1889. German SIEGFRIED.

EARLY EXAMPLES OF WING TURRETS.] It may not be too much to say that what Cuniberti “saw as through a glass darkly,” the _Dreadnought_ translated into fact, and that she was the first battleship avowedly so designed. “Fire control” was a new thing in 1905. No navy, save the British, had considered it to any appreciable degree. The _King Edwards_ had taught that control of two calibres from one position was a practical impossibility. Mixed calibres were damned accordingly, and there was no outlet but the _Dreadnought_. But for Cuniberti she might, and possibly would, have remained a theoretical desirability for several more years. The measure of his genius may be the demonstration that such an ideal ship could be built. It is to be argued that he did nothing more than put into practicable shape what already existed as a hypothesis. Even so, however, to him belongs the honour of indicating that the step from theory to practice was possible; and on that account alone he deserves to go down to posterity as the actual creator of Dreadnoughts. In the other three ships of the 1905–06 programme, however, a high speed was accepted as the governing factor. The ships as built were designated “armoured cruisers,” and in so far as the Japanese were known to be building armoured cruisers carrying battleship guns, that designation was legitimate. For that matter, there also existed a paper by Professor Hovgaard, of the Massachusetts School of Naval Architecture, in which it was tentatively laid down that the ideal armoured cruiser of the future would be a battleship in armament and armour, increased in size, to obtain greater speed. The three companion ships to the _Dreadnought_--the _Invincible_, _Inflexible_, and _Indomitable_--adhered no more closely to the Hovgaard ideal than to the Cuniberti one. In principle they varied from the _Dreadnought_ design only in that they sacrificed a certain amount of armour in order to obtain a greater speed. By the adoption of the échelon system, the same broadside-fire was secured for them (on paper, at any rate) as for the _Dreadnought_, though with a turret less. In practice it has been found that there are very few positions in which they can bring more than six big guns to bear, but this must be considered as an error of construction rather than of principle. They have turned out to be wonderful steamers, but considerably inferior sea-boats to the _Dreadnought_, and in the British Navy are generally likely in the future to become regarded as obsolete long before the former. For all that, they probably approximate more nearly to the warship of the future than the _Dreadnought_. Admiral Bacon, in his views as to the warship of the future, generally inclined to the idea of very large and very swift ships, relying on armament, speed, and super-scientific internal sub-division rather than on armour protection. These ships would act more or less independently, each, as it were, representing a divided squadron group of to-day. It is interesting to note that Italy, which in the seventies evolved in the _Duilio_ and _Dandolo_ the “Dreadnought” of that period, eventually developed a very similar idea in the _Italia_ and _Lepanto_, which had no side armour whatever. In later designs a thin belt was reverted to, and finally the old cycle was resumed. This result was brought about by the quickfirer, which appeared as a rival to the hitherto predominant monster gun. To-day the torpedo is becoming paramount and a danger to a fleet in close order at almost any range--hence the Bacon ideal. It remains to be seen whether the future will produce any analogy to the cycle of the quickfirer of the eighties. Details of the _Invincible_ type are:-- Displacement--17,250 tons. Length (over all)--562ft. (_p.p._, 530ft.). Beam--78½ft. Draught--29ft. Armament--Eight 12-inch, XI, 45 calibre, sixteen 4-inch (model 1907); three submerged tubes. Armour Belt--7-inch, reduced to 4-inch at the ends. Machinery--Parsons Turbine. Horse-power--41,000 = 25 knots. Boilers--(_Invincible_ and _Inflexible_) Yarrow, (_Indomitable_) Babcock. Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 3,000 tons; oil fuel also. Builders--(_Invincible_) Elswick, (_Inflexible_) Clydebank, (_Indomitable_) Fairfield. Engined--(_Invincible_) Humphrys, (_Inflexible_) Clydebank, (_Indomitable_) Fairfield. As originally designed, the anti-torpedo guns of these ships would have been the same as the _Dreadnought’s_, but, having been completed nearly two years later and a new pattern 4-inch quickfirer having been invented in the interim, they were fitted with these guns. The trial results were as follows:--_Invincible_, 26.6 knots; _Inflexible_, 26.5 knots; and _Indomitable_, 26.1 knots; the designed horse power being considerably exceeded in every case. After they were commissioned and had shaken down, these trial speeds were considerably exceeded, and at one time and another they all did well over 28 knots; the _Indomitable_ having made a record of 28.7. The fuel consumption of these ships is naturally enormous. The _Indomitable_, in crossing the Atlantic at full speed, burned about 500 tons of coal a day, as well as about 120 tons of oil. As steamers they are to be considered remarkably successful. The average cost of construction was about £1,752,000, which works out at a little under £102 per ton. Towards the close of the year 1911 the official designation of “armoured cruiser” for them and similar ships was abandoned, and the term “battle cruiser” substituted. No further secret was made of the fairly obvious fact that they were designed as “fast battleships,” intended to engage and hold a retreating enemy till such time as the main squadron could come up. Curiously enough, for some while, though every nation started building _Dreadnoughts_, Germany alone proceeded to build _Invincibles_ also. In 1911 Japan ordered a ship of fast battleship type; but, generally speaking, foreign nations have abstained from embodying this portion of the Cuniberti ideal in their designs. [Illustration: DREADNOUGHT. INDOMITABLE. NEPTUNE. INDEFATIGABLE. DREADNOUGHTS.] The programme for the years 1906–07 had been originally intended to include the building of four armoured ships, presumably one _Dreadnought_ and three _Invincibles_; but the Liberal party, which had just come into power, modified this to three battleships of an improved _Dreadnought_ type. This action led to a popular agitation which ultimately eventuated in the provision of no less than eight armoured ships in the estimates of three years later. The three ships which followed, the _Dreadnought_, the _Bellerophon_, _Téméraire_, and _Superb_, are some seven hundred tons heavier, but otherwise differ only in minor details. For the one heavy tripod of the _Dreadnought_, two were substituted, and the 4-inch anti-torpedo gun was also mounted. In the next year the _St. Vincent_ class, a group of similar type, but increased by 650 tons, were provided. The anti-torpedo armament is carried to 20 guns in the _St. Vincent_ class, which are 10ft. longer than their predecessors, and carry fifty-calibre big guns in place of the forty-five calibre pieces of the earlier ships. The constructive particulars of these ships are as follows:-- ==============+============+====================+===========+===========+======== Name. | Built at. | Machinery by. | Laid down.| Completed.| Trials. --------------+------------+--------------------+-----------+-----------+-------- _Bellerophon_ | Portsmouth | Fairfield | Dec., ’06 | Feb., ’07 | 21.9 _Téméraire_ | Devonport | Hawthorn, Leslie | Jan., ’07 | May, ’09 | _Superb_ | Elswick | Wallsend Co. | Feb., ’07 | June, ’09 | --------------+------------+--------------------+-----------+-----------+-------- _St. Vincent_ | Portsmouth | Scott Eng. & S. Co.| Dec., ’07 | Jan., ’10 | 21.9 _Collingwood_ | Devonport | Hawthorn, L. | Feb., ’08 | Jan., ’10 | 22 _Vanguard_ | Vickers | Vickers | April, ’08| Feb., ’10 | 22.1 ==============+============+====================+===========+===========+======== In the Estimates for 1908–09, the armoured ships provided were reduced to two, the _Neptune_ and the _Indefatigable_. Provision in the United States, Argentine, and Brazilian Navies for ships bearing ten big guns on the broadside and the prospect of ships with equal broadsides being constructed elsewhere is presumably the reason why in the _Neptune_ the original _Dreadnought_ design was varied, and a new arrangement of turrets introduced. The _Neptune_, which is of 20,200 tons, is a species of compromise between the _Dreadnought_ and _Invincible_ designs, the amidship guns being _en échelon_, and so mounted that they give a very full arc of fire on either broadside. The increased space occupied by this arrangement necessitated a certain cramping aft, for which reason the forward of the two after turrets was superposed to train over the aftermost, American fashion. Particulars of the _Neptune_ are as follows:-- Displacement--20,200 tons. Length (over all)--546ft. Beam--85ft. Draught--29ft. Guns--Ten 12-inch, fifty calibre, twenty 4-inch. Armour--Belt 12-in. amidships, 6-in. forward, 4-in. aft. Lower deckside, 9¾-in. Turrets, 12--8-in. Machinery--Parsons Turbine. Horse-power--25,000 = 21 knots. Boilers--Yarrow. Coal--(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,700 tons; oil fuel also. Built at Portsmouth Dockyard. Engined by Harland and Wolff. On trial she developed at three-quarter power I.H.P. 18,575, with a speed of nineteen knots, and at full power 27,721, with 21.78 knots. Her best maximum spurt speed was 22.7--that is to say, about one and three-quarter knots over contract. In the _Neptune_ the original _Dreadnought_ practice of mounting the anti-torpedo armament on top of the