Financial Crime and Corruption by Samuel Vaknin

6. Corruption is a symptom of an all-pervasive sense

1802 words  |  Chapter 9

of helplessness. The citizen (or investor, or firm) feels dwarfed by the overwhelming and capricious powers of the state. It is through corruption and venality that the balance is restored. To minimize this imbalance, potential participants in corrupt dealings must be made to feel that they are real and effective stakeholders in their societies. A process of public debate coupled with transparency and the establishment of just distributive mechanisms will go a long way towards rendering corruption obsolete. VI. The Kleptocracies of the East The process of transition from communism to capitalism was largely hijacked either by outright criminals in budding outfits of organized crime - or by pernicious and all-pervasive kleptocracies: politicians and political parties bent on looting the state and suppressing the opposition, sometimes fatally. In the past 16 years, industrial production in the economies in transition tumbled in real terms by more than 60 percent. The monthly salary in the poorer bits equals the daily wage of a skilled German industrial worker, or one seventh the European Union's average. Gross domestic product per capita is less than one third the EU's. Infrastructure, internal and export markets, state institutions - all crumbled with dizzying speed. In some countries - not the least Russia - privatization amounted to a mass transfer of assets to cronies and insiders, often well-connected members of the communist nomenclature: managers, members of the security services and other penumbral figures. Laws were passed and institutions tweaked to reflect the special interests of these groupings. "Classical" forms of crime flourished throughout the benighted region. Prostitution, gambling, drugs, smuggling, kidnapping, organ trafficking and other varieties of delinquency yielded to their perpetrators billions of dollars annually. In the impoverished economies of the east, these fantastic revenues - laundered through off shore accounts - were leveraged by criminals to garner political favors, to buy into legitimate businesses and to infiltrate civil society. None of this is new to Western publics. Rogues and "robber barons" have always doubled as entrepreneurs. The oil, gaming and railways industries in America, for instance, owe their existence to dubious personas and questionable practices. Well into the 17th century, the British sovereign maintained a monopoly on chartering businesses and awarded the coveted licenses to loyal servants and obsequious sycophants. Still, the ubiquity of crime in east Europe and its reach are unprecedented in European annals. In the void-like interregnum between centrally planned and free market economies only criminals, politicians, managers, and employees of the security services were positioned to benefit from the upheaval. At the outset of transition, the underworld constituted an embryonic private sector, replete with international networks of contacts, cross-border experience, capital agglomeration and wealth formation, sources of venture (risk) capital, an entrepreneurial spirit, and a diversified portfolio of investments and revenue generating assets. Criminals were used to private sector practices: price signals, competition, joint venturing, and third party dispute settlement. Crime - alone among all economic activities in communist societies - obeyed the laws of the free market. Criminals had to be entrepreneurial and profitable to survive. Their instincts sharpened by - often lethal - competition, they were never corrupted by central planning. Deprived of access to state largesse, criminals invested their own capital in efficiently-run small to medium size enterprises. Attuned to the needs and wishes of their customers, criminals engaged in primitive forms of market research, through neighborhood and grassroots "pollsters" and "activists". They responded with agility and in real time to changes in the patterns of supply and demand by altering their product mix and their pricing. They have always been pioneers of bleeding-edge technologies. Criminals are effective organizers and managers. They excel at enforcing workplace discipline with irresistible incentives and irreversible disincentives, at setting targets and at networking. The superior felonious echelons are upwardly mobile and have a clear career path. Every management fad - from territorially exclusive franchises to "stock" options - has been invented by criminals long before they triumphed in the boardroom. In east Europe, criminals on all levels, from the organized to the petty, often substituted for the dysfunctional, or ideologically hidebound organs of the state. Consider the dispensation of justice. The criminal code of conduct and court system replaced the compromised and lethargic official judiciary. Debt collectors and enforcers stood in for venal and incompetent police forces. Crime is a growth industry and sustains hordes of professionals: accountants and lawyers, forgers and cross border guides, weapons experts and bankers, mechanics and hit-men. Expertise, know-how and acumen, amassed over centuries of practice, are taught in the criminal universities known as penitentiaries: roads less traveled, countries more lenient, passports to be bought, sold, or forged, how-to manuals, goods and services on offer and demand. Profit margins in crime are outlandish and lead to feverish wealth accumulation. The banking system is used both to stash the proceeds and to launder them. Tax havens, off shore financial institutions and money couriers - all form part of a global web. Thus cleansed and rendered untraceable, the money is invested in legitimate activities. In some countries - especially on the drug path, or on the trail of white slavery - crime is a major engine of economic growth. As opposed to the visible sectors of the east's