Financial Crime and Corruption by Samuel Vaknin

6. The last type of market impeders is well known

3023 words  |  Chapter 69

and is the only one to have been tackled - with varying degrees of success by governments and by legislators worldwide. These are the trade restricting arrangements: monopolies, cartels, trusts and other illegal organizations. Rivers of inks were spilled over forests of paper to explain the pernicious effects of these anti-competitive practices (see: "Competition Laws"). The short and the long of it is that competition enhances and increases efficiency and that, therefore, anything that restricts competition, weakens and lessens efficiency. What could anyone do about these inefficiencies? The world goes in circles of increasing and decreasing free marketry. The globe was a more open, competitive and, in certain respects, efficient place at the beginning of the 20th century than it is now. Capital flowed more freely and so did labour. Foreign Direct Investment was bigger. The more efficient, "friction free" the dissemination of information (the ultimate resource) - the less waste and the smaller the lebensraum for parasites. The more adherence to market, price driven, open auction based, meritocratic mechanisms - the less middlemen, speculators, bribers, monopolies, cartels and trusts. The less political involvement in the workings of the market and, in general, in what consenting adults conspire to do that is not harmful to others - the more efficient and flowing the economic ambience is likely to become. This picture of "laissez faire, laissez aller" should be complimented by even stricter legislation coupled with effective and draconian law enforcement agents and measures. The illegal and the illegitimate should be stamped out, cruelly. Freedom to all - is also freedom from being conned or hassled. Only when the righteous freely prosper and the less righteous excessively suffer - only then will we have entered the efficient kingdom of the free market. This still does not deal with the "not serious" and the "personality disordered". What about the inefficient havoc that they wreak? This, after all, is part of what is known, in legal parlance as: "force majeure". Note There is a raging debate between the "rational expectations" theory and the "prospect theory". The former - the cornerstone of rational economics - assumes that economic (human) players are rational and out to maximize their utility (see: "The Happiness of Others", "The Egotistic Friend" and "The Distributive Justice of the Market"). Even ignoring the fuzzy logic behind the ill- defined philosophical term "utility" - rational economics has very little to do with real human being and a lot to do with sterile (though mildly useful) abstractions. Prospect theory builds on behavioural research in modern psychology which demonstrates that people are more loss averse than gain seekers (utility maximizers). Other economists have succeeded to demonstrate irrational behaviours of economic actors (heuristics, dissonances, biases, magical thinking and so on). The apparent chasm between the rational theories (efficient markets, hidden hands and so on) and behavioural economics is the result of two philosophical fallacies which, in turn, are based on the misapplication and misinterpretation of philosophical terms. The first fallacy is to assume that all forms of utility are reducible to one another or to money terms. Thus, the values attached to all utilities are expressed in monetary terms. This is wrong. Some people prefer leisure, or freedom, or predictability to expected money. This is the very essence of risk aversion: a trade off between the utility of predictability (absence or minimization of risk) and the expected utility of money. In other words, people have many utility functions running simultaneously - or, at best, one utility function with many variables and coefficients. This is why taxi drivers in New York cease working in a busy day, having reached a pre-determined income target: the utility function of their money equals the utility function of their leisure. How can these coefficients (and the values of these variables) be determined? Only by engaging in extensive empirical research. There is no way for any theory or "explanation" to predict these values. We have yet to reach the stage of being able to quantify, measure and numerically predict human behaviour and personality (=the set of adaptive traits and their interactions with changing circumstances). That economics is a branch of psychology is becoming more evident by the day. It would do well to lose its mathematical pretensions and adopt the statistical methods of its humbler relative. The second fallacy is the assumption underlying both rational and behavioural economics that human nature is an "object" to be analysed and "studied", that