5. Malpractice cases, involving the degree of care and skill usual,

and that used in the case under investigation, and involving delicate questions as to the propriety of the treatment adopted, etc. [186] See also 1 Bishop Crim. Law, sec. 36; Rex _v._ Romiski, 1 Moody, 19; Reg. _v._ Ellis, 2 Car. & K., 470. [187] In such cases as these the patient would have a right of action in the civil courts for damages against the physician or surgeon, because he had taken wilful and wicked advantage of his professional relation to her, to do her a grievous wrong. [188] The Pennsylvania courts at an early period refused to follow this common-law doctrine, and held that the moment the womb is instinct with life in embryo and the process of gestation has begun the crime may be perpetrated. Mills _v._ Com., 13 Pa. St., 631. [189] 1 Bishop Crim. Law, sec. 217, citing Rex _v._ Williamson, 3 Car. & P., 635. [190] The same learned and philosophical text-writer (2 Bishop Crim. Law, sec. 664) compares the English and American cases and declares that the difference between them is more apparent than real. [191] See Rice _v._ The State, 8 Mo., 561; Fairlee _v._ People, 11 Ill., 1; Holmes _v._ State, 23 Ala., 17; Rex _v._ Spilling, 2 M. & Rob., 107; Ferguson’s Case, 1 Lew., 181; Thomas _v._ Winchester, 2 Selden, N. Y. Court of App., 397; Com. _v._ Pierce, 138 Mass., 165, and cases cited; State _v._ Hahn, 38 Ark., 605; Wharton’s Crim. Law, sec. 1015; Elwell on Malpractice, etc., 238, 239. [192] 1 Bishop Crim. Law, sec. 558, citing Groenvelt’s case, 1 Lord Raymond, 213; Rex _v._ Long, 4 C. & P., 398. [193] See also Kelsey _v._ Hay, 84 Ind., 189; Small _v._ Howard, 128 Mass., 131; Gates _v._ Fleisher, 67 Wis., 286; Smothers _v._ Hanks, 34 Iowa, 286; Almond _v._ Nugent, 34 Iowa, 300; Haire _v._ Reese, 7 Phila. (Pa.), 138; Nelson _v._ Harrington, 72 Wis., 591. [194] Ruddock _v._ Low, 4 F. & F., 519; Musser _v._ Chase, 29 Ohio St., 577. [195] See particularly Gieselman _v._ Scott, 25 Ohio St., 86; Lanphier _v._ Phipos, 8 C. & P., 475; Pym _v._ Roper, 2 F. & F., 783; Carpenter _v._ Blake, 60 Barb., 485, 50 N. Y., 696, 10 Hun, 358, 75 N. Y., 12; Leighton _v._ Sargent, 7 N. H., 460. [196] Synonymous terms with “reasonable care” are “fair knowledge and skill,” Jones _v._ Angell, 95 Ind., 376; “ordinary care and skill,” Heath _v._ Glisan, 3 Oregon, 64. [197] See Corsi _v._ Maretzek, 4 E. D. Smith, 1, quoted at p. 362 of this volume. [198] Small _v._ Howard, 128 Mass., 131, and cases cited. [199] Clairvoyancy of course is not recognized in the courts as medical or surgical practice. And any one professing to treat patients as a clairvoyant must be held to the standard of regular practising physicians in the neighborhood where the clairvoyant operates. Nelson _v._ Harrington, 72 Wis., 591; Bibber _v._ Simpson, 59 Me., 181; Musser _v._ Chase, 29 Ohio St., 577. [200] McCandless _v._ McWha, 22 Pa. St., 261; Carpenter _v._ Blake, _supra_; Leighton _v._ Sargent, _supra_. [201] Kelley _v._ Hay, 84 Ind., 189; Stone _v._ Evans, 32 Minn., 243; Teft _v._ Wilcox, 6 Kans., 646; Brooke _v._ Clark, 57 Tex., 105; Graunis _v._ Branden, 5 Day (Conn.), 260, s. c., 5 Am. Dec., 143; Wenger _v._ Calder, 78 Ill., 275; Carpenter _v._ Blake, _supra_. [202] Hyrne _v._ Irwin, 23 S. Car., 226, s.c., 55 Am. Rep., 15; Whittaker _v._ Collins, 34 Minn., 209. [203] Boor _v._ Lowrey, 103 Ind., 468. [204] Hitchcock _v._ Burgett, 38 Mich., 501. [205] See U. P. R. R. Co. _v._ Botsford, 141 U. S., 250; McQuiggan _v._ D., L. & W. R. R. Co., 129 N. Y., 50; Roberts _v._ O. & L. C. R. Co., 29 Hun, 154, and cases cited. [206] Olmstead _v._ Gere, 100 Pa. St., 127; Carpenter _v._ Blake, _supra_. [207] Greenleaf Ev., s. 236; Taylor Ev., s. 908; Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, p. 363; Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, vol. 19, p. 122; Code Civ. Pro. Cal., s. 1,881; Mills’ Ann. Stats. of Col., 1891, s. 4,824; Rev. Stats. Idaho, 1887, s. 5,958; Gen. Stats. Minn., 1891, s. 5,094; Comp. Stats. Mont., 1887, s. 650; Gen. Laws Ore., 1892, s. 712; Comp. Laws Utah, 1888, s. 3,877. [208] Taylor Ev., s. 911; Stephen, Dig. of Ev., art. 115; Greenleaf Ev., s. 237. [209] The successive efforts made to extend protection by judicial ruling to communications between physician and patient will appear from a consideration of the cases that are usually cited as authority for the English rule: Annesley _v._ Earl of Anglesea (1743), 18 How. St. Tr., 1,139; Duchess of Kingston’s case (1776), 20 How. St. Tr., 355 (cf. p. 572, p. 585, p. 586, p. 613); Wilson _v._ Rastall (1791)., 4 Term R. (Durnford & East), 753; Rex _v._ Gibbons (1823), 1 C. & P., 97; Broad _v._ Pitt (1828), 3 C. & P., 518; Greenough _v._ Gaskell (1832), 1 My. & K., 98. See also Wheeler _v._ Le Marchant, 50 L. J. Ch., 795 (1880). 1 Phillips Ev., p. 136; Starkie Ev., p. 40; Wharton Ev., s. 606; Greenleaf Ev., secs. 248, 237, 239; Taylor Ev., s. 916; Stephen, Dig. of Ev., art. 115; Rogers’ Expert Testimony, s. 45; Reynolds’ Theory of Evidence, s. 86. It is to be noted that none of the cases which are cited as authority for the common-law rule as usually stated are really precedents to that extent. The cases of the Duchess of Kingston (_supra_); Lord William Russel (9 How. St. Tr., 602); Dr. Ratcliff (9 How. St. Tr., 582); Earl Ferrers (19 How. St. Tr., 886), and Rex _v._ Gibbons (_supra_), were all criminal prosecutions; and in Annesley _v._ Anglesea, Wilson _v._ Rastall, Broad _v._ Pitt, and Greenough _v._ Gaskell (_supra_), which were civil causes, the question of the privilege of a medical man was not really in dispute. It is well settled that communications between attorney and client are privileged, and yet Judge Pitt Taylor expresses some doubt whether the protection cannot be removed without the client’s consent in cases where the interests of _criminal justice_ require the production of the evidence (Taylor Ev., s. 929). This intimation of a distinction between criminal and civil actions, even in the case of attorneys, suggests the possibility of a difference between those two classes of actions in the case of medical men. The cases cited establish authoritatively that in criminal prosecutions, at common law, confidential communications between medical man and patient are not privileged; but in civil causes, the opinions of the eminent judges seem to be _obiter dicta_. It is, however, established by other decisions that mere confidential relations do not prevent the disclosure of communications. (For the case of _bankers_, see Loyd _v._ Freshfield, 2 C. & P., 325; _managers_, Anderson _v._ British Bank of Columbia. 45 L. J. Ch., 449; _clerks_, Lee _v._ Burrell, 3 Camp., 337; Webb _v._ Smith, 1 C. & P., 337; _stewards_, Vaillant _v._ Dodemead, 2 Atk., 524; Earl of Falmouth _v._ Moss, 11 Price, 455; _Pursuivant of Herald’s College_, Slade _v._ Tucker, 49 L. J. Ch., 644.) The opinions of so many eminent men, though strictly speaking _obiter dicta_, together with the uniform statements of text-writers based upon them, leave no room for reasonable doubt that independent of statute, in civil as well as criminal causes, communications between medical adviser and patient are not entitled to protection from disclosure in evidence. [210] See Duchess of Kingston’s case (_supra_, p. 91, note 3) (cf. _ib._, pp. 572, 585, 586, 