1893. In substance they were very large torpedo boats of about 250

tons displacement, designed by Messrs. Yarrow. Their speed of 27 knots was well in excess of that of any existing torpedo boat, and it was confidently expected that they would easily run down and destroy any such. In addition to what was then the very considerable armament of one 12-pounder and three 6-pounders, they were also fitted with torpedo tubes.[26] The original idea of this was that when hostile torpedo boats had been annihilated by them, the destroyers could be used as torpedo boats in case of need. In 1894 the _Havock_ and _Hornet_ were used in manœuvres and tested by being made to lie by for twenty-four hours in the Bay of Biscay. They underwent the test very well, and to this is probably attributed the realisation of the fact that in them a more or less really effective sea-going torpedo boat had been evolved. A large number of duplicates were ordered; at first of 27 knots. Later this was increased to 30, and in a few boats to a little more. The whole of these boats were nothing but enlarged editions of existing torpedo boats, and some of them proved rather weak for the service demanded of them. In the year 1902 and onwards, therefore, a type of better sea-going qualities was demanded, and the River class, which totalled about 35 boats, began to be built. A feature of the River class was that they were a blend of the early torpedo gunboats of the Rattlesnake type, with the later and heavier torpedo gunboats. There was a reduction of speed to 25½ knots, with a view to securing better sea-going qualities. On account of their slow speed the River class are verging on the obsolete to-day, but the high forecastle first embodied in them has never been departed from, and the very latest types of destroyers are nothing but swifter and larger editions of them. It is interesting to note that here again to some extent the Germans led the way. German destroyers had the North Sea to consider, whereas all early British destroyers were built with a view to being used only in the Channel. Consequently and naturally enough the Germans were the first to perceive the necessity for a high forecastle. The submarine also appeared in the pre-Dreadnought era, but the boats of that time were of such a primitive type that they need hardly be specially mentioned. They will be found alluded to in a later chapter. _END OF THE PRE-DREADNOUGHT ERA._ So ended the pre-Dreadnought era. It was characterised by a multiplicity of types which had included:-- First class battleships. Second class battleships. Fast intermediate battleships. First rate armoured cruisers. Second rate armoured cruisers. First class protected cruisers. Second class protected cruisers. Third class protected cruisers. Scouts. Torpedo gunboats. Sloops. Gunboats. Destroyers. Torpedo boats. Submarines. Although the whole of these types were not all building or provided for at any one and the same time, yet towards the end of the period there was a general feeling that too many types of ships were in use. Reductions in this direction were announced, at first indicating that in future programmes provision would be made only for:-- “Armoured ships.” Destroyers. Submarines. Contemporaneously with this came Admiral Fisher’s famous “scrap-heap policy,” whereby some eighty vessels of one kind and another were struck off the effective list, and either sold or relegated to subsidiary service. The ships removed included all battleships and armoured cruisers of earlier date than the _Trafalgar_, several ships of the _Apollo_ class, all earlier protected cruisers, some of the “P” class, and the bulk of the small fry in the way of sloops and gunboats. This action aroused a certain amount of criticism on the grounds that the clearance was excessive. As some of the ships were subsequently restored to the active list, something is undoubtedly to be said for that point of view; especially as no steps were taken to replace the scrapped cruisers. On the other hand, most of the ships removed were of trivial fighting value; though here again the zeal of the reformer somewhat overlooked the fact that the police duties rendered by the small fry had been valuable. In connection with this policy some of the outlying naval bases were done away with, and there commenced a “reorganisation” of the Fleet which has continued intermittently from that day to this! Certain other considerable changes affecting the _personnel_ will be found dealt with in a later chapter. IV. THE DREADNOUGHT ERA--(WATTS). A new era in battleship design, not only for the British Navy, but for the navies of the entire world, was opened with the