it is static and unchanged. But, of course, humans change inexorably. This is the only fixed feature of being human: change. Some changes are unpredictable, even in deterministic principle. Other changes are well documented. An example of the latter class of changes in the learning curve. Humans learn and the more they learn the more they alter their behaviour. So, to obtain any meaningful data, one has to observe behaviour in time, to obtain a sequence of reactions and actions. To isolate, observe and manipulate environmental variables and study human interactions. No snapshot can approximate a video sequence where humans are concerned. XLIII. The Pettifogger Procurators Diplomats in Post-Communist Countries In 2001, the most unusual event has gone unnoticed in the international press. A former minister of finance has accused the more prominent members of the diplomatic corps in his country of corruption. He insisted that these paragons of indignant righteousness and hectoring morality have tried to blackmail him into paying them hefty commissions from money allotted to exigent humanitarian aid. This was immediately and from afar - and, therefore, without proper investigation - denied by their superiors in no uncertain terms. The facts are these: most (though by no means all) Western diplomats in the nightmarish wasteland that is East Europe and the Balkan, the unctuously fulsome and the frowzily wizened alike, are ageing and sybaritic basket cases. They have often failed miserably in their bootless previous posts - or have insufficiently submerged in the Byzantine culture of their employers. Thus emotionally injured and cast into the frigorific outer darkness of a ravaged continent, they adopt the imperial patina of Roman procurators in narcissistic compensation. Their long suffering wives - bored to distraction in the impassibly catatonic societies of post communism - impose upon a reluctant and flummoxed population the nescient folderol of their distaff voluntary urges or exiguous artistic talents. Ever more crapulous, they aestivate and hibernate, the queens of tatty courts and shabby courtiers. The cold war having ebbed, these emissaries of questionable provenance engage in the promotion of the narrow interests of specific industries or companies. They lobby the local administration, deploying bare threats and obloquies where veiled charm fails. They exert subtle or brutal pressure through the press. They co-opt name- dropping bureaucrats and bribe pivotal politicians. They get fired those who won't collaborate or threaten to expose their less defensible misdeeds. They are glorified delivery boys, carrying apocryphal messages to and fro. They are bloviating PR campaigners, seeking to aggrandize their meagre role and, incidentally, that of their country. They wine and dine and banter endlessly with the provincial somnolent variety of public figures, members of the venal and pinchbeck elites that now rule these tortured territories. In short - forced to deal with the bedizened miscreants that pass for businessmen and politicians in this nether world - they are transformed, assuming in the process the identity of their obdurately corrupted hosts. Thus, they help to sway elections and hasten to endorse their results, however disputed and patently fraudulent. They intimidate the opposition, negotiate with businessmen, prod favoured politicians, spread roorbacks and perambulate their fiefdom to gather intelligence. More often than not, they cross the limpid lines between promotion and extortion, lagniappe and pelf, friendship and collusion, diplomacy and protectorate, the kosher and the criminal. They are the target and the address of a legion of pressures and demands. Their government may ask them to help depose one coalition and help install another. Their secret services - disguised as intrusive NGOs or workers at the embassy - often get them involved in shady acts and unscrupulous practices. Real NGOs ask for their assiduous assistance and protection. Their hosts - and centuries old protocol - expect them to surreptitiously provide support while openly refrain from intervening, maintaining equipoise. Other countries protest, compete, or leak damaging reports to an often hostile media. The torpid common folk resent them for their colonial ways and hypocritical demarches. Lacking compunction, they are nobody's favourites and everybody's scapegoats at one time or another. And they are ill-equipped to deal with these subtleties. Not of intelligence, they end where they now are and wish they weren't. Ignorant of business and entrepreneurship, they occupy the dead end, otiose and pension-orientated jobs they do. Devoid of the charm, negotiating skills and human relations required by the intricacies of their profession - they are relegated to the Augean outskirts of civilization. Dishonest