613). [211] Greenleaf Ev., secs. 249, 252, 252a. [212] Greenleaf Ev. s. 249. [213] See Barnes _v._ Harris, 7 Cush., 576; Hatton _v._ Robinson, 4 Pick, 422. See also historical review of the attorney’s privilege and the reasons for it, by Judge Seldon, at Special Term, in Rochester City Bank _v._ Suydam, 5 How. Pr. (N.Y.), 254. [214] Wilson _v._ Rastall, 4 Term R., 753. [215] Best, Prin. of Ev., s. 582. [216] The revisers of the New York Statutes in 1828 in their report (5 N. Y. Stats. at Large, edited by John W. Edmonds, 2d ed., p. 726) stated as their reason for suggesting a statutory privilege for communications between physician and patient, that “in 4 Term Rep., 580, Buller, J. (to whom no one will attribute a disposition to relax the rules of evidence), said it was ‘much to be lamented’ that the information specified in this section (2 R. S., p. 406, s. 73) was not privileged. Mr. Phillips expressed the same sentiments in his treatise on Evidence, p. 104. The ground on which communications to _counsel_ are privileged is the supposed necessity of a full knowledge of the facts, to advise correctly, and to prepare for the proper defence or prosecution of a suit. But surely the necessity of consulting a medical adviser, when life itself may be in jeopardy, is still stronger. And unless such consultations are privileged, men will be incidentally punished by being obliged to suffer the consequences of injuries without relief from the medical art, and without conviction of any offence. Besides, in such cases, during the struggle between legal duty on the one hand and professional honor on the other, the latter, aided by a strong sense of the injustice and inhumanity of the rule, will in most cases furnish a temptation to the perversion or concealment of truth, too strong for human resistance. In every view that may be taken of the policy, justice or humanity of the rule as it exists, its relaxation seems highly expedient.” These or similar reasons have prevailed in many States and Territories to bring about a statutory restriction on disclosures. [217] The following cases show or tend to show that the English rule is in operation in Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Texas, and West Virginia: Wilson _v._ Town of Granby, 47 Conn., 59; Fayette _v._ Chesterville, 77 Me., 28; Weems _v._ Weems, 19 Md., 334; Morrissey _v._ Ingham, 111 Mass., 63; Barber _v._ Merriam, 11 Allen, 322; Castner _v._ Sliker, 4 Vr., 95; Steagald _v._ State, 3 S. W. Rep., 771; Jarrett _v._ Jarrett, 11 W. Va., 584. For the common-law rule in the States where statutes are now in force, see Campau _v._ North, 39 Mich., 606; Territory _v._ Corbett, 3 Mont., 50; Pierson _v._ People, 79 N. Y., 424; Edington _v._ Ætna L. I. Co., 77 N. Y., 564; Buffalo Loan Tr. & S. D. Co. _v._ Knights Templar, etc., 126 N. Y., 450. [218] Dig. Stats. Ark., 1884, s. 2,862; Code Civ. Pro. Cal., s. 1,881 as amended Law 1893, c. 217; Mills’ Ann. Stats. Col., 1891, secs. 4,824, 4,825; R. S. Ida., 1887, s. 5,958; Myers’ Ann. R. S. Ind., 1888, s. 497; Act of May 2d, 1890, U. S. Stats. at Large, c. 182, making the laws of evidence of Arkansas applicable to Indian Territory; McClain’s Ann. Code Iowa, 1888, s. 4,893; Code Civ. Pro. Kan., s. 323; Gen. Stats. Kan., 1889, s. 4,418; Howell’s Ann. Stats. Mich., 1882, s. 7,516; Kelley’s Gen. Stats. Minn., 1891, s. 5,094; R. S. Mo., 1889, s. 8,925; Comp. Stats. Mont., 1887, s. 650; Code of Civ. Pro. Neb., secs. 333, 334; Bailey & Hammond’s Gen. Stats. Nev., 1885, s. 3,406; Code Civ. Pro. N. Y., secs. 834, 836, as amended by Laws 1893, c. 295; Laws of N. C., Act of 1885, c. 159; Code Civ. Pro. Dak., 1883, s. 499; Smith & Benedict’s R. S. Ohio, 1890, s. 5,241; Stats. of Okl., 1893, s. 4,213; Hill’s Gen. Laws Ore., 1892, secs. 712, 713; Code Civ. Pro. Dak., 1883, s. 499; Code Civ. Pro. Utah, s. 1,156; Comp. Laws of Utah, s. 3,877; 2 Hill’s Ann. Stats. Wash., 1891, s. 1,649: Sanborn & Berryman’s Ann. Stats. Wis., 1889, s. 4,075; R. S. Wyo., 1887. s. 2,589. For the chronological order and the date of the passage of the earlier of these laws, see note to Gartside _v._ Connecticut Mutual L. I. Co., 76 Mo., 446. [219] Rev. Stats. U. S., s. 721. [220] Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. _v._ Union Trust Co., 112 U. S., 250. See also Dreier _v._ Continental L. I. Co., 24 Fed. Rep., 670; Adrereno _v._ Mutual Res. Fund L. I. Co., 34 Fed. Rep., 870. [221] Logan _v._ United States, 144 U. S., 263; United States _v._ Reid, 12 How., 361. [222] See references to the several statutes in note 2 on p. 94. [223] See Freel _v._ Market St. Cable Ry. Co., 31 Pac. Rep., 730 (Supr. Ct. Cal.). [224] This seems to be the proper construction of the Kansas and Oklahoma statutes, though what seem to be typographical errors in the published laws render it doubtful. [225] For laws regulating practice in the several States and Territories, see _infra_, p. 137 _et seq._ [226] Laws N. Y., Act 1893, c. 295. [227] N. Y. Code Civ. Pro., s. 836, as amended Act 1893, c. 295. A similar exception was introduced by Act 1891, c. 381, and modified by Act 1892, c. 514. [228] _Supra_, p. 94, note 1. [229] Bishop, Written Laws, secs. 119, 155; Potter’s Dwarris, Statutes, p. 185; 1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, “Construction,” p. 386. [230] Masonic Mut. Ben. Assn. _v._ Beck, 77 Ind., 203. For the construction of particular words and phrases, see _infra_, p. 115 _et seq._ [231] For waiver of the privilege, see _infra_, p. 106. [232] Penn Mut. L. I. Co. _v._ Wiler, 100 Ind., 92. [233] Lunz _v._ Mass. Mut. L. I. Co., 8 Mo. App., 363. [234] Kling _v._ City of Kansas, 27 Mo. App., 231. [235] Gartside _v._ Conn. Mut. L. I. Co., 76 Mo., 446; said to be overruled by Groll _v._ Tower, 85 Mo., 249, in Squires _v._ City of Chillicothe, 89 Mo., 226; but followed in Thompson _v._ Ish, 99 Mo., 160. [236] N. Y. Code Civ. Pro., s. 3,345. Disclosures by physicians are restricted by secs. 834, 836 of said Code. [237] Code Civ. Pro., secs. 834, 836, as new existing are re-enactments with modifications of 2 R. S., p. 406, s. 73. [238] People _v._ Stout, 3 Park Cr. Rep., 670; Edington _v._ Mut. L. I. Co., 67 N. Y., 185. Cf. Kendall _v._ Grey, 2 Hilt., 300; Pearsall _v._ Elmer, 5 Redf., 181. A disposition to construe the statute strictly was disclosed in the opinion of Earl, J., in Edington. _v._ Ætna L. I. Co., 77 N. Y., 564, but his personal views were disapproved in subsequent cases; see Grattan _v._ Metro. L. I. Co., 80 N. Y., 281; Renihan _v._ Dennin, 103 N. Y., 573; Buffalo Loan, etc., Co. _v._ Knights Templar, etc., 126 N. Y., 450. See also Jones _v._ Brooklyn, etc., Ry. Co., 3 N. Y. Supp., 253; in matter of Darragh, 52 Hun, 591; Marx _v._ Manhattan Ry. Co., 56 Hun, 575; Treanor _v._ Manhattan Ry. Co., 28 Abb. N. C., 47. [239] See Collins _v._ Mack, 31 Ark., 684. [240] N. Y. Code of Pro., s. 390; N. Y. Code of Civ. Pro., s. 870. [241] Edington _v._ Mut. L. I. Co., 5 Hun, 1; s. c., 67 N. Y., 185. Under sec. 873, Code Civ. Pro., as amended by Law 1893, c. 721, the plaintiff in an action for personal injuries may be compelled to submit to a physician’s inspection. Cf. Page _v._ Page, 51 Mich., 88. [242] _Supra_, p. 96. [243] Guptill _v._ Verback, 58 Iowa, 98. In this case, however, it was determined that it did not appear that a crime was intended. [244] 2 