Chapter 1

The Project Gutenberg eBook of Modern ships of war This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook. Title: Modern ships of war Author: Sir Edward J. Reed Edward Simpson Contributor: J. D. Jerrold Kelley Release date: June 22, 2024 [eBook #73887] Language: English Original publication: United States: Harper & Brothers, 1887 Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/73887 Credits: deaurider, John Campbell and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive) *** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MODERN SHIPS OF WAR *** TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been placed at the end of the book. A superscript is denoted by ^, for example y^3. Basic fractions are displayed as ½ ⅓ ¼ etc; other fractions are shown in the form a-b/c, for example 16-9/10 or 9/16. The tables in this book are best viewed using a monospace font. Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book. [Illustration: THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, OCTOBER 21, 1805.—From a drawing by J. O. Davidson.] MODERN SHIPS OF WAR BY SIR EDWARD J. REED, M.P. LATE CHIEF CONSTRUCTOR OF THE BRITISH NAVY AND EDWARD SIMPSON REAR-ADMIRAL U.S.N., LATE PRESIDENT U. S. NAVAL ADVISORY BOARD WITH SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTERS AND NOTES BY J. D. JERROLD KELLEY LIEUTENANT U.S.N. AUTHOR OF “THE QUESTION OF SHIPS” “ARMORED VESSELS” ETC. _ILLUSTRATED_ NEW YORK HARPER & BROTHERS, FRANKLIN SQUARE 1888 Copyright, 1887, by HARPER & BROTHERS. _All rights reserved._ PREFACE. After many years of neglect, the people of this country have awakened to the necessity of creating a modern fleet. Proud as they were of the Navy’s achievements in the past, they failed for a long time to exhibit any interest in its present or future, and met all claims for its re-establishment by a denial of its usefulness, or by a lazy optimism of indifference which smilingly put the question by. Indeed, at one time, the popular solicitude disappeared completely, and outside of the service there was manifested neither an alarm at its degeneracy nor an appreciation of the dangers this made possible. With an apathy inexplicable upon any rational grounds, the notes of warning sounded by experts were unheeded, and the law-makers contented themselves by pinning their faith to what they called “the creative possibilities of American genius.” They accepted this fallacy as a fact, they made this phrase a fetich, and with a fatuous hope believed it could, by some occult inspiration, in the event of sudden, sharp, and short war, save them from the fighting-machines which twenty years of tireless experiment had perfected abroad. In the end, by a neatly balanced policy of pride and folly, the Navy was exhausted almost to dissolution. Then Congress lazily bestirred itself to action, and prescribed as a remedy three unarmored cruisers and a despatch-boat. Heroic treatment, not homœopathy, was needed; but, thanks to a naturally vigorous constitution, the bolus sufficed to lift the patient out of the throes, and to encourage him into a languid convalescence. Luckily, the vessels became a party question, and their historic tribulations did so much towards educating the nation that a public sentiment was aroused which made a modern navy possible. It must be confessed, however, that the demand even yet is not so vociferous as to dominate all other issues, though there is apparent everywhere a quickening desire for the country to take, if not the first, at least a respectable, place among the great maritime powers. With these new ideas came a desire for information which could not be satisfied, because, curiously enough, the popular literature of the subject is meagre, or rather it is unavailable. There are treatises in plenty which soar beyond the skies of any but experts; there are handy manuals wherein the Navy, like the banjo, is made easy in ten lessons; but between these extremes nothing exists which is accurate, and at the same time free from those dismal figures and dry-as-dust facts that are so apt to discourage a reader at the outset. To meet this want, which was one by no means “long felt,” these articles were originally published in _Harper’s Magazine_, and with a success that seemed to justify their collection in a more available, if not a more permanent, form. It may be said now that no changes of any moment have been made in the text, that the notes attempt only to bring down the data to the latest date, and that the appendices are needful additions which the limited space of a monthly publication necessarily forbade. The reader who has not followed the progress of naval war construction will undoubtedly find many surprises, both in achievement and promise, which may be difficult to understand, yet it is hoped that the non-technical manner in which Sir Edward Reed and Rear-admiral Simpson have written will do much to make plain this important National question. Both these gentlemen are authorities of the first rank, both are luminous writers, and each in his own country and own sphere has had an important influence upon war-ship design and armament. To those who read within the lines there awaits a mortifying realization of our inferiority; for during all the years that this country—masterful beyond compare in other material struggles—was so successfully neglecting its navy, foreign designers were achieving triumphs which are marvellous. With this knowledge there is sure to come a high appreciation of the intelligence exercised; for the evolution of the battle-ship has been so rapid, and the resultant type has so little in common with the wooden vessel of our war, that those who have solved the problems have practically created a new science. CONTENTS. PAGE INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER 1 THE BRITISH NAVY 12 NOTES 52 THE FRENCH NAVY 67 NOTES 92 THE ITALIAN, RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, AND TURKISH NAVIES 104 NOTES 134 Italy 134 Russia 139 Spain 141 Austria 144 THE UNITED STATES NAVY 148 NOTES 183 UNITED STATES NAVAL ARTILLERY 194 NOTES 226 Guns 226 Machine and Rapid-fire Guns 234 SHIPS OF THE MINOR NAVIES 241 APPENDIX I 251 SUBMARINE WARFARE 251 TORPEDOES 259 A NAVAL RESERVE 261 FORCED DRAFT 263 APPENDIX II 267 THE QUESTION OF TYPES 267 APPENDIX III 283 RANGE OF GUNS 283 ILLUSTRATIONS. THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, OCTOBER 21, 1805.—From a drawing by J. O. Davidson _Frontispiece._ PAGE The “Victory” 13 The “Glatton” 15 The “Dreadnought” 17 The “Inflexible” 19 Section of the “Amiral Duperré” 23 Section of the “Inflexible” 23 Section of the “Collingwood” 23 New Admiralty Ship 23 The “Devastation” 24 The “Sultan” 27 Section and Plan of the “Alexandra” 28 Section and Plan of the “Téméraire” 28 Section and Plan of the “Nelson” 29 Section and Plan of the “Shannon” 29 The “Alexandra” 30 The “Téméraire” 31 The “Hotspur” 34 The “Warspite” 37 Transverse Section of the “Mersey” 38 The “Inconstant” 41 The “Colossus” 43 Transverse Section of one of the New “Scouts” 49 The “Jumna” 50 The “Dévastation:” French Armored Ship of the First Class 73 The “Courbet” (formerly the “Foudroyant”): French Armored Ship of the First Class 75 The “Richelieu” 77 The “Amiral Duperré:” French Armored Ship of the First Class 81 The “Vengeur:” French Iron-clad Coast-guard Vessel 87 British Torpedo Gun-boat of the “Grasshopper” Class (side view) 90 The “Grasshopper”—Plan of Upper Deck, Poop, and Forecastle 90 The “Duilio” 105 Section of the “Italia” 110 Deck Plan of the “Italia” 110 The “Italia” 111 The “Esmeralda” 113 The “Amerigo Vespucci” 115 The “Catherine II.” 119 Half-deck Plan of the “Sachsen” 121 Side Elevation of the “Sachsen” 121 Half-deck Plan of the “Kaiser” 122 Side Elevation of the “Kaiser” 122 The “Sachsen” 123 U. S. Side-wheel Steamer “Powhatan” 150 U. S. Frigate “Franklin,” of the “Merrimac” Class 152 U. S. Sloop-of-war “Hartford” 153 U. S. Sloop-of-war “Brooklyn” 154 U. S. Sloop-of-war “Kearsarge” 155 U. S. Iron-clad “New Ironsides” 156 U. S. Monitor “Passaic” 156 U. S. Double-turreted Monitor “Terror” 157 U. S. Frigate “Tennessee” 159 U. S. Sloop-of-war “Adams” 160 U. S. Sloop-of-war “Marion” 161 U. S. Sloop-of-war “Alert” (Iron) 162 U. S. Sloop-of-war “Trenton” 163 U. S. Frigate “Chicago” (Steel) 169 Deck Plans of the U. S. Frigate “Chicago,” showing Battery 171 Deck Plan of the U. S. Sloop-of-war “Atlanta,” showing Battery 171 U. S. Sloop-of-war “Atlanta” (Steel) 173 U. S. Despatch-boat “Dolphin” 176 Light Draught Coast-defence Vessel, with Deck Plan 180 The Howell Torpedo 182 Bronze Breech-loading Cannon captured in Corea, age unknown 194 Bronze Breech-loader used by Cortez in Mexico 195 Breech-loader captured in the War with Mexico 196 Bronze 12-pounder, “El Neptuno,” 1781 197 U.S.N. Carronade, Slide, and Carriage 198 U.S.N. Medium 32-pounder 199 U.S.N. 9-inch Dahlgren (9-inch Smooth-bore) 201 Horizontal Section of Millwall Shield 204 A Krupp Gun on a Naval Carriage 206 Alfred Krupp 207 Breech-loading Rifle-tube ready for receiving Jacket 210 Breech-loading Rifle-jacket, Rough-bored and Turned 210 Putting the Jacket on a 6-inch Breech-loading Rifle-tube 211 Breech-loading Rifle after receiving Jacket 214 A Krupp Hammer 215 Transporting Cannon at Bremerhaven 217 Breech-loading Rifle after receiving Jacket and Chase Hoops 218 Breech-loading Rifle with Jacket, Chase Hoops, and Jacket Hoops in place 218 U.S.N. 6-inch Breech-loading Rifle 218 Cartridge Case and Grains of Powder, U.S.N. 220 Common Shells, U.S.N. 220 Unburned and Partially Consumed Grains of U.S.N. Powder 222 Section of U.S.N. 6-inch Built-up Steel Breech-loading Rifle 222 Broadside Carriage for 6-inch Breech-loading Rifle 223 Rapid-firing Single-shot Hotchkiss Gun 224 New 6-inch Breech-loading Rifle 238 Longitudinal Plans of Nordenfeldt Boat 254 The Submarine Monitor “Peacemaker” 257 MODERN SHIPS OF WAR. INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. During the last thirty years the changes in naval science have been so much greater than in its whole previous history as to be epoch-making. Between the wooden vessel of 1857 and the metal machine of 1887 there exist in common only the essential principles that each is a water-borne structure, armed with guns and propelled by steam. Beyond this everything is changed—model, material, machinery, rig, armament, equipment. In truth, so radical are the differences, and so sudden have been the developments, that authorities are widely separated in opinion, even upon such a primary question as a universally accepted system of classification. But as this is necessary to a proper appreciation of the subject, a generalization may be made in which war-vessels are divided into armored and unarmored types, the former including battle-ships, and the latter those employed in the police of the seas, in commerce protection or destruction, or in the attack of positions which are defenceless. In the absence of any accepted differentiations of these classes, the new British nomenclature may be adopted with safety, for to a certain degree it explains the terms and includes the types now used so variously in different navies. Under this armored vessels are grouped into (1) battle-ships, (2) cruisers, (3) special types, such as rams and torpedo-boats, and (4) coast-service ships; and unarmored vessels comprise (1) cruisers, (2) sloops, (3) gun-vessels, (4) gun-boats, (5) despatch-vessels, and (6) torpedo-vessels. “As it was impossible to unite all the qualities which are to be desired in a ship-of-war in a single vessel, it became necessary to divide the leading types into subdivisions, each specially adapted to the use of a particular arm, or to perform some special service. For the battle-ships designed for naval operations in European waters great offensive and defensive powers and evolutionary qualities are essential, while the highest sea-going qualities, including habitability, are, in the opinion of some, less essential. For sea-going battle-ships offensive and defensive strength must be partially sacrificed in order to secure unquestionable sea-worthiness. In ocean-going battle-ships canvas is a valuable auxiliary. In battle-ships for European waters, masts and yards involve a useless sacrifice of fighting power.... Heavily armored ships intended for the line of battle must necessarily carry powerful guns. They must be able to traverse great distances, and must therefore have considerable storage for coal. Great speed is required to enable them to meet the inevitable contingencies of an engagement. In a word, the class of ships which may be called battery-ships must be furnished with very considerable offensive and defensive power. Their great size, however, and the enormous weight of their armor and armament, necessitate such displacements as render them unfit for coast defence” (BRASSEY). While the antagonistic elements of offence, defence, speed, or endurance have caused the main differences of design in all types, the greatest variances with battle-ships are found in the distribution of armor for protection. A hasty summarization of the policies now adopted by the great maritime nations shows that the French generally adhere to a complete armor-belt at the water-line, that the Italians have in their latest ships totally abandoned side-armor, and that the English favor its partial employment. The popular idea that armor consists only of thick slabs of wrought-iron or steel, or of steel-faced iron, bolted to a ship’s side, is erroneous. “In the earlier broadside ships,” writes the present director of English naval construction, Mr. W. H. White, “this view was practically correct; they had no armor or protected decks, the decks being covered only by thin plates fitted for structural purposes. But in the _Devastation_ class, and all subsequent ships, considerable and increasing weights of material are worked into the deck armor, and with good reason. Experiments showed conclusively that horizontal protection at the top of the armor-belt, or citadel, was of vital necessity, and even now (1887) it is open to question whether the provision made for horizontal protection in relation to vertical armor is as large as it might advantageously be.” The factors which have most influenced the problem are the torpedo, ram, and gun. Of these the last is indubitably of the highest importance, for the number and nature, the effective handling, the disposition and command, and the relative protection of the guns are the elements which control most powerfully the principles of ship design. In the first stage of the contest between gun and armor the defence was victorious, but so rapidly have the art and science of ordnance developed that to-day the power of the heaviest pieces as compared with the resistance of the heaviest armor is greater than ever before. The story of the contest can be briefly told. In 1858 the armament of the newest ships was principally a broadside battery of 32-pounders; in this were included a few 56-pound shell-guns and one or two eight-inch 68-pounders, though of the whole number not one had an energy, that is, a force of blow when striking, sufficient to penetrate four and a half inches of wrought-iron at short range. In the earliest iron-clads—the French _La Gloire_ and the English _Warrior_—batteries mainly of nine-inch calibre were carried, the latter mounting forty guns of all kinds. The _Minotaur_, the first representative of the next English type, had fifty guns, but after this class was launched there appeared that distinctively modern tendency to decrease the number of pieces while increasing the intensity of their fire. The succeeding vessels carried from fourteen to twelve pieces, until, in 1874, the principle of concentration reached its maximum in giving the _Inflexible_ only four guns. These, like the _Warrior’s_, were muzzle-loaders, and their relative dimensions and power may be compared as follows: +--------------------------------+----------------+------------------+ | | _Warrior._ | _Inflexible._ | +--------------------------------+----------------+------------------+ | Weight of gun | 4¾ tons. | 80 tons. | | Length | 10 feet. | 26 feet 9 inches.| | Calibre | 8 inches. | 16 inches. | | Powder charge | 16 pounds. | 450 pounds. | | Weight of projectile | 68 ” | 1700 ” | | Energy at 1000 yards | 452 foot-tons. | 26,370 foot-tons.| | Penetration of 4½ inches of | | | | wrought-iron at short range | None. | ... | | Penetration of wrought-iron at | | | | 1000 yards | ... | 23 inches. | +--------------------------------+----------------+------------------+ The term energy, when employed to indicate the work that a gun can perform, is expressed in foot-tons, and signifies that the amount developed is sufficient to raise the given weight in tons to the height of one foot. The piercing power of the _Inflexible’s_ projectile was, under the same conditions of charge and range, sufficient to penetrate twenty-five feet of granite and concrete masonry, or thirty-two feet of the best Portland cement. When the thickness of armor-plating increased, gun-makers tried to overcome the resistance by giving greater energy to the shot. As this required large charges of powder and very long guns, muzzle-loaders became impracticable on shipboard, and were supplanted by breech-loaders. From this stage guns developed greatly in power until, in 1882, those designed for the _Benbow_ were to weigh 110 tons, to be 43 feet long and 16¾ inches in calibre, and with 900 pounds of powder and an 1800-pound projectile were to develop 54,000 foot-tons, or an energy sufficient to penetrate thirty-five inches of unbacked wrought-iron at one thousand yards. The guns for the latest English ships, the _Trafalgar_ and the _Nile_, weigh 67 tons, are 36 feet 1 inch in length and 13½ inches in calibre, and with a 520-pound charge and a 1250-pound projectile are expected to develop 29,500 foot-tons, or an energy sufficient to penetrate an iron target twenty-two and a half inches thick at a thousand yards. These results apparently show a retrogression in power, but a comparison of the _Inflexible’s_ and _Trafalgar’s_ batteries proves that the more modern gun of the latter weighs 13 tons less, is 2½ inches smaller in calibre, fires a shot 450 pounds lighter, and yet develops an energy greater by 3000 foot-tons. This gain is mainly due to the improvements made with powder and projectiles. In 1883 a 403-pound Whitworth steel shell penetrated a wrought-iron target eighteen inches thick backed by thirty-seven inches of well-packed wet sand, one and a half inches of steel, various balks of timber, and sixteen feet more of sand. When the projectile was recovered after this stratified flight it was found to be practically uninjured. On the Continent, where breech-loaders were favored earlier than in England or with ourselves, the heaviest rifles afloat are the 75-ton, 16.54-inch calibre, French, and the 106 tons, 17-inch Italian guns. These are, however, not the largest pieces designed, for there is an 120-ton Krupp gun, and the French have projected one which will weigh 124 tons, be 18.11 inches in calibre, and fire a 2465-pound projectile—over a ton—with a powder charge of 575 pounds. A comparison of the Krupp 120-ton gun with the 110-ton Armstrong shows that the former is more powerful; that its projectile is much heavier, and the initial velocity and pressure are smaller. The results at the recent test were as follows: Armstrong. Krupp. Charge 850 pounds 847 pounds. Shot 1800 ” 2315 ” Velocity 2150 feet 1900 feet. Pressure 19.9 tons 18.8 tons. Energy 57,679 foot-tons 67,928 foot-tons. From the _Warrior_ to the _Inflexible_ the evolution of design was based upon a principle that sought the best results for the offence in small, powerful batteries, with all-around fire and armor protection; and for the defence, in thick armor carried over the vitals of the ship. This was satisfied by larger weights of armor and a smaller ratio of armored part to total surface. Wrought-iron armor was also replaced by compound, with a corresponding gain of twenty per cent. for equal thicknesses, and at present all-steel plates, of which great things may reasonably be expected, are now employed by France and Italy. In 1861 the _Minotaur_ was belted throughout her 400 feet of length with 1780 tons of armor, or with a weight nearly double that given to the _Warrior_ two years before. The _Inflexible_ has 3280 tons, and the _Trafalgar_ 4230 tons, of which 1040 are fitted horizontally. The maximum thickness of the _Warrior’s_ wrought-iron armor is 4½ inches, of the _Devastation’s_, 12 inches, and of the _Inflexible’s_ 24 inches; the compound (iron steel-faced) armor of the _Trafalgar_ is 18 and 20 inches thick, and the _Baudin_ and _Formidable_ have 21.7 inches in solid plates of steel. These, of course, are some of the dry-as-dust figures before referred to, and they are cited only to assist a comparison, their mere enumeration having no scientific value, because the disposition and character of the plates are unconsidered. To meet this development of offence and defence many changes in design have been adopted. The _broadside system_ of the first armored ships was followed in 1863-1867 by a _belt and battery type_, wherein the principal guns, much reduced in number, were carried in a box battery amidships, and given a fore-and-aft fire by means of recessed ports or outlying batteries. In 1869 the Admiralty adopted the _breastwork monitor_, a low free-boarded structure, which was plated from stem to stern in the region of the water-line, and had in its central portion an armored breastwork that carried at each end a revolving turret. In 1870 this type was pronounced unsafe, and after a careful investigation by a special committee on design certain modifications were recommended. These did not affect materially the essential features of Sir Edward Reed’s plan, for the complete water-line belt and the central armored battery were retained; and to-day many of the critics who then denounced it claim that, after all, it is the true type of an ideal battle-ship. In 1872 the Italian naval authorities accepted the conclusions of the British committee, and laid down the first _central-citadel_ battle-ships, now known as the _Duilio_ and _Dandolo_; and about the same time Mr. Barnaby, the new Chief Constructor of the British Navy, brought forward a similar design in the _Inflexible_. The engines, boilers, and the bases of two turrets in this vessel are protected by an armored box-shaped citadel, from the extremities of which a horizontal armored deck extends fore and aft below the water-line; above this deck an armored superstructure completes the free-board, and has its unprotected spaces at the water-line, subdivided into numerous water-tight compartments. This ship met with so much hostile criticism that a committee was appointed to investigate the charges, but in the end the Admiralty plans were officially sustained. The French, with characteristic ability and independence, have in the mean time made many notable departures from their first types of broadside ships. Believing in the association of heavy guns with light ones—mixed armaments, as they are called—the central armored casemate of wholly protected guns has been rejected in order to give a maximum thickness of plating at the water-line. The largest guns are mounted _en barbette_—that is, in towers which protect the gun mechanism, and permit the pieces to be fired, not through port-holes, but over the rim of armored parapets. The French constructors reason, and with justice, that no single shot from a heavy gun should be wasted, and that, in addition to an extended range, gun captains must be enabled, by keeping their eyes upon the enemy, to select the best opportunity for firing. With broadside pieces this is impossible, for apart from the limited range, and the obscurity caused by the smoke, the port-holes through which the sighting has necessarily to be done are almost choked by the gun-muzzles. Turrets have their objections also, because the poisonous gases which formerly escaped wholly from the muzzle will, as soon as the breech is opened, rush into the turret and make it almost uninhabitable. Often after one discharge the air becomes stifling, and in the _Duilio_ it deteriorated so quickly as to be unfit for respiration until a part of the turret-roof had been lifted. Then, again, structural difficulties not easily overcome in the turret are simplified in the barbette, as the latter, with equal gun facilities, weighs fifty per cent. less, and at the same time escapes all those chances of disablement which a well-placed shot is almost sure to cause in any revolving system. At sea the chance of hitting the gun is never great, and the main things to protect are the gun machinery and the gunners; the armored wall of the barbette tower does this for the former, and the latter have a fair fighting chance afforded by the gun-shield. Of course war is not deer-stalking, and the patriot who wants to go into battle so fully protected as to be in no danger had better stop playing sailor or soldier, and take to the woods before the fighting begins. In addition to the heavy ordnance, the French mount a number of lighter pieces, and carry powerful secondary batteries of rapid fire and machine-guns; and sufficient armor defence is given by a belt at the water-line, an armored deck, and a glacis and parapet for the barbette. It is quite probable that these purely military terms may seem odd when applied to ships, but they are the only ones which can exactly explain what is meant, and, after all, they show how much a battle-ship has become a floating, transferable fortress. The Italians were not altogether satisfied with the _Duilio_, as she lacked the high speed and coal endurance which they deem essential in any Mediterranean naval policy; so in 1878 they adopted an idea advanced some years before in England, and startled the world with the _Italia_ type. In this ship protection is given, not by vertical or side armor, but by an armored deck, between which and the deck above there is a very minute subdivision of the water-line space. The system is based upon the theory that the power to float must be obtained, not by keeping our projectiles, but by so localizing their effect as to make any penetration practically harmless. The _Italia’s_ heavy guns are carried in a central armored redoubt, at a height of thirty-three feet above the water-line, and with their machinery and fittings weigh over two thousand tons. This fact shows the magnitude of the task accepted by her designer, for it means that a load nearly equal to the total weight of a first-class line-of-battle ship of the last century has to be sustained at this great elevation. Besides the main battery of four 106-ton guns, eighteen six-inch breech-loading guns are carried—twelve in broadside on the upper battery deck, four in the superstructure before and abaft the redoubt, and two under cover at the extremities of the spar-deck. The redoubt is protected by seventeen inches of compound iron, inclined twenty-four degrees from the vertical; and the complete armored deck, which is nearly three inches thick, dips forward to strengthen the ram, curves aft to cover the steering gear, and, at the ship’s sides, extends six feet below the water-line. To cope with this formidable rival, which, whether right or wrong in principle, must, under England’s policy, be surpassed, the ships of the _Admiral_ class were designed. In these the main battery is mounted in two barbettes built high out of water, near the extremities of the vessel, while in a central broadside are carried the armor-piercing and rapid-fire guns. The engines, boilers, and barbette communications are protected by a water-line belt of thick armor which covers about forty-five per cent. of the ship’s length; at the upper edge of this there is a protective deck, and at its ends athwartships bulkheads are erected; before and abaft the belt and beneath the water-line there is a protective deck, together with the usual minute subdivision into water-tight compartments. The barbettes and the cylindrical ammunition tubes which extend from the belt-deck to the barbette floors are strongly armored. Owing to the strong protest made against these vessels, more efficient armor protection has been given to the battle-ships lately laid down. * * * * * From this very hasty and incomplete review it may be gathered that the first and most lasting influence in the development of battle-ships is due to France and England, though the _Monitor_ had no little share in the result. It is difficult to say, in the ceaseless struggle for something which, if not good, is new, what may be the outcome of the latest efforts to revolutionize the question, or, curiously enough, to bring it back to the point whence its departure was taken. Whatever may be the courage of one’s opinion, there is not sufficient data—a first-class war can only supply these—upon which to say, Yea, yea! or Nay, nay! and prophecy is certain to be without honor, especially as the discussions given in the appendices demonstrate how the wisest and most experienced have no substantial agreement in views. An editorial in a late number of the _Broad Arrow_ declares that “the days of armored plate protection are, in the opinion of many thinking men, coming to a close. The gun is victorious all along the line, and the increased speed given to the torpedo-boat, taken in conjunction with the destructive efficiency attained by the torpedo, makes it a questionable policy to spend such large sums of money as heretofore upon individual ships.” There is no room here to give the various arguments, though very clever and ingenious they are, by which this position is fortified; it may be added, however, that to a large degree this is the opinion of Admiral Aube, the late French Minister of Marine, and undoubtedly this declaration re-echoes the shibboleth of those other French officers who, in the absolute formula of their chief, Gabriel Charmes, insist that “a squadron attacked at night by torpedo-boats is a squadron lost.” English authorities, with a few notable exceptions, do not go so far as their more impulsive, or, from the Gallic stand-point, less conservative neighbors. Chief Constructor White believes that at no time in the war between gun and armor has the former, as the principal fighting factor, so many chances of success. He concedes the value of light, quick-firing guns in association with heavy armaments, grants the importance of rams, torpedoes, submarine boats, and torpedo-vessels generally, but denies that the days of heavily armored battle-ships are ended. Lord Charles Beresford asserts that the value of large guns at sea is overestimated, advocates from motives of morals and efficiency mixed armaments, agrees to the great, yet subordinate, importance of the usual auxiliaries, and insists that England builds cumbersome and expensive battle-ships only because of their possession by her dangerous rivals. There are equally rigorous disagreements upon all the other types of armored, unarmored, and auxiliary vessels, as needs must be, so long as the naval policies of no two nations can be alike. England and Russia are at opposite poles, so far as their environments are concerned, and between France and Turkey the differences are as radical as their national instincts and ambitions. But, among all, England is as isolated as her geographical situation. Whatever fleets other nations may assemble, whatever types other countries may deem best for their interests, England, whose existence depends upon her naval strength, must have all; not only the best in quality, but so many of every class that she will be able to defend her integrity against any foe that assails it. England can take no chances. Upon one point alone, the necessity of high speed, is there substantial agreement. Less than four years ago fifteen or sixteen knots were accepted as a maximum beyond which profitable design could not be urged. Greater speed, it is true, had been attained by our first type of commerce destroyer. In February, 1868, the _Wampanoag_ ran at the rate of 16.6 knots for thirty-eight hours, and made a maximum of 17.75 knots; but great as was the achievement, there is a general acceptance of the fact that this vessel was a racing-machine, and not in the modern sense a man-of-war. Fighting-ships, with the power to steam thousands of miles at sea without recoaling, are now being built under contracts which, for every deficiency in speed or horse-power, pay penalties that at our former summit of expectations would have been prohibitive to ship construction; and, what is more startling yet, the bonus which goes to any increase upon this speed proves the co-relation between scientific attainment and popular appreciation of the subject, and shows how readily the impossibilities of yesterday become the axioms of to-morrow. The development of speed has therefore a special interest. Between 1859 and 1875, that tentative period which led to such wonderful realizations, the highest speed, under the most favorable circumstances, of large war-vessels was fourteen knots; in the smaller classes of unarmored ships it ranged between eight and thirteen, while that attained by fast cruisers was from fifteen to sixteen and a half knots. In 1886 Italian armored vessels made eighteen knots. Cruisers like the Japanese _Naniwa-Kan_ and the Italian _Angelo Emo_ reached nearly nineteen, and the _Reina Regente_, launched in February last, is expected to steam over twenty. Torpedo-vessels beginning in 1873 with fourteen knots are now running twenty-five, and at the same time the type has so much increased in size and importance as to be an essential and not an accessory in naval warfare. It is impossible to explain the difficulties which have beset this development, because the conditions that surround any attempt at speed-increase are such as can be properly understood only by those who have technical training; and then, too, the great ocean racers have so much accustomed the public to wonderful sea performances that the results are accepted without a knowledge of the credit which is due the mechanical and marine engineers who have achieved them. But with greater experience the higher, surely, will be the appreciation which every one must give; for, in the words of Chief Constructor White, “when it is realized that a vessel weighing ten thousand tons can be propelled over a distance of nine knots in an hour by the combustion of less than one ton of coal—the ten-thousandth part of her own weight—it will be admitted that the result is marvellous,” and that “‘the way of a ship in the midst of the sea’ is beyond full comprehension.” It is often asked which has the better fleet, France or England. Who can tell? No one definitely. Admiral Sir R. Spencer Robinson, late Comptroller of the British Navy, declares, in the _Contemporary Review_ of February, 1887, that “the number of armored vessels of the two countries may be stated approximately as fifty-five for England and fifty-one for France. Without going into further details, taking everything into consideration, giving due weight to all the circumstances which affect the comparison, and assuming that the designs of the naval constructors on each side of the Channel will fairly fulfil the intentions of each administration (a matter of interminable dispute, and which nothing but an experiment carried to destruction can settle), the iron-clad force of England is, on the whole, rather superior to that of France. A combination of the navy of that Power with any other would completely reverse the position. I should state as my opinion, leaving others to judge what it may be worth, that in fighting power the unarmored ships of England are decidedly superior to those of our rival’s; but if the _raison d’être_ of the French navy is—as has been frequently stated in that country, and by none more powerfully and categorically than by the French Minister of Marine—the wide-spread, thorough destruction of British commerce, and the pitiless and remorseless ransom of every undefended and accessible town in the British dominions, regardless of any sentimentalities or such rubbish as the laws of war and the usages of civilized nations; and if at least one of the _raisons d’être_ of the British navy is to defeat those benevolent intentions, and to defend that commerce on which depends our national existence and imperial greatness—then I fear that perhaps they have prepared to realize their purpose of remorseless destruction rather better than we have ours of successful preservation.” A long sentence this, but it emphasizes the great axiom that war is business, not sentiment, and teaches a lesson which this country will do well to learn. Fortunately, we are at last out of the shallows, if not fairly in the full flooding channel-way, though many things are yet wanting with us. Perhaps this over-long chapter cannot be made to end more usefully than by quoting in proof of this the concluding paragraph of that brilliant article on naval policy which Professor James Russell Soley, United States Navy, contributed to the February (1887) number of _Scribner’s Magazine_: “It is the part of wisdom,” he writes, “to study the lessons of the past, and to learn what we may from the successes or the failures of our fathers. The history of the last war is full of these lessons, and at no time since its close has the navy been in a condition so favorable for their application. At least their meaning cannot fail to be understood. They show clearly that if we would have a navy fitted to carry on war, we must give some recognition to officers on the ground of merit, either by the advancement of the best, or, what amounts to nearly the same thing, by the elimination of the least deserving; that we must give them a real training for war in modern ships and with modern weapons; that the direction of the naval establishment, in so far as it has naval direction, must be given unity of purpose, and the purpose to which it must be directed is fighting efficiency; that a naval reserve of men and of vessels must be organized capable of mobilization whenever a call shall be made; and, finally, that a dozen or a score of new ships will not make a navy, but that the process of renewal must go on until the whole fleet is in some degree fitted to stand the trial of modern war. Until this rehabilitation can be accomplished the navy will only serve the purpose of a butt for the press and a foot-ball for political parties and its officers—a body of men whose intelligence and devotion would be equal to any trust will be condemned to fritter away their lives in a senseless parody of their profession.” THE BRITISH NAVY. BY SIR EDWARD J. REED. When timber gave place to iron and steel in the construction of war-ships, the naval possibilities of Great Britain became practically illimitable. Prior to that great change the British Admiralty, after exhausting its home supplies of oak, had to seek in the forests of Italy and of remote countries those hard, curved, twisted, and stalwart trees which alone sufficed for the massive framework of its line-of-battle ships. How recently it has escaped from this necessity may be inferred from the fact that the present writer, on taking office at the Admiralty in 1863, found her Majesty’s dockyards largely stored with recent deliveries of Italian and other oak timber of this description. And here it may not be inappropriate for one whose earliest professional studies were devoted to the construction of wooden ships, but whose personal labors have been most largely devoted to the iron era, to pay a passing tribute of respect to the constructive genius of those great builders in wood who designed the stanch and towering battle-ships of the good old times. Skilful, indeed, was the art, sound, indeed, was the science, which enabled them to shape, assemble, and combine thousands of timbers and planks into the _Grace de Dieu_ of Great Harry’s day (1514), the _Sovraigne of the Seas_ of Charles’s reign (1637), the _Royal William_ of half a century later (1682-92), the _Victory_, immortalized by Nelson, and in our own early day such superb ships as the _Queen_, the _Howe_, and scores of others. Only those who have made a study of the history of sea architecture can realize the difficulties which the designers of such structures had to overcome. With the introduction of iron and steel for ship-building purposes the necessity for ransacking the forests of the world for timber suitable for the frames and beam-knees of ships passed away, and Great Britain, which early became, and thus far remains, first and greatest in the production of iron and steel, was thus invited to such a development of naval power as the world has never seen. The mercantile marine of England at the present time furnishes a splendid demonstration of the readiness with which the commercial classes have appreciated this great opportunity; but the Royal Navy, by almost universal assent, supplies a melancholy counter-demonstration, and shows that neither the capabilities of a race nor the leadings of Providence suffice to keep a nation in its true position when it falls into the hands of feeble and visionary administrators. Any one who will contrast the British navy of to-day with the British navy as it might and would have been under the administration, say, of such a First Lord of the Admiralty as the present Duke of Somerset proved himself in every department of the naval service five-and-twenty years ago, will understand the recent outcry in England for a safer and more powerful fleet. [Illustration: THE “VICTORY.” From a photograph by Symonds & Co., Portsmouth.] It is impossible, as will presently appear, to describe the existing British navy without making reference to those administrative causes which have so largely and so unhappily influenced it; but the primary object of this chapter is, nevertheless, to describe and explain it, and only such references will be made to other circumstances as are indispensable to the fulfilment of that object. It is fitting, and to the present writer it is agreeable, in this place, to take early note of a matter which has, perhaps, never before been fully acknowledged, _viz._, the indebtedness of Great Britain and of Europe to the United States for some invaluable lessons in naval construction and naval warfare which were derived from the heroic efforts of their great civil war. The writer is in a position to speak with full knowledge on this point, as his service at the Admiralty, in charge of its naval construction, commenced during the American conflict, and continued for some years after its fortunate conclusion. There can be no doubt whatever that from the _Monitor_ and her successors European constructors and naval officers derived some extremely valuable suggestions. The Monitor system itself, pure and simple, was never viewed with favor, and could never be adopted by England, except under the severest restrictions, because the work of England has mainly to be done upon the high seas and in distant parts of the world, and the extremely small freeboard of the _Monitor_, or, in other words, the normal submersion of so very much of the entire ship, is highly inconvenient and not a little dangerous on sea service, as the fate of the _Monitor_ itself demonstrated. But for the work the _Monitor_ was designed to do in inland waters she was admirably conceived, and her appearance in the field of naval warfare startled seamen and naval constructors everywhere, and gave their thoughts a wholly novel direction. In saying this I am not unmindful that seven years previously England had constructed steam-propelled “floating batteries,” as they were called, sheathed with iron, and sent them to operate against the defences of Russia. But useful as these vessels were in many respects, their construction presented no striking novelty of design, and their employment was unattended by any dramatic incidents to powerfully impress the naval mind. The _Monitor_ was both more novel and more fortunate, and opened her career (after a severe struggle for life at sea) with so notable a display of her offensive and defensive qualities that all eyes turned to the scene of her exploits, and scanned her with a degree of interest unknown to the then existing generation of sailors and ship-builders. Her form and character were in most respects singular, her low deck and erect revolving tower being altogether unexampled in steamship construction. He must have been a dull and conservative naval architect, indeed, whose thoughts Ericsson’s wonderful little fighting ship did not stimulate into unwonted activity. But the service rendered to Europe was not confined to the construction and exploits of the _Monitor_ itself. The coasting passages, and, later on, the sea-voyages, of other vessels of the Monitor type, but of larger size, were watched with intense interest, and gave to the naval world instructive experiences which could in no other way have been acquired. Some of these experiences were purchased at the cost of the lives of gallant men, and that fact enhanced their value. [Illustration: THE “GLATTON.”] It is not possible to dwell at length upon the means by which the Monitor influence took effect in the navies of Europe, but it may be doubted whether ships like the _Thunderer_, _Devastation_, and _Dreadnought_, which naval officers declare to be to-day the most formidable of all British war-ships, would have found their way so readily into existence if the Monitors of America had not encouraged such large departures from Old-world ideas. In this sense the _Times_ correctly stated some years ago that the “American Monitors were certainly the progenitors of our _Devastation_ type.” The one ship in the British navy which comes nearest to the American Monitor, in respect of the nearness of her deck to the water, is the _Glatton_, a very exceptional vessel, and designed under a very peculiar stress of circumstances. But even in her case, as in that of every other armored turret-ship of the present writer’s design, the base of the turret and the hatchways over the machinery and boilers were protected by an armored breastwork standing high above this low deck, whereas in the American Monitors the turret rests upon the deck, which is near to the smooth sea’s surface. We have here, in the features just contrasted, the expression of a fundamental difference of view between the American system, as applied to sea-going turret-ships, and the European system of sea-going ships introduced by the writer. It has never been possible, in our judgment on the British side of the Atlantic, to regard even such Monitors as the _Puritan_ and _Dictator_ were designed to be, as sufficiently proof to sea perils. At the time when these lines were penned the following paragraph appeared in English newspapers: “The Cunard steamer _Servia_ arrived at New York yesterday, being three days overdue. During a heavy sea the boats, the bridge, and the funnel were carried away, and the saloon was flooded.” Any one who has seen the _Servia_, and observed the great height above the smooth sea’s surface at which her boats, bridge, and funnel are carried, will be at no loss to infer why it is that we object to ships with upper decks within two or three feet only of that surface. In short, it can be demonstrated that ships of the latter type are liable, in certain possible seas, to be completely ingulfed even to the very tops of their funnels. In the case of the _Glatton_, which had to be produced in conformity to ideas some of which were not those of the designer, one or two devices were resorted to expressly in order to secure in an indirect manner some increase of the assigned buoyancy, and thus to raise the upper deck above its prescribed height. The officers who served in her, however, judiciously regarded her, on account of her low deck, as fit only for harbor service or restricted coast defence. A very dangerous combination, as the writer regards it, was once proposed for his adoption by the representative of a colonial government, but was successfully resisted. This was the association of a “Coles” or English turret (which penetrates and passes bodily through the weather deck) with a low American Monitor deck. This was opposed on the ground that with such an arrangement there must of necessity be great danger at sea of serious leakage around the base of the turret as the waves swept over the lower deck. It would be extremely difficult to give to the long, circular aperture around the turret any protection which would be certain, while allowing the turret to revolve freely, both to withstand the fire of the guns and to resist the attack of the sea. It will now be understood that while the Monitor system was from the first highly appreciated in Europe, and more especially in England, it never was adopted in its American form in the British navy. Russia, Holland, and some other powers did adopt it, and the Dutch government had to pay the penalty in the total disappearance of a ship and crew during a short passage in the North Sea from one home port to another. In a largely altered form, and with many modifications and additions due to English ideas of sea service, it was, however, substantially adopted in the three powerful ships already named, of which one, the _Dreadnought_, lately bore the flag of the British admiral who commands the Mediterranean fleet. If the opinion of officers who have served in these ships may be accepted as sufficiently conclusive, it was a great misfortune for the British navy when the ruling features of this type of ship were largely departed from in its first-class ships, and made to give place to a whole series of so-called first-class iron-clads, of which only about one-third of the length has been protected by armor, and which are consequently quite unfit to take a place in any European line of battle. [Illustration: THE “DREADNOUGHT.”] The characteristic differences between the American type and the English type of sea-going Monitors (if we may apply that designation to the _Devastation_ type) have already been stated, but may be restated here in a single sentence, _viz._, the elevation in the English ship of the turret breastwork deck to a height of eleven or twelve feet above the sea’s surface, and the raising of the upper deck generally, or of a considerable part of it, to at least that height, by means of lightly built superstructures. Over these again, and many feet above them, are built bridges and hurricane decks, from which the ships may be commanded in all weathers. Lofty as these ships are by comparison with American Monitors, it is only gradually that they have acquired the confidence of the naval service, so freely do the waves sweep over their weather decks when driven, even in moderate weather, against head-seas. The British navy, having very diversified services to perform during both peace and war, requires ships of various kinds and sizes. Its first and greatest requirement of all is that of line-of-battle ships in sufficient numbers to enable England to stand up successfully against any European naval force or forces that may threaten her or her empire. If any one should be disposed to ask why this requirement—which is obviously an extreme one, and an impossible one for more than a single power—is more necessary for England than for any other country, the answer must be, _Circumspice!_ To look round over England’s empire is to see why her failure on the sea would be her failure altogether. France, Germany, Italy, and even Holland, might each get along fairly well, losing nothing that is absolutely essential to their existence, even if every port belonging to them were sealed by an enemy’s squadron. But were Great Britain to be cut off from her colonies and dependencies, were her ships to be swept from the seas, and her ports closed by hostile squadrons, she would either be deprived of the very elements of life itself, or would have to seek from the compassion of her foes the bare means of existence. It is this consideration, and the strong parental care which she feels for her colonies, that make her sons indignant at any hazardous reduction of her naval strength. There are even in England itself men who cannot or will not see this danger, and who impute to those who strive to avert it ambitious, selfish, and even sordid motives. But it is to no unworthy cause that England’s naval anxieties are due. We have no desire for war; we do not hunger for further naval fame; we cherish no mean rivalry of other powers who seek to colonize or to otherwise improve their trade; we do not want the mastery of the seas for any commercial objects that are exclusively our own. What we desire to do is to keep the seas open thoroughfares to our vast possessions and dependencies, and free to that commercial communication which has become indispensable to our existence as an empire. To accomplish that object we must, at any cost, be strong, supremely strong, in European waters; and it is for this reason that England’s line-of-battle ships ought to be always above suspicion both in number and in quality. [Illustration: THE “INFLEXIBLE.”] It is not a pleasant assertion for an Englishman to make when he has to say that this is very far from being the case at present. A few months ago this statement, from whomsoever it emanated, would have been received with distrust by the general public, for the truth was only known to the navy itself and to comparatively few outsiders. But the official communications made to both Houses of Parliament early in December, 1885, prepared the world for the truth, the First Lord of the Admiralty in the Chamber of Peers and Lord Brassey in the House of Commons having then proposed to Parliament a programme of additional ship-building which provided for a considerable increase in the number of its first-class ships and cruisers, and which also provided, on the demand of the present writer, that the cruisers should be protected with belts of armor—an element of safety previously denied to them. It need hardly be repeated, after this wholesale admission of weakness by the Admiralty, that Great Britain is at present in far from a satisfactory condition as regards both the number and the character of its ships. Were that not so, no public agitation could have moved the government to reverse in several respects a policy by which it had for so long abided. It will be interesting to broadly but briefly review the causes of the present deplorable condition of the British navy. In the first place, in so far as it is a financial question, it has resulted mainly from the sustained attempt of successive governments to keep the naval expenditure within or near to a fixed annual amount, notwithstanding the palpable fact that every branch of the naval service, like most other services, is unavoidably increasing in cost, while the necessities of the empire are likewise unavoidably increasing. The consequence is that, as officers and men of every description must be paid, and all the charges connected therewith must in any event be fully met, the ship-building votes of various kinds are those upon which the main stress of financial pressure must fall. From this follows a strong desire, to which all Boards of Admiralty too readily yield, to keep down the size and cost of their first-class ships, to the sacrifice of their necessary qualities. This may be strikingly illustrated by the fact that, although the iron _Dreadnought_, a first-class ship, designed fifteen or sixteen years ago, had a displacement of 10,820 tons, and was powerful in proportion, the Admiralty has launched but a single ship (the _Inflexible_) since that period, of which the displacement has reached 10,000 tons. In fact, every large iron-clad ship for the British navy since launched has fallen from twelve hundred to twenty-four hundred tons short of the _Dreadnought’s_ displacement, and has been proportionally feeble. If this cutting down in the size of the principal ships of Great Britain had been attended by a corresponding reduction in the sizes of the ships of other powers, or even by some advantages of design which largely tended to make up for the defect of size, there might be something to say for it. But the French ships have shown no such falling off in size, and have benefited as fully as the English ships by the use of steel and by the improved power and economy of the marine steam-engine. Simultaneously with the reduction in the size of the English ships there has been brought about—voluntarily, and not as a consequence of reduced size, for it was first applied in the largest of all British men-of-war, the _Inflexible_—a system of stripping the so-called armored ships of the English navy of a large part of their armor, and reducing its extent to so deplorable a degree that, as has already been said, they are quite unfit to take part, with any reasonable hope of success, in any general engagement. Here, again, there might have been something to say for a large reduction in the armored surface of ships if it had been attended by some great compensation, such as that which an immense increase in the thickness of the armor applied might have provided, although no such increase could ever have compensated for such a reduction of the armored part of the ship as would have exposed the whole ship to destruction by the mere bursting in of the unarmored ends, which is what has been done. But although in the case of the large _Inflexible_ the citadel armor was of excessive thickness, that is not true of the more recent ships of England, the armor of which sometimes falls short of that of the French ships, in two or three instances by as much as four inches, the French ships having 22-inch armor, and the English 18-inch. But by the combined effect of injudicious economy and of erroneous design, therefore—both furthered by a sort of frenzied desire on the part of the British Admiralty to strip the ships of armor, keep down their speed, delay their completion, and otherwise paralyze the naval service, apparently without understanding what they were about—the British navy has been brought into a condition which none but the possible enemies of the country can regard without more or less dismay. [Illustration: SECTION OF THE “AMIRAL DUPERRÉ.” SECTION OF THE “INFLEXIBLE.” SECTION OF THE “COLLINGWOOD.” NEW ADMIRALTY SHIP.] In order to illustrate the extent to which side armor has been denied to the British ships, as compared with the French, we refer the reader to these diagrams of the _Amiral Duperré_ (French) and of the _Inflexible_ and _Collingwood_ (both English). The black portions represent the side armor in each case. It is scarcely possible for any one friendly to Great Britain to look at these diagrams, and realize what they signify, without profoundly regretting that a sufficient force of public opinion has not yet been exerted to compel the Admiralty to a much more liberal use of armor in the new first-class ships, the intended construction of which was announced to Parliament in December, 1885. In these new ships, while the length of the partial belt has been slightly increased, no addition to its height above water has been made (as compared with the _Collingwood_ or “Admiral” class), so that the slightest “list” towards either side puts all the armor below water. To describe such ships as “armored ships” is to convey a totally false impression of their true character. A side view of one of these new ships shows that the two principal guns are carried high up forward in an armored turret, which sweeps from right ahead, round the bow on each side, and well towards the stern, while several smaller guns are carried abaft with very thin armor protection to complete the offensive powers of the ship. The arrangement of the two principal guns in a turret forward resembles that of the _Conqueror_, but in her the armor rises high above the water, and a belt extends to the bow and nearly to the stern. It is a matter of inexpressible regret that the armored surface of these new ships is so excessively contracted as to be wholly insufficient to preserve the ship from that terrible danger to which so many of their predecessors have been exposed, _viz._, that of capsizing from loss of stability when the unarmored parts alone have been injured. [Illustration: THE “DEVASTATION.”] There is a sense in which all the British ships to which reference has thus far been made may be roughly regarded as developments of, or at least as starting from, the _Devastation_, or British Monitor type of ship, for in all of them masts and sails have been done away with, and steam propulsion relied upon, a single military mast alone remaining.[1] We have now to notice another and more numerous class of ships, which may be regarded as the lingering representatives of those sailing-ships which have come down to us through the long centuries, but which are now rapidly disappearing, yielding to the all-prevalent power of steam. Some of these ships were built for the line of battle, in their respective periods, but as they range in size from about one thousand tons of displacement up to nearly eleven thousand tons, it is obvious that many of them were built for various other employments. In dealing with the full-rigged ships, we are taking account of types of war-ships which, for all but secondary purposes, are passing away. It fell to the lot of the present writer (under the rule of Mr. Childers, then First Lord of the Admiralty, and of Admiral Sir Robert Spencer Robinson, then Controller of the Navy) to introduce the mastless war-ship, and thus to virtually terminate what had certainly been for England a glorious period, _viz._, that of the taunt-masted, full-rigged, and ever-beautiful wooden line-of-battle ship. It is now, alas! but too apparent (from what has gone before) that in virtually terminating that period, and opening the era of the steam and steel fighting engine, we were also introducing an era in which fantastic and feeble people might but too easily convert what ought to have been the latest and greatest glory of England into her direct peril, and possibly even her early overthrow. The first British iron-clad (neglecting the “floating batteries” of 1854) was the _Warrior_, a handsome ship 380 feet long, furnished with steam-power, and provided with masts, spars, and a large spread of canvas. Her ends were unprotected by armor, and her steering gear consequently much exposed. She was succeeded by a long series of full-rigged iron-clads, all of them supplied with steam-power likewise, the series continuing down to the present time. The little dependence which is now placed in the British navy upon the use of sail-power in armored ships will be seen, however, when it is stated that of all the ships protected by side armor which are now under construction in the royal dockyards, but two are to be given any sail-power at all, and these are to be rigged on two masts only, although the ships are of large size, and intended for cruising in distant seas.[2] It is unnecessary in a popular subject of this description to dwell upon, or even to state, the minor differences which exist between the different types of rigged iron-clads. There are, however, some points of interest in connection with their armor and armament to be mentioned. In the design of the first group (speaking chronologically) were commenced those changes in the disposition of the armor which continue down to the present time, the British Admiralty being so mixed and so virtually irresponsible a body that it is not obliged to have a mind of its own for any great length of time, even when many of the same men continue in office. The _Warrior_, as we saw, and the sister ship _Black Prince_, had a central armored battery only; the same is true of those reduced _Warriors_, the _Defence_ and the _Resistance_. But the next succeeding ships of the _Warrior’s_ size, the _Minotaur_ and _Agincourt_, were fully armored from end to end; and the somewhat smaller ship the _Achilles_ was furnished with a complete belt at the water-line. The _Hector_ and _Valiant_ (improved _Defences_) had complete armor above the water, but, oddly enough, had part of the water-line at each end left unarmored. A third ship of the _Minotaur_ class, the _Northumberland_, was modified by the present writer at the bow and stern on his entering the Admiralty, the armor above water being there reduced, and an armored bow breastwork constructed. Within this armored breastwork were placed two heavy guns firing right ahead. With this exception, all these early ships, nine in number, were without any other protected guns than those of the broadside. These ships were followed by a series of rigged ships of the writer’s design, _viz._, the _Bellerophon_, _Hercules_, _Sultan_, _Penelope_, _Invincible_, _Iron Duke_, _Vanguard_, _Swiftsure_, and _Triumph_, all with hulls of iron, or of iron and steel combined, together with a series of rigged ships constructed of wood, converted from unarmored hulls or frames, _viz._, _Enterprise_, _Research_, _Favorite_, _Pallas_, _Lord Warden_, _Lord Clyde_, and _Repulse_. Every one of these ships was protected by armor throughout the entire length of the vessel in the region of the water-line, and in some cases the armor rose up to the upper deck. Most of them, however, had the armor above the belt limited to a central battery. The chief interest in these vessels now lies in the illustrations they furnish of the evolution, so to speak, of bow and stern fire. In several of them a fire approximately ahead and astern (reaching to those directions within about twenty degrees) was obtained by means of ports cut near to the ship’s side, through the transverse armored bulkheads. In others these bulkheads were turned inward towards the battery near the sides of the ship in order to facilitate the working of the guns when firing as nearly ahead and astern as was practicable. In the _Sultan_ an upper-deck armored battery was adopted for the double purpose of forming a redoubt from which the ship could be manœuvred and fought in action, and of providing a direct stern fire from protected guns. In the five ships of the _Invincible_ class a direct head and stern fire was obtained from a somewhat similar upper-deck battery, which projected a few feet beyond the side of the ship. [Illustration: THE “SULTAN.”] The rigged ships of later design than the writer’s present a still greater variety in the disposition of their armor and armaments. This variety may be in part illustrated by four examples, which for convenience are principally taken from Lord Brassey’s book.[3] The scales of these small drawings, as given there, are not all the same. These examples are the _Alexandra_, the _Téméraire_, the _Nelson_, and the _Shannon_. The _Alexandra_ (of which a separate view, in sea-going condition, is given), which is probably the best of the rigged iron-clads of the British navy, may be regarded as a natural, but not the less meritorious, development of the combined broadside and bow and stern fire of the central-battery ships which preceded her. In her were provided a broadside battery on the main-deck, a direct bow fire, also on that deck, and both a direct bow and a direct stern fire on the upper deck from within armor, as in the _Invincible_ class. The guns employed for bow and stern fire were all available for broadside fire. The upper-deck battery did not project beyond the main-deck as in the _Invincible_ class, the forward and after parts of the ship above the main-deck being greatly contracted in breadth in order to allow the guns to fire clear both forward and aft. The _Téméraire_ is a smaller ship than the _Alexandra_, and has a battery similar to hers on the main-deck, but with one gun less on each side, the danger of a raking fire entering through the foremost battery port being met by a transverse armored bulkhead, as shown in the plan of the ship. She is provided with an additional bow gun and a stern-chaser, carried high up in barbette towers, but worked on Colonel Moncrieff’s disappearing principle. [Illustration: SECTION AND PLAN OF THE “ALEXANDRA.” SECTION AND PLAN OF THE “TÉMÉRAIRE.”] [Illustration: SECTION AND PLAN OF THE “NELSON.” SECTION AND PLAN OF THE “SHANNON.”] “The _Téméraire_ fires three 25-ton guns right ahead, against two 25-ton and two 18-ton guns in the _Alexandra_; on either bow, two 25-ton against one 25-ton and one 18-ton; right aft, one 25-ton against two 18-ton; on either quarter, one 25-ton against one 18-ton; on either beam, if engaged on one side at a time, two 25-ton and two 18-ton, with a third 25-ton available through only half the usual arc, against three 18-ton guns, with two of the same weight and one of 25-tons, each available with the limitation just described.”[4] [Illustration: THE “ALEXANDRA.”] The _Alexandra_ is a ship of 9500 tons displacement, the _Téméraire_ is of 8500 tons; after them came the _Nelson_ (to which the _Northampton_ is a sister ship), of 7320 tons displacement. This vessel cannot be regarded as an armored ship at all, in the usual sense of the word, having but a partial belt of armor, and none of her guns being enclosed within armor protection, although two guns for firing ahead and two for firing astern are partially sheltered by armor. Even less protection than this is afforded to the guns of the _Shannon_, which also has but a partial belt of armor, and protection for two bow guns only. The comparatively small size of the _Shannon_ (5400 tons displacement) relieves her in some degree from the reproach of being so little protected; but it is difficult (to the present writer) to find a justification for building ships of 7320 tons, like the _Nelson_ and _Northampton_, and placing them in the category of armor-plated ships, seeing that their entire batteries are open to the free entrance of shell fire from all guns, small as well as large. Where a ship has a battery of guns protected against fire in one or more directions, but freely exposed to fire coming in other directions, to assume that the enemy will be most likely to attack the armor, and avoid firing into the open battery, appears to be a reversal of the safe and well-accepted principle of warfare, _viz._, that your enemy will at least endeavor to attack your vulnerable part. No doubt, when the size or cost of a particular ship is limited, the designer has to make a choice of evils, but where people are as free as is the British Board of Admiralty to build safe and efficient ships, the devotion of so much armor as the _Nelson_ and _Northampton_ carry to so limited a measure of protection is a very singular proceeding, and illustrates once more with how little wisdom the world is governed. [Illustration: THE “TÉMÉRAIRE.”] Before passing from the armored ships of the navy—or, rather, as we must now say, in view of some of the ships just described and illustrated, before passing from the ships which have some armor—it is desirable to take note of a few exceptional vessels which cannot be classed either with the pretentious and so-called line-of-battle ships or with the rigged iron-clads generally. Among these will be found two comparatively small ships, designed by the writer many years ago to serve primarily as rams, but to carry also some guns. These were the _Hotspur_ and _Rupert_. The water-line of the _Hotspur_ was protected with very thick armor for her day (11-inch), extending from stem to stern, dipping down forward to greatly strengthen the projecting ram. She carried (besides a few smaller guns) the largest gun of the period, one of twenty-five tons, mounted on a turn-table, but protected by a fixed tower pierced with four ports.[5] This fixed tower was years afterwards replaced by a revolving turret, similar to that which the writer gave in the first instance to the _Rupert_, designed soon after the _Hotspur_. Both the armor and the armament of the second vessel were heavier than those of the first, but the ram, as before, was the chief feature of the ship. It is needless here to describe some of the very early turret-ships, such as the _Prince Albert_, _Scorpion_, _Wyvern_, and _Royal Sovereign_, all of which embodied the early (though not by any means the earliest) views of that able, energetic, and lamented officer, the late Captain Cowper Coles, R.N., who was lost at sea by the capsizing of his own ship, the _Captain_, her low sides failing to furnish the necessary stability for enabling her to resist, when under her canvas, the force of a moderate gale of wind. Had he been able to foresee the coming abandonment of sail-power in rigged ships, and had he been placed, as the writer advised, in charge of the revolving turrets of the navy, leaving ship-designing to those who understood it, he might have been alive to this day, to witness the very general adoption in the British navy of that turret system to which he for some years devoted and eventually sacrificed his life. [Illustration: THE “HOTSPUR.”] The first real sea-going and successful ship designed and built to carry the revolving turret of Coles was, by universal consent, the _Monarch_, whose sea-going qualities secured for her the distinction of transporting to the shores of America—as a mark of England’s good-will to the people of the United States, and of her admiration of a great and good citizen—the body of the late Mr. George Peabody. “The performances of the _Monarch_ at sea,” says Brassey’s “British Navy,” “were in the highest degree satisfactory;” and nothing could exceed the frank and liberal praises bestowed upon her for her performances during the voyage to New York by the officers of the United States man-of-war which accompanied her as a complimentary escort. A great deal has been written and said at different times about four other turret-ships of the British navy, _viz._, the _Cyclops_, _Gorgon_, _Hecate_, and _Hydra_—far less terrible vessels than these formidable names would seem to import. Whether these four comparatively small turret-ships possess the necessary sea-going qualities for coast defence (as distinguished from harbor service) is a question which has been much discussed, and is not yet settled. The truth is that the defence of the coasts of England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland is a service in which the sea-going qualities of vessels may be called into requisition as largely as in any service in the world. There are some (this writer among them) who much prefer the mid-Atlantic in a heavy gale of wind to many parts of these coasts, more especially if there be any doubt about the perfect obedience of the ship to her steam-power and her helm. The worst weather the writer has ever experienced at sea was met with in the English Channel, and the only merchant-ship which he ever even in part possessed was mastered by a Channel storm, had to cast anchor outside of Plymouth Breakwater, was blown clean over it, and sank inside of it, with her cables stretched across that fine engineering work. It is therefore difficult, and has always been difficult, not to say impossible, for him to regard a “coast-defence ship,” which certainly ought to be able to defend the coast, and to proceed from one part of it to another, as a vessel which may be made less sea-worthy than other vessels. Only in one respect, _viz._, that of coal supply, may such a ship be safely made inferior to sea-going ships. But whether the four vessels under notice be fit for coast defence or not, it ought to be known that they were not designed for it. They were hastily ordered in 1870, when the Franco-German war was breaking out, under the impression that Great Britain might get involved in that war. The British Admiralty knew then (as it knows now, and as it has known for years past) that the navy had not been maintained in sufficient strength, and it consequently seized the first design for a small and cheap ship that it could lay hands on, and ordered the construction, with all despatch, of four such vessels. The design which it happened to take, or which seemed to it most suitable, was that of the _Cerberus_—a breastwork Monitor designed by the writer for special service in inland colonial waters, and made as powerful as was then possible on 3300 tons of displacement, both offensively and defensively, but with no necessity for, and no pretensions whatever to, sea-going qualities. It is scarcely to be supposed that four vessels having such an origin could be expected to take their place as sea-going ships of the British navy; nor could they, either, for reasons already suggested, be expected to possess any high qualities as vessels for the defence of “That land ’round whose resounding coasts The rough sea circles.” The Admiralty which ordered their construction may possibly be able to state why it built them, but even that is not at all certain. One of the evil results of mean economies in national enterprises in ordinary times is extravagant and aimless expenditure in times of necessity. A later example of this kind of expenditure under very similar circumstances was furnished during Lord Beaconsfield’s administration, when war with Russia seemed likely to occur. Again the insufficiency of the navy was strongly felt, and again public money to the extent of two millions sterling or more was expended upon the acquisition of such ships as could be most readily acquired, regardless of cost. At this time the _Neptune_ (of 9170 tons displacement), the _Superb_ (of 9100 tons), and the _Belleisle_ and _Orion_ (each of 4830 tons), were purchased into the service, and having been built for other navies, and under very peculiar circumstances in some cases, required large dockyard expenditure to convert them to their new uses in the British navy. It only remains, in so far as existing armored, or rather “partly armored,” ships are concerned, to advert to the _Impérieuse_ and _Warspite_, two cruisers building for distant service. These ships are three hundred and fifteen feet long, and to them has been allowed, by the extraordinary generosity of the Admiralty, as much as one hundred and forty feet of length of armored belt. If this had been extended by only twenty feet, these British cruisers, which Lord Brassey—whether grandiloquently or satirically it is hard to say—calls “armored cruisers,” would have actually had one-half of their length protected by armor-plating at the water-line. In what spirit and with what object is not known, but Lord Brassey, in his outline sketch of these ships, writes the word “coals” in conspicuous letters before and abaft the belt. Can it be possible that he, undoubtedly a sensible man of business, and one who laboriously endeavors to bring up the knowledge and sense of his fellow-countrymen to a level with his own, and who was once Secretary to the British Admiralty—can it be possible that he considers coal a trustworthy substitute for armor, either before or after it has been consumed as fuel? It is very distressing to have to write in these terms, and put these questions about Admiralty representatives and Admiralty ships; but what is to be done? Here are two ships which are together to cost nearly half a million of money, which are expressly built to chase and capture our enemies in distant seas, which are vauntingly described as “armored cruisers,” which cannot be expected always by their mere appearance to frighten the enemy into submission, like painted Chinese forts, which must be presumed sometimes to encounter a fighting foe, or at least to be fired at a few times by the stern guns of a vessel that is running away, and yet some eighty or ninety feet of the bows of these ships, and as much of their sterns, are deliberately deprived of the protection of armor, so that any shell from any gun may pierce them, let in the sea, and reduce their speed indefinitely; and in apparent justification of this perfectly ridiculous arrangement—perfectly ridiculous in a ship which is primarily bound to sustain her speed when chasing—a late Secretary to the Admiralty tells us that she is to carry in the unprotected bow some coals! May my hope formerly expressed in _Harper’s Magazine_ find its fruition by giving to the British Admiralty a piece of information of which it only can be possibly ignorant, _viz._, that even while coal is unconsumed, it differs largely from steel armor-plates in the measure of resistance which it offers to shot and shell; and further, that coal is put on board war-ships that it may be consumed in the generation of steam? It is very desirable that this information should somehow be conveyed to Whitehall in an impressive manner, and possibly, if the combined intelligence of the two great nations to which Harpers’ publications chiefly appeal be invoked in its favor, it may at length be understood and attended to even by the Admiralty, and one may hear no more of the protection of her Majesty’s ships by means of their “coal.” [Illustration: THE “WARSPITE.”] [Illustration: TRANSVERSE SECTION OF THE “MERSEY.”] Passing now from the so-called iron-clads of the British navy, we come to a class of vessels which have their boilers, etc., protected from above by iron decks sweeping over them from side to side. The section of the _Mersey_, one of the most important British ships of this type, will illustrate the system of construction. Various attempts have been made to impose numerous ships of this kind upon a sometimes too credulous public as armored vessels, and Lord Brassey, while publishing descriptions and drawings which demonstrated beyond all question that the buoyancy and stability of these ships are not at all protected by armor, nevertheless deliberately includes some of them in his list of “armored ships.”[6] Now, the thick iron deck certainly protects (in some degree, according to its thickness) all that is below it against the fire of guns, and armor itself is sometimes employed to protect the gun machinery; but the existence of a thickish deck under the water, or mainly under the water, occasionally associated with patches of armor above water here and there to protect individual parts, does not constitute the ship itself an armored ship in any such sense of the term as is ordinarily accepted and understood. How can that be properly called an “armored ship” which can be utterly destroyed by guns without any shot or shell ever touching such armor as it possesses? The British Admiralty, in the “Navy Estimates” for 1883-84, under some unknown influence, put forward two ships of this description as armored vessels, and was afterwards forced to remove them from that category, but only removed them to place them in another not less false, not less misleading, not less deceptive and dangerous, _viz._, that of “protected ships.” And this most improper description is still applied to various ships of which the special characteristic is that they themselves are _not_ protected. If the ship’s own coal and stores may be regarded as her protection, or if the existence of a certain number of exposed and extremely thin internal plates can be so regarded, then may these vessels be deemed partly, but only partly, “protected;” but if “protected ship” means, as every honest-minded person must take it to mean, that the ship herself is protected by armor against shot and shell, then the designation “protected ship,” as employed by the British Admiralty, is nothing less than an imposition. These ships are not protected. Neither their power to float, nor their power to keep upright, nor their power to exist at all, after a few such injuries as even the smallest guns afloat can inflict, is “protected,” as any war whatever is likely to demonstrate. Those who employ such language ignore the essential characteristic of a ship-of-war, and some of the gravest dangers which menace her. It is conceivable that in the old days, when men wore armor, the protection of the head with an “armet,” and of the breast by a breastplate, might have justified the description of the man so defended as an “armored man,” although it is difficult to see why, since he might have been put _hors de combat_ by a single stroke. But protect the boilers and magazines of a ship how you will, if you do not protect the ship itself sufficiently in the region of the water-line to prevent such an invasion of the sea as will sink or capsize her, she remains herself essentially unprotected, liable to speedy and complete destruction, and cannot truly be called a “protected ship.” It must not for a moment be supposed that this is a mere question of words or designations. On the contrary, it is one of the most vital importance to all navies, and most of all to the navy of Great Britain. What the Admiralty says, the rest of the government, and beyond them the country, are likely to believe and to rely upon, and when the stress of naval warfare comes, the nation which has confidingly understood the Admiralty to mean “armored ships” and “protected ships” when it has employed these phrases, and suddenly finds out, by defeat following defeat, and catastrophe catastrophe, that it meant nothing of the kind, may have to pay for its credulity, allowable and pardonable as it may be, the penalty of betrayal, and of something worse even than national humility. On the other hand, it is not to be inferred from the objections thus offered to the employment of deceptive designations that objection is also offered to the construction of some ships with limited or partial protection, falling short of the protection of the buoyancy and the stability, and therefore of the life, of the ship itself. It is quite impossible that all the ships of a navy like that of Great Britain, or of the navies of many other powers, can be made invulnerable, even in the region of the water-line, to all shot or shell. Indeed, there are services upon which it is necessary to employ armed ships, but which do not demand the use of armored or protected vessels. Unarmored vessels, with some of their more vital contents protected, suffice for such services. Moreover, even where it would be very desirable indeed to have the hull protected by armor to a sufficient extent to preserve the ship’s buoyancy and stability from ready destruction by gun-fire, it is often impracticable to give the ship that protection. This is true, for example, of all small corvettes, sloops, and gun-vessels, which are too small to float the necessary armor-plates, in addition to all the indispensable weights of hull, steam-machinery, fuel, armament, ammunition, crew, and stores. It would be both idle and unreasonable, therefore, to complain of the construction of some ships with the protecting armor limited, or even, in certain cases, with no protecting armor at all. Such ships must be built, and in considerable number, for the British navy. But this necessity should neither blind us to the exposure and destructibility of all such vessels, nor induce us to endeavor to keep that exposure and destructibility out of our own sight. Still less should it encourage us to sanction, even for a moment, such an abuse of terms as to hold up as “armored” and “protected” ships those which, whether unavoidably or avoidably, have been deprived of the necessary amount of armor to keep them afloat under the fire of small or even of moderately powerful guns. We are now in a position to review the British navy, and to see of what ships it really consists. In this review it will not be necessary to pass before the eyes of the reader that large number of vessels of which even the boilers and magazines are without any armor or thick-plate protection whatever. It will help, nevertheless, to make the nature and extent of the navy understood if these are grouped and summarized in a few sentences. Neglecting altogether all large vessels with timber frames (which may be regarded as out of date, seeing that all the war vessels of considerable size now built for the navy have iron or steel frames), it may be first said that there are but three ships of the large or frigate class in the British navy which carry no thick protecting plate at all, _viz._, the _Inconstant_, the _Shah_, and the _Raleigh_. Of much less size than these, and equally devoid of protection, are the two very fast vessels, the _Iris_ and _Mercury_, built as special despatch-vessels, steaming at their best at about eighteen knots. Among the unarmored corvettes are the _Active_, _Bacchante_, _Boadicea_, _Euryalus_, _Rover_, and _Volage_, all exceeding fourteen knots in speed, and all more than three thousand tons displacement. Then follow thirty-six smaller and less swift corvettes, nearly one-half the number being built wholly of wood, most of which exceed, however, thirteen knots in speed; and below these about an equal number of sloops of less speed and tonnage. The smaller gun-vessels and gun-boats need not be summarized. [Illustration: THE “INCONSTANT.”] Passing on to vessels which, although themselves unarmored, have thick-plate decks to give some protection to the machinery, we observe first that there are eight ships of three thousand five hundred to three thousand seven hundred tons built and under construction, _viz._, the _Amphion_, _Arethusa_, _Leander_, _Phaeton_, _Mersey_, _Severn_, _Forth_, and _Thames_.[7] Lord Brassey very properly classes such of these vessels as he mentions in his lists as “unarmored ships,” although, as before mentioned, when two of them—the _Mersey_ and _Severn_—were designed, with a deck two inches thick, the Admiralty at first ventured to put them forward as “armored ships.” Ascending in the scale of protection, and dealing for the present with sea-going vessels only, we come to a long series of ships which are undeserving of the designation of armored ships, because they are liable to destruction by guns without the limited amount of armor which they carry being attacked at all. These ships are the _Impérieuse_ and _Warspite_, previously discussed, and also the _Ajax_, _Agamemnon_, _Colossus_, _Edinburgh_, and the six large ships of the “Admiral” class. Any one who has intelligently perused the report of the committee on the _Inflexible_ would justify the inclusion of that ship in this category; but she is omitted here out of deference to the strenuous exertions which were made to invent or devise some little stability for her, even when her bow and stern are supposed to be badly injured, and out of compassion upon those officers of the Admiralty who have long ago repented those trying compromises with conscience by aid of which they expressed some slight confidence in her ability to float upright with her unarmored ends badly damaged. She is omitted also out of gratitude to Lord Brassey for a sentence in which, while saving her from being placed in so dreadful a category, he honestly places some of the other ships in it without qualification or circumlocution. He says: “In one important particular the _Ajax_ and _Agamemnon_ are inferior to the _Inflexible_. The central armored citadel is not, as it is in the case of the _Inflexible_, of sufficient displacement to secure the stability of the ship should the unarmored ends be destroyed.”[8] In another place the former Secretary to the Admiralty, referring to the report of the _Inflexible_ committee (which was nominated by the Admiralty, and under heavy obligations to support it), says: “It is doubtless very desirable that our armored ships should possess a more ample margin of stability than is provided in the armored citadel of the _Inflexible_. The ideas of the committee and of Sir Edward Reed on this point were in entire accord.”[9] [Illustration: THE “COLOSSUS.”] It has recently been acknowledged that, as Lord Brassey states, the _Ajax_ and _Agamemnon_ are so constructed that they are dependent for their ability to float, the right side uppermost, upon their unarmored ends. To call such ships “armored ships” is, as we have seen, to mislead the public. But some pains have been taken of late to show that the “Admiral” class is better off in this respect, and certainly the known opinions of the present writer have been so far respected in these ships that their armored citadels, so called, have been made somewhat longer and of greater proportionate area. The following figures have been given: Percentage of water-line area covered by armor. Inflexible 42. Agamemnon 45.4 Collingwood 54.15 Camperdown 56.35 But any one who understands this question knows perfectly well that “percentage of water-line area covered by armor” in no way represents the relative stabilities of these ships. Indeed, that is obvious upon the face of the matter, because we have seen the _Ajax_ and _Agamemnon_ pronounced devoid of the necessary stability when injured, while the _Inflexible_ is said to possess it, although the former vessel has 45½ per cent. of the water-line area covered, while the latter has but 42 per cent. But this is not the consideration which has led to the condemnation of the whole “Admiral” class of so-called iron-clads as not possessing the essential characteristic of an armored ship, _viz._, the power to float, and to float with needful buoyancy and stability, all the time the armor is unpierced. The ground of that condemnation is to be found in the introduction into the “Admirals” of a dangerous combination from which the _Inflexible_ and _Agamemnon_ and other like ships are exempt—the combination of long unarmored ends comprising about forty-five per cent. of the water-line area with so shallow a belt of armor that, when the unarmored ends are injured and filled by the sea (as they would be in action), there would remain so little armor left above water that a very slight inclination of the ship would put it all below water. In the _Agamemnon_ class, small as the initial stability may be (and with the unarmored ends torn open it would be nothing), the armor is carried up to a reasonable height above water. But in the “Admiral” class all the advantage arising from a slightly lengthened citadel is more than destroyed by this lowering of the armor. So great is the consequent danger of these ships capsizing, if ever called upon to engage in a serious battle at close quarters, that the writer cannot conscientiously regard them as “armored ships,” but must in common fairness to the officers and men who are to serve in them, and to the nation which might otherwise put its trust in them, relegate them to the category of ships with only parts protected. It will be observed that nothing has yet been said about thickness of armor, although that is, of course, a very important element of a ship’s safety or danger. But important as it is, it has to be kept scrupulously separated from the question just discussed—the limitation of the armor’s extent—because no misrepresentation and no misconception can well arise concerning the relative power or trustworthiness of ships armored variously as to thickness, while much misrepresentation has actually taken place, and much consequent misconception has actually arisen, on the other matter, more than one European government having deliberately placed in the category of “armored ships” ships which in no true sense of the word can be so classed. The following classifications will conform to the foregoing views, describing as “armored ships” only those which have sufficient side-armor to protect them from being sunk or capsized by the fire of guns all the time the armor remains unpierced: BRITISH SHIPS OF WAR, BUILT AND BUILDING. ARMORED SHIPS WITH THICK ARMOR. +---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+ | | | | | Maximum | | | | Tons |Indicated | Speed, | Thickness | Largest | |NAME OF SHIP | Displace-| Horse- | in | of Armor, | Guns, | | | ment. | power. | Knots. | in Inches.| in Tons.| +---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+ |Alexandra | 9,490 | 8,610 | 15 | 12 | 25 | |Belleisle | 4,830 | 3,200 | 12¼ | 12 | 25 | |Conqueror | 5,200 | 4,500 | 15 | 12 | 43 | |Devastation | 9,330 | 6,650 | 13¾ | 12 | 35 | |Dreadnought | 10,820 | 8,200 | 14½ | 14 | 38 | |Hero | 6,200 | 4,500 | 15 | 12 | 43 | |Inflexible[10] | 11,400 | 8,000 | 14 | 24 | 80 | |Neptune | 9,170 | 9,000 | 14½ | 12 | 38 | |Orion | 4,830 | 3,900 | 13 | 12 | 25 | |Rupert | 5,440 | 4,630 | 13½ | 12 | 18 | |Superb | 9,100 | 7,430 | 14 | 12 | 18 | |Thunderer | 9,330 | 6,270 | 13½ | 12 | 38 | |Glatton[11] | 4,910 | 2,870 | 12 | 12 | 25 | +---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+ ARMORED SHIPS WITH MEDIUM ARMOR. +---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+ | | | | | Maximum | | | | Tons |Indicated | Speed, | Thickness | Largest | |NAME OF SHIP | Displace-| Horse- | in | of Armor, | Guns, | | | ment. | power. | Knots. | in Inches.| in Tons.| +---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+ |Hercules | 8,680 | 8,530 | 14¾ | 9 | 18 | |Hotspur | 4,010 | 3,500 | 12¾ | 11 | 25 | |Sultan | 9,290 | 8,630 | 14 | 9 | 18 | |Téméraire | 8,540 | 7,700 | 14½ | 11 | 25 | +---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+ ARMORED SHIPS WITH THIN ARMOR.[12] +---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+ | | | | | Maximum | | | | Tons |Indicated | Speed, | Thickness | Largest | |NAME OF SHIP | Displace-| Horse- | in | of Armor, | Guns, | | | ment. | power. | Knots. | in Inches.| in Tons.| +---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+ |Achilles | 9,820 | 5,720 | 14½ | 4½ | 12 | |Agincourt | 10,690 | 6,870 | 15 | 5½ | 12 | |Audacious | 6,910 | 4,020 | 13 | 8 | 12 | |Bellerophon | 7,550 | 6,520 | 14¼ | 6 | 12 | |Black Prince | 9,210 | 5,770 | 13¾ | 4½ | 9 | |Gorgon[13] | 3,480 | 1,650 | 11 | 9 | 18 | |Hecate[13] | 3,480 | 1,750 | 11 | 9 | 18 | |Hector[13] | 6,710 | 3,260 | 12½ | 4½ | 9 | |Hydra[13] | 3,480 | 1,470 | 11¼ | 8 | 18 | |Invincible | 6,010 | 4,830 | 14 | 8 | 12 | |Iron Duke | 6,010 | 4,270 | 13¾ | 8 | 12 | |Minotaur | 10,690 | 6,700 | 14½ | 5½ | 12 | |Monarch | 8,320 | 7,840 | 15 | 7 | 25 | |Northumberland | 10,580 | 6,560 | 14 | 5½ | 12 | |Penelope | 4,470 | 4,700 | 12¾ | 6 | 9 | |Prince Albert | 3,880 | 2,130 | 11¾ | 4½ | 12 | |Swiftsure | 6,640 | 4,910 | 15¾ | 8 | 12 | |Triumph | 6,640 | 4,890 | 14 | 8 | 12 | |Valiant | 6,710 | 3,560 | 12¾ | 4½ | 9 | |Warrior | 9,210 | 5,470 | 9¼ | 4½ | 9 | +---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+ SHIPS ARMORED IN PLACES. The ships in this list, although having some armor upon their sides, being liable to capsize at sea from injuries inflicted upon their unarmored parts, cannot be classed with the armored ships. +---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+ | | | | | Maximum | | | | Tons |Indicated | Speed, | Thickness | Largest | |NAME OF SHIP | Displace-| Horse- | in | of Armor, | Guns, | | | ment. | power. | Knots. | in Inches.| in Tons.| +---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+ |Ajax | 8,490 | 6,000 | 13 | 18 | 38 | |Agamemnon | 8,490 | 6,000 | 13 | 18 | 38 | |Anson | 10,000 | 7,500 | 14 | 18 | 63 | |Benbow | 10,000 | 7,500 | 14 | 18 | 110 | |Camperdown | 10,000 | 7,500 | 14 | 18 | 63 | |Collingwood | 9,150 | 7,000 | 14 | 18 | 43 | |Colossus | 9,150 | 6,000 | 14 | 18 | 43 | |Edinburgh | 9,150 | 6,000 | 14 | 18 | 43 | |Howe | 9,600 | 7,500 | 16 | 18 | 63 | |Rodney | 9,600 | 7,500 | 14 | 18 | 63 | |Impérieuse[14] | 7,390 | 8,000 | 16 | 10 | 18 | |Warspite[14] | 7,390 | 8,000 | 16 | 10 | 18 | +---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+ To the preceding list may now be added two ships of 10,400 tons displacement, with 18-inch armor, and five cruisers of 5000 tons displacement, with 10-inch armor, recently ordered by the Admiralty to be built by contract. UNARMORED SHIPS WITH UNDER-WATER STEEL DECKS.[15] +---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+ | | | | | Maximum | | | | Tons |Indicated | Speed, | Thickness | Largest | |NAME OF SHIP | Displace-| Horse- | in | of Armor, | Guns, | | | ment. | power. | Knots. | in Inches.| in Tons.| +---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+ |Amphion | 3,750 | 5,000 | 16¾ | 1½ | 6 | |Arethusa | 3,750 | 5,000 | 16¾ | 1½ | 6 | |Leander | 3,750 | 5,000 | 16¾ | 1½ | 6 | |Phaeton | 3,750 | 5,000 | 16¾ | 1½ | 6 | |Mersey | 3,550 | 6,000 | 17 | 2 | 6 | |Severn | 3,550 | 6,000 | 17 | 2 | 6 | |Thames | 3,550 | 6,000 | 17 | 2 | 6 | |Forth | 3,550 | 6,000 | 17 | 2 | 6 | +---------------+----------+----------+--------+-----------+---------+ Armored ships with 12-inch armor and upward are called ships with thick armor; those with armor less than twelve inches but more than eight inches thick are designated as ships with medium armor; and those with 8-inch armor or less as ships with thin armor. A number of vessels of the “Scout” class are now under construction for the Admiralty. There is a disposition in certain quarters to include these among the ships of the class recorded in the last table. A transverse section of one of these is given here, in which the so-called protective deck is but three-eighths of an inch in thickness, and can therefore be pierced by any gun afloat, from the largest down to the very smallest. It would be quite absurd to speak of this class of vessels as being in any way “protected” against gun fire. The first-class ships, so called, and the armored cruisers referred to in the former part of this chapter as having been promised to Parliament by the Admiralty representatives, were ordered, and work upon them is well under way in the yards of those firms to whom their building has been intrusted. The former are two in number, and their principal dimensions and particulars are as follows: length, 340 feet; breadth, 70 feet; draught of water, 26 feet; displacement, 10,400 tons; indicated horse-power, 10,000; estimated speed, 16 knots; thickness of armor, 18 inches; largest guns, 110 tons. The armor-belt in these ships is a little more than 160 feet long, or about half their length, but rises to a height of only two feet six inches above the water. Before and abaft the belt under-water armored decks extend to the stem and stern respectively, as in the “Admiral” class. Besides the two 110-ton guns, which, as has been said, are placed in a turret forward and fire over the upper deck, there are twelve 6-inch guns ranged round the after-part of the ship on the upper deck. A certain amount of protection has been given to these guns by means of armor-plating, but as this is only three inches thick, it can be said to do little more than protect the gun crews from the fire of rifles and of the smallest machine-guns. [Illustration: TRANSVERSE SECTION OF ONE OF THE NEW “SCOUTS”] Of the armored cruisers,[16] five have been contracted for. Their principal dimensions and particulars are: length, 300 feet; breadth, 56 feet; draught of water, 21 feet; displacement, 5000 tons; indicated horse-power, 8500; estimated speed, 18 knots; thickness of armor, 10 inches; largest guns, 18 tons. These vessels are protected by an armor-belt nearly two hundred feet long, which extends to a height of one foot six inches above the water, and to a depth of four feet below it, and they also have under-water decks before and abaft the belt. They carry two 18-ton guns, one well forward, ranging right round the bow, and the other well aft, ranging right round the stern, as well as five 6-inch guns on each broadside, the foremost and aftermost of which are placed on projecting sponsons, by which they are enabled to fire right ahead and right astern respectively. None of these guns is protected except by the thin shields usually fitted to keep off rifle fire from those actually working the guns. No mention has yet been made of the troop or transport ships of the British navy. There are in all about a dozen of these, but by far the most conspicuous and important of them are the five Indian transports which were built about twenty years ago, conjointly by the Admiralty and the government of India, and ever since worked by those departments of the State with general satisfaction. One of these, the _Jumna_, is illustrated in the annexed figure. So satisfied was the late Director of Transports, Sir William R. Mends, K.C.B., with the services of these ships that, before retiring from his office, he informed the writer that if he had to assist in the construction of a new fleet of such transports he would desire but a single improvement in them, as working ships, and that was the raising of the lower deck one foot, in order to increase to that extent the stowage of the holds. [Illustration: THE “JUMNA.”] In the early part of this chapter the writer made reference to the influence exerted upon European ship-building by the incidents of the American civil war. He will conclude by a reference to an influence exerted upon his own mind and judgment by the most distinguished naval hero of that war, the late Admiral Farragut. On the occasion of that gallant officer’s visit to England the Board of Admiralty invited him, as a wholly exceptional compliment, to accompany it on its annual official visit of inspection to her Majesty’s dockyards. On the way from Chatham to Sheerness in the Admiralty yacht, the writer had a most instructive conversation with the admiral as to the results of his practical experience of naval warfare at the brilliant capture of New Orleans, and elsewhere, and one of those results was this: “Never allow your men to be deceived as to the ships in which you expect them to fight. They will fight in anything, and fight to the death, if they know beforehand what they are going about, and what is expected of them. But if you deceive them, and expose them to dangers of which they know nothing, and they find this out in battle, they are very apt to become bewildered, to lose heart all at once, and to fail you just when you most require their utmost exertions.” The writer has not forgotten this, and will not forget it. The British Admiralty is, unhappily, altogether unmindful of it. NOTES.[17] There is no rigorous law by which a universal naval policy may be formulated, for a nation’s environment, geographical and political, defines the conditions that must be obeyed. Underneath all, however, the immutable principle exists that the first and supreme duty of a navy is to protect its own coasts. The measures required to achieve this end are as various as a country’s necessities, resources, opportunities, and temperament. England, for example, has always guarded her homes, not at the hearth-stone nor the threshold, but within gunshot of her enemy’s territory; her defence has been an attack upon his inner line, and her vessels have been, not corsairs preying upon merchantmen, but battle-ships, ready for duel or for fleet engagement, whether they had the odds against them or not. This is the true sailor instinct; this has made England’s greatness. To-day the question is so much governed by the complexities of modern progress that the details must be altered to suit the new demands; for it is not the England of the British Islands nor of the sparsely settled colonies that is now to be defended—it is a Greater Britain. The trade and commerce of England have increased so enormously in late years that no figures are necessary to show the interests she has afloat; but as proof of her growth in territory and in population outside of the mother-country, these statistics, taken from a late number of the _Nineteenth Century_, may perhaps be quoted: FIFTY YEARS’ GROWTH OF INDIA AND THE COLONIES. INDIA.