advent of the _Dreadnought_. As has been seen, it was in a way led up to by previous designs, notably the _Lord Nelson_ class. The essential point of difference, however, lies in the fact that whereas the _Lord Nelson_ carries heavy guns of two calibres, in the _Dreadnought_ the main armament is confined to one calibre only. The advantages of this on paper are not particularly great, but for practical purposes, such as fire control and so forth, the superiority to be obtained by a uniformity of big gun armament is tremendous. As the historical portion of this book indicates, the “Dreadnought idea” has been a fairly regular feature of British Naval Policy, but in this particular case the inception would seem to have been due to accident and circumstance rather than to any settled policy. Immature and abortive attempts to realise something of the “Dreadnought ideal” had taken place in the past. The earliest ship claimed to represent the Dreadnought ideal was the U.S. _Roanoake_, built at the time of the Civil War. This was a high freeboard ship, fitted with three turrets in the centre line. A few years later something of the same sort found expression in the four-turreted British _Royal Sovereign_ and _Prince Albert_, though these were merely coast defence ships. Still later in the _Tchesma_ class, Russian, and in the _Brandenburg_ class of the German Navy, six big guns were installed as the primary armament. Both these two ideas were laughed out of existence; and it became a settled fashion to carry four big guns, two forward and two aft. [Illustration: GENERAL CUNIBERTI.] Matters were at this stage when the late “Colonel” Cuniberti, Constructor to the Italian Navy, conceived the idea of a ship carrying a considerable number of big guns, and embodying in herself the power of two or three normal battleships. This design was considered altogether too ambitious for the Italian Navy; but permission was given him to publish the general idea, subject to official revision. It first saw the light in “_Fighting Ships_,” in 1903, and is now so historically interesting that I here reproduce the article in full, the original being long since out of print:-- “Admiral Sir John Hopkins, late Controller of the British Navy, in his admirable article, ‘Intermediates for the British Fleet,’ published in the last edition (1902) of this Annual, asks what results it would be possible to obtain in the British Navy by extending the ideas of the two Italian Ministers of Marine, Admiral Morin and Admiral Bettolo, which were translated into fact in the _Vittorio Emanuele III_ (12,625 tons), so as to arrive at the much greater tonnage of recent British battleships, in the same manner as the ideas that found concrete form in the projected vessels of the _Amalfi_ class were amplified and realised in the Italian battleships alluded to and regarding which, even now, so many doubts are expressed as to such realisation being practicable. “To proceed from 8,000 to 12,000, and from 12,000 to 17,000 tons of displacement, constitutes not only a problem of naval architecture, but also involves high considerations of quite another nature, such as the special functions of the Fleet, so as to harmonise with the political objects of any given maritime Power, the geographical position of that Power, the state of its finances, etc., etc. So that not only does the answer to such a question entail a certain amount of difficulty from the constructive point of view, but before the answer can be seriously considered it is absolutely necessary to determine exactly what end this ideal British battleship is to serve; for it is not to be imagined that we are going merely to enlarge the _Vittorio Emanuele_ until we arrive at a displacement equal to that of the _King Edward VII._ For example, putting an extra 4,000 tons on board will produce a vessel that will perhaps be a little steadier in heavy weather than the original ship. * * * * * “In Britain are to be found naval experts of the highest possible order, and they will have their own ideas as to what type of vessels best fulfil the needs and ideals of the British Fleet, so that it would almost appear a presumption on my part to offer suggestions for any Navy other than the Italian. But in deference to the courteous interrogation of Admiral Hopkins I may be permitted to point out that from the purely human point of view there are two leading methods by which one can strike to the ground one’s opponent, either by gradually developing the attack and disposing of him little by little, or, on the other hand, killing him at one blow without causing him prolonged suffering. In like manner there are two distinct modes