R. S., 406, s. 73. [245] Act 1876, c. 448, Code Civ. Pro., secs. 834, 836. [246] Act 1877, c. 417, s. 1. [247] 3 R. S., 1029, s. 19. Superseded by Code Crim. Pro., s. 392, as amended by Act 1892, c. 279, s. 7. People _v._ Murphy, 101 N. Y., 126. People _v._ Brower, 53 Hun, 217. [248] Pierson _v._ People, 79 N. Y., 424; People _v._ Harris, 136 N. Y., 423. [249] Pierson _v._ People, 18 Hun, 239. [250] People _v._ Murphy, 101 N. Y., 126 (1886). [251] People _v._ Brower, 53 Hun, 217 (1889). See also People _v._ Stout, 3 Park Cr. Rep., 670. [252] Johnson _v._ Johnson, 4 Paige, 460; s. p., 14 Wend., 636; Hanford _v._ Hanford, 3 Edw. Ch., 468; Hunn _v._ Hunn, 1 T. & C., 499. In Indiana, information as to abortion and criminal intimacy is protected in an action for criminal conversation. Harris _v._ Rupel, 14 Ind., 209. In Hewitt _v._ Prime, 21 Wend., 77 N. Y. (1839), in an action for seduction the testimony of a physician that he was asked for medicine to produce an abortion was admitted. It was stated that such testimony is not privileged, but there were other reasons for the judgment, and the case seems to be at variance with later decisions on that principle. See also Briggs _v._ Briggs, 20 Mich., 34. [253] Allen _v._ Pub. Adm., 1 Bradf., 221 (1850). [254] Staunton _v._ Parker, 19 Hun, 55 (1879). [255] Citing the fact that no objection was raised in the noted case of Delafield _v._ Parish, 25 N. Y., 1. [256] Renihan _v._ Dennin, 103 N. Y., 573 (1886), followed in Loder _v._ Whelpley, 111 N. Y., 239 (1888). _In re_ Hannah, 11 N. Y. St. Rep., 807 (Supr. Ct., G. T., 1887). In matter of Connor (Sup. Ct., G. T.), 27 N. Y. St. Rep., 905 (1889); Mason _v._ Williams (Sup. Ct., G. T., 1889), 6 N. Y. Supp., 479; Van Orman _v._ Van Orman (Sup. Ct., G. T., 1890), 34 N. Y. St. Rep., 824. See also In matter of Halsey (N. Y. Surr.), 29 N. Y. St. Rep., 533 (1890). Allen _v._ Pub. Adm., 1 Bradf., 221, had been overruled in part by Edington _v._ Mut. L. I. Co., 67 N. Y., 185 (1876), but not on this point. [257] _Supra_, p. 98. [258] Heuston _v._ Simpson, 115 Ind., 62. [259] Fraser _v._ Jennison, 42 Mich., 206. In this case the testimony was admitted on the ground that the representative could waive the privilege. See Thompson _v._ Ish, 99 Mo., 160. [260] _In re_ Benson (Monroe County Court), 16 N. Y. Supp., 111 (1891). Some States have statutory provisions for the qualification of physicians as examiners in lunacy, _e.g._, Laws of Col., 1893, c. 119, s. 5; Laws of N. Y., 1874, c. 446, t. 1, art. 1, s. 1. The bearing of these provisions upon the statutory privilege has not been made clear. [261] In matter of Baird, 11 N. Y. State Rep., 263 (1887). [262] In matter of Hoyt, 20 Abb. N. C. (Sup. Ct., G. T., 1887). [263] 13 N. Y. W. D., 505 (1880). [264] Dilleber _v._ Home L. I. Co., 13 N. Y. W. D., 505 (1881). [265] The following cases in which the rule has been enforced have arisen out of contracts of life insurance: Masonic Mut. Ben. Assn. _v._ Beck, 77 Ind., 203; Excelsior Mut. Aid Assn. _v._ Riddle, 91 Ind., 84; Penn Mut. L. I. Co. _v._ Wiler, 100 Ind., 92; Ætna L. I. Co. _v._ Denning, 123 Ind., 390; Lunz _v._ Mass. Mut. L. I. Co., 8 Mo. App., 363; Edington _v._ Mut. L. I. Co., 67 N. Y., 185; Grattan _v._ Metrop. L. I. Co., 80 N. Y., 281; s. p., 92 N. Y., 274; Conn. Mut. L. I. Co. _v._ Union Tr. Co., 112 U. S., 250. [266] See Renihan _v._ Dennin. 103 N. Y., 573, dictum to same effect. As to whether a physician may contradict his patient to prevent fraud, see _infra_, p. 111 _et seq._ [267] _Supra_, p. 97. [268] _Infra_, p. 119. [269] “Physician: A person who has received the degree of doctor of medicine from an incorporated institution; one lawfully engaged in the practice of medicine.”—Bouvier’s Law Dict., vol. ii., p. 412. “Surgeon: One who applies the principles of the healing art to external diseases or injuries, or to internal injuries or malformations, requiring manual or instrumental intervention. One who practises surgery.”—Bouvier’s Law Dict., vol. ii., p. 698, _q. v._ [270] Edington _v._ Mutual L. I. Co., 5 Hun, 1. [271] People _v._ Stout, 3. Park Cr. Rep., 670 (1858). In this case the witness was undoubtedly a duly qualified physician under the State law. [272] Wiel _v._ Cowles, 45 Hun, 307 (1887) (Supreme Ct., Gen. T.). Sec. 356, N. Y. Penal Code, which was in operation at that time, was repealed by Act 1887, c. 647, s. 9, but the prohibition of unauthorized practice is now to be found in Act 1893, c. 661, s. 140. [273] Kendall _v._ Gray, 2 Hilt., 300 (N. Y. Com. Pl., Gen. T., 1859). [274] Brown _v._ Hannibal & St. J. R. R. Co., 66 Mo., 588. [275] Carrington _v._ St. Louis, 89 Mo., 208. [276] _Infra_, p. 128. [277] Record _v._ Village of Saratoga Springs, 46 Hun, 448 (N. Y. Supr. Ct., Gen. T.). [278] _Supra_, p. 96. [279] Penn Mut. L. I. Co. _v._ Wiler. 100 Ind., 92; Morris _v._ Morris, 119 Ind., 341. [280] Grand Rapids & Ind. R. R. Co. _v._ Martin, 41 Mich., 667; Fraser _v._ Jennison, 42 Mich., 206. [281] Carrington _v._ St. Louis, 89 Mo., 208; Squires _v._ City of Chillicothe, 89 Mo., 226; Blair _v._ C. & A. R. R. Co., 89 Mo., 334; s. p., 89 Mo., 383; Adrereno _v._ Mut. Res. F. L. I. Co., 34 Fed. Rep., 870; Davenport _v._ City of Hannibal, 18 S. W. Rep., 1122. [282] The most of the cases in which the rule has been enforced are those in which the physician has actually testified without raising the objection himself, and in which, therefore, the rule could not be enforced if the physician’s waiver were valid, but the following cases particularly are in point: Harris _v._ Rupel, 14 Ind., 209; Barton _v._ Allbright, 29 Ind., 488; Storrs _v._ Scougale, 48 Mich., 387; Lunz _v._ Mass. Mut. L. I. Co., 8 Mo. App., 363; Johnson _v._ Johnson, 14 Wend., 636; Hanford _v._ Hanford, 3 Edw. Ch., 468; People _v._ Stout, 3 Park Cr. Rep., 670. [283] Mulhado _v._ Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 30 N. Y., 370; Heller _v._ Sharon Springs, 28 Hun, 344; Winner _v._ Lathrop, 67 Hun, 511. [284] See Penn Mut. L. I. Co. _v._ Wiler, 100 Ind., 92; Territory _v._ Corbett, 3 Mont., 50; Johnson _v._ Johnson, 14 Wend., 636; Babcock _v._ People, 15 Hun, 347. [285] Barton _v._ Allbright, 29 Ind., 488; Campau _v._ North, 39 Mich., 606; Territory _v._ Corbett, 3 Mont., 50; Blair _v._ Chic. & Alton R. R. Co., 89 Mo., 334; Johnson _v._ Johnson, 14 Wend. (N. Y.), 636. [286] N. Y. Code Civ. Pro., s. 836 (Act 1876, c. 448), as amended Act 1877, c. 416, s. 185. Previous to the Code of Civil Procedure the provision for waiver was not in the statute, 2 R. S., 406, s. 73. The amendment of 1891 allowed an express waiver of information, except confidential communications and such facts as would tend to disgrace the memory of the patient, by his personal representatives, or if the validity of the last will and testament of the patient is in question, by the executor or executors named in said will. Law 1891, c. 381. The amendment of 1892 added the surviving husband, widow, heir at law, any of the next of kin or any other party in interest, in case the validity of the last will and testament of the patient is in question. Law 1892, c. 514. The present law contains the same provisions. Act 1893, c. 295. [287] Westover _v._ Ætna L. I. Co., 99 N. Y., 56; Loder _v._ Whelpley, 111 N. Y., 239; Alberti _v._ N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 118 N. Y.,