Financial Crime and Corruption by Samuel Vaknin

1995. PwC did make a mild comment in the 1997 audit.

884 words  |  Chapter 11

But the first real warning appeared only three years later in the audit for the year 2000. Andrei Sharonov, deputy minister in the federal Ministry of Economics said, in an interview he granted "Business Week" last February: "Auditors have been working on behalf of management rather than shareholders." In a series of outlandish ads, published in Russian business dailies in late February, senior partners in the PwC Moscow office made this incredible statement: "(Audit) does not represent a review of each transaction, or a qualitative assessment of a company's performance". The New York Times quotes a former employee of Ernst&Young in Moscow as saying: "A big client is god. You do what they want and tell you to do. You can play straight-laced and try to be upright and protect your reputation with minor clients, but you can't do it with the big guys. If you lose that account, no matter how justified you are, that's the end of a career". PwC should know. When it mentioned suspicious heavily discounted sales of oil to Rosneft in a 1998 audit report, its client, Purneftegaz, replaced it with Arthur Andersen. The dubious deals dutifully vanished from the audit reports, though they continue apace. Andersen claims such transactions do not require disclosure under Russian law. How times change! Throughout the 1990's, Russia and its nascent private sector were subjected to self-righteous harangues from visiting Big Five accountants. The hectoring targeted the lack of good governance among Russia's corporations and public administration alike. Hordes of pampered speakers and consultants espoused transparent accounting, minority shareholders' rights, management accessibility and accountability and other noble goals. That was before Enron. The tables have turned. The Big Five - from disintegrating Andersen to KPMG - are being chastised and fined for negligent practices, flagrant conflicts of interests, misrepresentation, questionable ethics and worse. Their worldwide clout, moral authority, and professional standing have been considerably dented. America's GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Practices) - once considered the undisputable benchmark of rectitude and disclosure - are now thought in need of urgent revision. The American issuer of accounting standards - FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board) - is widely perceived to be an incestuous arrangement between the clubby members of a rapacious and unscrupulous profession. Many American scholars even suggest to adopt the hitherto much-derided alternative - the International Accounting Standards (IAS) recently implemented through much of central and eastern Europe. Russia's Federal Commission for the Securities Market (FCSM) convened a conclave of Western and domestic auditing firms. The theme was how to spot and neutralize bad auditors. With barely concealed and gleeful schadenfreude, the Russians said that the Enron scandal undermined their confidence in Western accountants and the GAAP. The Institute of Corporate Law and Corporate Governance (ICLG), having studied the statements of a few major Russian firms, concluded that there are indications of financial problems, "not mentioned by (mostly Western) auditors". They may have a point. Most of the banks that collapsed ignominiously in 1998 received glowing audits signed by Western auditors, often one of the Big Five. The Russian Investor Protection Association (IPA) and Institute of Professional Auditors (IPAR) embarked on a survey of Russian investors, enterprises, auditors, and state officials - and what they think about the quality of the audit services they are getting. Many Russian managers - as avaricious and venal as ever - now can justify hiring malleable and puny local auditors instead of big international or domestic ones. Surgutneftegaz - with $2 billion net profit last year and on-going dispute with its shareholders about dividends - wants to sack "Rosexperitza", a respectable Russian accountancy, and hire "Aval", a little known accounting outfit. Aval does not even make it to the list of 200 largest accounting firms in Russia, according to Renaissance Capital, an investment bank. Other Russian managers are genuinely alarmed by the vertiginous decline in the reputation of the global accounting firms and by the inherent conflict of interest between consulting and audit jobs performed by the same entity. Sviazinvest, a holding and telecom company, hired Accenture on top of - some say instead of - Andersen Consulting. A decade of achievements in fostering transparency, better corporate governance, and more realistic accounting in central and eastern Europe - may well evaporate in the wake of Enron and other scandals. The forces of reaction and corruption in these nether lands - greedy managers, venal bureaucrats, and anti-reformists - all seized the opportunity to reverse what was hitherto considered an irreversible trend towards Western standards. This, in turn, is likely to deter investors and retard the progress towards a more efficient market economy. The Big Six accounting firms were among the first to establish a presence in Russia. Together with major league consultancies, such as Baker-McKinsey, they coached Russian entrepreneurs and managers in the ways of the West. They introduced investors to Russia when it was still considered a frontier land. They promoted Russian enterprises abroad and nursed the first, precarious, joint ventures between paranoid Russians and disdainful Westerners. Companies like Ernst&Young are at the forefront of the fight to include independent directors in the boards of Russian firms, invariably stuffed with relatives and cronies. Together with IPA, Ernst&Young recently established the National Association of Independent Directors (NAID). It is intended to "assist Russian companies to increase their efficiency through