of sending an enemy’s ship to the bottom. “Let us take, for example, a human combat. The first--the most commonly used, and the most practical in the majority of cases--has as its basis the progressive dismemberment of the enemy. “Two mortal foes place themselves on guard at a distance; they begin with exceptional strokes, with feints, with opportune advances and retreats, never coming to close quarters for a deadly blow until the capabilities of the enemy, both offensive and defensive, are well tested, and until some fortunate stroke, even although not actually deadly, has considerably weakened the foe, has rendered his defence less able, and has somewhat demoralised him. Covered with blood, stunned, mutilated, and hardly capable of remaining on his feet, then comes the moment when his adversary closes in upon him and delivers the final and mortal blow. And we may almost imagine we hear the beaten one, with thick and choking voice, repeat the terrible words of Francesco Ferruccio at the battle of Gavinana: ‘Maramaldo, thou but killest a man already dead!’ “Similarly, two opposing ships, with but slight differences in their powers, will commence their combat at a great distance, utilising their evolutionary abilities and their speed in prudent manœuvres, seeking to gain as much advantage as possible from their offensive powers, and attempting to place every obstacle in the way of the antagonist utilising powers in either direction. The discharge of projectiles will commence in earnest, greatly assisted by the rapid loading of which the guns of medium and small calibre are now capable. What results can reasonably be expected from the discharge of the smaller guns at such great distances is hard to say; nor can the slender expectation of, let us say, chancing to hit the captain of the opposing ship in the eye with a lucky shot, at all justify such a waste of ammunition. Gradually nearing one another, the ships manœuvring less freely, hits will become more dangerous; the boats that were not set adrift before the action began will be alight and burning fiercely; the cowls of the wind trunks, the funnels, and the masts will be in fragments. “The crew, wounded and reduced in numbers, will have lost their calm, and consequently the firing will have become wilder; finally, one of the two antagonists will get in a lucky shot that will disable the other. She will speedily become unmanageable, and her enemy will as speedily close into within the thousand metres which will permit of a torpedo being launched with every chance of success, or the battle may be concluded by a final rush and the point of the ram. “As the wounded hull sinks slowly beneath the waves, the flag which had put such heart into the crew, and the sight of which had spurred them to fight to the last, may well seem as it disappears to repeat to the enemy these sad words, ‘Thou but slayest one already dead.’ “Four ships in place of two, eight in place of four, will repeat in a perhaps more complex action the same phases of attack, and the same foolish waste of ammunition, which in these days causes the greatest preoccupation of those who, having to design warships, must decide on the quantity of ammunition and projectiles provided for each different calibre of the armament. * * * * * “There is, however, another method of fighting and sending your enemy to the bottom; but it is one that is capable of adoption only by a Navy at the same time most potent and very rich. “Let us imagine a vessel whose armour is so well distributed and so impervious as to be able to resist all the attacks of an enemy’s artillery with the exception of the projectiles of the 12-inch guns. Such a ship could approach her enemy without firing a shot, without wasting a single round of ammunition, absolutely regardless of all the scratchings that her antagonist might inflict on the exterior of her armour plates. “And as to-day the belts of fighting ships are generally of such thickness that, when we leave the results of the proving ground and come to the conditions of actual combat, we find that it would be more than difficult to penetrate them with 6-inch guns, we see at once that it would be useless to equip our contemplated ship with such artillery. “Further, if this ideal vessel which we have imagined to be so potently armoured is also very swift, and of a speed greater than that of a possible antagonist, she could not only prevent this latter from getting away, but also avail herself of her superiority in this respect for choosing the most convenient position for striking the belt of the enemy in the most advantageous manner. “For this swift vessel a numerous and uniform armament