turrets was entirely abandoned, and these guns were placed inside or on top of the superstructure in three main groups. The number of torpedo tubes was reduced to three, the reason for this being partly to save space and also to take advantage of improved methods for securing rapidity of fire. In the _Neptune_ the possibility of aero craft first received consideration, the upper deck being built sufficiently thick to be proof against bombs dropped from aloft. [Illustration: “INDEFATIGABLE” AND “INVINCIBLE” 1911.] The _Neptune_ was one of the cheapest ships ever built for the British Navy, her cost working out at a little under £87 per ton. The other ship of the same programme was the _Indefatigable_, an improved _Invincible_. She represents an increase of nearly 2,000 tons over the type ship, with an increase in length of 18ft. and a foot more beam. Save for the addition of four more anti-torpedo guns the armament remains the same, but an extra inch is added to the belt. The principal improvement achieved in her is that the two amidship turrets are much less crowded up than in the type ship, thus securing a considerably better range of fire. Although the horse power is proportionately less than that of the _Invincibles_, the better lines of the ship have made her even more speedy. She easily exceeded her designed speed on trial, and has reached as high as 29.13 knots. The cost of construction was £1,547,426, which works out at about £82 10s. per ton, as against the average £120 per ton that the _Invincibles_ cost to build. She was the cheapest ship ever built for the British Navy,[33] to her date. Details of the _Indefatigable_ are:-- Displacement--19,200 tons. Length--578ft. Beam--79½ft. Draught--27¾ft. Guns--Eight 12-inch, fifty calibre, twenty 4-inch. Armour Belt--8-in. amidships, diminished to 4-in. at the ends. Machinery--Parsons Turbine. Horse-power--43,000 = 25 knots. Boilers--Babcock. Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 2,500 tons; oil fuel also. Built at Devonport Dockyard. Engined by J. Brown & Co., of Clydebank. Two other battle-cruisers almost identical to the _Indefatigable_, the _Australia_ at Clydebank, for the Australian Navy, and the _New Zealand_ at Fairfield, a gift from New Zealand to the British Navy, were launched in 1911. The programme for 1908–09, consisting as it did of only two armoured ships, and the fact that the corresponding German programme was increased by one capital ship, bringing the total to four, brought the naval agitation to a head. Meetings demanding eight “Dreadnoughts” were held all over the country, with the result that the British programme for 1909–10 rose to four armoured ships with four other “conditional” ships. The ships of the former programme were the _Colossus_, _Hercules_, _Orion_, and _Lion_, and the first two of these were laid down some months before the usual date, the _Colossus_ being commenced in July instead of at the end of the year. The “conditional” ships were all eventually laid down in April of the following year. They were the _Monarch_, _Conqueror_, _Thunderer_, and _Princess Royal_. Under this programme there were no less than three distinct types of ships. The first two, the _Colossus_ and _Hercules_, are practically sisters of the _Neptune_, but of 400 tons greater displacement. They differ in appearance in having but one tripod mast instead of two. This, like the _Dreadnought’s_, is placed abaft the foremost funnel. The _Colossus_ was built and engined by the Scott Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., commenced in July, 1909, and completed two years later. The _Hercules_, built by Palmer’s, followed a month later in both cases. The first is fitted with Babcock, and the second with Yarrow boilers. A point of minor interest about these two ships is that whereas the anti-torpedo armament of the _Neptune_ is in three groups, that of the _Colossus_ and _Hercules_ is in two groups only, the mounting of small guns between the échelon turrets being done away with. The other two types of the 1909–10 Estimates are the ships generally known as “super-Dreadnoughts.” _SUPER-DREADNOUGHTS._ The most obvious feature of the so-called “super-Dreadnoughts” is the introduction of the 13.5-inch gun, particulars of which will be found at the end of this chapter. This gun was experimented with with a certain amount of secrecy, and was for a long time officially designated as the 12-inch “A,” although practically everybody knew that it was really a 13.5. It was only rendered possible by recent improvements in gun-mountings and gun-construction. It is not very appreciably heavier than the latest type of 12-inch, as mounted in the _Colossus_, and its adoption was not so much a matter of obtaining an increased range and penetration, as of securing the tremendously increased smashing power of the heavier projectile. Somewhat less obvious to the general public, but really of a great deal more far-reaching importance, is the “Americanising” of British naval design exhibited in all the “super-Dreadnoughts.” Though differing in detail, the arrangement of the armament in all the “super-Dreadnoughts” followed the American centre-line system, an interesting indication of the progress of the United States Navy from the days, not so very long ago, when American warship design was more or less a _pour faire rire_! It is none the less interesting from the fact that in the earliest designs, in all ships carrying more than two turrets, the centre line was the only arrangement ever built or even considered. Yet when an increased number of turrets came into being, the American Navy was the only one which followed the original practice. In all other Navies ideas of the period 1870–1880, when strong end-on fire was considered an all-important essential, influenced design. America alone appreciated the prophecy long ago made by Admiral Colomb to the effect that whatever else might temporarily obtain, broadside to broadside would always be reverted to for battle, on the grounds that thus, and thus only, could the maximum number of guns be utilised. It is proper here to remark that though the Americans adopted the centre line from the outset for practical reasons, this disposition became more or less a necessity when 13.5’s came in, owing to the infinitely greater strain on the structure. This has been occasionally used as an argument against American influence having made itself felt, but the balance of evidence shows that even had the 13.5-inch not appeared, the centre line system would have figured in the Navy. The original centre-line idea disappeared because the échelon system looked so superior. The échelon system of the 1875–85 era, however, died out in its turn on account of certain practical disadvantages. It was resurrected when these had been forgotten in the lapse of years; but the disadvantages entailed in firing across a deck soon made themselves felt again once the system was reverted to. [Illustration: U.S. ROANOKE. British. ROYAL SOVEREIGN. Russian. ADMIRAL LAZAREFF. French. AMIRAL BAUDIN. German. BRANDENBURG. U.S. S. CAROLINA. CENTRE-LINE SHIPS OF VARIOUS DATES.] One of the earliest advocates, if not the first of modern advocates, of the centre-line in England was Admiral Hopkins. Discussing the original Cuniberti ideal, Admiral Hopkins pointed out that although for an absolute right-ahead or astern fire wing-turrets gave an advantage, a very slight yaw entirely altered the proportion, and that circumstance in which the enemy was dead right-ahead necessitating such a yaw were likely to occur very rarely indeed in war. He leaned, therefore, to the opinion that a fewer number of guns all in the centre line would be equally as efficacious, practically, as a larger number disposed partly in wing turrets. The échelon system, of course, renders practically no assistance here, the arc of the guns firing across the deck being necessarily restricted, even with the best échelon arrangement. While, therefore, the échelon system is good for absolute end-on, or for more or less absolute broadside firing, any intermediate and more probable position renders it less efficient than a centre-line arrangement. Another defect of the échelon system is that with it, except exactly end-on, one side of the ship is necessarily more efficient than the other, and that this is reversed according to whether the enemy is ahead or astern, twenty-five per cent. of the big-gun armament being affected thereby in a four turreted ship. Though attention never seems to have been drawn to the matter, it is a fact worthy of some attention that the _Von der Tann_, which is to be regarded as Germany’s “answer” to the _Invincibles_, has (like all German[34] ships on the same system) her échelonned turrets exactly in reverse order to British ones. All British ships have the port turret foremost; all German ones the starboard. The net result of this is that (as the diagram indicates) there are two worst and two best positions for either design. An _Invincible_ getting and keeping a _Von der Tann_ upon her starboard bow or port quarter would have a twenty-five per cent. superiority over her, while, supposing the German type to maintain a position on her starboard quarter or port bow she would be to the same extent over-matched, and to a certain extent “in chancery.” With the centre line system, the imposition of fighting one side rather than the other is not imposed, and overhauling or being overhauled causes no disadvantage. Nothing is lost, save in the almost hypothetical case of two ships engaging exactly end-on--a condition which in no case would endure for more than a very short space of time, to say nothing of the fact that practically all gunnery errors being of “elevation” and not of “direction,” a ship adopting the end-on position offers the equivalent of a vertical target of some 60ft. to 70ft. instead of the equivalent of 30ft. or so that she would present broadside on. The centre-line system may, therefore, be expected to endure against all other dispositions pending the appearance of some fresh condition of affairs which would cause the old end-on idea to be reverted to.