absolute departure from the old standards is apparent in material, in armament, in speed, and in rig. The causes that have led to this change in material may be found, first, in the change that has taken place in ordnance. The