of 8-inch guns, such as was contemplated for the _Amalfi_ class,[27] would appear to be sufficient, if we had only to consider the penetration at right angles of modern belts, especially if capped projectiles are adopted. “If, however, the hit is an oblique one, and the distance is considerable, it appears necessary that we should adopt the calibre of 12-inch if we want to be absolutely certain of sinking the adversary, striking him _only_ on the belt. But the loading of such guns is as yet very slow, although it has been greatly improved of late. Besides, the number of hits that one can get in on to the belt itself is small. From this it appears that in our ideal and intensely powerful ship we must increase the number of pieces of 12-inch so as to be able to get in at least one fatal shot on the enemy’s belt at the water-line before she has a chance of getting a similar fortunate stroke at us from one of the four large pieces now usually carried as the main armament. “We thus have outlined for us the main features of our absolutely supreme vessel--with medium calibres abolished--so effectually protected as to be able to disregard entirely all the subsidiary armament of an enemy, and armed only with twelve pieces of 12-inch. Such a ship could fight in the second method we have delineated, without throwing away a single shot, without wasting ammunition. Secure in her exuberant protection with her twelve guns ready, she would swiftly descend on her adversary and pour in a terrible converging fire at the belt. “Having disposed of her first antagonist, she would at once proceed to attack another, and almost untouched, to despatch yet another, not throwing away a single round of her ammunition, but utilising all for sure and deadly shots. A large and abundant supply of 12-inch projectiles and ammunition can be provided, in addition to the belt and guns contemplated, out of the 4,500 tons of increase of displacement that will be disposable in the enlargement of the _Vittorio Emanuele III_ to become the national British type of vessel in place of the _King Edward VII_. “It will be necessary to defend our ‘_Invincible_’ with a thick complete belt of twelve inches, and a battery also protected with the 12-inch armour (for the redoubt must be thus defended as well as the water-line, so as to eliminate the perils of the first system of attack sketched out, of progressive damages being adopted against her); and at the same time she must be armed with twelve pieces of 12-inch, arranged as in the _Amalfi_ class or in the _Vittorio Emanuele III_, so as to be able herself to attack in the second method that has been outlined, that is to say, the system of the stronger, of the better defended, and most certainly that of the richer. But when a certain number of such colossi of 17,000 tons--six, for example--had been constructed, it is more than probable that the adversary would do his utmost to prevent their getting near him, and, fearful of the fatal result of so unequal a combat, would seek to betake himself elsewhere immediately on the appearance of the famous _Invincible_ division. “In that case the command of the seas, or a deluded belief that they have such command, will remain with these _Invincible_ ships, even although they may be of slow speed; but to stop at this point would be too little and unworthy of the Navy of the richest and most potent Power in the world. “For this squadron or division, however ‘invincible,’ will not be really and truly _supreme_ if it cannot also catch hold of the enemy’s tail. The bull in the vast ring of the amphitheatre deludes himself with the idea that because he is more powerful than the agile toreador he therefore has absolute command of the scene of the combat; but he is too slow in following up his adversaries and these almost always succeed in eluding his terrible horns. “We must, therefore, come to the conclusion that the type of vessel will not be absolutely _supreme_ and worthy of such a nation unless we furnish it with such speed that it can overtake any of the enemy’s battleships and oblige them to fight. It is, then, possible to give to a vessel of 17,000 tons displacement-- Protective armour of 12ins. Twelve guns of 12-inch calibre. An abundant supply of ammunition, and A very high speed, superior to that of all and existing battleships afloat. “It has been said and written--indeed, repeatedly written--that the _Vittorio Emanuele III_ was a practical impossibility. But before long she will be actually in the water, and facts already show how vain were the suppositions and criticisms of such croakers.