[35] [Illustration: DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE WEAK POINT OF THE ÉCHELON SYSTEM.] The _Orion_ was the only one of her class which belonged to the normal Estimates, 1909–10, the other three--_Conqueror_, _Thunderer_, _Monarch_--being “contingent ships.” Details of the class are as follows:-- Displacement--23,500 tons. Length--(between perpendiculars) 554½ft; (over all) 584ft. Beam--88½ft. Draught--(mean) 27¾ft. Armament--Ten 13.5-inch, forty-five calibre; sixteen 4-inch; three 21-inch torpedo tubes. Armour Belt--12--4-inch. Turrets, 12-inch. Machinery--Parsons turbine. Horse-power--27,000 = 21 knots. Boilers--Babcock. Coal--(nominal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,700 tons; oil, 1,000 tons. ============+=============+============= Name. | Built at. | Engines by. ------------+-------------+------------- _Orion_ | Portsmouth | Wallsend Co. _Conqueror_ | Beardmore | Beardmore _Thunderer_ | Thames I.W. | Thames I.W. _Monarch_ | Elswick | Hawthorn ============+=============+============= The _Orion_ was laid down in November, 1909, the others in April, 1910. The _Orion_ was the first of these ships to be commissioned, and her gunnery trials were watched with great interest. Few details of them transpired, save that part of the secondary battery was injured by blast. After commissioning, the _Orion_ was sent for a voyage across the Bay of Biscay, and attracted much attention by rolling very heavily, this being attributed to the fact that her bilge keels were not large enough--not to any general structural defect. An interesting feature of the _Orion_ type is that in it provision first appears for the protection of boats in action. Belonging to the same programme (1909–10), the first belonging to the normal Estimates and the second to the “contingent,” are the battle cruisers _Lion_ and _Princess Royal_. A great deal of secrecy was observed about these ships, but their main details are approximately as follows:-- Displacement--25,000 tons. Full load, 26,350 tons. Length--(water-line), 675ft.; (over all) 690ft. Beam--86½ft. Draught--(maximum) 30ft. Armament--Eight 13.5 inch 45 calibre, twenty 4-inch, three 21-inch torpedo tubes. Armour--Belt, 9--4-inch. Machinery--Parsons Turbine. Horse-power--(as designed) = 28 knots. Boilers--Yarrow. Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 3,500 tons; oil also. _Lion_--Built at Devonport; engined by Vickers. _Princess Royal_--Built at Vickers; engined by Vickers. The _Lion_ was laid down in November, 1909, and launched in the following year. The _Princess Royal_ was laid down in April, 1910, and launched a year later. Both were arranged to be completed during 1912. The _Lion_ was somewhat delayed owing to slight repairs being required to her turbines. In addition, the authorities very wisely did not “hurry” her--hurrying ships to fit an exact official date having done more mischief than anything else in the past. The _Lion_ did her trials early in 1912, and reached a maximum of 31.7 knots by patent log, with a mean of 29 knots at full power and 24.5 or so at three-quarter power. For her trials the _Lion_ burned coal only, and this at the seemingly enormous rate of 950 tons a day, which worked out at approximately about a ton and a quarter per mile. This consumption, heavy though it seems, really pans out at about the usual “ton a mile,” as the ship developed horse-power far in excess of the contract. At the same time it necessarily draws attention to the enormous increase in coal stores required for supplying modern warships. It is unfortunately by no means clear that the question of the very great increase in coal required for modern warships has been thoroughly realised by the authorities. The amount provided may be said to be what ships needed in the pre-Dreadnought era. It is now an open secret that at the time of the “war scare” with Germany in 1911, the British Home Fleet was unable to proceed to sea owing to a shortage of coal supply, many ships being a thousand tons short and no proper arrangements for rapid remedy existing. This state of affairs, at one time alleged to be merely a newspaper _canard_, is not likely to occur again; but it is an indication of how difficult it is adequately to realise the problem of coal supply to ships of ever-increasing horse-power. During the _Lion’s_ trials it was found that the heat from the fore funnel was so great that the fire-control station (then carried on a tripod mast placed immediately over the forward funnel) was so intense as to render that position practically impossible. On the navigating bridge also, instruments were badly affected by the heat. The ship was consequently further delayed in order to effect essential modifications. These included the abolition of the tripod mast, shifting the fore funnel back a long way, and enormously increasing the height of all funnels. The principal item of the Estimates of 1910–11 was five armoured ships. Of these, four, the _King George V_ class, are slightly improved replicas of the _Orion_, while the remaining vessel, the _Queen Mary_, is a battle-cruiser of the _Lion_ type. Ships of the _George V_ class are as follows:-- ================+===============+============== Name. | Built at. | Machinery by. ----------------+---------------+-------------- _King George V_ | Portsmouth Y. | Hawthorn _Centurion_ | Devonport Y. | Hawthorn _Ajax Scotts_ | Scotts | Scotts _Audacious_ | Cammell-Laird | Cammell-Laird ================+===============+============== The over-all length is increased to 596ft., and the horse-power to 31,000. All were laid down during 1911, with a view to launching during 1912 and completion in 1913. The displacement of these ships is 23,000 tons odd. The _Queen Mary_, laid down at Palmers’ early in 1911, and engined by Clydebank, is virtually a sister to the _Lion_, differing from her merely in a slight variation of the lines, and some increase in length. Save for these items, and a small difference in the arrangement of the anti-torpedo armament, the ship belongs to the same class and type. The 1911–12 Estimates provided for five further large armoured ships, which represent an increase in dimensions over their predecessors. Of these the first four are battleships varying from their predecessors in the inevitable increase in size to allow of somewhat superior protection and an improved secondary battery--twelve 6-inch being substituted for the sixteen 4-inch of the _King George_ class. The selection of the 6-inch gun as the anti-torpedo craft weapon was due partly to the way in which Germany had persisted in her rigid adherence to that calibre for her minor armament, and partly to the rapidly increasing size of destroyers. It was held as questionable, even by the most ardent believers in the ability of the big ship to defend herself against destroyer attack, whether the 4-inch was sufficient to disable large destroyers. Hence the adoption of the 6-inch--the largest gun that can be man-handled. The nominal displacement of these battleships, the _Iron Duke_ class, rises to 25,000 tons as against 23,000 of the previous class. The length is increased to 620ft. and the beam to 89½ (instead of 89ft.). Owing to improved lines, the horse-power is reduced to 30,000 without any very material loss of speed. In all these super-Dreadnoughts, as in the Dreadnoughts themselves, 21 knots has always been the selected speed, though in units there have been slight variations. Ships of the _Iron Duke_ class are as follows:-- ====================+===============+============== Name. | Built at. | Machinery by. --------------------+---------------+-------------- _Iron Duke_ | Portsmouth Y. | Cammell-Laird _Benbow Beardmore_ | Beardmore | Beardmore _Emperor of India_ | Vickers | Vickers _Marlborough_ | Devonport Y. | Hawthorn ====================+===============+============== The _Emperor of India_ was originally named _Delhi_. The first two were given Babcock, and the second two Yarrow boilers. All were completed in 1914, but only the _Iron Duke_ was available for service on the eve of the outbreak of the war with Germany and Austria. The other three were, however, rapidly completed and put into commission. The fifth ship of the 1911–12 Estimates was the battle cruiser _Tiger_, nominally belonging to the _Lion_ group, but actually differing very considerably in various important details. She was laid down at Clydebank in June, 1912, a great deal of official reticence being maintained concerning her. She was not complete on the outbreak of war; but as she was available for service not long afterwards she is included in this survey. The marked and most characteristic difference between her and the _Lions_ is that the third turret instead of being cramped amidships as in the _Lion_ design, is moved further aft, thus giving a greatly improved arc of fire. Twelve 6-inch were substituted for the sixteen 4-inch of the _Lions_ for reasons already given. The _Tiger_ is approximately 720ft. long, with a nominal horse-power of 75,000. Babcock type boilers are fitted. Her nominal speed is 27 knots, but this has more than once been very considerably exceeded. For 1912–13 the Estimates provided for four capital ships, the usual twenty destroyers, and a new type of warship designated as “lightly armoured cruisers.” This programme is of abounding interest, not only on account of the fact