Chapters

1. Chapter 1 2. 1997. The US Department of Justice brought another 30 3. 1989. Both events have forever altered the patterns of the 4. 1. Egregiously corrupt, high-profile, public figures, 5. 2. All international aid, credits, and investments must 6. 3. Corruption cannot be reduced only by punitive 7. 4. Opportunities to be corrupt should be minimized 8. 5. Corruption is a symptom of systemic institutional 9. 6. Corruption is a symptom of an all-pervasive sense 10. 1999. Its report remains classified but Stroev confirmed 11. 1995. PwC did make a mild comment in the 1997 audit. 12. introduction of best independent directors' practices". 13. 1989. Six years later, their number shrank to 1,612 and it 14. 2600. By 2002, it has increased elevenfold since 1995. 15. 2001. Nine of every 10 hijacked ships are ultimately 16. 4. NEVER expect ANY help from the Nigerian 17. 5. NEVER rely on YOUR Government to bail you 18. 1996. Iraqis are also being trained in Belarus to operate 19. 1. Job security is a thing of the past. Itinerancy in various 20. 2. Outsourcing and offshoring of back office (and, more 21. 3. The populace in developed countries are addicted to 22. 4. The other side of this dismal coin is workaholism - the 23. 5. The depersonalization of manufacturing - the 24. 6. Many former employees of mega-corporations abandon 25. 7. Despite decades of advanced notice, globalization 26. 8. The decline of the professional guilds on the one hand 27. 9. The quality of one's work, and of services and products 28. 10. Moral relativism is the mirror image of rampant 29. 11. The disintegration of the educational systems of the 30. 12. Irrational beliefs, pseudo-sciences, and the occult 31. 1. That the fair "value" of a share is closely 32. 2. That price movements are mostly random, though 33. 3. That the fair value responds to new information 34. introduction of a reciprocal visa regime between the two 35. 1. Legal activities that are not reported to the tax 36. 2. Illegal activities which, needless to say, are also 37. 1. How to make sure that the expenditures match and 38. 2. How to prevent the criminally corrupt activities 39. introduction of free marketry are unemployment and 40. 1. There should be no barriers to the entry of new 41. 2. A larger scale of operation does introduce 42. 3. Efficient competition does not exist when a market 43. 4. A competitive price will be comprised of a 44. 1. Blocking Statutes - which prohibit its legal entities 45. 2. Clawback Provisions - which will enable the local 46. 1. National laws should be applied to solve 47. 2. Parties, regardless of origin, should be treated as 48. 3. A minimum standard for national antitrust rules 49. 4. The establishment of an international authority to 50. 1. Agreements to fix prices (including export and 51. 3. Market or customer allocation (division) 52. 5. Collective action to enforce arrangements, e.g., by 53. 6. Concerted refusal to sell to potential importers; 54. 7. Collective denial of access to an arrangement, or 55. introduction of new management techniques (example: 56. 1. They attack the perceived source of frustration in 57. 2. They seek to subsume the object of envy by 58. 3. They resort to self-deprecation. They idealize the 59. 4. They experience cognitive dissonance. These 60. 5. They avoid the envied person and thus the 61. 2. It is impossible for two players to improve the 62. 3. Is not influenced by the introduction of irrelevant 63. 4. Is symmetric (reversing the roles of the players 64. 1. Crooks and other illegal operators. These take 65. 2. Illegitimate operators include those treading the 66. 3. The "not serious" operators. These are people too 67. 4. The former kind of operators obviously has a 68. 5. Speculators and middlemen are yet another 69. 6. The last type of market impeders is well known 70. 1995. But the phenomenon recurred in Kosovo. 71. 1. What part of the NGO's budget is spent on salaries and 72. 2. Which part of the budget is spent on furthering the aims 73. 3. What portion of the NGOs resources is allocated to 74. 4. What part of the budget is contributed by governments, 75. 5. What do the alleged beneficiaries of the NGO's 76. 6. How many of the NGO's operatives are in the field, 77. 7. Does the NGO own or run commercial enterprises? If it 78. 1. The process and rules of joining up (i.e., the 79. 2. The application and membership procedures are 80. 3. The system alters its membership requirements in

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