[28] “But it has also been asserted that in the case of this vessel surpassing the contemplated speed of 21½ knots on trial and attaining that hoped for of 22 knots, such would only prove that that particular tonnage of displacement especially lends itself to obtaining a form of hull with which we can realise a very high speed, and more so than with larger ships. This, however, is not quite exact. The law which governs the speed and displacement, other things being equal, is well known to all naval constructors, who have by heart the rule that whilst the displacement increases as the cube of the dimensions, the resistance, on the other hand, at a given speed does not increase in the same proportion as the displacement. The pith of the kernel lies in utilising the most opportune dimensions, or, rather, let us say, in adopting the special form of hull most adapted to those dimensions, more than in the actual amount of the displacement itself. “The amount of the displacement, however, is intimately bound up with the question of the defensive and offensive powers that it is wished to give to a ship; so that once the particular objectives of the Italian Navy had been laid down, and thereby the defensive and offensive power sought for decided on, the question resolved itself into harmonising them with a form of hull of the greatest possible efficiency, and this worked out at 12,600 tons. Nor does it appear that the problem could have been satisfactorily solved with a vessel of less displacement, as in that case it would have been impossible to realise the required power, while with a greater displacement the ship would have been incapable of obtaining the desired speed. “In the same manner the defensive and offensive power of the projected ships of the _Amalfi_ class was harmonised with a form of hull of such high efficiency that it would have been possible to obtain a speed of 23 knots and probably more; but the statement that the problem could not have been solved with a displacement of much less or much greater tonnage than that projected, is not to be taken as insisting that the solution must be interpreted in a too absolute manner, asserting that the speed of 23 knots could not be efficiently obtained save with a displacement of from 8,000 to 9,000 tons, for this would be inexact. “If now the question be put--Is it possible for some naval architect to design a special form of hull having a displacement of 17,000 tons, and with which we can realise a very high speed--twenty-four knots, for example? “‘Without doubt,’ will answer all practical naval constructors. “If we go further, and ask--Is it possible for him at the same time to arm such a vessel with twelve pieces of 12-inch? “‘Without doubt,’ will answer but a certain number of such experienced men. “But if we go still further, and demand, finally--Is it also possible for him to protect such a ship with 12-inch armour? “‘Without doubt,’ will answer only one here and there who may have already made researches in that direction. “And as the solving of such a problem necessitates many and many a calculation, and no amount of discussion or argument on the matter could in any way be conclusive unless based on definite plans and figures, these lines might well conclude here. “But, in deference to the courteous inquiry of Admiral Hopkins, this brief article must not be allowed to close in a manner so indefinite. “I would, therefore, say frankly at once that the designs for such a vessel have already been worked out, and that its construction seems quite feasible and attainable. Following up the progressive scale of displacement from 8,000 to 12,000 tons, and then on to 17,000 tons, a new _King Edward VII_ has been designed, 521½ft. (159 metres) in length, with a beam of eighty-two feet (twenty-five metres), and mean draught of 27ft. (8.5 metres); with the water-line protected with 12-inch plates, and the battery similarly armoured; having two turrets at the ends, each armed with a pair of 12-inch guns, and two central side turrets high up (similar to the two with 8-inch guns in the _Vittorio Emanuele III_), also each armed with two pieces of 12-inch, and four turrets at the four angles of the upper part of the battery, having each one 12-inch gun. “This vessel has no ports whatever in her armour; she carries no secondary armament at all, but only the usual pieces of small calibre for defence against torpedo attack. “The speed to be realised, as proved by the tank trials, is twenty-four knots.” The idea was at first received with derision and scepticism, which lasted until, in the Russian-Japanese War, it was announced that the Japanese had laid down two battleships, the _Aki_ and _Satsuma_, which “were to be more or less on the