that--so far as the larger types of ships are concerned--it probably embodies the last new construction available for the British Fleet in the war (unless the war endure beyond all anticipations) but also because of its more or less revolutionary nature. [Illustration: EARLY “30 KNOT” DESTROYERS.] The big ships of the programme were as follows:-- ==================+=================+============== Name. | Built at. | Machinery by. ------------------+-----------------+-------------- _Queen Elizabeth_ | Portsmouth Yard | Wallsend _Warspite_ | Devonport Yard | Hawthorn _Valiant_ | Clydebank | Fairfield _Barham_ | Fairfield | Fairfield _Malaya_ | Elswick | Wallsend ==================+=================+============== The fifth ship in this list, the _Malaya_, is an extra vessel paid for and presented to the British Navy by the Federated Malay States. In general appearance these ships of the _Queen Elizabeth_ class do not greatly differ from their predecessors; but there all resemblance ends. In every other way they embody a “new idea”--an attempt so to blend the battleship proper with the battle-cruiser so as to secure the best points of both. Roughly, the battleship proper sacrifices speed for extra gun power and protection; while the battle-cruiser sacrifices these two latter for speed. The speed of the _Queen Elizabeths_ was fixed at 25 knots--something rather less than that of battle-cruisers, but still sufficiently high to take them out of the ordinary battleship category as hitherto understood. Certainly they differ from the normal quite as much as the original _Dreadnought_ differed from her immediate predecessors. It was only possible to secure this high speed, plus other qualities, by the bold adoption of oil fuel only--in itself of the nature of a gigantic experiment, which, however, results have more than justified. The designed horse-power to secure 25 knots is 58,000. If, however, the motive power embodied novelty, still more so did the armament. For the ten 13.5’s of preceding ships, eight 15-inch guns were substituted. So far as power is concerned the 13.5 is ample for all contingencies, but the 15-inch embodies a marked superiority in range and the additional accuracy which a heavier projectile naturally affords. Furthermore--a very important point--the “life” of the 15-inch gun is much longer, owing to there being no necessity to utilise the full power of which it is capable. The general arrangement of turrets is that of all the super-Dreadnoughts, with the middle turret (always the most restricted in arc of fire) omitted. Nothing has ever been officially stated as to the armour protection; but it is known to be equal or superior to that of any preceding battleships. When war broke out, the first two of these ships were nearing completion--the first being completed about the end of 1914 and the second at the end of March, 1915. The 1913–14 Estimates provided for five more or less normal battleships designed for coal fuel,[36] the usual 21 knots speed, but 15-inch instead of 13.5-inch guns. ==================+===============+============== Name. | Built at. | Machinery by. ------------------+---------------+-------------- _Royal Sovereign_ | Portsmouth Y. | (not stated) _Royal Oak_ | Devonport Y. | (not stated) _Resolution_ | Palmer | Palmer _Ramillies_ | Beardmore | Beardmore _Revenge_ | Vickers | Vickers ==================+===============+============== Beyond that they are of 25,750 tons, and were designed for 31,000 horse-power, no details of these ships have been furnished. Two were estimated to be completed by the end of 1915--the others in 1916. The rest of the programme consisted of eight more lightly armoured cruisers, a reduced number of destroyers and an increased number of submarines. In the 1914–15 Estimates three more battleships of the _Royal Sovereign_ class--to be named _Renown_, _Repulse_, and _Resistance_--were provided for, also a sixth ship of the _Queen Elizabeth class_, which was provisionally named _Agincourt_. The participation of any of these in the war is very improbable. The other vessels of the programme were four lightly armoured cruisers, twelve destroyers and an unstated number of submarines. When war broke out three battleships building in British Yards--two for Turkey and one for Chili--were taken over by the British Admiralty. Details of these are as follows:-- ==========================+===============+============================== Name. | Displacement. | Armament. --------------------------+---------------+------------------------------ _Agincourt_ | | (ex-_Sultan Osman I_) | 27,500 | 14--12in., 20--6in.; 3 tubes. | | _Erin_ | | (ex-_Sultan Rechad V_) | 23,000 | 10--13.5, 16--6in.; 3 tubes. | | _Canada_ | | (ex-_Almirante Latorre_)| 28,000 | 10--14in., 16--6in.; 4 tubes. ==========================+===============+============================== There were also taken over three Brazilian armoured gunboats--renamed _Humber_, _Severn_, and _Mersey_--of 1,200 tons each, carrying two 6-inch guns forward and two 4.7-inch howitzers aft. The speed is about 11½ knots, and early use was made of these vessels on the Belgian coast shortly after the outbreak of war. In addition to the above, two large Chilian destroyers building at Cowes were taken over and renamed _Broke_ and _Faulknor_. A variety of other vessels were likewise incorporated into the British Fleet, liners (to act as auxiliary cruisers), trawlers (to act as mine sweepers), plus various hospital ships, transports, and so on and so forth. Roughly, from 25 to 33 per cent. of the British Mercantile Marine came to be used in some way or other by the Admiralty--to say nothing of innumerable private yachts and motor boats. The destroyers of the period have not materially differed from their predecessors of the Dreadnought era, save for the adoption of two, and subsequently three, 4-inch guns in the armament, instead of one. Submarines and aerial craft are dealt with in a separate chapter. * * * * * At and about the year 1912, the “super-Dreadnought” may be said to have reached its apotheosis. For what it is worth, however, it may here be put on record that junior opinion in the Navy was then becoming opposed not only to “super-Dreadnoughts” but to Dreadnoughts in any shape or form. Hardly any naval officer under the rank of Commander, and an ever-increasing percentage over that rank, was to be found who was not more or less convinced that the days of the Dreadnoughts and “super-Dreadnoughts” might be nearly numbered, and that we were possibly on the verge of some as yet indeterminate revolution in naval construction as great as any that the “fifties” saw. As yet no very clear argument can be produced. Only vaguely it is put forward that with torpedo range what it is, the big ship’s chance against torpedo craft is practically relegated to not being found, and “not being found” depends mainly upon the “super-Dreadnought” being screened with very numerous smaller craft. When Lord Charles Beresford put it on record that a hundred anti-torpedo attack guns would be useless in a battleship, he spoke for all progressive naval ideas. A destroyer may be hit and hit vitally, but it is hard to imagine a hit which will stop her drifting within easy range of her quarry before going down. If hostile destroyers get in, the only real chance of big ships is to sweep their decks with the modern variant of “case shot” and so kill the crews, a difficult proposition at the best owing to the small amount of time available. The proposition is rendered tenfold harder by the certainty that attack, if it comes, will not come from one quarter only, but from several. Consequently to preserve the Dreadnoughts, an ever increasing number of auxiliaries is demanded. Of these no Navy can be said to have a sufficiency. Hence it is argued that a destroyer attack is bound to succeed sooner or later, while even did a sufficiency of small craft exist, the big ship has to be so nursed and protected that her sphere of usefulness is enormously reduced. Submarines also are a deadly danger. On the other hand it is argued that, given sufficient bulk to the big ship, torpedoes are likely to be relatively harmless to her; it is also asked how can the small craft protect their own big ships and also search out and attack the enemy’s mastodons? There, till the war proves something definite one way or the other, the matter must be left. The big ship has been doomed so often, and so often adapted itself to changed conditions, that it may well do so again, despite the seemingly heavy odds against it. _PROTECTED CRUISERS OF THE DREADNOUGHT ERA._ The original conception of the Dreadnought era was “nothing between the most powerful armoured ships and torpedo craft,” though so far as second class cruisers were concerned the last of these had been laid down in 1901. The persistence with which Germany continued yearly to build small protected cruisers eventually, however, began to cause some perturbation; and in the 1908–09 Estimates five protected cruisers of the _Bristol_ class were provided for. These were the _Bristol_ (Clydebank), _Glasgow_ (Fairfield), _Gloucester_ (Beardmore), _Liverpool_ (Vickers), _Newcastle_ (Elswick). The designed displacement was 4,820 tons, length 453 feet over all, beam 47 feet, and mean draught 15¼ feet. Armament two 6-inch, ten 4-inch, and two submerged tubes. A speed of 25 knots was expected from 22,000 horse-power. On trials all exceeded 26 knots. All were fitted with Yarrow boilers, also turbines of the Parsons type, except in the _Bristol_, in which Curtiss type turbines were installed. For 1909–10 four more similar ships were provided--the _Weymouth_ class. Displacement rose to 5,250 tons, and a uniform armament of eight 6-inch was substituted for the mixed armament of the _Bristol_ class. These four “Town” cruisers were the _Weymouth_ (Elswick), _Yarmouth_ (London and Glasgow Co.), _Dartmouth_ (Vickers), and _Falmouth_ (Beardmore). All were given Yarrow boilers and Parsons turbines except the _Weymouth_, which was supplied with Curtiss turbines. The Estimates of 1910–11 contained three cruisers, the _Chatham_, _Dublin_, and _Southampton_, of the same type, but with a displacement increased by 200 tons. Three more, the _Birmingham_, _Nottingham_, and _Lowestoft_, figured in the Estimates of 1911–12. In 1907 the practice was instituted of building a Scout or two a year, those constructed to date being the _Boadicea_, _Bellona_, _Blanche_, _Blonde_, _Active_, _Amphion_, and _Fearless_, all of which are unarmoured, and so more or less compelled to fight modern destroyers on equal terms. Of these the _Amphion_ was lost early in the war by a mine. Of the original type were three Australian cruisers, _Sydney_, _Melbourne_ and _Brisbane_, of which two were built in this country and the third built, or put together, in Australia. In all these ships the slight increase in displacement was due to the introduction of a thin armour belt amidships--a “reply” to a similar innovation in the German Navy. The 1912–13 Estimates saw no more of the “Town” class cruisers being provided for, but, as already stated, they heralded the appearance of eight vessels of a new type, officially described as “lightly armoured cruisers.” They were at one and the same time an entirely new type, and also a reversion to the original _Bristol_ with modifications born of experience. In essence, these ships of the _Arethusa_ class--_Arethusa_, _Aurora_, _Galatea_, _Inconstant_, _Royalist_, _Penelope_, _Phaeton_ and _Undaunted_, compared with the prototype as follows:-- ====================+========================+====================== | _Arethusa._ | _Bristol._ --------------------+------------------------+---------------------- Displacement (tons) | 3520 | 4800 Armament | 2--6in. | 2--6in. | 6--4in. | 10--4in. | 4 above water t. tubes | 2 submerged t. tubes Side protection | 2½″ | _nil._ H.P. | 30,000 | 22,000 Speed (est.) kts. | 30 | 25 ====================+========================+====================== Fuel supply has never been given out officially, but it may be stated that, roughly, by making use of oil fuel in the _Arethusa_, a radius equal to that of the _Bristols_ was secured with a considerable saving in weight. Incidentally, this is one of the most interesting examples of how the progress of invention makes possible to-day the impossibility of yesterday. When the _Bristols_ were designed they were the “best possible” of 1908. Four years later oil fuel had opened out an entirely novel vista. In the 1913–14 Estimates another eight of similar cruisers were provided for, with, however, 250 tons odd added to the displacement and an extra 6-inch gun forward allowed for; though this, however, was altered afterwards, as this batch of cruisers, the _Calliope_, _Caroline_, _Carysfort_, _Champion_, _Cleopatra_, _Comus_, _Conquest_, _Cordelia_, do not carry any 6-inch guns forward like the _Arethusa_, but mount a couple, one abaft the other aft--a wise arrangement, as a heavy weight forward does not make for sea-worthiness. The _Arethusas_ and the “C” class, therefore, compare as follows:-- ==============+==========+============+=================== | Forward. | Amidships. | Aft. --------------+----------+------------+------------------- _Arethusas_ | One 6in. | Four 4in. | One 6in., two 4in. “_C_” _class_ | Two 4in. | Six 4in. | Two 6in. ==============+==========+============+=================== which indicates a couple of 4-inch guns gained for the extra 250 tons. In the 1914–15 Estimates four similar vessels were provided for, but no details whatever have been published concerning them. _DESTROYERS IN THE DREADNOUGHT ERA._ The Dreadnought era, while simplifying types of big ships, was the early institution of two distinct types of destroyers, plus an experimental vessel which was not duplicated. The original staple idea of Dreadnought era destroyers was to build very fast ocean-going destroyers for fleet work, and smaller craft, “coastals,” for local duties. A considerable flourish of trumpets accompanied the announcement of this decision, which, however, was in no way really novel. It merely reproduced in destroyers the long exploded idea of sea-going and coast-defence ironclads. Of these boats the first instalment amounted to a total of eighteen; the most important being the experimental boat _Swift_, which was given a displacement of 1,825 tons, and so might just as well have been designated a fast small cruiser. The horse-power provided was no less than 30,000, the speed 36 knots, though on trials she once reached nearly 39 knots. Armament four 4-inch, two 18-inch tubes. Cost about £280,500. It is interesting to note that in 1885 a precisely similar idea found vent in a _Swift_ (afterwards renamed t.b. 81) of 125 tons against the 40 to 65 tons that was then normal for torpedo boats. It was nine years before anything else of the same size was built. The first standard destroyers of the era were the “Oceans” (often known as “Tribals”). These averaged 880 tons, 33 knot speed with oil fuel only. Between 1906 and 1910 altogether a dozen were built. The armament given to the five first was five 12-pounder, and two 18-inch tubes; in later boats two 4-inch, 25-pounder were substituted for the five 12-pounders. The “coastal destroyers,” which have since lost that name, and are now known as first-class torpedo-boats, were built in groups of twelve for three years; the first batch averaging 225 tons, and later boats about 260 tons. In all the armament is two 12-pounder and three 18-inch torpedo tubes; speed 26 knots. Parsons turbines in all, and oil fuel instead of coal. In 1908–09 there came a revulsion of official feeling against both types, and an attempt to evolve a species of intermediate was made. It was held that the Oceans were exceedingly costly; also somewhat fragile. The new boats, the _Beagle_ class, averaged 900 tons instead of the thousand tons that the latest Oceans were getting to. Armament was reduced to one 4-inch, 25-pounder, and three 12-pounders, with the usual two 18-inch torpedo tubes. Speed was cut down to 27 knots. Oil fuel was done away with, and coal reverted to. The 1909–10 programme provided for 20 destroyers of the _Acorn_ class. These are slightly smaller than the _Beagles_, armed with two 4-inch and two 12-pounders, but with oil again instead of coal only. On account of considerable agitation in Parliament as to the small number of modern British destroyers, the construction of all this class was accelerated by a few months, and with a single exception they were completed in June, 1911. Up till this time considerable latitude had been given to contractors for destroyers. In the 1910–11 programme the _Acheron_ class, an Admiralty design, was given out for fourteen of the boats, which, except that they had two funnels instead of three, closely corresponded with the destroyers of the preceding year. In the other six boats the firms of Thornycroft, Yarrow, and Parsons were given some considerable freedom of design with two boats each, and an increased speed was obtained with all. For 1911–12 boats a similar principle was followed, and there was also still further acceleration. These latest boats are somewhat faster than heretofore, and an interesting innovation in the case of one of them--the Thornycroft type--is the appearance of the Diesel engine for partial propulsion instead of steam. As a matter of fact, this idea did not eventually materialise, owing to various circumstances of the side issue nature. More or less contemporaneously with this the Yarrow firm in the _Archer_ and _Attack_, their special destroyers, evolved a system of super-heated steam, which led to a very considerable increase in speed, as compared with older methods. A conflict between steam and “gas engines” for destroyers was, therefore, in 1912, a probable feature of the early future, a conflict still in the “to-morrow” stage; but it may be unwise to place too much reliance on the fact that a similar conflict with motor cars ended in the practical extinction of steam, for all that the probabilities point in that direction. The superior convenience of the Diesel engine whether for destroyers or larger ships is obvious, but there are undoubtedly still certain practical difficulties which cannot be ignored. In 1912 the destroyer may be said to have reached its apotheosis. Later boats are considerably larger, more powerfully armed, and occasionally a trifle faster, but, taken all in all, they do not indicate any definite advance on the “general idea” of a destroyer. Novelty, such as it exists, is confined to the introduction of flotilla leaders. The idea is not new, since the Germans hit on it for torpedo boats long before destroyers as we understand them were evolved. There is also the still older idea of our original _Swift_. The integral notion is in each case the same. The idea is to provide the commander of the flotilla with a boat swifter and more powerful than those of his normal command, and thus to enable him to reinforce as requisite any particular portion of his squadron. Thus viewed, the idea is, of course, as old as naval warfare itself, or, for that matter, any warfare whatever; and it is strange that the principle of the superior power of the chief should ever have been allowed to lapse. It is, however, curious to note that at the outbreak of the present war the British was the only Navy in which the idea was in actual practice. Not till the war is over shall we learn whether the seeming advantage is or is not of real value. All the indications, however, are that it should be an immense asset if properly handled. _GUNS OF THE WATTS ERA._ The principal guns of the Watts era are as follows:-- =======+========+========+==========+========================= Calibre| Length | Weight |Weight of | Maximum penetration in. | in | tons. |projectile| A.P. capped against K.C. | cals. | | lbs. +------------+------------ | | | |at 5000 yds.