demonetized economies, criminal enterprises never run out of liquidity and thus are always keen to invest. Moreover, crime is international and cosmopolitan. It is accustomed to sophisticated export-import transactions. Many criminals - as opposed to the vast majority of their countrymen - are polyglottal, well-traveled, aware of world prices, the international financial system and demand and supply in various markets. They are experienced negotiators. In short: criminals are well- heeled international businessmen, well-connected both abroad and with the various indigenous elites. The Wild East in Europe is often compared to the Wild West in America a century or so ago. The Russian oligarchs, goes the soothing analogy, are local versions of Morgan, Rockefeller, Pullman and Vanderbilt. But this affinity is spurious. the United States always had a civic culture with civic values and an aspiration to, ultimately, create a harmonious and benevolent civic society. Criminality was regarded as a shameful stepping stone on the way to an orderly community of learned, civilized, law-abiding citizens. This cannot be said about Russia, for instance. The criminal there is, if anything, admired and emulated. Even the language of legal business in countries in transition is suffused with underworld parlance. There is no - and never was - a civic tradition in the countries of eastern Europe, a Bill of Rights, a veritable Constitution, a modicum of self rule, a true abolition of classes and nomenclatures. These territories are accustomed to being governed by paranoiac and murderous tyrants akin to the current crop of delinquents. That some criminals are members of the new political, financial and industrial elites (and vice versa) - tends to support this long-rooted association. In all the countries of the region, politicians and managers abuse the state and its simulacrum institutions in close symbiosis with felons. Patronage and sinecures extend to collaborating lawbreakers. Veritable villains gain access to state owned assets and resources in a cycle of money laundering. Law enforcement agencies and the courts are "encouraged" to turn a blind eye, or even to help criminals eliminate internal and external competition in their turf. Criminals, in return, serve as the "long and anonymous arm" of politicians, obtaining for them illicit goods, or providing "black" services. Corruption often flows through criminal channels or via the mediation and conduit of delinquents. Within the shared sphere of the informal economy, assets are shifted among these economic players. Both players oppose attempts at reform and transparency and encourage - even engender - nationalism and racism, paranoias and grievances to recruit foot soldiers. Fortunately, there is the irrepressible urge to become legitimate. Politicians, who grope for a new ideological cover for their opportunism, partner with legitimacy- seeking, established crime lords. Both groups benefit from a swelling economic pie. They fight against other, less successful, criminals, who wish to persist in their old ways and, thus, hamper economic growth. The battle is never won but at least it succeeds to firmly drive crime where it belongs: underground. VII. FIMACO - Russia's Missing Billions Russia's Audit Chamber - with the help of the Swiss authorities and their host of dedicated investigators - may be about to solve a long standing mystery. An announcement by the Prosecutor's General Office is said to be imminent. The highest echelons of the Yeltsin entourage - perhaps even Yeltsin himself - may be implicated - or exonerated. A Russian team has been spending the better part of the last two months poring over documents and interviewing witnesses in Switzerland, France, Italy, and other European countries. About $4.8 billion of IMF funds are alleged to have gone amiss during the implosion of the Russian financial markets in August 1998. They were supposed to prop up the banking system (especially SBS-Agro) and the ailing and sharply devalued ruble. Instead, they ended up in the bank accounts of obscure corporations - and, then, incredibly, vanished into thin air. The person in charge of the funds in 1998 was none other than Mikhail Kasyanov, Russia's current Prime Minister - at the time, Deputy Minister of Finance for External Debt. His signature on all foreign exchange transactions - even those handled by the central bank - was mandatory. In July 2000, he was flatly accused by the Italian daily, La Reppublica, of authorizing the diversion of the disputed funds. Following public charges made by US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin as early as March 1999, both Russian and American media delved deeply over the years into the affair. Communist Duma Deputy Viktor Ilyukhin jumped on the bandwagon citing an obscure "trustworthy foreign source" to substantiate his indictment of Kremlin cronies and oligarchs contained in an open letter to the Prosecutor General, Yuri Skuratov. The money trail from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to Swiss and German subsidiaries of the Russian central Bank was comprehensively reconstructed. Still, the former Chairman of the central bank, Sergei Dubinin, called Ilyukhin's allegations and the ensuing Swiss investigations - "a black PR campaign ... a lie". Others pointed to an outlandish coincidence: the ruble collapsed twice in Russia's post-Communist annals. Once, in 1994, when Dubinin was Minister of Finance and was forced to resign. The second time was in 1998, when Dubinin was governor of the central bank and was, again, ousted. Dubinin himself seems to be unable to make up his mind. In one interview he says that IMF funds were used to prop up the ruble - in others, that they went into "the national pot" (i.e., the Ministry of Finance, to cover a budgetary shortfall). The Chairman of the Federation Council at the time, Yegor Stroev, appointed an investigative committee in

Chapters

1. Chapter 1 2. 1997. The US Department of Justice brought another 30 3. 1989. Both events have forever altered the patterns of the 4. 1. Egregiously corrupt, high-profile, public figures, 5. 2. All international aid, credits, and investments must 6. 3. Corruption cannot be reduced only by punitive 7. 4. Opportunities to be corrupt should be minimized 8. 5. Corruption is a symptom of systemic institutional 9. 6. Corruption is a symptom of an all-pervasive sense 10. 1999. Its report remains classified but Stroev confirmed 11. 1995. PwC did make a mild comment in the 1997 audit. 12. introduction of best independent directors' practices". 13. 1989. Six years later, their number shrank to 1,612 and it 14. 2600. By 2002, it has increased elevenfold since 1995. 15. 2001. Nine of every 10 hijacked ships are ultimately 16. 4. NEVER expect ANY help from the Nigerian 17. 5. NEVER rely on YOUR Government to bail you 18. 1996. Iraqis are also being trained in Belarus to operate 19. 1. Job security is a thing of the past. Itinerancy in various 20. 2. Outsourcing and offshoring of back office (and, more 21. 3. The populace in developed countries are addicted to 22. 4. The other side of this dismal coin is workaholism - the 23. 5. The depersonalization of manufacturing - the 24. 6. Many former employees of mega-corporations abandon 25. 7. Despite decades of advanced notice, globalization 26. 8. The decline of the professional guilds on the one hand 27. 9. The quality of one's work, and of services and products 28. 10. Moral relativism is the mirror image of rampant 29. 11. The disintegration of the educational systems of the 30. 12. Irrational beliefs, pseudo-sciences, and the occult 31. 1. That the fair "value" of a share is closely 32. 2. That price movements are mostly random, though 33. 3. That the fair value responds to new information 34. introduction of a reciprocal visa regime between the two 35. 1. Legal activities that are not reported to the tax 36. 2. Illegal activities which, needless to say, are also 37. 1. How to make sure that the expenditures match and 38. 2. How to prevent the criminally corrupt activities 39. introduction of free marketry are unemployment and 40. 1. There should be no barriers to the entry of new 41. 2. A larger scale of operation does introduce 42. 3. Efficient competition does not exist when a market 43. 4. A competitive price will be comprised of a 44. 1. Blocking Statutes - which prohibit its legal entities 45. 2. Clawback Provisions - which will enable the local 46. 1. National laws should be applied to solve 47. 2. Parties, regardless of origin, should be treated as 48. 3. A minimum standard for national antitrust rules 49. 4. The establishment of an international authority to 50. 1. Agreements to fix prices (including export and 51. 3. Market or customer allocation (division) 52. 5. Collective action to enforce arrangements, e.g., by 53. 6. Concerted refusal to sell to potential importers; 54. 7. Collective denial of access to an arrangement, or 55. introduction of new management techniques (example: 56. 1. They attack the perceived source of frustration in 57. 2. They seek to subsume the object of envy by 58. 3. They resort to self-deprecation. They idealize the 59. 4. They experience cognitive dissonance. These 60. 5. They avoid the envied person and thus the 61. 2. It is impossible for two players to improve the 62. 3. Is not influenced by the introduction of irrelevant 63. 4. Is symmetric (reversing the roles of the players 64. 1. Crooks and other illegal operators. These take 65. 2. Illegitimate operators include those treading the 66. 3. The "not serious" operators. These are people too 67. 4. The former kind of operators obviously has a 68. 5. Speculators and middlemen are yet another 69. 6. The last type of market impeders is well known 70. 1995. But the phenomenon recurred in Kosovo. 71. 1. What part of the NGO's budget is spent on salaries and 72. 2. Which part of the budget is spent on furthering the aims 73. 3. What portion of the NGOs resources is allocated to 74. 4. What part of the budget is contributed by governments, 75. 5. What do the alleged beneficiaries of the NGO's 76. 6. How many of the NGO's operatives are in the field, 77. 7. Does the NGO own or run commercial enterprises? If it 78. 1. The process and rules of joining up (i.e., the 79. 2. The application and membership procedures are 80. 3. The system alters its membership requirements in

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