lines of the ship projected by Colonel Cuniberti.” Contemporaneous with this the United States authorised the building of the _South Carolina_ and _Michigan_, which carry eight 12-inch guns, so disposed as to be available on either broadside. Both these ideas were public property before the British _Dreadnought_ was laid down. She was, however, built with such rapidity that she was completed long before any other vessel of the type. [Illustration: THE “DREADNOUGHT”--1906.] In the design for a new type of British capital ship, a great many ideas were considered and rejected. Eventually, however, it was decided to equip the _Dreadnought_ with five turrets so disposed that eight guns were available on either broadside and six guns available ahead or astern. The designed speed of the ship was twenty-one knots. Together with this type of ship, another type, somewhat more resembling the Cuniberti ideal, was laid down. Three ships of this class, the _Invincible_ class, were designed for a speed of twenty-five knots, and given big guns so disposed that eight guns were available on either broadside and six big guns ahead or astern. The _Dreadnought_ was officially laid down in December, 1905, and completed ten months later. Actually, however, materials for her were collected months beforehand, and the rate at which she was built,[29] like the secrecy with which her building was surrounded, consisted in great measure of a theatrical display, very impressive to the general public at the time, but to-day generally regarded as “unfortunate” on account of the foreign attention thus attracted. But, while the previous chapter is clear proof of the futility of any real secrecy about the “Dreadnought idea,” so far as the British Navy was concerned, it likewise serves to refute a charge which has been made to the effect that the “secrecy policy” induced foreign nations to build Dreadnoughts also. The most that can be said is that had the _Dreadnought_ been built without so much attention being attracted to her, foreign nations might have been less in a hurry to copy her. But it is absolutely clear that the all-big-gun ship era had arrived, just as in the past the ironclad era came, or, in earlier days still, the gun and steam eras did. The actual place of the _Dreadnought_ in history is that she marks a wise and rapid recognition of new conditions. Details of the _Dreadnought_ are as follows:-- Displacement--17,900 tons. Length--526ft. (over all). Beam--82ft. Draught--Maximum, 29ft. (normal). Armament--Ten 12-inch, 45 cal.; twenty-seven 12 pounders; five submerged tubes (18 inch). Armour Belt--11-in. to 6-in. forward; and 4-in. aft. On turrets 11-inch (K.C.) Machinery--Parsons Turbine; four screws. Horse-power--23,000 = 21 knots. Boilers--Babcock. Coal--(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,000 tons; oil fuel also. Built at Portsmouth; Engined by Vickers. The _Dreadnought_ was unique in every particular. The exact disposition of her big gun armament was only arrived at after a long and careful consultation, and the consideration of a number of alternatives. It admits of eight big guns bearing in nearly every position, and allows a minimum fire of six in any case. It is understood that, in addition to the plan actually adopted, in the earliest plan of all (which was merely an adaption of the _Lord Nelson_ class), consideration was given to a scheme of five turrets, all in the centre line, and also to an arrangement whereby the two amidship turrets would be placed _en échelon_. One of the particular arguments in favour of the plan ultimately adopted was that next to four, eight big guns form the best workable unit for fire control purposes. It was also considered that eight guns would probably be the maximum that could safely be fired together continuously, with full charges in battle conditions. [Illustration: ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS FOR THE DREADNOUGHT.] In these days when all big gun armaments are the rule, there is a tendency to overlook the fact that the _Dreadnought’s_ main armament was double that of previous ships, with only a comparatively small increase of displacement, and that no intermediate experience existed as to what might be expected. With a view to standing the shock of discharge, the _Dreadnought_ was built with very heavy scantlings and generally given an immensely strong hull. The armouring followed orthodox lines, except that a certain amount was applied internally under-water as a protection against torpedoes. In addition she was given solid bulkheads,[30] though this was no novelty except with the British Navy, as they had been introduced some years before