| 3000 yds. -------+--------+--------+----------+------------+------------ | | | | in. | in. 13.5 | 45 | 80 | 1250 | 22 | 26 12 | 50 | 58 | 850 | 19 | 24 12 | 45 | 50 | 850 | 17½ | 22 9.2 | 50 | 30 | 380 | 10 | 13 9.2 | 45 | 27 | 380 | 8¾ | 11¼ =======+========+========+==========+============+============ It may be noted that the 12-inch, 45 cal. (as mounted in the original _Dreadnought_) is quite capable of penetrating anything in existence at most ranges, and the 12-inch, 50 cal. anything likely to exist. The main advantage of the 13.5 is the superior weight of the projectile and the better capacity of its shell. Modern progress in gunnery is remarkably demonstrated by a comparison between the 13.5 of the Barnaby era and the same calibre of the Watts era. ========+========+========+==========+======================+================ Calibre | Length | Weight |Projectile| Maximum penetration | Corresponding in. | in | tons. | lbs. | A.P. capped against | value in K.C. | cals. | | | K.C. at | of belt of ship | | | +-----------+----------+ carrying | | | | 5000 yds. | 3000 yds.| --------+--------+--------+----------+-----------+----------+---------------- 13.5 | 30 | 80 | 1250 | 9 | 12 | 9 13.5 | 45 | 67 | 1250 | 22 | 26 | 12 ========+========+========+==========+===========+==========+================ From which it will be seen that armour has in no way kept pace with the gun, except in so far as that in the conditions which obtained with the old 13.5 a range of 3,000 yards was considered an outside limit, 12,000 yards is now held in the same or even less estimation. Along such lines progress has been practically nullified during the last twenty years. But the limit of vision has now been reached, and increased gun-power cannot, practically speaking, any longer be met by range. Whence the argument of many that, failing the production of some armour altogether superior to anything now existing, the armoured ship is closely approaching the status of the armoured soldier of the Middle Ages. A precisely similar remark, however, was first made in 1887,[37] and proved an incorrect prophecy. To-day, therefore, those best able to judge are extremely careful about prophecying. Meanwhile, the outbreak of war synchronised with the fact that both the British and German Navies had under construction ships carrying 15-inch guns; thus indicating a trend of opinion towards ships capable of delivering heavier and heavier projectiles. _TORPEDO PROGRESS._ The principal feature of the last few years has been the steadily increasing efficiency of torpedoes, mainly by the adoption of improved engines. For many years 2,000 yards had been the maximum torpedo range. About 1904 an 18-inch Whitehead with 4,000 yards range and a maximum speed of 33 knots came into service. This was presently improved upon by torpedoes of 7,000 yards range. The exact range of the latest type Hardcastle torpedo--so called after its inventor, Engineer Commander Hardcastle--is a matter of uncertainty, but it is supposed to be capable of about 7,000 yards at 45 knots, and up to 11,000 at 30 knots. As a torpedo would take about 5½ minutes to travel this distance, it is obviously unlikely to be able to anticipate the position of a single enemy sufficiently to ensure hitting her, except by pure chance. On the other hand, if a fleet be fired at, hits with a torpedo are almost as likely as hits from a gun, and it seems impossible that the old idea of ships fighting in line can possibly survive, and Admiral Bacon’s theory that for the squadron of the past there will have to be substituted the isolated monster ship of the future seems the only reasonable one, despite all the protests against “mastodons.” With the improvement of torpedoes, especial attention has been devoted to under-water protection against them. One form of this, the solid bulkheads of the original _Dreadnought_, was, after a time, partially abandoned owing to its extreme inconvenience. Another form of protection adopted in all Dreadnoughts is a certain amount of internal armour, an idea first evolved in France for the battleship _Henri IV_, which was laid down in July, 1897. Experiments with a view to testing the efficiency of this device were not very promising. An improvement on the system was effected by M. Lagane, of La Seyne, in the Russian _Tsarevitch_ in 1899. This ship was actually torpedoed in the Russo-Japanese War, but unfortunately she was not hit on the specially-protected portion, so no experience was gained of the war utility of the system. While at the outbreak of war it was believed by some that the modern system is proof against half a dozen torpedoes, others were extremely sceptical as to whether any real immunity is afforded. The most that could ever be prophesied was that the next naval war would see the torpedo accomplish either a great deal more or a great deal less than is generally assumed. A paradoxical position; but so things are! No one can predict with any more certainty, even now that war is on us. We do not know what may happen. Some of us adhere to the idea that the torpedo is going to be omnipotent: that the gun is going to be relegated to the second place. The future is likely enough to discount the destroyer idea. But, from the submarine the torpedo is likely to do many unexpected things. If the Germans realise the torpedo, startling things are toward.[38] The period just preceding the war saw a curious state of affairs in connection with net defence against torpedoes. Practically ever since nets were invented the use of them had been confined to the British, Russian and Japanese Navies--most other navies making no use of net defence. Curiously enough the adoption of nets by Germany and Austria coincided with their abandonment in the British Navy--the British theory being that net cutters had become so efficient that any kind of net would immediately be cut through. Incidentally it may be observed that with nets down a ship can only proceed at a very slow speed. _NAVAL ESTIMATES OF THE WATTS ERA._ ==========+============+===========+=============================================== Financial | Amount. | Personnel.| Ships provided. Year. | | +-----------+----------------------------------- | | |Battleships|Battle-cruisers|Armoured |Prot. | | | | |cruisers.|cruisers. ----------+------------+-----------+-----------+---------------+---------+--------- 1902–03 | 31,003,977 | 122,500 | 2 | | 2 | 1903–04 | 35,709,477 | 127,100 | 3 | | 4 | 1904–05 | 36,859,681 | 131,100 | 2 | | 3 | 1905–06 | 33,389,500 | 129,000 | 1 | 3 | | 1906–07 | 31,472,087 | 129,000 | 3 | | | 1907–08 | 31,419,500 | 128,000 | 3 | | | 1908–09 | 32,319,500 | 128,000 | 1 | 1 | | 5 1909–10 | 35,142,700 | 138,000 | 6 | 2 | | 3 1910–11 | 40,603,700 | 131,000 | 4 | 1 | | 3 1911–12 | 44,392,500 | 134,000 | 4 | 1 | | 3 1912–13 | 44,085,400 | 136,000 | 3 | 1 | | ==========+============+===========+===========+===============+=========+========= Later in 1912 the sum of £1,000,000 was handed to the Navy out of the Budget surplus. This sum, the “supplementary estimate,” was allotted in order to set off a corresponding German increase. The decrease of 1905–1908 is probably directly responsible for the increase 1910–1912; owing to the fact that the British decrease was met by a corresponding rise in German expenditure. It was the fashion before the war to deplore the sums spent on naval armaments, while little or nothing was said about the military estimates. For 1912–13 the Naval Estimates were £45,075,400. For 1912–14 they increased to £48,809,300, and for 1914–15 they stood at £51,550,000. On the face of things, this ever-increasing naval outlay looked likely to lead to ultimate financial ruin. This, however, is really a somewhat superficial view, and mostly nothing but a modern equivalent to that “Insular Spirit” which has been referred to in previous pages. Compared to the national interests at stake, the increase regarded as an insurance is more apparent than real. It is, if anything, a smaller percentage on national existence; also over a period of a hundred years it is far less than the corresponding increase in the Civil Service Vote, which lacks any claims to be considered an “insurance.” The entire amount spent in shipbuilding is expended in the country, and about 70 per cent. of it goes in direct payment to “Labour”: which is probably a larger percentage than would be achieved were the same sum spent in any other way whatever. The “ruinous competition in naval armaments” so prated on by certain publicists was really little better than an idle phrase so far as the British nation is concerned; and there was never any real reason to regard future increases with apprehension. Now that the nation is at war this fact is being recognised. We must continue to recognise it. In trenches over the water we may attack. But on the British Navy depends our defence of home interests. V. SUBMARINES. The submarine as anything of the nature of a practical arm made its first appearance as a “submarine torpedo boat,” useful merely for harbour defence. As such it was eagerly embraced by the French Navy, and had a considerable vogue therein, besides being a commonplace in the United States long before the British Admiralty accepted it as serious in a way. As a matter of fact, till the invention of the periscope enabled it to see where it was going when submerged, the submarine was little if anything but a paper menace. The periscope altered all this. The first submarines for the British Navy figured in the 1901–2 Estimates. Five copies of the American _Holland_ were laid down at Barrow, the first being launched in October, 1901. These boats were of 120 tons submerged displacement, and used merely as instructional or experimental craft almost as soon as completed. [Illustration: SUBMARINES LEAVING PORTSMOUTH HARBOUR.] They were followed immediately by the “A” class, totalling thirteen boats in all. Displacement submerged, 207 tons. Those numbered from five to thirteen were given sixteen cylinder surface motors of 550 horse-power in place of the 450 horse-power twelve cylinder ones of the earlier boats. In 1904 A1 was lost with all hands under tragic circumstances off Spithead, being run down by a merchant steamer. This disaster led to the installation of double periscopes in later types. A3 was lost off Spithead in 1912, being run down by the _Hazard_, very near where A1 was lost. The B class which followed numbered eleven boats, of which B1 was originally known as A14. The remaining B class belong to the 1904–05 Estimates. The submerged displacement in these rises to 313 tons, and the surface speed to thirteen knots, instead of eleven and a half, though, owing to improved lines, the horse-power was little increased. New boats, completed in 1906 and later, though generally identical with the B class, were known as the C class, and totalled thirty-eight altogether. One, C11, was lost at sea from a collision. In 1907 the earliest boat of a new type (D Class) was put in hand. Displacing 600 tons submerged, she practically doubled her predecessors. Her surface speed rose to sixteen knots with 1,200 horse-power. Three instead of two torpedo tubes were fitted, also wireless telegraphy was experimentally adopted in her. She herself was never any great success, but the rest of the type were far more successful. By the end of 1911 eight boats of the D class had been launched. It was originally intended to build a total of nineteen of this class, but meanwhile an improved boat of the E type was evolved. The E class are 177ft. long, with a submerged displacement of 800 tons or thereabouts, and four 21-inch tubes. They are fitted with wireless. Their special feature, however, is the fitting of guns, as a regular and integral part of the design. The first submarine to mount a gun was D4, in which a special 12-pounder was experimentally mounted, so that it could be housed when the boat was submerged; for later boats two guns were decided on. The E class were followed by an F class--and a variety of other boats, most of which have been completed since the war began and concerning which it is obviously undesirable to say anything whatever. Guns for submarines were expected to appear sooner than they actually did. At an early stage it was foreseen that, once radii developed, submarines were likely enough to find themselves in contact with hostile submarines and to need something to attack them with. The original idea of the submarine as “the weapon of the weaker Power” soon went the same way as did a similar idea about torpedo boats at their first inception. In torpedo-boats it was at once self-evident that, whatever the value of the torpedo boat, the stronger Power was able to build far more than the weaker, and to annihilate accordingly. For a time the submarine seemed to defy this law. It was fatuously hoped that “submarines cannot injure hostile submarines”; and that the “torpedo boat is the answer to the torpedo boat” would not have as sequel “the submarine is the answer to the submarine.” [Illustration: _Photo_] [_Stephen Crabb. Southsea._ SUBMARINE E 2.] It may well be in the womb of the future that submarines to-morrow, or perhaps to-day, may be what the ironclad was yesterday or the day before. The submarine battleship may appear and render obsolete the “Dreadnought” of to-day! But nothing can alter the cardinal fact that, given equal efficiency, the Power with most such craft must win, and that, given an inferior efficiency, defeat may be looked for as the natural corollary on lines entirely unconnected with whether the “capital ship” is of a type that floats only or one that can be submerged at will. Tactics may alter, the means may alter, and the most obvious instruments of naval strategy may do the same. But nothing whatever can affect the bedrock truth that, given equal efficiency, “numbers only can annihilate.” Given the “equal efficiency” nothing else really matters! If the creators of weapons keep themselves to date, if those who supply them see to it that the supply is sufficient, if those who work the weapons are efficient, the part of those in chief control resolves itself into little save achieving victory with the minimum of loss. The day may yet arrive when someone discovers that a good deal of what has been written about the genius of various famous admirals of the past is verbiage rather than fact, that they were a part of one great whole, rather than the sole controlling organisation--at any rate, once battle was engaged. In the future, if the submarine “Dreadnought” becomes an actuality, this is probably likely to be so to a greater extent than anything which obtained in the past. So far as we can to-day conceive of such future fights, much of the battle, at any rate, will entail more or less blind work under the surface, individual enemies engaging one another, the leader compelled to rely more and more upon the efficiency of his individual units and less and less upon his own tactical combinations. Of course things may turn out otherwise. Inventions yet undreamed of may come to the fore, and the nether waters present no greater obstacle to regular operations than the surface does to-day. Plunging may offer no salvation to a beaten enemy. We can only make idle speculations now. Yet, however things may shape, success or failure, victory or defeat must assuredly depend in a great measure on the makers of the weapons and the efficiency of those who work them--the tools, on the reliability of which every admiral must trust for victory. When this war started there were roughly thirty German submarines to something like seventy British. At the moment of writing (June, 1915) at least twenty of those German submarines have gone below. How and why cannot be published: but they have gone under in one way or another. Means of defeating submarines are being developed. Where big ships are concerned the principle means in use are high speed and a zig-zag course, the combination making it difficult for the relatively slow submarine to arrive at the correct striking point. In this connection it has to be remembered that the vision of a submarine is limited; and so that though the range of modern torpedoes is something like five miles, the actual effective range of a submarine’s torpedoes is nearer a mile or less. So much is this the case that German submarines are fitted with a torpedo which has a range of only a thousand yards or thereabouts, the reduced range being compensated for by a greatly increased charge. This charge, 420 lbs. of very high explosive instead of the usual charge of 300 lbs. or less, accounts for the devastating effects of German torpedoes fired from submarines. It is merely a phase in submarine warfare. At present a submarine dare not fire too near its victim lest it be involved in the common destruction. That, however, is likely enough to be guarded against in future construction, and the prospects of the early future is one of more importance for submarines rather than less. They are bound to become larger and larger, their radius increasing with the size. Coincidently with this we may expect to see the birth of small submarines designed to attack big ones: some new variant of the swordfish and the whale. VI. NAVAL AVIATION. The aeroplane idea is so old that we find it in Greek mythology, and it is consequently of unknown antiquity. Hundreds of years before Christ there were hoary old legends of Dædalus and Icarus, who made wings for themselves and flew. Icarus flew too high, the sun melted his wings, with the result that there happened to him what happens about once a week to aviators to-day, he fell and died. Contemporary with these legends, are legends of floating rocks which spurted out fire--stories which sounded inestimably silly till steamships came along. We may imagine prophets able to look ahead[39] and to invest their day with visions of the future. Equally we can discard prophets and imagine a civilisation long since dead which knew all about flying and steamers, and survives in legends only. [Illustration: _Photo_] [“_Topical._” BRITISH NAVY SEAPLANE.] The latter alternative is really the more reasonable of the two. While imagination can do a very great deal and exaggerate to any extent, it must have a base to work on. It is easier to believe in some long gone and extinct civilisation which destroyed itself in the air, than to believe that pure imagination accounts for the flying stories of long ago. Africa is full of traces of vast cities older than any history, telling of past civilisations of which nothing is or ever will be known. Also there is practically no known age in which anything but the motive power stood between aeroplane theories and their realisation. In support of the theory that men flew before to-day there is the following:--Somewhere about the year 1100, that is to say, back in the reign of King Stephen, a French historian relates the appearance of “as it were, a ship, in the air over London.” It anchored, and the citizens of London got hold of the anchor. The airship sent a man down to free it, and the citizens of London caught him and drowned him in the river. The rest of the aviators then cut the rope and sailed away. This incident is mentioned so baldly and casually and so much mixed up with ordinary petty chat of the era (chat which proves to have been quite true), that it takes far more faith to accept it as “pure lies” than to accept it as fact more or less. These legends cannot be disregarded lightly. They one and all give priority to the aeroplane--the “heavier than air” vehicle. Once in a way the “lighter than air” idea got a casual look in; but it was not till the end of the eighteenth century that it got into the regions of practical politics with the French Montgolfiers. But there were people who invented elementary aeroplanes long before Montgolfier. From the end of the eighteenth century until to-day the Montgolfier idea of “lighter than air” has got little further. The shape has altered; instead of hot air, hydrogen gas is now employed; and by means of motors the balloon no longer drifts before the wind. But progress is terribly slow. That it is so, is a very important thing to recognise, as slow development is by no means a reason for ignoring an invention. Sometimes it is quite the opposite. It will probably be a good many years before it is definitely settled whether the “heavier than air” or “lighter than air” principle is the better for Naval purposes, though there are not wanting enthusiasts who decry the “lighter than air” machines altogether. This is probably a grave mistake, brought about by the fact that practical balloons existed long before practical aeroplanes, and dirigibles made flights before ever aeroplanes rose off the earth. Yet the dirigible is in a far more elementary stage than the aeroplane is. Not only is the aeroplane a much older idea in the theoretical direction, but, being very much smaller, it on that account has very possibly developed more quickly. The world has been building ships for thousands of years, yet it has only recently developed _Tigers_ and _Olympics_, and both are still developing and likely to do so for some time to come. Row-boats, however, arrived at perfection a good thousand years ago. That is to say, there has been no alteration or improvement in them at all commensurate with the alterations that have taken place in big ships during the same period. [Illustration: _Photo_] [_Sport & General._ HOISTING A NAVAL SEAPLANE ON BOARD THE _HIBERNIA_.] Something of the same sort is quite possible with aeroplanes. It is already comparatively easy to forecast their eventual form without much danger of being proved a false prophet later on. We may safely say that they will become capable of much higher speeds than at present; also (which is perhaps more important) _slower_ speeds; and that all existing troubles with stability will eventually be overcome. But experiments made with birds indicate that the run which an aeroplane has to take before it can rise occurs in much the same proportion with birds; and so there are few, if any, practical men who now expect to see future aeroplanes capable of rising vertically from the ground, or hovering in the air except under such conditions as any bird can hover without inconvenience. The possibilities of the dirigible, on the other hand, no man can foresee. The gasbag that can be brought to the ground by a single bullet hole in it, is a very different thing from the possibility of airships of the future, which may be a mile or two long, divided into innumerable compartments, filled with non-explosive gas such as is sure to be discovered sooner or later. Two miles seems an extraordinary length to-day, but a ship ten miles long would only be something like the ratio of the early dirigible to the future ones compared to the ratio Dreadnoughts bear to the first ships built by men. On the water, bulk is limited by the depth and size of harbours, but in the vast regions of the air there are practically no limitations whatever, and there is virtually nothing to limit size, save the building of land docks on open plains into which airships could descend for purposes of repair and so forth. Consequently those who hastily assume from a few accidents that the “lighter than air” craft has no future are probably making a mistake; at any rate, so far as naval work is concerned. Certain definite uses are apparent even now to those who think and ignore commercial rivalries. It has been wisely laid down that aeroplanes for naval purposes must be capable of rising from and descending on the water. The Curtiss was the first successful hydro-aeroplane, but since then floats have been fitted to various other types with equal success. It is doubtful whether naval aeroplanes will ever be carried on shipboard like boats, although this is by no means impossible. It will, however, be more convenient for a variety of reasons to use them like submarines with their own special depot ships. The main naval use of aeroplanes at the outbreak of war was for scouting purposes. How near they would be able to approach a hostile fleet was a question not likely to be solved until the day of battle. The question of their being hit is secondary to the question of their being upset, owing to tremendous concussions of heavy gun fire. The idea of aeroplanes dropping bombs down the funnels of warships can be dismissed as the entirely fanciful dreams of people who know nothing whatever about aeroplanes or the mathematical problems involved. Judging by recent events, dropping bombs anywhere upon a moving ship is nearly or entirely impossible, except at ranges where the aviator would at once be brought down by rifle fire. A far more likely and useful service would be the destruction of enemy aeroplanes. For this purpose a special gun, firing a species of chain shot, has already been suggested, and the naval aeroplane of the future was always certain to carry a gun of some kind. The off-chance of doing a certain amount of damage to a hostile ship by dropping a bomb upon it, is nothing compared to the importance of destroying the enemy’s aeroplanes. This last seems likely to be all-important as time goes on. The duties of naval airships will be of a different nature. Already a point kept in view in their design is ability to “keep the air” for a considerable period, and with what are in these days “large airships” of the Zeppelin type (to which the ill-fated Naval Airship No. 1 _Mayfly_ belonged) there seems no reason why an airship should not be kept in the air for three or four days already. The fuel problem is not very difficult, because a great deal can already be done without the use of the engines, or with only partial use of them. It is also more than probable that with a view to further economy some kind of sails, combined with sea-anchors, will be evolved, whereby the ship might become able to sail in the air nearly as well as the old three-deckers, or, at any rate, as well as the masted ironclads, sailed in the water. The difficulty of “keeping the air” is the inevitable leakage of gas, but as leakage nowadays is infinitesimally less than it once was, the assumption is that as the years go on it will eventually be reduced to almost a minus quantity. Gales will be met by “bulk” and efficient anchors, on the principle that the gale which swamps a fishing-boat or blows over a haystack has no effect on a Dreadnought or a cathedral. Ability to keep the air will enable all Fleets to be accompanied by airships, which would detect mines and perhaps submarines, and with their ability to adapt their speeds at will, the presumption is that they would be able to destroy submarines by bombs. A further and very important duty would be the detection of torpedo attacks at night. Experiments carried out in Austria some few years ago with a captive balloon proved conclusively that except in cases of thick fog any vessels in motion are easily detected at a distance of ten or twelve miles. It is not merely the tell-tale flames in the funnels which betray attacking vessels; their wakes are always clearly visible, and as a general rule the vessels themselves, no matter how dark the night. Bomb-dropping from an airship must be a more serious matter than from aeroplanes, as so much more in the way of explosives could be carried. The chance of being hit, however, would probably be so much greater that it was (when war broke out) unlikely that any airships would be risked for such purposes. Nor is it very probable that naval airships will for some time to come attack each other, if they can possibly avoid it, the reason being that for a good many years they will be comparatively few in number, and the attack would have, in most cases, to be delivered in the presence of a fleet, which would make the attack, to say the least of it, very hazardous. Eventually, of course, aerial Dreadnoughts fighting each other are probable enough; but “the Trafalgar of the air” is unlikely to be witnessed within the lifetime of most or any of us now living. Nor is it likely that aerial Dreadnoughts will replace Dreadnoughts of the water, although as years go on they may cause profound modifications in design in order to allow of mounting guns for vertical fire. We are in the presence of the introduction of a “new arm.” But between what a “new arm” can actually accomplish, and what enthusiastic inventors say it will do, there is always an enormous gap. Inventors, when they come to prophesying, are usually one of two things--asses, or prodigious asses! France--once the second Naval Power in Europe--became of little or no account because it took the submarine at the enthusiastic inventor’s face value, and neglected the present and immediate future. The present stage of aerial progress in the British Navy is briefly to be summarised as follows:--