and mountebank, they persist in their mortifying positions, inured to the conniving they require. This blatantly discernible ineptitude provokes the "natives" into a wholesale rejection of the West, its values and its culture. The envoys are perceived as the cormorant reification of their remote controllers. Their voluptuary decadence is a distant echo of the West's decay, their nonage greed - a shadow of its avarice, their effrontery and hidebound peremptory nature - its mien. They are in no position to preach or teach. The diplomats of the West are not evil. Some of them mean well. To the best of their oft limited abilities, they cadge and beg and press and convince their governments to show goodwill and to contribute to their hosts. But soon their mettle is desiccated by the vexatious realities of their new habitation. Reduced to susurrus cynicism and sardonic contempt, they perfunctorily perform their functions, a distant look in their now empty eyes. They have been assimilated, rendered useless to their dispatchers and to their hosts alike. XLIV. Microsoft's Third Front The Intellectual Property Wars Elated investors greeted chairman Bill Gates and chief executive officer Steve Ballmer for Microsoft's victory in the titanic antitrust lawsuit brought against it by the Department of Justice and assorted state attorneys general. They also demanded that Microsoft distribute its pile of cash - $40 billion in monopoly profits - as dividends. But Microsoft may need that hoard. The battle is far from over. The European Commission, though much weakened by recent European Court of First Instance rulings against its competition commissioner, Mario Monti, can fine the company up to one tenth its worldwide turnover if it finds against it. Microsoft is being investigated by the European watchdog for anti-competitive practices now threatening to spread into the high-end server software and digital media markets. But the software colossus faces an even more daunting third front in central and eastern Europe and Asia. It is the war against piracy. Both its operating system, Windows, and its office productivity suite, Office, are widely cracked and replicated throughout these regions. Three years ago, Microsoft negotiated a $3 million settlement with the government of Macedonia, one of the single largest abusers of intellectual property rights in this tiny country. More than 1 percent of Macedonia's GDP is said by various observers to be derived from software and digital content piracy. According to Yugoslavia's news agency, Tanjug, The governments of Serbia and Yugoslavia purchased, last month, 30,000 software licenses from the Redmond giant. Another 10-15,000 are in the pipeline. Aleksandar Bojovic, public relations manager of Microsoft's representative office in Belgrade was ebullient: "Before the signing of an agreement on a strategic partnership with authorities of Yugoslavia and Serbia, the percentage of legal software used by the citizens and industry of Serbia and Montenegro was only a few percents. Presently it is about 20 percents. Microsoft is more than surprised at the interest for legalization that exists in Yugoslavia". According to the Yugoslav newspaper Danas, Microsoft Yugoslavia has developed versions of Windows and Office in Serbian, replete with a spell-checker. There are c. 1 million computers in Yugoslavia. The company undertook, last year, to revamp the Yugoslav labyrinthine health, education, customs and tax systems. It also sent representatives to a delegation of businessmen that visited Bosnia-Herzegovina in February. Microsoft obstinately refused to price its products differentially - to charge less in poorer markets. The Office suite costs the equivalent of 6 weeks of the average wage in Macedonia and a whopping 3 months' wages in Serbia. This extortionate pricing gave rise to resentment and thriving markets in pilfered Microsoft applications. Pirated software costs between $1.5 per compact disk in Macedonia and $3 in Moscow's immense open-air Gorbushka market. According to the Russia-based Compulog Computer Consultants, quoted by USA Today, most communist states maintained large-scale hacking operations involving not only the security services, but also the computers and electrical engineering departments of universities and prestigious research institutes. American bans on the sale of certain software applications - such as computer-aided design and encryption - fostered the emergence of an officially-sanctioned subculture of crackers and pirates. In the last few years, Russian organized crime has evolved to incorporate computer fraud, identity theft, piracy of software and digital media and other related offenses. The Russian mafia employs programmers and graduates of computer sciences. The British Daily Express reported in September that - probably Russian - hackers broke into Microsoft's computer network and absconded with invaluable source codes. These are believed to be now also in the possession of the FSB, the chief successor to Russia's notorious KGB. The Business Software Alliance, a United States based trade group, claims that 87-92 percent of all business computer programs used in Russia are bootlegged - a piracy rate second only to China's. Microsoft sells c. $80- 100 million a year in the Russian Federation and the CIS. Had it not been for piracy, its revenues could have climbed well above the $1 billion mark. According to Moscow Times and RosBalt, Microsoft's sales in Russia almost doubled in the last 12 months and it has decided to expand into the regions outlying Moscow and into Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Yet, the company's attempts to stamp out illicit copying in the last years of Russian president Boris Yeltsin's regime - including a much publicized visit by Bill Gates and a series of televised raids on disk stamping factories - floundered and yielded a wave of xenophobic indignation. Still, central and eastern Europe is a natural growth market for the likes of Microsoft. The region is awash with highly qualified, talented, and - by Western measure - sinfully cheap experts. Purchasing power has increased precipitously in countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, parts of Russia, and Croatia. Both governments and businesses are at the initial stages of investing in information technology infrastructure. Technological leapfrogging rendered certain countries here more advanced than the West in terms of broadband and wireless networks. XLV. NGOs - The Self-Appointed Altruists Their arrival portends rising local prices and a culture shock. Many of them live in plush apartments, or five star hotels, drive SUV's, sport $3000 laptops and PDA's. They earn a two figure multiple of the local average wage. They are busybodies, preachers, critics, do-gooders, and professional altruists. Always self-appointed, they answer to no constituency. Though unelected and ignorant of local realities, they confront the democratically chosen and those who voted them into office. A few of them are enmeshed in crime and corruption. They are the non-governmental organizations, or NGO's. Some NGO's - like Oxfam, Human Rights Watch, Medecins Sans Frontieres, or Amnesty - genuinely contribute to enhancing welfare, to the mitigation of hunger, the furtherance of human and civil rights, or the curbing of disease. Others - usually in the guise of think tanks and lobby groups - are sometimes ideologically biased, or religiously-committed and, often, at the service of special interests. NGO's - such as the International Crisis Group - have openly interfered on behalf of the opposition in the last parliamentary elections in Macedonia. Other NGO's have done so in Belarus and Ukraine, Zimbabwe and Israel, Nigeria and Thailand, Slovakia and Hungary - and even in Western, rich, countries including the USA, Canada, Germany, and Belgium. The encroachment on state sovereignty of international law - enshrined in numerous treaties and conventions - allows NGO's to get involved in hitherto strictly domestic affairs like corruption, civil rights, the composition of the media, the penal and civil codes, environmental policies, or the allocation of economic resources and of natural endowments, such as land and water. No field of government activity is now exempt from the glare of NGO's. They serve as self-appointed witnesses, judges, jury and executioner rolled into one. Regardless of their persuasion or modus operandi, all NGO's are top heavy with entrenched, well-remunerated, extravagantly-perked bureaucracies. Opacity is typical of NGO's. Amnesty's rules prevent its officials from publicly discussing the inner workings of the organization - proposals, debates, opinions - until they have become officially voted into its Mandate. Thus, dissenting views rarely get an open hearing. Contrary to their teachings, the financing of NGO's is invariably obscure and their sponsors unknown. The bulk of the income of most non-governmental organizations, even the largest ones, comes from - usually foreign - powers. Many NGO's serve as official contractors for governments. NGO's serve as long arms of their sponsoring states - gathering intelligence, burnishing their image, and promoting their interests. There is a revolving door between the staff of NGO's and government bureaucracies the world over. The British Foreign Office finances a host of NGO's - including the fiercely "independent" Global Witness - in troubled spots, such as Angola. Many host governments accuse NGO's of - unwittingly or knowingly - serving as hotbeds of espionage. Very few NGO's derive some of their income from public contributions and donations. The more substantial NGO's spend one tenth of their budget on PR and solicitation of charity. In a desperate bid to attract international attention, so many of them lied about their projects in the Rwanda crisis in 1994, recounts "The Economist", that the Red Cross felt compelled to draw up a ten point mandatory NGO code of ethics. A code of conduct was adopted in

Chapters

1. Chapter 1 2. 1997. The US Department of Justice brought another 30 3. 1989. Both events have forever altered the patterns of the 4. 1. Egregiously corrupt, high-profile, public figures, 5. 2. All international aid, credits, and investments must 6. 3. Corruption cannot be reduced only by punitive 7. 4. Opportunities to be corrupt should be minimized 8. 5. Corruption is a symptom of systemic institutional 9. 6. Corruption is a symptom of an all-pervasive sense 10. 1999. Its report remains classified but Stroev confirmed 11. 1995. PwC did make a mild comment in the 1997 audit. 12. introduction of best independent directors' practices". 13. 1989. Six years later, their number shrank to 1,612 and it 14. 2600. By 2002, it has increased elevenfold since 1995. 15. 2001. Nine of every 10 hijacked ships are ultimately 16. 4. NEVER expect ANY help from the Nigerian 17. 5. NEVER rely on YOUR Government to bail you 18. 1996. Iraqis are also being trained in Belarus to operate 19. 1. Job security is a thing of the past. Itinerancy in various 20. 2. Outsourcing and offshoring of back office (and, more 21. 3. The populace in developed countries are addicted to 22. 4. The other side of this dismal coin is workaholism - the 23. 5. The depersonalization of manufacturing - the 24. 6. Many former employees of mega-corporations abandon 25. 7. Despite decades of advanced notice, globalization 26. 8. The decline of the professional guilds on the one hand 27. 9. The quality of one's work, and of services and products 28. 10. Moral relativism is the mirror image of rampant 29. 11. The disintegration of the educational systems of the 30. 12. Irrational beliefs, pseudo-sciences, and the occult 31. 1. That the fair "value" of a share is closely 32. 2. That price movements are mostly random, though 33. 3. That the fair value responds to new information 34. introduction of a reciprocal visa regime between the two 35. 1. Legal activities that are not reported to the tax 36. 2. Illegal activities which, needless to say, are also 37. 1. How to make sure that the expenditures match and 38. 2. How to prevent the criminally corrupt activities 39. introduction of free marketry are unemployment and 40. 1. There should be no barriers to the entry of new 41. 2. A larger scale of operation does introduce 42. 3. Efficient competition does not exist when a market 43. 4. A competitive price will be comprised of a 44. 1. Blocking Statutes - which prohibit its legal entities 45. 2. Clawback Provisions - which will enable the local 46. 1. National laws should be applied to solve 47. 2. Parties, regardless of origin, should be treated as 48. 3. A minimum standard for national antitrust rules 49. 4. The establishment of an international authority to 50. 1. Agreements to fix prices (including export and 51. 3. Market or customer allocation (division) 52. 5. Collective action to enforce arrangements, e.g., by 53. 6. Concerted refusal to sell to potential importers; 54. 7. Collective denial of access to an arrangement, or 55. introduction of new management techniques (example: 56. 1. They attack the perceived source of frustration in 57. 2. They seek to subsume the object of envy by 58. 3. They resort to self-deprecation. They idealize the 59. 4. They experience cognitive dissonance. These 60. 5. They avoid the envied person and thus the 61. 2. It is impossible for two players to improve the 62. 3. Is not influenced by the introduction of irrelevant 63. 4. Is symmetric (reversing the roles of the players 64. 1. Crooks and other illegal operators. These take 65. 2. Illegitimate operators include those treading the 66. 3. The "not serious" operators. These are people too 67. 4. The former kind of operators obviously has a 68. 5. Speculators and middlemen are yet another 69. 6. The last type of market impeders is well known 70. 1995. But the phenomenon recurred in Kosovo. 71. 1. What part of the NGO's budget is spent on salaries and 72. 2. Which part of the budget is spent on furthering the aims 73. 3. What portion of the NGOs resources is allocated to 74. 4. What part of the budget is contributed by governments, 75. 5. What do the alleged beneficiaries of the NGO's 76. 6. How many of the NGO's operatives are in the field, 77. 7. Does the NGO own or run commercial enterprises? If it 78. 1. The process and rules of joining up (i.e., the 79. 2. The application and membership procedures are 80. 3. The system alters its membership requirements in

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