in the battleship _Tsarevitch_ and the armoured cruiser _Bayan_, built for the Russians at La Seyne. Another novelty in the _Dreadnought_ was the adoption of a high forecastle, she being the first British battleship in which this appears. Another innovation was the placing of the officers’ quarters forward and putting the men aft, a system which, however, has since been abandoned in the most recent vessels. The greatest novelty of the _Dreadnought_, however, was the adoption of turbine machinery, and the form of her hull, with a 30ft. overhang aft, in order to adapt the ship to the new means of propulsion. The fitting of turbines to the new _Dreadnought_ was perhaps an even greater novelty than her armament, she being the first warship, other than small cruisers, to be so equipped. The introduction of turbines was regarded with a good deal of apprehension in certain quarters, especially when it became known that the three other big ships belonging to the same programme were also to be turbine propelled. The type selected for all was the Parsons with four shafts. The wing shafts of the _Dreadnought_ have each one high pressure ahead and one high pressure astern turbine. The amidship ones are fitted with three turbines each--one low pressure one ahead, and one low pressure astern, and one turbine for going astern. Each turbine has 39,600 blades. On her first trials the _Dreadnought_ exceeded her designed speed for short spurts by three-quarters of a knot, but on the eight hours’ run barely succeeded in making a mean of twenty-one knots. Shortly afterwards she fell a little below this, but at a later date picked up again, and on more than one occasion since she has easily made twenty-two knots or over. Such early difficulties as occurred were due to the fact that her engine-room complement were at first necessarily unfamiliar with working so large an installation. The total cost of the _Dreadnought_, which belongs to the 1905–06 programme, was £1,797,497, and save that her draught somewhat exceeded anticipations, the ship was a success in every way, proving a remarkably steady gun-platform. The Committee which sat on the _Dreadnought_ design was by no means entirely unanimous as to what sacrifice should be made for speed. The _Dreadnought_ herself, despite a considerable increase of speed as compared with the battleships that preceded her, did not obtain that speed by the sacrifice of any battleship qualities, but almost entirely on account of the substitution of turbines for reciprocating engines. To that extent, therefore, though nearly as fast as the armoured cruisers of a few years before, she may be said to have developed entirely along normal lines, rather than on those laid down by Cuniberti. The table on the next page and diagrams indicate how the original Cuniberti idea compares with the first results obtained. It will be noticed that, except in the case of the _Invincible_ type, and there only at a sacrifice of armour and armament, was, however, anything like the Cuniberti speed attempted. It should be stated that in the Cuniberti ship the peculiar “girder construction” of his _Vittorio Emanuele_ was obviously contemplated. This construction, which admits of far lighter scantlings than usually employed, has not been attempted in any other Navies, and a corresponding extra dead-weight results. Coming to details, there is uncertainty as to the exact original design of the _Satsuma_; but a uniform armament of big guns was certainly the first to be projected. It is not clear whether it was abandoned from a preference for a numerically larger but mixed battery; or with a view to utilising such guns as were most likely to be available for early delivery. Japan was then at war, and there was the natural anticipation that the ships might be wanted before the war was over. It should, on the other hand, be borne in mind that the _Kashima_ and _Katori_, of 16,400 tons, carrying four 12-inch, four 10-inch, twelve 6-inch, and twelve 14-pounders, with 9-inch belts and 18.5 knot speeds were at that time held up in England on account of the war. Hence it has with some considerable show of reason been argued that the _Satsuma_ and _Aki_ are nothing but normal developments of the _Kashima_ design, bearing just the same relation to it as the British _Lord Nelsons_ bear to the _King Edwards_. It was also practically admitted by the Japanese at a later date that for diplomatic reasons, in accounts of the contemporary armoured cruisers of the _Tsukuba_ class, the armaments[31] were exaggerated. ORIGINAL DREADNOUGHT DESIGNS. ============================+===============+==================================+=======+========+============ | Normal | | | Des’d. | | Displacement. | Armament. | Belt. | Speed. | Laid | Tons. | | in. | Knots. | Down. ----------------------------+---------------+----------------------------------+-------+--------+------------ _Cuniberti_ (as built) | 17,000 | 12--12in., 18--12 pdr. | 12 | 24 | _pro._ 1903 _Satsuma_ Design | 19,250 | 12 _or_ 10--12in., 12--4.7 | 9 | 20 | ---- ----------------------------+---------------+----------------------------------+-------+--------+------------ _Satsuma_ | 19,250 | 4--12in., 12--10in., 12--6 | 9 | 20 | 1905 _S. Carolina, pro._ | 16–17,000 | 8--12in., (_or_ 4--12in., | 10 | 18–20 | ---- | | 8--10in.), 30--14 pdr. | | | _S. Carolina_ | 16,000 | 8--12in., 22--14 pdr. | 12 | 18½ | 1906 _Dreadnought_, 1st Design | ? | 10--12in. | .. | .. | ---- _Dreadnought_ (as built) | 17,900 | 10--12in., 27--12 pdr. | 11 | 21 | 1905 _Invincible_ | 17,250 | 8--12in., 16--4in. | 7 | 25 | 1906 _Nassau_ (as “S”) | ? | 8--11in., 12--6in., 10--24 pdr. | ? | 19½ | 1906 _Nassau_ | 18,500 | 12--11in., 12--6in., 10--24 pdr. | 9¾ | 19½ | 1907 ============================+===============+==================================+=======+========+============ _Note._--The _Nassau_ was delayed a year owing to alterations in design. Be all these things as they may, however, Japan is obviously entitled to some considerable share in originating the “Dreadnought movement.” The claims of the United States Navy rest on a stronger basis. The _South Carolina_ type, all big guns in the centre line, all bearing on either broadside, was a distinct advance and novelty. The actual chronological date of laying down goes for nothing; the ships were designed and authorised long before they were commenced. No secrecy whatever was observed about them, and a strong body of opinion will always credit the United States with being the first Navy that definitely adopted the “all-big-gun idea.” It is interesting to note (see table) that at one stage a mixed 12-inch and 10-inch armament was regarded as a possible alternative. [Illustration: CUIBERI. SATSUMA. S CAROLINA. FIRST DESIGN S CAROLINA. FIRST BRITISH DREADNOUGHT DESIGN DREADNOUGHT. INVINCIBLE. NASSAU FIRST DESIGN NASSAU AS BUILT ORIGINAL DREADNOUGHT DESIGNS.] It has been claimed, either by those responsible for the _Dreadnought_ herself, or by others professing to speak for them, that the _Dreadnought_ was evolved entirely independently of Cuniberti’s ideal. It is practically impossible to say definitely how far there can be any truth in this. In all Admiralties, ships are, as a rule, designed as “projects” long before they see the light (some never see it at all, as witness the sea-going masted turret-ship of his design referred to by Sir Edward Reed in some remarks quoted on an earlier page!). The first British all-big-gun ship design (see diagram) is a lineal enough descendant of the _King Edward_ and _Lord Nelson_, just as Cuniberti’s is a descendant of the _Vittorio Emanuele_. The Cuniberti design appears, however, to have been submitted as early as 1901. In any case, to Cuniberti belongs the first clear exposition of the idea, while the ridicule with which it was at first received indicates the general novelty. Germany is also a claimant to having evolved Dreadnoughts with the “_S_” type, intended to have been laid down in 1906, to follow the _Deutschlands_. These ships can hardly have been designed much later than 1904. When first heard of they were reported to carry four big gun turrets, of which two were placed on either side amidships. Six big guns was the first reputed armament, later each turret was to carry two guns. The absurd secrecy with which subsequent German designs have been shrouded was not then in evidence; and all the indications are that the _Nassau_, as originally contemplated, was to have been a four-turret ship--the two extra 11-inch being Germany’s equivalent for the four 12-inch, four 9.2, of our _King Edwards_. This would perhaps accord Germany a priority in actually adopting the principle of an increased number of heavy guns. All of which suffices to indicate that the adoption of more than four big guns had little or nothing to do with the somewhat theatrical building of the original _Dreadnought_. On the other hand (with the possible and doubtful exception of the _South Carolinas_[32]) it appears clear that the _Dreadnought_ was the first ship in which the all-big-gun principle was adopted as a technical asset in gun-laying over and above guns _qua_ guns. After four, eight was the “tactical unit” of guns, promising results altogether out of proportion to anything that six, or for that matter, ten (in proportion) could achieve. [Illustration: