The British battle fleet, Vol. 2 (of 2) : its inception and growth throughout…

1885. She differed from the _Conqueror_ only in that all four of her

21805 words  |  Chapter 2

6-inch guns were mounted on the superstructure, whereas the _Conqueror_ carried two of them on the main deck inside the superstructure. [Illustration: TEMERAIRE IMPERIEUSE BRITISH SYSTEM IDEAL FRENCH SYSTEM IDEAL BARNABY BARBETTE SHIPS.] Although developed from the _Rupert_, the _Conqueror_ differed a good deal in appearance, on account of the whole of the after part of the ship being one huge superstructure. In her, the superstructure, as a very definite feature instead of a mere accessory, may be said to have made its first appearance, to remain as a factor of growing importance for many years. Contemporaneously with these ships two entirely different types made their appearance. One of these was the “torpedo ram” _Polyphemus_, an absolutely unique vessel, the outcome (though not so designed) of the influence of the torpedo. The ship was never duplicated, and never performed much service, but it would be rash to assert that the future may not see something like her re-appear. She was first projected as a “ram” pure and simple, so long ago as 1873, and designed by Barnaby to suit the specifications of certain naval officers as embodying their ideals of the warship of the future. This is the generally accepted theory, though Sir N. Barnaby[5] has made public a somewhat different view of the matter, and according to him, Admiral Sir George Sartorius, the naval officer principally concerned, lost his interest in the _Polyphemus_ when it was decided to give her an armament of torpedo tubes and some quick-firers against torpedo attack. So far as can be gauged, the torpedo tubes were likewise a naval innovation with which Sir N. Barnaby was also not much in sympathy. At any rate, he has put on record the view[5] that:-- “The introduction of torpedoes made the ship far more costly than she need have been, and it is possible that the type would have been continued and improved had the simplicity of the ram been adhered to.” The _Polyphemus_ performed little useful service; her life on the Navy List was short; and she is always spoken of as a “failure.” Officers who served in her were, however, invariably enthusiastic about her, and had war occurred during the time that she was in existence there is no telling what she might have accomplished or how profoundly she might have affected naval construction. In essence the _Polyphemus_ was a semi-submerged craft, those parts of her which were above water being merely a light superstructure for the accommodation of her crew in peace time. She was of 2,640 tons displacement, length 240ft. between perpendiculars, beam 40ft., and a normal mean draught of 20ft. In form she was cigar-shaped, plated with 3-inch armour on the upper part of her curved sides. With 5,520 I.H.P. she had the then very high speed of 17.8 knots. She carried 300 tons of coal, sufficient for a nominal radius of 3,400 miles at economical speed. Her principal feature, however, was the fitting of five submerged tubes, one in the bow the others on the broadside. For repelling a torpedo attack she carried six 6-pounders and a couple of machine guns. [Illustration: POLYPHEMUS. ALARM. KATAHDIN. SOME FAMOUS RAMS.] It is here of interest to relate that some years later the U.S. Navy created a species of _Polyphemus_ imitation in the “ram” _Katahdin_. To a certain extent they had anticipated her likewise in the _Alarm_, 720 tons, launched in 1873, which carried a 15-inch smooth-bore gun _under water_ in her ram, and the _Intrepid_ (launched 1873), of 1,123 tons, of which no details ever transpired, and it may be said that she was “strangled at birth.” But the _Polyphemus’s_ ancestry is undoubtedly American. The _Katahdin_ (first produced as the “ram” _Ammen_) was not launched till 1893. She was of 2,050 tons and seventeen knots, and having no torpedo tubes, being a “ram” pure and simple, exactly reproduced the Sartorious-Barnaby idea. She soon disappeared from the U.S. Navy List, and she never did anything. She doubled the armour of the _Polyphemus_, whilst lacking her torpedo armament. Since then, the idea has found expression in three small U.S. “semi-submerged” boats, with the torpedo as their main armament; but these three boats never got beyond the “designed” stage. No other nation ever exhibited the least interest in the _Polyphemus_ idea. Reference has already been made to the _Shannon_, which was the first armoured cruiser of the British Navy. She was launched towards the end of 1875 and completed two years later. In substance she was a development of the idea which first found expression in the _Inconstant_, heavy armament being preferred to the protection of the guns. A narrow belt of armour with a maximum thickness of 9-ins. protected three-quarters of the water-line. This belt commenced at the stern and ended in a bulkhead some 70ft. from the bow. Forward of this bulkhead was an under-water protective deck, and a certain amount of armour was concentrated on the ram under water. The bulkhead, which was from 9in. to 8in. thick, rose to the upper deck, and afforded protection to a couple of 18-ton muzzle-loaders, capable of right-ahead fire. The remainder of her armament consisted of seven 12½ton guns, and was entirely unprotected. Other details of the ship are as follows:-- Displacement--5,390 tons. Length--260ft. Beam--54ft. Draught--23ft. 4in. Horse-power--3,370. Speed--12.35 knots. Coal carried--580 tons = nominal economical radius of 2,260 miles. The speed of the _Shannon_ was so low, even in those days, that it is a little difficult to surmise for what purpose she was designed, especially as this design was more or less contemporary with the re-designing of the _Dreadnought_.[6] It found favour, however, since she was almost immediately followed by two larger replicas, the _Nelson_ and the _Northampton_, details of which were:-- Displacement--7,630 tons. Length (between perpendiculars)--280ft. Beam--60ft. Draught (maximum)--26ft. 6in. Armour--Belt amidships, 9in. to 6in., compound: bulkhead ditto. Armour deck only, at ends. Main Armament--Four 18-ton M.L.R., eight 12-ton M.L.R., two above-water 14-inch torpedo tubes. Horse-power--6,640. Speed--14.41 knots. Coal carried--1,150 tons = nominal radius of 3,850 miles. These ships differed from the _Shannon_ in that the armour belt was confined to a water-line strip amidships, while the after guns were also protected by a bulkhead. The most curious, and to modern ideas, eccentric feature of these ships, was that they were fitted with triangular rams, which, “for the sake of safety,” could be removed in peace time and merely put on for war purposes! As a matter of fact, the ships always carried their rams without rendering themselves dangerous to anybody. On the other hand, shortly after construction, the _Northampton_ was run into by a small trading schooner, which cut her down to the water’s edge. The ships, therefore, started with an unfavourable reputation, which the _Northampton_ followed up by a total inability to make even her moderate designed speed. The _Nelson_, on the other hand, proved herself a comparatively good steamer, so much so that at a later date she was to a certain extent modernised. Both ships were originally heavily masted, the idea being to perform most of their peace service when convenient under sail. The _Nelson_ sailed moderately well, but the _Northampton_ very badly. It was possibly with some view to remedying this that some years later, when it was decided that the _Imperieuse_, originally built as a brig, should be given a military rig, her lofty iron fore and mainmast were taken out of her and substituted for the two equivalent masts in the _Northampton_. The change, however, was not satisfactory, as thereafter she sailed if anything worse than ever. At and about this year protected cruisers made their first appearance in the _Comus_ class. Of these altogether eleven were built, the best known of these being the _Calliope_, which in the early nineties became famous through steaming out of Samoa Roads in the teeth of a hurricane, which utterly destroyed every foreign vessel anchored there at the same time. The _Comus_ class consisted of the _Calliope_, _Calypso_, _Canada_, _Carysfort_, _Champion_, _Cleopatra_, _Comus_, _Conquest_, _Constance_, _Cordelia_, and _Curacoa_. They averaged 2,380 tons displacement, though the first mentioned, which were the last to be built, were slightly larger. The original armament consisted of two 6-ton muzzle-loaders and twelve 64-pounders. This was afterwards varied by the substitution of breechloaders. The ships generally had a speed of about thirteen knots, and were completed between the years 1877, for the earliest, and 1884 for the latest. They had a 1½-inch protective deck for the engines amidships. These ships, which were generally officially known as the “C” class cruiser, were undoubtedly diminutives of the _Shannon_, or, at any rate, inspired by a similar idea. Besides growing downwards the idea also grew upwards, and resulted in the building of six ships of the “Admiral” class, of which the first was the _Collingwood_. These, which were the apotheosis of the Barnaby idea, represented an absolute revolution in naval construction, so far as big ships were concerned. The “Admirals” were not all identical, as they formed four different groups in the matter of displacement and three in armament. In all, however, the integral idea was the same. Amidships was a narrow belt, 150ft. long by 7½ft. wide, which sufficed to protect engines, boilers, and communication tubes of the barbettes. This belt varied in thickness from 18ins. to 8ins, of compound armour. The ends of the belt were closed up by 16-inch bulkheads. Forward and aft was merely a curved protective deck; there was also a flat protective deck on top of the armour belt. The ships were of low freeboard, forward and aft, but had a large superstructure built up amidships. At either end of the superstructure, with their bases unprotected by armour except for the communication tubes already referred to, were many-sided barbettes with plates set at an angle of about forty-five degrees. These barbettes were about 11½ins. thick, and carried each a couple of the heaviest guns then available. These were 12-inch breechloaders in the _Collingwood_, and 13.5-inch in the other ships, except the _Benbow_, which mounted one 16.5 inch 110-ton in each barbette instead. An auxiliary armament was mounted inside the superstructure. The speed of these ships was about seventeen knots, and was considerably in excess of the average for the period. =====================+====================+=====================+=====================+==================== Name. | _Collingwood._ | _Rodney_, | _Anson_, | _Benbow._ | | _Howe._ | _Camperdown._ | ---------------------+--------------------+---------------------+---------------------+-------------------- Displacement, tons | 9,500 | 10,300 | 10,600 | 10,600 | | | | Length (_p.p._) ft.| 325 | 325 | 330 | 330 | | | | Beam, ft. | 68 | 68 | 68½ | 68½ | | | | Draught (_mean_) ft. | 26¾ | 27¼ | 26¾ | 27¼ | | | | H.P. | 9,500 | 11,500 | 11,500 | 11,500 | | | | Nominal Speed, | | | | knots | 16.5 | 16.7 | 17.2 | 17.5 | | | | Armament | 4--12in., 6--6in. | 4--13.5, 6--6in. | 4--13.5, 6--6 in. | 2--16.25, 10--6in. | | | | Built at | Pembroke Yard | _Rodney_, | _Anson_, | Thames, I.W. | | Chatham Yd. | Pembroke Yd. | | | _Howe_, Pembroke Yd.| _Camperdown_, | | | Chatham Yd. | Por’th. | | | | | Engines by | Humphrys | _Rodney_, Humphrys | _Anson_, Humphrys | Maudslay | | _Howe_, Humphrys | _Camperdown_, Maud’y| | | | | Armour belt | 18in.-8in. | 18in.-8in. | 18in.-8in. | 18in.-8in. | | | | barbettes | 14in.-12in. | 11½in.-10in. | 16in.-6in. | 12in.-4in. | | | | bulkheads | 16in.-6in. | 16in.-6in. | 14in.-12in. | 18in.-6in.* | | | | Armament | 4--12in., 6--6in., | 4--13.5, 6--6in., | 4--13.5, 6--6in., | 2--16.25, 10--6in., | and smaller, | and smaller, | and smaller, | and smaller, | 2 sub. and 4 | as _Collingwood_ | as _Collingwood_ | as _Collingwood_ | above water tubes | | | =====================+====================+=====================+=====================+==================== As compared with the _Colossus_ and _Edinburgh_ class of the same date and era of design, the “Admirals” were somewhat inferior in armour protection, but because of that secured a far better speed and a greatly superior big gun command. In all the “Admiral” class the armour weighed about 2,500 tons--say, 20 per cent. of the displacement. This proportion has never been very greatly varied from either before or since, and the popular idea that Barnaby designs sacrificed armour weight for other features is entirely incorrect. The real Barnaby ideal is better described (the conditions of his own time being kept in mind) as an attempt to put into practice “everything or nothing,” so far as protection was concerned. To-day, a compromise is in fashion, and Barnaby is very much out of date. It may well be but a phase in the cycle of naval design. Properly to appreciate the _Admiral_ class ideal, we have to translate it into the ideal which obtains to-day. Thus put, the _Admirals_ would be somewhat swifter than our existing battle-cruisers, their vitals would be invulnerable and their armaments superior to that of any potential enemy. They would not, in fact, very greatly differ from Admiral Bacon’s conception (published some five years before the present war) of the battleship of the future, in which he predicted the disappearance of much of the side armour of to-day. [Illustration: _Photo_] [_Symonds & Co._ THE _BENBOW_--A SHIP OF THE “ADMIRAL” CLASS.] The coming of the medium calibre quick-firer soon rendered the “Admirals” obsolete and even ridiculous. The medium calibre quick-firer profoundly modified design until the development of the big gun enabled it to act well beyond the effective range of the medium gun, and incidentally enabled it to fire nearly as fast as the elementary quick-firers were built to do. Thus we have come back to something very akin to the condition under which the Barnaby ships were designed. These ships could not, perhaps, be described as an absolutely original idea, save in so far as the British Navy was concerned, since the Italian _Italia_ was launched in the same year that the _Collingwood_, the first of the “Admirals” was laid down. The _Italia_, equally abnormally fast (or faster) for the period, carried four 100-ton guns échelonned in one large heavily armoured barbette amidships, but had no water-line belt whatever, and relied entirely upon an armour-deck to protect the motive power. In the “Admirals” the motive power was thoroughly protected by the vertical belt amidships, while flotation otherwise depended upon internal sub-divisions. The “Admiral” class idea was re-developed into armoured cruisers in a somewhat curious fashion. At that time the French Navy was second in the world, and French ideas of construction commanded a great deal of respect. French notions at that era ran largely to single gun positions, four guns being separately disposed in four barbettes placed one ahead, one astern, and one on either side. The particular point of this arrangement was that while British designs accepted two or four big guns bearing, the French system allowed for a definite mean of three. More practically put, this may be translated into a conception that an enemy would use every effort to avoid positions in which four big guns could be brought to bear on him, and seek those in which he was exposed to two only. A gun-arrangement which gave three big guns bearing in _any_ position seemed therefore far more reasonable on paper. It stands to the credit of Sir N. Barnaby (or else to the credit of the Admiralty of the era) that he recognised the impossibility of any such manœuvres in fleet actions, but at the same time he also realised how heavily it might tell in cruiser duels. Out of which the _Imperieuse_ and _Warspite_ were born. Details of these ships:-- Displacement--8,400 tons. Length (between perpendiculars)--315ft. Beam--62ft. Draught (maximum)--27⅓ft. Armament--Four 9.2 24-ton B.L., six 6-inch, 89cwt., six torpedo tubes. Horse-power--10,000=16.75 knots. Coal--1,130 tons = nominal radius of ten knots of 7,000 miles. Armour--Belt amidships of 10in. compound, with 9-inch bulkheads, 8-inch barbettes. No armour to lesser guns. 3-inch protective deck fore and aft, and on top of belt. [Illustration: SHANNON. NORTHAMPTON. ADMIRAL class. “C” class. ORLANDO class. CHARACTERISTIC BARNABY SHIPS.] The _Imperieuse_ was built at Portsmouth Dockyard and engined by Maudslay. The _Warspite_, built at Chatham, was engined by Penn. Both were completed in 1886 at a total cost of about £630,000 each. They were copper sheathed, and (like the _Inflexible_) originally were to carry a heavy brig-rig. This was removed at an early stage, and a single military mast between the funnels substituted. The _Imperieuse’s_ masts were subsequently put in the _Northampton_ (which see). Both proved faster than anticipated; but the coming of the quick-firer placed them in the semi-obsolete category almost as soon as they were completed. The type was never repeated. Till recently the _Imperieuse_ still existed as a depot ship for destroyers; the _Warspite_ has long since gone to the scrap heap. Years after their conception a modernised version of them was to some extent reproduced in the _Black Prince_ class. In their own day, however, they appeared and that was all. The “battleship of the future” ideal of those days had to some extent been foreshadowed in the _Benbow_, with her couple of 110-ton guns. The monster gun was “the vogue” and no way of carrying it on existing displacements allowed of more than two such pieces being mounted. The idea of the moment became the mounting of guns capable of delivering deadly blows, and (corollary therewith) protection to ensure that that deadly blow could be delivered with relative impunity. Since the secondary gun had now come in, auxiliary guns and a secondary battery were a _sine quâ non_; but the ideal ship was to be one incapable of vital injury from such weapons. On lines such as these the _Victoria_ class was designed. The call was for an improved _Benbow_. The armament was to be no less and, if possible, more; while better protection was an essential feature. Details of the _Victoria_ type, of which only two were built, are as follows:-- Displacement--10,470 tons (approximately that of the _Benbow_). Length (between perpendiculars)--340ft. Beam--70ft. Draught (maximum)--27¼ft. Armament--Two 110-ton guns (in a single turret), one 9.2 (aft), twelve 6-inch; twenty-one anti-torpedo guns, and six torpedo tubes (14-inch). Armour (compound)--18-inch to 16-inch belt amidships, redoubt and bulkheads, 18-inch turret, 2-inch in battery. Armour deck, and heavily armoured conning tower. Horse-power--14,000 = 16.75 knots. Coal--1,200 tons = 7,000 miles at 10 knots. The _Victoria_ was built at Elswick and engined by Humphrys; launched in 1887 and completed for sea in 1889. The _Sanspareil_, engined by the same firm, but built at Blackwall (Thames Ironworks) was launched a year later, but completed about the same time. The design of these ships closely approximated to the _Conqueror_, of which they were merely enlarged editions with a heavily increased battery. [Illustration: RUPERT. CONQUEROR. VICTORIA. DREADNOUGHT. TRAFALGAR. TURRET SHIPS OF THE BARNABY ERA.] The _Victoria_ on completion became the flagship in the Mediterranean of Admiral Sir George Tryon. In the course of evolutions off the coast of Syria on June 22nd, 1893, she was rammed and sunk by the _Camperdown_. The disaster, which cost the lives of the Admiral and 321 officers and men, teaches no useful lesson, saving the danger of transverse bulkheads. Water-tight doors were shut too late. The sea entered. The ship gradually turned over, then suddenly “turned turtle” and capsized. The mystery of her loss has never been fully explained. Admiral Tryon gave an order for the fleet, then in two lines, to turn inboard sixteen points, while at six cables apart. This manœuvre, with turning circles as they were, was bound to create a collision. This was pointed out to Admiral Tryon, who, however, took no notice of the representations. It has since been assumed that he went suddenly mad. A more reasonable explanation is that he intended the ships to “jockey with their screws” (a manœuvre which he never employed as a rule), and forgot to mention the fact, though details of evidence in the court-martial hardly bear this out. The exact signal as made was:-- “Second division alter course in succession sixteen points to starboard, preserving the order of the Fleet.” “First division alter course in succession sixteen points to port, preserving the order of the Fleet.” This signal was capable of more than one interpretation. Along one of them each ship in the two squadrons might easily have rammed the other in succession, according to some interpretations. Using screws, both divisions might have closed in very closely but quite safely. Acting other than simultaneously they might anyway have effected the manœuvre without disaster. At eight cables (a distance which was suggested to the Admiral an hour before) it might have been done quite safely. There have been other explanations also. In the Fleet at the time everything was believed, except the “blunder” theory which has gone down to history. To this day that is accepted with reservation. But the rest is mystery. The _Camperdown_, in turning, crashed into the _Victoria_, striking her forward, curiously enough directly on a bulkhead, just as the _Vanguard_ was struck when she was rammed. It was not expected that the _Victoria_ would be sunk. Had the water-tight doors been closed during the manœuvre, instead of at the last moment, she would probably have remained afloat. As things were, it was impossible to close many at the time the order was given, but her low-freeboard also played a part. The sea invaded the door on the starboard side of the superstructure and thence got everywhere on that side of the ship. It was that which threw her over and capsized her, but the chance circumstance of the blow on the lateral bulkhead should not be forgotten. The _Victoria_ was struck just on one of the points where all the odds were against her being struck. The _Sanspareil_ had an uneventful career, and was eventually sold out of the Service somewhat suddenly under the “scrap-heap” policy of Admiral Fisher in 1904. Following upon the _Imperieuse_ type, an entirely new class of armoured cruisers, the _Orlandos_, were designed. Just as the _Victorias_ were improved and enlarged _Conquerors_, so the _Orlandos_ were “improved _Merseys_.” Particulars of these ships, of which seven were built altogether, are as follows:-- Displacement--5,600 tons. Length (between perpendiculars)--300ft. Beam--56ft. Draught (maximum)--22½ft. (actually more). Armament--Two 9.2in. B.L.; ten 6in.; and six torpedo tubes. Armour (compound)--Belt amidships 10in., with 16in. Bulkheads. Protective deck at ends. All guns protected by shields only. Horse-power--8,500 = 18 knots. Coal (maximum)--900 tons = nominal radius of 8,000 miles. [Illustration: BOARDING A SLAVE DHOW] They were built as follows:-- ===============+===========+============= NAME. | BUILDER. | ENGINED BY ---------------+-----------+------------- _Orlando_ | Palmer | Palmer _Australia_ | Glasgow | Napier _Aurora_ | Pembroke | Thompson _Galatea_ | Glasgow | Napier _Immortalité_ | Chatham | Earle _Narcissus_ | Hull | Earle _Undaunted_ | Palmer | Palmer ===============+===========+============= They were laid down in 1885 and 1886. The _Orlando_ was completed in 1888, all the others in 1889. They were launched in 1886 and 1887, and some of them, fitted with wooden guns (“Quakers”), served to swell the Fleet at the great Jubilee Review of 1887. All made over their designed speeds on trial, but they did their trials “light.” In service all proved fairly useful, and the _Undaunted_, with Lord Charles Beresford as her captain in the Mediterranean, “made history” to the extent of first creating an Anglo-American _entente_, beginning with the U.S.S. _Chicago_, captained then by the now universally known naval author, Admiral Mahan. Beresford first achieved fame in the _Condor_ at Alexandra, in 1882; but it was in the _Undaunted_ that he first “made history” by ending the previously existing hostility between the British and U.S. Navies; and establishing the naval brotherhood of those who speak the same language. The _Orlandos_ were the last of the essentially Barnaby ships. Barnaby was associated with the Navy thereafter; but the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_, though produced under his régime, were not “Barnaby ships,” and differences of opinion with the Admiralty about them eventuated in his resignation. The tide of naval opinion was then setting back in the old _Dreadnought_ direction. More complete protection was being demanded. The quick-firer was just coming in and its potentialities seemed enormous. The secondary battery had to be protected. Destruction of communications on board began to take on a fresh and more serious aspect. In a word, the Admiralty reverted to Reed ideas, and in reverting exaggerated them. In such circumstances the general idea of the _Trafalgars_ was born. Sir N. Barnaby totally dissented from the Admiralty line of thought. In his view the size of a ship could not legitimately be increased unless her offensive powers increased in proportion; in the _Trafalgar_ idea both speed and armament were reduced as compared to the _Admiral_ class, and over a thousand odd tons added entirely to carry extra defensive armour. Over which dispute he resigned his position. Details of the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_ as built are:-- Displacement--11,940 tons. Length (between perpendiculars)--345ft. Beam--73ft. Draught (mean)--27½ft. Armament--Four 13.5-inch, six 4.7 Q.F., also smaller guns, and four 14-inch torpedo tubes, of which two were submerged. Armour (compound)--Belt, 230ft. long (_i.e._, 80ft. longer than in the _Admirals_ and _Victorias_), 20--16in., with 16--14 inch bulkheads, protective deck at ends and over main belt. Over this a redoubt 141ft. long, 18in. thick. Above the redoubt a battery, 4in. thick. Turrets, 18in. Horse-power--12,000 = 17 knots. Coal--(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 1,200 tons = 6,500 miles at 10 knots. [Illustration: _Photo_] [_Russell & Sons._ SIR N. BARNABY. A recent photograph.] The _Nile_ was built at Pembroke and engined by Maudslay. She was laid down in April, 1886, launched in March, 1888, and completed some two years later. The _Trafalgar_ was laid down at Portsmouth in January, 1886, and launched in September, 1887. Her machinery was supplied by Humphrys. The armour of these ships weighed no less than 4,230 tons, _i.e._, some 35 per cent. of the displacement instead of the more usual 25 per cent. or so. The then first Lord of the Admiralty took the occasion of the launch to remark that the days of such armoured ships were over, and that probably these were the last ironclads that would ever be built--the future would lie with fast deck-protected vessels! As, for three years, no more armoured ships were laid down, he at least enunciated a definite policy when these heavily armoured successors of the _Admiral_ class were put afloat. They differed from the _Admirals_ in that turrets were reverted to instead of barbettes, and, as already mentioned, they were really nothing but modernised versions of the old low freeboard _Dreadnought_. At a later date 6-inch Q.F. were substituted for the 4.7’s; but no other schemes of modernising the ships ever came to a head. _PROTECTED CRUISERS OF THE BARNABY ERA._ Four ships of the _Amphion_ Class--_Amphion_, _Arethusa_, _Leander_, and _Phæton_, of which the first (_Arethusa_) was laid down in 1880--represented the first Barnaby idea of the protected cruiser. They were of 4,300 tons displacement, and 16.5 knots nominal speed. They carried ten 6-inch guns, and a 1½-inch deck amidships. According to the ideas of those days they were heavily over-gunned. They always steamed well; but it is doubtful whether Barnaby, left to himself, would ever have produced them. Incidentally, they were always bad sea-boats. In 1883, completed about the same time as the _Victoria_, the _Mersey_ class--_Mersey_, _Thames_, _Severn_, and _Forth_--of 4,050 tons displacement, and carrying two 8-inch and ten 6-inch, were commenced: practically early essays at the _Orlando_ class idea which followed. The _Orlandos_, on only a thousand or so tons more displacement, carried 9.2’s instead of 8-inch, had armour-belts as well as protective decks, and were a good knot faster. Both the _Amphions_ and _Merseys_ may be described as representing strictly naval Admiralty ideas--the _Orlando_, Barnaby ones. Each type was quickly rendered obsolete by the coming of the quick-firer; but the Barnaby type of cruiser, for 20 per cent. extra displacement, certainly offered better chances than any rival proposition, if only we consider matters in the light of what existed in those days and what promised best at that time. So ends the Barnaby era. Barnaby’s constructional ideas were blown to mincemeat by the advent of the quick-firer. Even to-day his ideas seem somewhat obsolete. Yet a few years hence (if big ships survive) they stand every chance of being reverted to, because to-day the big gun has more or less come back to where it was in 1875–1885. Barnaby, though he worked into its era, never realised the preponderance or possible preponderance of the “secondary gun.” In his era it fired too slowly to count for very much; in our own, range neutralises whatever it may have accomplished in the rapidity of fire direction. Likely enough, the reversion to Barnaby ideals, which is reasonably probable for the immediate future, will be merely a phase; and casual historians will ever put him down as the naval constructor who was least able to anticipate the years ahead of his creations. But a hundred years hence Barnaby may come into his own in a way little suspected to-day. A hundred years hence, when all the most modern ideas are ancient history, Barnaby may stand with Phineas Pett, and the Navy which he created stand for something infinitely more than the scrap heap to which a later age swiftly relegated it. Only the historian of the distant future can estimate him at his real value. His own generation never placed much faith in his ships; the generation that followed generally regarded them with scorn. It was probably wrong, but only the future can prove it to have been so. _GUNS IN THE ERA._ The guns which especially belong to the Barnaby era were as follows:-- ======+=======+========+==========+==========+=========+================ | | | | | | Penetration | Weight| Length | Weight | Muzzle | Muzzle | 2000 yds. Cal. | in | in |projectile| velocity | energy +-------+-------- ins. | tons. | cals. | lbs. | f.s. | ft. | iron. | comp. ------+-------+--------+----------+----------+---------+-------+-------- M.L. | | | | | | | 16 | 81 | 18 | 1684 | 1590 | 29,530 | 22 | 15 ----- +-------+--------+----------+----------+---------+-------+-------- B.L. | | | | | | | 16.25 | 110 | 30 | 1800 | 2148 | 57,580 | 29 | 19 13.5 | 67 | 30 | 1250 | 2025 | 35,560 | 26 | 17 12 | 45 | 25 | 714 | 2000 | 18,060 | 19 | 12½ 9.2 | 22 | 25 | 380 | 1809 | 8622 | 15 | 10 8 | 14 | 30 | 210 | 2200 | 7060 | 14 | 9 6 | 5 | 26 | 100 | 1960 | 2665 | 8 | 5 ======+=======+========+==========+==========+=========+=======+======== In the early part of the period, guns of the Reed era, down to the 10-inch 18-ton M.L., were also made use of; but generally speaking, the Barnaby designs coincide with early breechloading types. It is interesting to note that the 81-ton gun figured in one ship only (the _Inflexible_), and that after this the 38-ton 12.5 M.L. was reverted to, to be replaced in later designs by the 45-ton 12-inch B.L. The M.L. guns available for early Barnaby designs were considerably superior to earlier examples of their type; as after the fiasco of the _Glatton_ trials,[7] copper gas checks were introduced. These were affixed to the base of the projectile and expanded on firing. They led to a certain increased power and accuracy; but, even so, only of a relative nature compared with the better results obtained from breechloaders. The _Thunderer_ gun disaster, which after many experiments was found to have been caused by doubly loading the gun, added another argument to the anti-muzzle-loader cause. The 12-inch, which was the first large B.L. to be introduced, compared as follows with the 12-inch M.L.:-- ==========+========+======+=======+==========+=========================== | | | | | Penetration of iron at |Length |Weight|Muzzle |Weight of +--------------------------- Gun. |in cals.| tons.|energy |projectile|Muzzle.|1000 yds.|2000 yds. | | | ft. | lbs. | in. | in. | in. ----------+--------+------+-------+----------+-------+---------+--------- 12in. M.L.| 13½ | 35 | 9470 | 706 | 16 | 15 | 13 12in. B.L | 25 | 45 |18,060 | 1250 | 30½ | 28 | 26 ==========+========+======+=======+==========+=======+=========+========= The enormous difference in efficiency was of course traceable to other causes than the adoption of the breechloader instead of the old M.L.; but this was, equally naturally, overlooked; which, perhaps, was just as well--otherwise the muzzle-loader might have persisted to quite recent times. Though the _Thunderer_ disaster showed that a M.L. could be loaded twice over by accident, this was an obviously unlikely thing to occur again. The impression was made by the fact that the 12-inch B.L. was far more powerful than the old 16-inch M.L. It was possibly this which directly led to the “monster-gun craze” of the Barnaby era, the way to which had already been shewn by the 16-inch M.L. Incidentally it is interesting to note that the present monster gun era is the third in which, after a period of adhesion to a 12-inch gun, greatly increased calibres have suddenly and more or less generally been resorted to. _THE COMING OF THE TORPEDO._ Reference has been made in the past chapter to Sir E. J. Reed’s recognition of the possibilities of the torpedo; and floating mines were, of course, well known. It was not, however, till 1874 that either mine or torpedo came to be regarded at all seriously. The earliest Whitehead “fish torpedo” was produced in 1868; though it was then little more than a curiosity. It was a crude weapon, although it embodied, with two notable exceptions, most of the features that it possesses to-day. Its motive power was compressed air; it carried an explosive head with a sensitive pistol. The secret was bought by the British Government at an early stage. It was made strictly confidential; indeed, to the present day, the internal mechanism of a torpedo is more or less sacred. Most other nations purchased the secret also, and guarded it with like care! It is but fair to add that this ridiculous situation was brought about by the inventor, who particularly specified that the balance chamber must not be revealed even to admirals commanding fleets, but only to specially selected officers. A main difficulty with the torpedo was how to discharge it. For some while only two methods existed: the first, a mechanism of catapult type which hurled the torpedo into the water; the other, by a crude application of dropping gear, suitable, of course, for launches only. In either case, especially the former, there was a strong element of uncertainty as to the direction the torpedo would take; for one to describe a circle and return to the firer was not unknown.[8] The charge was inconsiderable, and range and speed were both very small. An instrument called the Harvey torpedo was more or less contemporaneous with the Whitehead. It was a very primitive idea, consisting as it did merely in attempting to tow explosives across the course of an enemy. It was too obviously cumbersome to cause disquietude, and with the invention of torpedo tubes passed into oblivion. The advantages of the torpedo tube were quickly recognised; and though the range was still little over a hundred yards or so--at any rate, so far as any probability of hitting was concerned--the torpedo quickly became a part of the armament of all important ships. So much was this the case that the submerged tube was developed with sufficient celerity to be adopted into the equipment of the _Inflexible_, of 1874 design. None the less, however, the possible results of torpedo attack remained uninvestigated till 1874, and even then only came to be inquired into after the _Oberon_ experiments, which were primarily if not entirely brought about by the advent of the observation mine as a practical thing. The mine’s arrival counted for little; the automobile torpedo being at the moment much in the public eye, the point that the _Oberon_ experiments were primarily designed to test the effect of mines got somewhat lost sight of. The essential fact is that by 1874 the fact of other enemies to the ship than the gun was established. For a long time it affected ship design no further than the gradual introduction of an anti-torpedo-boat armament; but this was mainly due to Sir E. J. Reed having in the _Bellerophon_ design endeavoured to anticipate torpedo effect. In 1874, and onward therefrom for some time, the double bottom, combined with water-tight bulkheads, was considered a suitable “reply” to the “new arm,” and it was not for many years that torpedo nets were in any degree appreciated. In the later eighties some torpedo experiments were conducted against the old ironclad _Resistance_, in which the Bullivant net defence system proved altogether superior to the cumbersome old wooden booms which were in use: but, despite this, nothing was done for many a year, and the old pattern was adhered to. _ESTIMATES IN THE ERA._ ===============+=============+=========== Financial Year.| Amount. | Personnel. ---------------|-------------|----------- 1869 | 9,996,641 | 63,000 1870 | 9,370,530 | 61,000 1871 | 9,789,956 | 61,000 1872 | 9,532,149 | 61,000 1873 | 9,899,725 | 60,000 1874 | 10,440,105 | 60,000 1875 | 10,825,194 | 60,000 1876 | 11,288,872 | 60,000 1877 | 10,971,829 | 60,000 1878 | 12,129,901 | 60,000 1879 | 10,586,894 | 58,800 1880 | 10,566,935 | 58,800 1881 | 10,945,919 | 58,100 1882 | 10,483,901 | 57,500 1883 | 10,899,500 | 57,250 1884 | 11,185,770 | 56,950 1885 | 12,694,900 | 58,334 ===============+=============+=========== II. THE WHITE ERA. The appointment of Sir William White as Chief Constructor more or less synchronised with a considerable revolution in naval construction and ideas. The institution of naval manœuvres drew great attention to the sea-going quality of various types of ships. The manœuvres of 1887 mostly centred around the _Polyphemus_, and her charging a boom at Berehaven. Little was here proved except that boom defences were easily to be annihilated. In 1888, however, the manœuvres were of a much more extensive nature, and a Committee was appointed to consider and report upon them, especially with regard to the following points:-- “The feasibility or otherwise of maintaining an effective blockade in war of an enemy’s squadron or fast cruisers in strongly fortified ports, including the advantages and disadvantages of-- (a) Keeping the main body of the blockading Fleets off the ports to be blockaded with an inshore squadron. (b) Keeping the main body of the blockading Fleets at a base, with a squadron of fast cruisers and scouts off the blockaded ports, having means of rapid communication with the Fleet. (c) In both cases the approximate relative number of battleships and cruisers that should be employed by the blockading Fleet, as compared with those of the blockaded Fleet. “The value of torpedo-gunboats and first-class torpedo boats both with the blockading and blockaded Fleets, and the most efficient manner of utilising them. “As to the arrangements made by B squadron for the attack of commerce in the Channel, and by A squadron for its protection. “As to the feasibility and expediency of cruisers making raids on an enemy’s coasts and unprotected towns for the purpose of levying contribution. “As to the claims and counterclaims made by the Admirals in command of both squadrons with regard to captures made during the operation. “As to any defects of importance which were developed in any of the vessels employed, and their cause.” As Supplementary Instructions there were:-- (1) As to the behaviour and sea-going qualities of, or the defects in, the new and most recently commissioned vessels, as obtained from the reports of the Admirals in command of the respective squadrons. (2) The general conclusion to be drawn from the recent operations.” A summary of the findings[9] is as follows:-- “That to maintain an effective blockade of a Fleet in a strongly fortified port a proportion of at least five to three would be essential and possibly an even larger proportion, unless a good anchorage could be found near the blockaded port which could be used as a base, in which case a proportion of four to three might suffice, supposing the blockading squadron to be very amply supplied with look-out ships and colliers.” Torpedo boats were condemned as being of little value to blockaders, though useful to the blockaded. For blockade purposes the torpedo-gunboats of the _Rattlesnake_ class were highly commended. Attention was drawn to the large number of deck hands employed down below on account of the insufficient engine-room complements, and the excess of untrained stokers. The case of the _Warspite_ was specifically mentioned. In order to break the blockade at sixteen knots she sent thirty-six deck hands down below at a time when every available deck hand would have been required above had the operations been real war. A special supplementary report was called for as to the sea-going qualities of the ships. Considerable historical interest attaches to this particular report, and the following extracts are especially interesting:-- _Admiral_ class. “So far as could be judged, these vessels are good sea-boats, and their speed is not affected when steaming against a moderate wind and sea; but we are of opinion that their low freeboard renders them unsuitable as sea-going armour-clads for general service with the Fleet, as their speed must be rapidly reduced when it is necessary to force them against a head sea or swell. “On the only occasion on which the _Collingwood_ experienced any considerable beam swell she is reported to have rolled 20 degrees each way; this does not make it appear as if the _Admiral_ class will be very steady gun-platforms in bad weather. “They are said to be ‘handy’ at 6 knots and over. “In the _Benbow_ much difficulty was experienced in stowing the bower anchors. This is the case in all low freeboard vessels, more or less, but the evil appears to have been intensified in this instance by defective fittings, and by the fact of her being supplied with the old-fashioned iron-stocked anchors instead of improved Martins. “Serious complaints are made from these ships that the forecastles leak badly, and that the mess-deck is made uninhabitable whenever the sea breaks over the forecastle at all; it would seem that this defect might be remedied.” This opinion was not shared by Admiral Sir Arthur Hood, who commented as follows:-- “I cannot concur in this opinion, my view being that the objects of primary importance to be fulfilled in a first-class battleship are: (1) That, on a given displacement, the combined powers of offence and defence shall be as great as can be given; (2) that she shall be handy and possess good speed in ordinary weather, combined with sea-worthiness; (3) that she shall have large coal-carrying capacity. I certainly do not consider that the _Admiral_ class, which, on account of their comparatively low freeboard forward, must have their speed reduced when steaming against a heavy head sea or swell to a greater extent than is the case with the long, high freeboard, older armour-clads, as the _Minotaur_, _Northumberland_, _Black Prince_ are for this reason rendered unsuitable as sea-going armour-clads for general service with a Fleet. The power of being able to force a first-class battleship at full speed against a head sea is not, in my opinion, a point of the first importance, although in the case of a fast cruiser it certainly is. Admiral Tryon draws an unfavourable comparison between the speed of the new battleships and that of the long ships of the old type, when steaming against a head sea. I admit at once that vessels like the _Minotaur_ class would maintain their speed and make better weather of it when being forced against a head sea than would the _Admirals_; but this advantage, under these exceptional conditions, cannot for a moment be compared with the enormous increase in the power of offence and defence possessed by the _Admirals_.” [Illustration: _Photo_] [_Russell & Sons._ SIR WILLIAM WHITE.] The _Conqueror_ and _Hero_ were reported to roll a great deal. Being short they felt a head sea quickly, and on account of their low freeboard it was found impossible to drive them against a heavy sea at anything approaching full speed. Incidentally these ships were known as “half-boots.” Here, again, Admiral Sir Arthur Hood dissented. In connection with these points, Admiral Tryon submitted a report in which he emphasised, as he had done with the _Admirals_, that however fast these short ships might be in smooth water, their speeds fell off rapidly in a seaway. The _Mersey_ class were described as being handy, steady gun platforms and able to fight their guns longer than most ships.[10] The captain of the _Severn_, however, reported a view that the 8-inch guns should be removed and lighter pieces substituted. Admiral Baird agreed with this. Sir Arthur Hood, in his comments, stated that he was “decidedly opposed” to any reduction of armament, both in this case and that of the other cruisers. The _Arethusa_ type were reported to roll so heavily when the sea was abeam or abaft that “accurate shooting would be impossible and machine guns in the tops would be useless.” The Committee concurred with Admiral Baird that the armament of these should be reduced. For the _Archer_ class it was unanimously suggested that lighter guns should be fitted forward. Sir Arthur Hood agreed with this view, which, however, was never carried into effect. Particular interest attaches to the _Rattlesnake_[11] class of torpedo-gunboats--these vessels being really prototypes of the destroyers of the present day. They were reported as “safe, provided they were handled with care.” Their handiness was unfavourably reported on. It was strongly urged that the 4-inch gun mounted forward should be removed. This, however, was never done. With reference to any new vessels of this type, the Committee reported as deserving immediate consideration:-- (1) Generally strengthen the hull in this type of vessel. (2) Raise the freeboard forward. _or_ (3) “Turtle-back” the forecastle. In the gunboats that followed the freeboard forward was considerably raised; but when destroyers came to be built several years later, it is interesting to observe that the turtle-back forecastle was adopted, and it was not till after over a hundred had been built that the high forecastle, recommended so long before, appeared in the _River_ class. The report concluded:-- “The proportion of untrained (2nd class) stokers which were drafted to several of the ships appears to have been too large; in point of physique they are reported as unequal to their work, and in many instances the experience of these men in stokehold (or any other work on board ship) was nil. “As a means of affording opportunities for training newly-raised stokers we recommend that at least one year should be served by them as supernumerary in a sea-going ship before they are considered fit to be draughted as part complement to any vessel; we further are of opinion that a Committee should be appointed to inquire into the sufficiency or otherwise of the complements allowed in the steam department of each class of ship, the proportion of 2nd class stokers which should be borne, and the amount of training which they should be required to undergo before they can usefully be borne as part complement in a fighting ship.” An agitation as to the state of the Navy, which was commenced in the year 1887, mainly by the initiative of the _Pall Mall Gazette_,[12] finally resulted in the passing of the Naval Defence Act of 1889. This provided for the construction of a total of seventy vessels, consisting of ten armoured ships, nine first-class cruisers, twenty-nine second-class cruisers, four third-class and eighteen torpedo gunboats, to be built as quickly as possible at the estimated cost of £21,500,000. The substantial part of the programme of 1886 had consisted of two big turret ships, the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_, and two armoured cruisers, _Immortalité_ and _Aurora_ of the _Orlando_ class. In 1887 nothing larger than second-class cruisers was laid down; and in 1888 the most important vessels on the programme were only the protected cruisers, _Blake_ and _Blenheim_. There was, therefore, ample material for panic. Details of the _Blake_ class:-- Length (_p.p._)--375 ft. Beam--65 ft. Guns--Two 9.2 in., 22-ton B.L.R., ten 6-in. Q.F., eighteen 3-pdr. H.P.--20,000. Designed speed--22.0 kts. Coal--1500 tons. Builder of Ship--_Blake_, Chatham; _Blenheim_, Thames Ironworks. Builder of machinery--_Blake_, Maudsley; _Blenheim_, Thames Ironworks. Launched--_Blake_, 1889; _Blenheim_, 1890. Special features of these ships were a combination of the armament of the _Orlando_ class with greatly increased speed secured by the development of deck armour in place of the belts of the _Orlando_ class. In so far as a special type of ship may be said to be the development of some predecessor, the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_ may be described as enlarged _Merseys_. They were, however, unique on account of their relatively great length and great increase of displacement as compared with preceding vessels. In them the armoured casemate, a leading characteristic of nearly all Sir William White’s ships, made its first appearance. It was employed in the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_ for four main deck guns, the upper deck guns being behind the usual shields. The coming of the casemate, curiously enough, attracted little attention, compared to its importance. It may be said to have rendered possible the return to main deck guns in unarmoured ships. In the _Orlando_ class, ten 6-inch guns were all bunched together on the upper deck amidships. Since these ships were designed the 6-inch quickfirer had made its first appearance, and the largest possible distribution of armament was therefore desirable. The adoption of the two-deck system of the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_ secured this much larger distribution, rendering it impossible for a single shell to put more than one of the five broadside 6-inch out of action, whereas in the _Orlando_ class at least three guns were at the mercy of a single shell. Another novelty of the type was the introduction of a special armoured glacis around the engine hatches. This system had, of course, been used before in the Italian monster ships _Italia_ and _Lepanto_, but it was first introduced in the British Navy in the _Blakes_.[13] The ships were very successful steamers, for all that neither made her expected twenty-two knots on trial. Trial results:-- _Blake_: Eight hours’ natural draught, mean I.H.P.--14,525 = 19.4 knots. _Blenheim_: Eight hours’ natural draught, mean I.H.P.--14,925 = 20.4 knots. _Blake_: Four hours’ force draught, mean I.H.P.--19,579 = 21.5 knots. _Blenheim_: Four hours’ forced draught, mean I.H.P.--21,411 = 21.8 knots. The principal item of the Naval Defence Act was eight first-class and two second-class battleships. All these ships were designed by Sir William White, and may be described as battleship editions of the _Blake_ and _Blenheim_, so far as the disposition of their armament was concerned. For the rest they may be described as attempts to combine in one ship the best features of the Read and Barnaby ideals. In place of the low freeboard of the _Admiral_ class, seven of the _Royal Sovereigns_ were given high freeboard fore and aft, with the big guns about twenty-three feet above water. The eighth ship, the _Hood_, was modified to suit the ideals of Admiral Hood, and was to some extent an improved _Trafalgar_, her big guns being in turrets some seventeen feet above the water, in turrets instead of _en barbette_, with guns exposed as in the rest of the class. In them, among other special features, 18-inch torpedo tubes were first introduced instead of 14-inch, and a stern torpedo tube appeared. The original idea of end-on torpedo tubes was torpedo attack from the bow in place of the ram. The _Polyphemus_ was the first ship in which an end-on tube appeared (submerged). In cruisers of a later date the bow tube was found to injure speed, and there was always the danger of a ship over-running her own torpedo. On this account the bow-tube never secured in the British Navy that vogue which it obtained, and still has, in Germany. The stern-tube appears to owe its origin to an idea that a defeated or overpowered ship, running from an enemy, might save herself by it: dim ideas of “runaway tactics” had also begun to appear. Sir William White never claimed for himself that he had anticipated the future in any way in his torpedo armament, even when defending himself against criticisms, to the effect that he “gave too little for the displacement.” Yet his torpedo innovations, besides discounting the future, all helped to swell the total weight; as also did many internal strengthenings of the kind which do not show on paper. Possibly he did not realise his own greatness as the designer of a class of ship which was so much better than any contemporary vessel, that even in these days of “Super-Dreadnoughts” the _Royal Sovereigns_ are still looked back upon with respect, and invariably regarded as marking the beginning of an entirely new phase in ship construction. In April, 1889, their designer read a paper about them at the Institution of Naval Architects, in which the principal points which he claimed were that much superior command of guns was given, and that the auxiliary armament was nearly three times the weight of that of the _Trafalgars_. The following points were also mentioned by him:-- “(_a_) ‘That (it was officially decided that) it was preferable to have two separate strongly protected stations for the four heavy guns, rather than to have a single citadel.’ “(_b_) ‘That on the whole the 4-inch armour amidships, from the belt deck to the main deck, associated as it would be with the internal coal bunkers, sub-divided into numerous compartments, might be considered satisfactory; but that if armour weight became available, it could be profitably utilised in thickening the 4-inch steel above the middle portion of the belt.’ “I would draw particular attention to the first of these conclusions, since it expresses a most important distinction between the two systems of protection. “With separate redoubts, placed far apart, the two stations are isolated, and there is practically no risk of simultaneous disablement by the explosion of shells, or perforation of projectiles from the heaviest guns. Each redoubt offers a small target to the fire of an enemy, and its weakest part--the thick steel protective plating on the top--is of so small extent that the chance of its being struck is extremely remote. Serious damage to the unarmoured turret bases therefore involves the perforation of the thick vertical armour on the redoubts. “With a single citadel, extending the full breadth of a ship, the case is widely different. “Over a comparatively large area of the protective deck-plating in the neighbourhood of each turret, perforation of the deck, or its disruption by shell explosions at any point, involves very serious risk of damage to the turret bases and the loading apparatus. In fact, such damage may be effected and the heavy guns put out of action while the thick vertical armour on the citadel is uninjured. Moreover, as the turrets stand at the ends of a single citadel, there is a possibility of their simultaneous disablement by the explosion of heavy shell within the citadel. “This last risk may be minimised (as in the _Nile_ and _Trafalgar_) by constructing armoured ‘traverses’ within the citadel; but it cannot be wholly overcome, so long as both turrets stand in one armoured enclosure. “It may be thought that the risk of damage to a 3-inch steel deck situated 11 ft. above water is remote; but I think the facts are as stated, when actions at sea are taken into account. “For example, if a ship of 70 to 75 ft. beam is rolling only to 10 degrees from the vertical, which is by no means a heavy roll, she presents a target having a vertical (projected) height of 13 to 14 ft. to an enemy’s fire, and even if she is a steady, slow-moving ship, she will do this four or five times in each minute. “Now, at this angle of inclination, assuming the flight of projectiles to be practically horizontal, even the thickest protective steel decks yet fitted in battleships are liable to serious damage from the fire of guns of moderate calibre, and this danger is increased by the employment of high explosives. Of course, I do not mean to say that this damage is to follow from fire intentionally aimed at the protective deck; but with a great and sustained volume of fire, such as is possible with a powerful auxiliary armament, and especially with quick-firing guns, it is obvious that there is a very real danger of chance shots injuring seriously the wide expanse of the protective deck at the top of a long citadel. “Again, it must be noted that the chances of damage to a deck placed 10 or 11 ft. above water, and with large exposed surfaces in the neighbourhood of the turrets when a ship is inclined or rolling, are greater far than those of a deck 7 or 8 ft. lower, and with 5-inch armour on the sides protecting the deck from the direct impact of shells containing heavy bursters. It is for the naval gunner to estimate these chances of injury; but, unless I am greatly mistaken, their verdict will be that a far greater number of shots are likely to strike at a height of 8 to 10 ft. above water than at a height of 4 to 5 ft. “These considerations, I submit, amply justify the selection of the separate redoubt system, in association with the thin side armour above the belt, and the lowering of the protective deck to the top of the belt in the new designs. “It may be urged that, if the redoubt system be adopted, it should be associated with side armour and screen bulkheads of greater thickness than 5-inch steel, and more strongly backed. This is perfectly practicable, but necessarily costly, involving an additional load of armour, and a corresponding increase in the size of the ship.” The designs were vigorously criticised by Sir Edward Reed, whose chief objections centred on the fact that the lower-deck protection was thin armour only. Sir William White combatted this idea, and proved very conclusively that, according to the needs of the moment, his views were correct. It is, however, worthy of record that at a later date with the _Majestic_ class (see a few pages further on), he effected modifications which brought his ships more into line with what Sir Edward Reed had advocated. It should, however, be mentioned that this was not done until improvements in armour construction rendered possible things that were certainly impossible in the days of the _Royal Sovereigns_. In connection with the later career of the _Royal Sovereign_ class these items may be added. On completion they were found to be singularly simple in all their internal arrangements, and extraordinarily strong. When they went to the scrap-heap in 1911–12, they were, constructionally, practically as good as when built. They proved to be good sea boats, but at first rolled very badly, which resulted in their getting an unenviable notoriety in this respect. This was, however, completely cured by the fitting of bilge keels, after which the ships were everything that could be desired in the way of being steady gun platforms. The ever increasing vogue of the quickfirer tended to render them rather quickly obsolescent over things which to-day would count much less than they did in the past. The defects of the _Sovereigns_, as realised not very long after completion, were:-- (1) That the big guns’ crews were practically unprotected, and easily to be annihilated by the newly-introduced high explosive shells of the secondary armament of an enemy. (2) Only four of the ten 6-inch were armour protected, which also was considered a fatal drawback. In the first case nothing was ever done; but in the second, about the year 1900, casemates were fitted for the upper-deck guns of all ships except the _Hood_,[14] which on survey was found unsuitable for such reconstruction. The only thing that remains to add is that although in the course of years the ships lost the speeds for which they were designed, up to the very end they proved capable of doing about thirteen knots indefinitely. In addition to the _Sovereigns_ two “second-class battleships” were built, the _Centurion_ and _Barfleur_, of which details are:-- Displacement--10,500 tons. Complement, 620. Length--(Waterline) 360ft. Beam--70ft. Draught--(Maximum) 27ft. Armament--Four 10-inch, ten 4.7-inch, eight 6-pounders, twelve 3-pounders, two Maxims, two 9-pounder boat guns. Torpedo tubes (18-inch)--two submerged and one above water in the stern. The _Barfleur_ was laid down at Chatham in November, 1890, launched in August, 1892, and completed two years later. The _Centurion_, laid down at Portsmouth in March, 1891, was launched a year later, but completed before her sister. The ships were armoured generally on the _Royal Sovereign_ plan, with 12-inch belts which, however, were only 200ft. long, instead of 250ft. The bulkheads were six inches only, and the upper belt (nickel steel) an inch less than in the big ships. The barbettes were reduced to nine inches only, but on the other hand were made circular instead of pear-shaped, and 6-inch shields were provided for the big guns--probably as the result of criticisms of the unprotected big guns of the _Sovereigns_. With a few early exceptions as to the shape of the base, and with certain variation in form, this kind of “turret” has been adhered to ever since in the British Navy and copied into every other. Both ships were engined by the Greenock Foundry Company, and designed for 13,000 H.P., with forced draught, giving a speed of 18.5 knots, which speed both exceeded on trial. This high speed and their coal endurance--they carried a maximum of 1,125 tons, sufficient for a nominal 9750 mile radius--makes them something more than the “second-class battleships” which they nominally were. Compared to the _Sovereigns_ they were:-- =========================+====================+================== _Minus Points_: | _Barfleurs._ | _Sovereigns._ | | Displacement (tons) | 10,500 | 14,100 Principal guns | 4--10in., 10--4.7 | 4--13.5, 10--6in. Armour belt | 12 inches. | 18 inches. -------------------------+--------------------+------------------ _Plus Points_: | | | | Horse Power | 13,000 | 13,000 Speed | 18.5 | 17 Nominal endurance (kts.) | 9,750 | 7,900 =========================+====================+================== From which the existence of an elementary conception of the “battle-cruiser” of to-day seems fairly apparent. To-day the battle-cruiser, instead of having guns of reduced calibre, carries a reduced number, but the general principle of “moderate sacrifices for increased speed” obtains. The _Barfleur_ and _Centurion_ proved excellent steamers and good sea-boats. Their defect was their weak armament, and in 1903 it was decided to remedy this. In that year they were “reconstructed.” Their 4.7’s were taken out and 6-inch guns substituted, and the six on the upper deck were put into casemates. As a species of make-weight the foremast was taken out of both ships; but this made little difference. The “improvements” were a total failure; the ships were immersed far below what they had been designed for, and they never thereafter realised much more than about sixteen knots. Within seven years they were removed from the Navy List altogether, and such service as they performed after modernising was entirely of a subsidiary order. For the first-class cruisers of the Naval Defence Act reduced examples of the _Blenheim_ were decided on. These vessels were the _Edgar_, _Endymion_, _Grafton_, _Hawke_, _St. George_, _Gibraltar_, _Crescent_, and _Royal Arthur_ (formerly designated as the _Centaur_). They were launched between 1891 and 1892, averaging 7,350 tons (unsheathed) and 7,700 tons (sheathed and coppered, in the case of the last four mentioned). Except the two last, all had the _Blenheim_ armament of two 9.2 and ten 6-inch. The two latter had a couple of extra 6-inch on a raised forecastle substituted for the forward 9.2. No attempt was made to obtain the high speed of the _Blenheims_--19.5 knots being the utmost aimed at. Not only, however, did the _Edgar_ class exceed expectations on trial, but they proved most remarkably good steamers in service. No engine-room defects of moment were ever encountered in any of them, and twenty years after launch most were still able to steam at little short of the designed speed. Like the battleships, they were given 18-inch torpedoes in place of the 14-inch of the _Blenheims_. In the course of their service careers, the _St. George_ (or rather her crew) earned distinction in the Benin Expedition. The _Crescent_ was served in by King George V, and the _Hawke_ achieved notoriety by ramming the _Olympic_ in the Solent in 1911. The lesser cruisers of the Naval Defence Act numbered altogether 28. Of these twenty belonged to the _Apollo_ class of 3,400 tons (unsheathed) and 3,600 tons (sheathed). They were _Apollo_, _Andromache_, _Latona_, _Melampus_, _Naiad_, _Sappho_, _Scylla_, _Terpsichore_, _Thetis_, _Tribune_ (unsheathed), and _Aeolus_, _Brilliant_, _Indefatigable_ (named _Melpomene_ in 1911), _Intrepid_, _Iphigenia_, _Pique_, _Rainbow_, _Retribution_, _Sirius_, and _Spartan_ (sheathed). In all, the armament was two 6-inch and six 4.7, with lesser guns, and, above-water, 14-inch torpedo tubes. The speed was twenty knots in the unsheathed, and a quarter of a knot less in the sheathed ones. When built all proved able to steam very well, but after some years service certain of them fell off very badly in speed. Others, however, remained as fast as when they were built--the _Terpsichore_, in 1908, averaging 20.1 knots, and the _Aeolus_, in 1909, nearly nineteen knots. During their service, the _Melampus_ was commanded by King George as Prince George, while the _Scylla_, under Captain Percy Scott, gave birth to the “dotter,” and the “gunnery boom” which followed. In 1904 and onwards seven of them, scrapped from regular service--the _Latona_, _Thetis_, _Apollo_, _Andromache_, Iphigenia, _Intrepid_, and _Thetis_--were totally or partially disarmed and converted into mine layers. [Illustration: SECOND CLASS CRUISER OF THE NAVAL DEFENCE ACT ERA. NOW CONVERTED INTO A MINE-LAYER] The remaining eight cruisers of the Act--_Astræa_, _Bonaventure_, _Cambrian_, _Charybdis_, _Flora_, _Forte_, _Fox_, and _Hermione_--were increased in size up to 4,360 tons, and given a couple of extra 4.7, and 18-inch in place of 14-inch tubes. Instead of their 4.7’s being mounted in the well amidships, they were placed on the upper deck level, a much better position in a sea-way, but they never proved themselves quite such good ships for their size as did the earlier type. They served to illustrate the general rule that slight improvements on a design are rarely satisfactory, and that while every staple design has its defects, it is extremely difficult to remove one drawback without creating another. Moreover, such improvements invariably cause increased cost, and an essential with the small cruiser is that she shall be cheap enough to be numerically strong. Four _Astræas_ cost as much as five _Apollos_. They were rather more seaworthy, but no faster--if as fast. The total broadsides obtained were only _one_ 4.7 more and _two_ 6-inch _less_.[15] A considerably greater possible bunker capacity was obtained; but the normal supply (400 tons) was the same for both. In the British Navy, in 1908–11, a precisely similar thing obtained. It was probably inevitable. In the German Navy, between 1897 and 1907, displacement for small cruisers rose from 2,645 to 4,350 tons, with practically the same armament. But here the horse-power rose from about 8,500 or less to 20,000, and designed speeds in proportion, from a twenty-one knots (not made) to a 25.5, which, on trial, turned out to be 27,000 I.H.P. and over twenty-seven knots. Here, however, there was a definite aim--increased speed, with only trivial improvements in any other direction. With similar British cruisers the defect has invariably been “general improvements” on what the original design _might have been_ if plotted a year or two later than it actually was. There is no question--or very little--but that Germany in its ultra-conservative policy gauged the situation better than any British Admiralty ever did till just before the war. Minor cruisers _must_ be cheap to construct. Any improvement in them _must_ have a definite intrinsic value. Lacking that, it is worth very little. The _Astræas_, as cited, indicated how a supposed advantage may even be a real deficit from another point of view. The value of increased speed cannot be put into £ s. d., but armament easily can be. Like reconstruction, minor “improvements” on a design rarely pay. With the original conception the naval architect is given certain data for which he arranges accordingly. Ordered to improve upon it in any direction he can only add displacement and upset the balance of everything. The Naval Defence Act also included a certain number of third-class cruisers--_Pallas_, _Pearl_, _Philomel_, and _Phœbe_--for the ordinary service, and five similar ships for the Australian station, originally named _Pandora_, _Pelorus_, _Persian_, _Phœnix_, and _Psyche_. These were later altered to Australian names, _Katoomba_, _Mildura_, _Wallaroo_, _Tauranga_, and _Ringarooma_. They were of 2,575 tons, with 2½ decks, armaments of eight 4.7-inch and four above-water 14-inch tubes. The designed speed was 19 knots. Thirteen torpedo gunboats, improved _Rattlesnakes_, were laid down under the Act, corresponding to nine others of the normal Programme, of which two were for Australia. The Naval Defence boats were _Alarm_, _Antelope_, _Circe_, _Gleaner_, _Gossamer_, _Hebe_, _Renard_, _Speedy_--all laid down in 1889, as also were the _Whiting_ (afterwards _Boomerang_) and _Wizard_ (renamed _Karahatta_) for Australia. Those laid down normally in the previous year were the _Salamander_, _Seagull_, _Sheldrake_, _Skipjack_, _Spanker_, _Speedwell_, for the British Navy. Two others, _Assaye_ and _Plassy_, were built for the Indian Marine at and about this time. All carried a couple of 4.7-inch guns, were of about 750–850 tons displacement, and were first known as “catchers.” They were all intended to steam at 19 knots or over with locomotive boilers; but in service none ever did. At a later date, reboilered with water-tubes, many reached or exceeded the designed speed, and the majority of them are still in service for auxiliary purposes--many being specially fitted as mine sweepers, and the rest used as tenders for various services. They are of considerable interest on account of the fact that the destroyers of 1909–12 were practically the same displacement and general shape, with a not very dissimilar armament--two 4-inch instead of two 4.7. The modern destroyers, however, were approximately ten knots faster--an interesting commentary on engineering improvements in the course of twenty years! More interesting still, however, is the fact that Sir William White should have evolved twenty years ago almost exactly what--except in the matter of modern speed possibilities--is to-day the recognised ideal for destroyers. In the British Navy the torpedo gunboats never get beyond the “catcher” stage--they never had the opportunity; but it is worthy of note that the first two ships to be torpedoed under anything like modern war conditions--the Chilian _Blanco Encalada_ and the Brazilian _Aquidaban_--were both sunk by vessels of almost exactly the same type as the “catchers,” and not by torpedo boats. So far as the British Navy was concerned, the “catchers” tested in the “secret manœuvres” of 1891 did uncommonly well. They hung about off the torpedo bases, and though only about one to four, accounted for at least 90 per cent. of the hostile torpedo boats. To this very success, perhaps, was due the fact that in their own day they were not thought of as an offensive arm against big ships--destruction of the torpedo boat was then the principal aim in view. This they fulfilled. The South American Republics discovered their “other uses,” and so really led the way to the evolution of the destroyer of a later era. Perhaps the only nation which really read the lesson involved was Germany. So long ago as 1895 she had launched the 2,000-ton “small cruiser” _Hela_; in 1898 the _Gazelle_ of 2,645 tons was set afloat. For years Germany added to the _Gazelle_ class, at a time when all the rest of the world had decreed that “third-class cruisers” were useless. Not for many a year did the British Admiralty discover that Germany had seen the matter of the _Lynch_ and the _Sampaio_[16] better than any other Power. Neither of these ships in attacking got hit. They got home without. But they might have been hit. Germany evolved something that even if hit badly would still float long enough to get off her torpedoes. Till the Chilian “catchers” in 1891 proved their offensive abilities, no one had ever considered that side of the question. To this day Germany has never really received her meed of credit for perceiving that a small third-class cruiser has potentialities with torpedoes against a battleship at night. [Illustration: HOOD. ROYAL SOVEREIGN. BARFLEUR. RENOWN. MAJESTIC. LONDON. KING EDWARD. BATTLESHIPS OF THE WHITE ERA.] So late as the present day much comment about German small cruisers being inadequately gunned, a clear indication that just as in the past there was a difficulty in conceiving of the torpedo-gunboat for other than her nominal use, so the possibilities of the small cruiser in the role of destroyer were still apt to be generally overlooked. In February, 1893, there was laid down the _Renown_, the only armoured ship of the 1892–93 Estimates; an improved _Centurion_, with thinner belt armour. Harvey armour--three inches of which had the resisting value of four inches of compound or six inches of iron--was adopted in this ship for the first time. Influences other than taking advantage of the reduced weight required for a given protective value were, however, at work, for in the _Renown_ sacrifices were made at the water-line in order to secure better protection to the lower deck side. Details of the _Renown_:-- Displacement--12,350 tons. Length (between perpendiculars)--380ft. Beam--72⅓ft. Draught--(maximum) 27ft. Armament--Four 10-inch, ten 6-inch 40 cal., twelve 12-pounders, four submerged 18-inch tubes, and one above water-line in stern. Armour--8--6in. belt, 200ft. long amidships, 6in. side above. Bulkheads 10--6in., barbettes 10in., casemates, main deck ones 6in., upper deck ones, 4in. Horse-power--12,000 = 18 knots. Coal--(normal) 800 tons; (maximum) 1,760 tons = nominal 7,200 miles at ten knots. Built at Pembroke; engined by Maudslay; she was launched in May, 1895, and completed for sea in April, 1897, having taken no less than 4¼ years to build. Cost, £746,247. She proved one of the best steamers ever built for the Navy. On a four-hour trial she made 18.75 knots, with 12,901 I.H.P. Her economical speed proved to be fifteen knots. She always steamed well, and after thirteen years’ service did 17.4 knots with ease. The special feature of this ship was that in her instead of the ordinary flat deck on top of the belt, a sloping deck behind the belt was first introduced. This system--rigidly adhered to in the British Navy ever since, and copied eventually into every other Navy--was based upon the idea of reinforcing the deck-protected cruiser with side armour. The principle involved was that at whatever angle the belt might be hit and penetrated, the incoming projectile would then meet a further obstruction at a 45° angle, calculated to present a maximum of deflecting resistance. Professor Hovgaard and others have since indicated that, weight for weight, three inches of inclined deck armour, having to be spread more, represent as much or more tons as six inches of vertical armour (the nominal equivalent), and protective decks behind armour are to-day much thinner than of yore and little better than “splinter decks.” The principle, however, remains, as originated by Sir William White, and is, perhaps, the most characteristic feature of his era: seeing how universally the idea was copied. The French were the last to adopt it. Instead, they used the flat deck below the belt in addition to the one on top of it. This was made use of so late as the _République_ and _Liberté_ class. While ideally better for resisting projectiles which might penetrate the belt, it was impossible of really practical application amidships on account of the difficulty of keeping the engines entirely below it. [Illustration: PROTECTED CRUISER. ROYAL SOVEREIGN. RENOWN. SUFFREN (FRENCH) SYSTEMS OF WATER-LINE PROTECTION.] The _Renown_ was the first ship to carry all her secondary guns in casemates. She was fitted as a flagship, and first served on the North American Station. When Admiral Fisher went from there to the Mediterranean he took the _Renown_ with him as flagship, presumably with the idea that speed was better than power in a flagship. The _Renown’s_ fighting power was small even then, but she was well fitted for the social side of flagship work--so nicely, indeed, that the flash-plates of the big guns had been taken up so as not to interfere with ladies’ shoes in dances! After leaving the Mediterranean the _Renown_ was still further converted into a “battleship yacht,” the six-inch guns being removed. She was painted white, and used to convey the then Prince of Wales to India. Thereafter she practically disappeared from the effective list and eventually became a training ship for stokers. The _Renown_ was followed by the ships of the Spencer programme, nine battleships of the _Majestic_ class, which were spread over the 1893–94 Estimates, and those of the next year. The _Majestics_ were in substance amplified _Renowns_, their special and particular feature being that in place of the two amidships belt of varying thickness a single belt of 16ft. wide of a uniform 9in. thickness was substituted. In the _Majestics_, the 13.5, which had been for so long the standard gun for first-class battleships, disappeared in favour of a new type of 12-inch, a Mark VIII. of 35 calibres. The two types compare as follows:-- =====+=======+=======+===========+================================= | | | |Maximum Penetration against K.C. Bore.|Length.|Weight.|Projectile.| (capped projectiles). Inch.| Cals. | Tons. | lbs. | at 5000 yds. | at 3000 yds. | | | | in. | in. -----+-------+-------+-----------+-----------------+--------------- 13.5 | 30 | 67 | 1250 | 9 | 12 | | | | | 12 | 35 | 46 | 850 | 11½ | 14½ =====+=======+=======+===========+=================+=============== The new gun was, therefore, superior in everything except weight of projectile, and that was not considered much in those days. To-day, of course, it has quite a special meaning. In the _Majestics_, except in the first two, all-round loading positions for the big guns were introduced in place of the cumbersome old system whereby, after firing, the guns had to return to an end-on position, tilt up, and at a fixed angle take their charges at what was little but an adaption for breechloaders of the loading system evolved twenty years before for the old _Inflexible_. Details of these ships:-- Displacement--14,900 tons. Length--(between perpendiculars) 390ft., (over-all) 413ft. Beam--75ft. Draught--(mean), 27½ ft., (maximum) about 30ft. Armament--Four 12-inch 35 cal., twelve 6-inch 40 cal., sixteen 12-pounders, twelve 3-pounders. Torpedo tubes (18-inch), four submerged and one above water in stern. Armour (Harvey)--Belt, (220ft. by 16ft.) 9in. Bulkheads, 14in. Barbettes, 14in. with 10in. turrets. Casemates, 6in. Horse-power--12,000 = 17.5 knots. Coal--(normal) 1,200 tons; (maximum) 2,200 tons = nominal radius of 7,600 miles at 10 knots and 4,000 at 15 knots. The ships were built, etc., as follows:-- ================+============+=============+================== Name. | Laid down. | Builder. | Engined by ----------------+------------+-------------+------------------ _Magnificent_ | Dec. ’93 | Chatham | Penn _Majestic_ | Feb. ’94 | Portsmouth | Vickers _Hannibal_ | April, ’94 | Pembroke | Harland & Wolff _Victorious_ | May, ’94 | Chatham | Hawthorn, Leslie _Mars_ | June, ’94 | Laird | Laird _Prince George_ | Sept. ’94 | Portsmouth | Humphrys _Jupiter_ | Oct. ’94 | Clydebank | Clydebank _Cæsar_ | March, ’95 | Portsmouth | Maudslay _Illustrious_ | March, 95 | Chatham | Penn ================+============+=============+================== Mostly they were completed inside two years, the only ones which took appreciably longer being the _Hannibal_ and the _Illustrious_. In these and the _Cæsar_ an innovation introduced in the others--the placing of the chart house round the base of the foremast with the conning tower well clear ahead--was done away with, and the old system of the bridge over the conning tower reverted to. In the _Cæsar_ and _Illustrious_, laid down later than the others, an improvement was effected by the introduction of circular instead of pear-shaped barbettes. The _Majestic_, _Magnificent_, and _Cæsar_ were built in dry dock instead of on slips--the first instance of this since the days of early coast-defence monitors. The total cost was approximately a million per ship. On trials most of them exceeded the designed speed, but all were light on trials. They proved very handy ships, with circles of 450 yards at fifteen knots. Coal consumption was always high. Compared to the _Sovereigns_, the following figures are of interest:-- =============+============+=========+==========+=======+======== | | | Weight of| | |Displacement|Weight of|Armament &| |Normal Name. | (tons). | Armour |Ammunition| | Coal | | (tons). | (tons). | H.P. |(tons). -------------+------------+---------+----------+-------+-------- _Majestics_ | 14,900 | 4260 | 1500 |12,000 | 1200 _Sovereigns_ | 14,100 | 4600 | 1410 |13,000 | 900 =============+============+=========+==========+=======+======== The total dead weight carried in armament, armour, and coal thus works out at practically the same figure, despite the rise of 800 tons in displacement. On these grounds certain attacks were made upon the ships, mainly by those who argued against the unarmoured ends. The criticisms were, however, mainly of the captious order--the ships were certainly the finest specimens of naval architecture of their day. At a later date electric hoists were fitted to the 6-inch guns, and 400 tons of oil fuel were added to the fuel capacity (the maximum coal capacity being reduced by 200 tons). The first ship to be so fitted was the _Mars_. Another innovation was shifting the torpedo nets, first in the _Mars_, then in all the others, from the upper deck to the main deck level; the idea being to keep the nets clear of the 6-inch guns. The _Majestic_ and _Magnificent_ served for a long time as flagships in the Channel Fleet. Admiral Sir F. Stephenson and Sir A. K. Wilson flew their flags in the _Majestic_, of which ship Prince Louis of Battenberg was at one time captain. It was during the early service of the _Majestics_ in the Channel Fleet that “invisible” colours for warships first came into consideration, all ships up to that date being painted with black hulls, white upper works, and yellow masts and funnels. For these experiments the _Magnificent_ was painted black all over, the _Majestic_ and _Hannibal_ were given grey and light green upper works respectively. The latter was really the more “invisible” of the two, but both ships were left with black hulls. Ultimately a grey, a little darker than that which the Germans had long used, was adopted as the regulation, though for some time it varied greatly between ship and ship, following the old system under which a good deal of latitude in painting was allowed.[17] To this era, 1894–95, belong two groups of protected cruisers, the _Powerfuls_ and the _Talbots_. The latter, nine in all, were merely enlarged (5,600 tons) editions of the later cruisers of the Naval Defence Act, and call for no comment. The former group were the _Powerful_ and _Terrible_, “replies” to the Russian _Rurik_ and _Rossiya_. They displaced nearly as much as the battleships--14,200 tons--and ran to the then unheard of length of 500ft. between perpendiculars. They carried no belt armour whatever, but were given stout protective decks, no less than 6in. on the slopes amidships. The two big guns (40 calibre, 9.2) were given 6in. Harvey barbettes, the twelve other guns[18] (6-inch) being in 6-inch casemates. Sixteen 12-pounders were disposed about the upper works. Designed horse-power 25,000 = 22 knots. Total bunker capacity of 3,000 tons, equal to a nominal 7,000 miles at fourteen knots. Both ships were laid down in 1894, the _Powerful_ by Vickers and the _Terrible_ at Clydebank. They were launched in the following year. In service the _Powerfuls_ proved capable of keeping up a speed of twenty knots almost indefinitely. For the rest, they were unhandy ships with large turning circles. At the time of the South African War, both of them were at the Cape, and did service with landed naval brigades. Of these, one from the _Powerful_, with some 4.7’s on special Percy Scott gun-carriages, materially assisted in the defence of Ladysmith. During the year 1911 the decision was come to that it was not worth while preserving either ship, on account of the large crews required and their comparatively small fighting value under modern conditions. Two considerable novelties were embodied in these ships. The first of these was the adoption of electrical gear for the big guns. The other and more far-reaching was the adoption of Belleville boilers. _THE BATTLE OF THE BOILERS._ Owing to favourable reports of their use in the French Navy, Belleville boilers were in 1895 experimentally fitted to the _Sharpshooter_, torpedo gunboat; but the decision to adopt them in large ships was taken from French rather than any British experience. Trouble and failure were freely predicted. With the result frequently attending lugubrious predictions, very little trouble has ever been experienced with any type and then only in the very early stage when the water-tube boiler was an almost unknown curiosity to the engine-room staff. The chief advantages claimed for Belleville boilers were the higher working pressures, economy in maintenance and fuel consumption, saving of weight, rapid steam raising, and great facility for repairs. [Illustration: WHITE ERA BATTLESHIPS OF THE MAJESTIC CLASS] The Belleville was the first water-tube boiler to come into prominence; other types, however, soon appeared. In the period 1895–98, torpedo gunboats were experimentally fitted as follows:--_Sharpshooter_, Belleville; _Sheldrake_, Babcock; _Seagull_, Niclausse; _Spanker_, Du Temple; _Salamander_, Mumford; _Speedy_, Thornycroft--these three last being of the small tube type. Other existing types were the Yarrow, White-Foster, Normand, Reed, Blechynden, all these being of the small tube type also, and regarded as suitable for small craft only.[19] In the matter of big ships, so far as the British Navy was concerned, “water-tube boiler” for some years meant Bellevilles only, whence it came that in the insensate “Battle of the Boilers,” which presently broke out, Bellevilles were the main object of attack in Parliament and elsewhere. Actually, of course, the whole principle was in the melting pot. All the elements opposed to change in any form rallied to the attack, led on and influenced in some cases by those whose interests were bound up with the old style cylindrical boilers. It was all over again the old story of the fight for the retention of the paddle against the screw propeller, with an equal disregard for facts. Unfortunately the party of progress played somewhat into the hands of the reactionaries. In fitting the Belleville type only, they had not much alternative, other types being then in a less forward state. The error made was that in the wholesale adoption of a new type of steam generator, requiring twice the skill and intelligence necessary for the old type, it was practically impossible to train quickly enough a sufficiency of engineers and stokers. Hence troubles soon arose. An even greater error was that the boilers were mostly built in England to the French specifications, without, in many cases, sufficient experienced supervision; and minor “improvements,” such as fusible plugs and restricting regulations, were introduced by more or less amateur Admiralty authorities--which also produced trouble. For example, French practice had taught that adding lime to the feed water was desirable; but in many British ships this rule was ignored. Again, one Belleville essential was to throw on coal in very small quantities at a time, in contradistinction to the old cylindrical practice in which shovelling on enormous quantities of coal was the recipe for increased speed. This feature was often disregarded. The Belleville, ever a complicated and delicate mechanism, if its full efficiency is to be secured, was a worse boiler for the experiments than many of the simpler types of to-day would have been. But no water-tube boiler of any type would have stood any chance of success against the opposition. There were some terrible times in the boiler rooms in those days. One or two ships whose chief engineers had been specially trained in France secured marvellous results, usually by ignoring Admiralty improvements and regulations.[20] But for one success there were many early failures. [Illustration: EDGAR. POWERFUL. DIADEM. CRESSY. DRAKE. COUNTY. DEVONSHIRE. PRINCIPAL CRUISERS OF THE WHITE ERA.] The agitation triumphed to the extent of a Committee of Inquiry being appointed. An interim report of this Committee made a scape-goat of the Belleville, to the extent of recommending that no more should be fitted. But the victory of the retrogrades ended there. A species of compromise with public opinion inflamed against the water-tube system was temporarily adopted, and absurd mixed installations of cylindrical and water-tube boilers were fitted to some ships. Four large tube types were selected as substitutes for Bellevilles, the Niclausse, Dürr (a German variant of the Niclausse), the Babcock and Wilcox, and the Yarrow large tube. It may approximately be said that every water-tube boiler is a species of compromise between facility for rapid repair on board ship and complication, and the need of great care in using and working. It is usual to put the Belleville at one end of this scale and the Yarrow (large tube) at the other, this last boiler now requiring little, if any, more care than the old type of cylindrical. In the course of comparatively short experiments, both the Niclausse and the Dürr were found to possess most of the alleged deficiencies of the Belleville without its advantages; and it was decided to fit all future types of large ships with the Babcock and Yarrow types only. The absurd mixture of cylindrical and water-tube boilers was wisely done away with. Curiously enough, the Belleville boiler, once the agitation had ceased, also ceased to be troublesome. This was no doubt due to the increased experience which had been gained in the interim. Both the Babcock and Yarrow boilers have been immensely improved since the days when they were first brought out. Something of the same sort is, of course, true of all the standard types, and there is to-day hardly any question as to which of them may be the best or worst. Each type has some special advantage of its own, and in no case, probably, is that advantage sufficiently pronounced to render any one type absolutely the best. When adopted by the Admiralty the Belleville was certainly the best water-tube boiler available. Had it been persisted in and not “improved” by amateurs it would probably have done quite as well as any type adopted to-day. The real issue was mainly not one of type, but of principle. That principle was the water-tube boiler as opposed to the old type cylindrical. The Estimates for 1896–97 provided for five battleships which were somewhat sarcastically alluded to as “improved” _Majestics_. These ships were the _Canopus_ class, and they mark a species of early striving after the ideal of the battle-cruisers of to-day. That is to say, certain sacrifices were made in them with a view to securing increased speed. Particulars of these ships:-- Displacement--12,950 tons. Length--(over all) 418ft. Beam--74ft. Draught--(maximum) 26½ft. Armament--Four 12in., 35 cal., twelve 6in. 40 cal., ten 12-pounders, four submerged tubes (18in.) Armour--Harvey-Nickel. Belt amidships 6in. with 2in. extension to the bow and 1½in. skin aft on the water-line. Bulkheads and barbettes 12in. Turrets 8in. Horse-power--31,500 = 18.25 knots. Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 2,300 tons = nominal radius of 8,000 miles at 10 knots. The adoption of Harvey-Nickel armour, which was of superior resisting power to Harvey armour in the ratio of about 5 to 4, partly, but not entirely accounted for the thinning of the armour of this class. Theoretically, the 9in. armour belt of the _Majestic_ was equal to 18in. of iron, while the belt of the _Canopus_ class was equal to about 15in. of iron. In place of the 4in. deck of the _Majestics_, the _Canopus_ class had only a 2½in. deck. The thin bow (2in.) plating was introduced as a sop to a public agitation against soft-ended ships. Such a belt is, of course, perfectly useless against any heavy projectile, or, for that matter, against 6in., except at very long range indeed. Sir William White never made any secret of his cynical disbelief in these bow belts. They were and always have been what doctors call a “placebo.” In the following year the sixth ship of this class was built--the _Vengeance_. She differed from the others in the form of her turrets, which were flat sided for the first time. In her also a mounting was first introduced, whereby, in addition to being loaded in any position, big guns could also be loaded at any elevation. Some other details of the _Canopus_ class are:-- =============+=============+=================+============+========== Name. | Built by | Engines by | Laid down. |Completed. -------------+-------------+-----------------+------------+---------- _Canopus_ | Portsmouth | Greenock | Jan. ’97 | 1900 _Goliath_ | Chatham | Penn | Jan. ’97 | 1900 _Albion_ | Thames I.W. | Maudslay | Dec. ’96 | 1902 _Ocean_ | Devonport | Hawthorn Leslie | Feb. ’97 | 1900 _Glory_ | Laird | Laird | Dec. ’96 | 1901 _Vengeance_ | Vickers | Vickers | Aug. ’97 | 1901 =============+=============+=================+============+========== The cruisers of the following year were eight cruisers of the much discussed _Diadem_ class, small editions of the _Powerful_ (11,000 tons), and carrying a pair of 6-inch guns in place of the 9.2’s of the _Powerfuls_. For the first four (the _Diadem_, _Andromeda_, _Europa_, and _Niobe_) a speed of 20.5 knots only was provided, but in the late four (the _Argonaut_, _Ariadne_, _Amphitrite_, and _Spartiate_) the horse-power was increased to 18,000, in order to provide twenty-one knots. At the present time (1912) these ships have for all practical purposes already passed from the effective list, all the weak points of the _Powerfuls_ being exaggerated in them. In the Estimates for the years 1895 to 1898, provision was made also for eleven small third-class cruisers of the “P” class of 2135 tons and twenty knot speed. The armament consisted of eight 4-inch guns. On trials most of them did well, but in a very short time their speeds fell off, and at the present time, such of them as remain on the active list are slower than the far older cruisers of the _Apollo_ class. In the Estimates for 1897–98, in addition to the _Vengeance_, already mentioned, three improved copies of the _Majestic_ were provided. These ships were:-- ===============+============+============+=========== Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engines by. ---------------+------------+----------- +----------- _Formidable_ | March, ’98 | Portsmouth | Earle _Irresistible_ | April, ’98 | Chatham | Maudslay _Implacable_ | July, ’98 | Devonport | Laird ===============+============+============+=========== The only difference between them and the _Majestics_ lies in advantage being taken of improvements in gunnery and armour to increase the offensive and defensive items. The absurd 2-inch bow belt of the _Canopus_ was repeated in them, but raised within 2½ft. of the main deck. A 40-calibre 12-inch was mounted, also a 45-calibre 6-inch. These were the first ships of the British Navy in which Krupp cemented armour was used. This armour, generally known as “K.C.,” has approximately a resisting power three times that of iron armour. That is to say, the 9in. belts of the _Formidables_ were approximately 33 per cent. more effective than the similar belts of the _Majestics_. These ships proved faster and more handy, easily exceeding their designed eighteen knots. The superior handiness was brought about by a superior form of hull--the deadwood aft being cut away for the first time in them. In this year’s Estimates armoured cruisers definitely re-appeared, six ships of the _Cressy_ type being laid down. Particulars of these:-- Displacement--12,000 tons. Length--454ft. Beam--69½ft. Draught--(maximum) 28ft. Armament--Two 9.2, 40 cal., twelve 6-inch, 45 cal., twelve 12-pounders, two 18in. submerged tubes. Armour--6in. Krupp belt amidships, 250ft. long by 11½ft. wide, 2in. continuation to the bow. Barbettes 6in. Casemates 5in. Horse power--21,000 = 21 knots. Coal--(normal) 800 tons; (maximum) 1,600 tons. ============+============+===========+============ Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engines by. ------------+------------+-----------+------------ _Sutlej_ | Aug. ’98 | Clydebank | Clydebank _Cressy_ | Oct. ’98 | Fairfield | Fairfield _Aboukir_ | Nov. ’98 | Fairfield | Fairfield _Hogue_ | July, ’98 | Vickers | Vickers _Bacchante_ | Dec. ’99 | Clydebank | Clydebank _Euryalus_ | July, ’99 | Vickers | Vickers ============+============+===========+============ In substance these ships were armoured editions of the _Powerful_. They steamed very well in their time, but have now fallen off considerably and are no longer of any importance. Total weight of armour 2,100 tons. An innovation introduced in these ships was the fitting of non-flammable wood, which at a later date was objected to on the grounds that it deteriorated the gold lace of the uniforms stored in drawers made of it. The _Cressy_ was completed in 1901; the others, excepting the _Euryalus_, in 1902. This latter ship was greatly delayed from various causes, and not completed until 1903. The 1898–99 Estimates consisted of three battleships and four armoured cruisers. The battleships were practically sisters to the _Formidable_, but differed from her in that the main belt, instead of being a patch amidships, has a total length of 300ft. from the bow. At the bow it is 2in., quickly increasing to 4in., 5in., 6in., and finally to 9in., and this provided a measure of protection that the 2in. belts of preceding ships could never afford. The flat-sided turrets, first introduced in the _Vengeance_, were also fitted in these ships, the _Formidables_ having the old pattern turrets. The advantages of flat-sided turrets lie in the fact that K.C. can be used for them instead of the relatively softer non-cemented. K.C. is not applicable to curved surfaces, for which reason barbettes, casemates, and batteries with curved portholes in them and rounded turrets cannot be constructed of it. Flat-sided turrets consist of a number of flat plates placed to meet each other at predetermined angles, thus forming one homogeneous whole. These battleships were:-- ============+============+===========+============ Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engines by. ------------+------------+-----------+------------ _London_ | Dec. ’98 | Portsmouth| Earle _Bulwark_ | March, ’99 | Devonport | Hawthorn _Venerable_ | Nov. ’99 | Chatham | Maudslay ============+============+===========+============ All were completed in 1902. The cruisers of the same year, the _Drake_ class, were “improved” _Cressies_, with increased displacement, power and speed. The increased displacement allowed of four extra 6-inch guns being mounted, these being placed in casemates on top of the amidships casemates. Particulars of the _Drake_ class:-- Displacement--14,000 tons. Length--(over all) 529½ft. Beam--71ft. Draught--(maximum) 28ft. Armament--Two 9.2, 45 cal. (instead of 40 cal., as in the _Cressies_), sixteen 6-inch, 45 cal., and fourteen 12-pounders, two submerged tubes (18in.). Armour--2,700 tons, as in _Cressy_, except that the casemates are 6in. thick. Horse-power--30,000 = 23 knots. Boilers, 43 Belleville. Coal--(normal) 1,250 tons; (maximum) 2,500. These ships were altogether superior to the _Cressy_ class. On trial they all easily made their contract speeds and subsequently greatly exceeded them. It was discovered that increased speed was to be obtained by additional weight aft, and this was so much brought to a fine art that weights were adjusted accordingly, and in one of them, seeking to make a speed record, the entire crew were once mustered aft in order to vary the trim! Building details are as follows:-- ===============+============+==========+===========+============== Name. | Laid down. |Completed.| Built at. | Engines by. ---------------+------------+----------+-----------+-------------- _Good Hope_ | Sept. ’99 | 1902 | Fairfield | Fairfield _Drake_ | April, ’99 | 1902 | Pembroke | Humphrys & T. _Leviathan_ | Nov. ’99 | 1903 | Clydebank | Clydebank _King Alfred_ | Aug. ’99 | 1903 | Vickers | Vickers ===============+============+==========+===========+============== For some years these were the fastest ships in the world. In 1905, in a race by the Second Cruiser Squadron across the Atlantic, with ships of nominally equal speed, the _Drake_ came in first. In December, 1906, at four-fifths power for thirty hours, she averaged 22.5 knots. In 1907, the _King Alfred_ averaged 25.1 knots for one hour, and made an eight hours’ mean of 24.8. They proved very economical steamers, being able to do nineteen knots at an expenditure of eleven tons of coal an hour, and though they are now getting old, as warships go, they have never yet been beaten on the results achieved by horse-power per ton of displacement. The Estimates of 1898–99 included a supplementary programme of four armoured ships which, like the _Canopus_ class, again foreshadowed the battle cruisers of to-day. These were the famous _Duncan_ class, and may be described as slightly smaller editions of the _London_, with armour thickness sacrificed for superior speed. The belt amidships was reduced from 9in. to 7in., but against this the belt at the extreme bow was made an inch thicker, and 25ft. away from the ram became 5in. thick. The displacement sank by 1,000 tons, the horse-power was increased by 3,000, and the speed by one knot. The total weight of armour is about 3,500 against 4,300 tons in the _Londons_. The _Duncans_ may be regarded as a species of recrudescence of Barnaby ideas, plus a later notion that a well-extended partial protection was better than a more concentrated protection of less area. Generally speaking, they were improved duplicates of the _Canopus_ class, in the same way that the _Formidable_ and the ships that followed her were duplicates of the _Majestic_. Two ideas were obviously at work. In other forms these two ideas have (with variations) existed to the present day. Then it was purely a question between ratios devoted to speed and protection. To-day (1912) matters have been so far modified that increased displacements are given to secure speed advantages, but protection remains proportionately as it was. Reduced armament has always been accepted. Construction details of the _Duncans_, of which two more figured in the estimates for 1899–1900:-- ============+============+==============+============= Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engines by. ------------+------------+--------------+------------- _Duncan_ | July, ’99 | Thames, I.W. | Thames, I.W. _Russell_ | March, ’99 | Palmer | Palmer _Cornwallis_| July, ’99 | Thames, I.W. | Thames, I.W. _Exmouth_ | Aug. ’99 | Laird | Laird _Albemarle_ | Jan. ’00 | Chatham | Thames, I.W. _Montagu_ | Nov. ’99 | Devonport | Laird ============+============+==============+============= The _Montagu_ was wrecked on Lundy Island in 1906. Contemporaneous with the _Drakes_, and extending over four ships in the Estimates of 1898–99 to two in the following and four in the year later, ten armoured cruisers were provided for, which in essence were little but an attempt to provide a normal second-class protected cruiser of the _Talbot_ class, with armour protection. These ships--the _County_ class--are of 9,800 tons displacement, and may also be regarded as diminutives of the _Drake_ and _Cressy_ classes, with a touch of the _Diadems_ thrown in. In place of the fore and aft 9.2’s of the _Drake_ and _Cressy_, they were supplied with a couple of pairs of 6-inch guns mounted in turrets fore and aft. The belt amidships was reduced to 4in. (a thickness in K.C. which has no virtues over armour of earlier type) with the usual extension of 2in. to the bow. The twin turrets, in which, like those of the _Powerful_, electrical control was once more introduced, have never given satisfaction, being very cramped for working purposes, and probably no more efficient than single gun turrets would have been, certainly less than the single gun 7--5in. turrets, originally proposed as an alternative, would have been. Had the ships been regarded frankly as modern variants of the second-class protected cruisers, they probably would have been esteemed more than they were. Unfortunately they have always been regarded as “armoured ships” and discounted on account of their obvious inferiority to the _Drakes_. In the matter of steaming all of them have invariably done well (except in the case of the _Essex_, over which a mistake in design was made). The anticipated twenty-three knots was made quite easily, once certain early propeller difficulties were overcome. The Boiler Commission, already referred to, affected these ships, in so far that, instead of the hitherto inevitable Bellevilles, the _Berwick_ and _Suffolk_ were given Niclausse boilers and the _Cornwall_ Babcocks. The total weight of armour is 1,800 tons. Details of the construction of this class are:-- ==============+===========+==============+============== Name. | Laid down.| Built at. | Engines by. --------------+-----------+------------- +-------------- _Essex_ | Jan. ’00 | Pembroke | Clydebank _Kent_ | Feb. ’00 | Portsmouth | Hawthorn _Bedford_ | Feb. ’00 | Fairfield | Fairfield _Monmouth_ | Aug. ’99 | L. & Glasgow | L. & Glasgow _Lancaster_ | Mar. ’01 | Elswick | Hawthorn L. _Berwick_ | April, ’01| Beardmore | Humphrys _Donegal_ | Feb. ’01 | Fairfield | Fairfield _Cornwall_ | Mar. ’01 | Pembroke | Hawthorn _Cumberland_ | Feb. ’01 | L. & Glasgow | L. & Glasgow _Suffolk_ | Mar. ’02 | Portsmouth | Humphrys & T. ==============+===========+==============+============== All were completed during 1903 and 1904. For the year 1900–01 only two battleships were provided: the _Queen_, built at Devonport and engined by Harland and Wolff, and the _Prince of Wales_, built at Chatham and engined by the Greenock Foundry Co. These were laid down in 1901 and completed in 1904. They were copies of the _Londons_ in every detail, saving that, instead of being enclosed, their upper deck batteries were left open as in the _Duncans_. The _Queen_ was given Babcock boilers instead of Bellevilles. The 1901–02 Estimates provided three battleships and six armoured cruisers of the _County_ class. These were the last ships designed by Sir William White. The battleships, of which eight were built altogether--three for 1901–02, two for the next year--were of a different type from any which had preceded them, and to some extent may be said to mark the birth of the _Dreadnought_ era. That is to say, in them the old idea of the two calibres, 12in. and 6in., died out, and heavier auxiliary guns began to appear. Particulars of these ships, _the King Edward VII_ class, are as follows:-- Displacement--16,350 tons. Length--(over all) 453¾ft. Beam--78ft. Draught--(maximum) 26¾ft. Armament--Four 12-inch, 40 cal., four 9.2, 45 cal., ten 6-inch, 45 cal., twelve 12-pounders, fourteen 3-pounders, five 18-inch submerged tubes (of which one is in the stern). Armour--As in the _London_ (but a 6in. battery instead of casemates). Horse-power--18,000 = 18.9 knots. Coal--(normal) 950 tons; (maximum) 2,150 tons, also 400 tons of oil, except in the _New Zealand_. ==============================+===========+============+============== Name. | Laid down.| Built at. | Engines by. ------------------------------+-----------+------------+-------------- _Commonwealth_ | June, ’01 | Fairfield | Fairfield _King Edward_ | Mar. ’02 | Devonport | Harland & W. _Dominion_ | May, ’02 | Vickers | Vickers _Hindustan_ | Oct. ’02 | Clydebank | Clydebank _New Zealand_ (now _Zelandia_)| Feb. ’03 | Portsmouth | Humphrys & T. _Africa_ | Jan. ’04 | Chatham | Clydebank _Britannia_ | Feb. ’04 | Portsmouth | Humphrys & T. _Hibernia_ | Jan. ’04 | Devonport | Harland & W. ==============================+===========+============+============== Except the last three, all were completed in 1905. The others were completed very shortly afterwards. The boilers fitted to these ships varied considerably. The _King Edward_, _Hindustan_, and _Britannia_ were given a mixed installation of Babcocks and cylindricals; the _New Zealand_ Niclausse boilers; the other ships Babcock only. In the _Britannia_, super-heaters were also fitted to six of her boilers. The point differentiating these ships from their predecessors was the mounting of four 9.2 guns in single turrets at the angles of the superstructure. Equally novel was the placing of 6-inch guns in a battery behind the armour on the main deck.[21] Fighting tops, a feature of all previous ships, disappeared, and in place of them fire-control platforms were substituted. When produced, these ships were considered as something like the “last word”; but in service later on it was very soon found that the two calibres of big guns rendered fire-control extremely difficult, and they have been a somewhat costly lesson in that respect. They cost about £1,500,000 each, and were found to be all that could be desired tactically, their turning circles with engines being only about 340yds. at fifteen knots. All of them did not make their speeds on trials, and some have never quite come up to expectations in that respect, but they have all proved remarkably reliable steamers. Six armoured cruisers provided for in the 1901–02 Estimates were the _Devonshires_. These were originally intended to have been enlarged _Counties_, carrying a single 7.5 fore and aft, in place of the twin 6-inch turrets of the prototype ships. The design was, however, modified to the extent of substituting a single 7.5 for each of the forward pairs of 6-inch casemates. Details of these ships are:-- Displacement--10,850 tons. Length (between perpendiculars)--450ft. Beam--68½ft. Draught--(maximum) 25½ft. Armament--Four 7.5, six 6-inch, 45 cal.; two 12-pounders, twenty-two 3-pounders, two 18in. torpedo tubes submerged. Armour Belt--(length 325ft. from the bow, width 10½ft.), 6in. amidships, thinning to 2in. right forward. Barbettes 6in. Turrets 5in. Casemates 6in. Horse-power--21,000==22.5 knots. Coal--(normal) 800; (maximum) 1,800 tons. Other details are:-- ================+============+==================+============== Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engined by. ----------------+------------+------------------+-------------- _Devonshire_ | Mar. ’02 | Chatham | Thames I.W. _Antrim_ | Aug. ’02 | Clydebank | Clydebank _Argyll_ | Sept. ’02 | Greenock Foundry | Greenock F.C. _Carnarvon_ | Oct. ’02 | Beardmore | Beardmore _Hampshire_ | Sept. ’02 | Elswick | Elswick _Roxburgh_ | June, ’02 | L. & Glasgow | L. & Glasgow ================+============+==================+============== Like the _King Edwards_, various boilers were given to them. All of them have one-fifth cylindrical boilers. The _Devonshire_ and _Carnarvon_ were otherwise given Niclausse; _Antrim_ and _Hampshire_, Yarrow; _Argyll_, Babcock; and _Roxburgh_, Dürr. The designed speed was exceeded by all on trials, but none have proved successful steamers ever since. They were completed between 1904 and 1905. These were the last ships to be designed by Sir William White. He resigned his position from ill-health; but, like his predecessors, left under a cloud--at any rate, with his services not really appreciated. He had created a magnificent fleet; but its very magnificence made many of his designs look poor on paper against any foreign construction of less displacement, but--_on paper_--of equal or superior qualities. It is the fate of the naval architect in peace-time to be judged on paper with small regard to issues such as nautical qualities, constructional strength, and a score of other details which are not to be expressed by any statistical formulæ, but yet make all the difference between efficiency and the absence of it. [Illustration: EARLY TYPE OF “27 KNOT” DESTROYERS.] Sir William White’s period of office was marked by an almost complete naval revolution. It began with the quick-firer and the disappearance of the low freeboard battleships. It ended with the coming of submarines, fire-control, and wireless. In between, it included the coming of the destroyer, the re-birth of the armoured cruiser; the arrival of the water-tube boiler, new forms of hull, unprecedented advances in both guns and armour--in fact, almost every conceivable change. Through these troubled waters with a steady hand and cool brain Sir William White guided the destiny of the Fleet and the millions of pounds expended in shipbuilding. Already his era is “the pre-_Dreadnought_” one, and to present-day ideas the term “pre-_Dreadnought_” is already very nearly akin to “pre-historic.” His creations preserved the peace, for which very reason they failed to secure glory. Already some have gone to the scrap-heap, and others are well on their way thither to join the Reed and Barnaby ships in that oblivion to which modern _Dreadnoughts_ will just as surely go in their season. More might be said: but _cui bono?_ Such public epitaph as Sir William White received when he retired was of the “about time, too!” order. The creator of the finest fleet that the world has ever seen left office with less honour and no more public interest than did half-a-dozen mediocre admirals who had chanced to fly their flags in some of his creations. It is not given for the stage manager to stand in the lime-light reserved for the principal actors. But the historian of a hundred years hence, placing great Englishmen in perspective, will assuredly place Sir William White far ahead of many who loom greater in the public eye to-day. _GUNS IN THE ERA._ The guns which especially belong to the White era are as follows:-- ===============+========+============+=========+============================ Designation. | Weight.| Projectile.| Velocity| Maximum Penetration with | Tons. | lbs. | f.s. | capped shot against K.C. at | | | +------------+--------------- | | | | 5000 yds. | 3000 yds. ---------------+--------+------------+---------+------------+--------------- 13.5, 30 cal. | 67 | 1250 | 2016 | 9 | 12 | | | | | 12in., 35 cal. | 46 | 850 | 2367 | 11½ | 14½ 12in., 40 cal. | 50 | 850 | 2750 | 16 | 20 | | | | | 10in., 32 cal. | 29 | 500 | 2040 | 5½ | 7½ | | | | | 9.2, 30 cal. | 24 | 380 | 2065 | 4 | 6 9.2, 40 cal. | 25 | 380 | 2347 | 6¾ | 9¼ 9.2, 45 cal. | 27 | 380 | 2640 | 8¾ | 11¼ | | | | | 7.5, 45 cal. | 14 | 200 | 2600 | 5¾ | 7½ | | | | | 6in., 40 cal. | 7½ | 100 | 2200 | -- | -- | | | | | 6in., 45 cal. | 7 | 100 | 2535 | -- | 4½ ===============+========+============+=========+============+=============== _PURCHASED SHIPS._ In the year 1902 two ships, the _Constitucion_ and _Libertad_, were laid down at Elswick and Vickers-Maxims’ respectively for the Chilian Government. They were designed by Sir Edward Reed, and compare interestingly with the _King Edwards_ in being much longer and narrower. It will be remembered that in the past Reed ideals had always centred round a “short handy ship.” They had also always embodied the maximum of protection, while these ships carried medium armour only. His ships had, further, always been characterised by extremely strong construction, while these verged on the flimsy, the scantlings being far lighter than in British naval practice. Out of all which it has been held that they represented the Reed ideal of armoured cruisers interlaced with whatever limitations the Chilian authorities may have specified. Particulars of these ships, which in 1903 were purchased for the British Navy and renamed _Swiftsure_ (ex _Constitucion_) and _Triumph_ (ex _Libertad_):-- Displacement--11,800. Complement, 700. Length--(over all) 470ft. Beam--71ft. Draught--(Maximum) 24ft. 8in. Armament--Four 10-inch, 45 cal.; fourteen 7.5-inch, 50 cal.; fourteen 14-pounders, four 6-pounders, four Maxims; two 18-inch submerged tubes. Armour--Practically complete belt 8ft. wide, 7-inch thick amidships, reduced to 3-inch at ends. 10-inch bulkheads at ends of thick portion of belt. Redoubt above (250ft. long), 7-inch on sides 6-inch bulkheads to it. Deck 1½-inch on slopes amidships, 3-inch on slopes at ends. Barbettes 10-inch, with 8 to 6-inch turrets. Battery and upper deck casemates, 7-inch. Horse-power--14,000 = 20 knots. Yarrow boilers. Coal--(normal) 800 tons; (maximum) 2,000 tons. These ships compare interestingly with the _King Edwards_ and _Devonshires_, between which they struck a mean, as follows:-- ===============+=================+===============+=============== | _King Edward._ | _Swiftsure._ | _Devonshire._ ---------------+-----------------+---------------+--------------- Displacement | 16,350 | 11,800 |10,850 Principal Guns | 4--12in. | 4--10in. | 4--7.5. | 4--9.2 | 14--7.5 | 6--6in. | 16--6in. | | | 5--18in. tubes | 2--18in. tubes| 2--18in. tubes ---------------+-----------------+---------------+--------------- Armour belt | 9--2in. | 7--3in. | 6--2in. Speed | 18.9 knots | 20 knots | 22.25 knots Coal (Normal) | 950 | 800 | 800 Coal (Maximum) | 2,150--400 (oil)| 2,000 | 1,800 ===============+=================+===============+=============== Other items of interest are that the armament of the _Swiftsures_ (10-inch and 7.5’s) had somewhere about that time been laid down by Admiral Fisher as the ideal armament of the future, on the principle that the best possible was “the smallest effective big gun, and the largest possible secondary gun.” In service these ships never proved brilliantly successful. They rarely managed to make their speeds successfully, and there was a great deal of vibration with them. They were shored up internally in places with a view to strengthening them. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that some of these alleged defects have been put down to conservatism in nautical ideas, and that the shoring up was not really required. Their great drawback was that so far as the British Navy was concerned they were neither one thing nor the other, being too light in heavy guns to be satisfactory with the battleships, and too slow to act with the cruisers. Had there been six or so of them they would, possibly enough, have formed an ideal squadron. Being two ships only, they of necessity became round pegs in square holes. _NAVAL ESTIMATES IN THE ERA._ ===========+=============+============+===================================== Financial | | | Ships. Year. | Amount. | Personnel. +--------------+-----------+---------- | | | | Armoured | Protected | | | Battleships. | Cruisers. | Cruisers. -----------+-------------+------------+--------------+-----------+---------- 1887–88 | 12,476,800 | 62,500 | -- | -- | 3 1888–89[22]| 13,082,800 | 62,500 | -- | -- | 2 1889–90 | 13,685,400 | 62,400 | -- | -- | -- 1890–91 | 13,786,600 | 65,400 | 8 | -- | 42 1891–92 | 14,557,856 | 68,800 | 2 | -- | -- 1892–93 | 14,240,200 | 67,700 | 1 | -- | -- 1893–94 | 14,340,000 | 70,500 | 6 | -- | 2 1894–95 | 17,365,900 | 83,000 | 3 | -- | 9 1895–96 | 18,701,000 | 88,850 | -- | -- | 8 1896–97 | 21,823,000 | 93,750 | 6 | -- | 3 1897–98 | 21,838,000 | 100,050 | 7 | 6 | -- 1898–99 | 23,780,000 | 106,390 | 3 | 4 | -- 1899–00 | 26,594,000 | 110,640 | 2 | 2 | 1 1900–01 | 28,791,900 | 114,880 | 2 | 6 | 1 1901–02 | 30,875,500 | 118,625 | 3 | 6 | -- 1902–03 | 31,255,500 | 122,500 | 2 | 2 | -- ===========+=============+============+==============+===========+========== In the following year 1903–04 three ships (the last of the _King Edwards_) were provided for. The total number of battleships designed for the British Navy by Sir William White was therefore 48. There were in addition 26 armoured cruisers--making a total of 74 armoured ships, and about as many protected cruisers, including some for Colonial service. III. THE WATTS ERA. Sir William White was succeeded by Mr., afterwards Sir Philip Watts, who came to the Admiralty from Elswick, where he had been Chief Constructor. He came with the reputation of “putting in plenty of guns,” and his appointment was favourably received, both inside the Navy and outside. The armoured cruisers _Duke of Edinburgh_ and _Black Prince_ were the first ships for which he was personally responsible. Details of these:-- Displacement--13,550 tons. Length (between perpendiculars)--480ft. Beam--73½ft. Draught--(maximum) 27½ft. Armament--Six 9.2, 45 cal., ten 6-inch, 50 cal.; twenty-two 3-pounders. Torpedo tubes:--Three submerged (18in.). Horse-power--23,500 = 22.3 knots. Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons; (maximum) 2,000; also 400 tons of oil. The former ship was laid down at Pembroke and engined by Hawthorn; the latter was built and engined by the Thames Iron Works. In the matter of armament and its arrangement the ships were to some extent cruiser versions of the _King Edward_; but equally, in the adoption of a number of single gun-houses for big guns, and the jump from two to a larger number of big guns, the influence of the Chilian _O’Higgins_, built at Elswick, may be noticed. The big guns were placed one forward and one aft, two on either beam and two on either quarter. The 6-inch were placed in an armoured battery below. As originally designed, right ahead fire was given to the forward battery guns, but this was dispensed with at a later date. The ships were never good sea boats, and the 6-inch guns were soon found to be well-nigh useless in any sea. The armour was disposed in generous fashion--a complete belt reaching up to the main deck, 4in. forward, 6in. for some 260ft. amidships, and 3in. aft of that. A 6in. battery (K.N.C.) with bulkheads surmounts the belt-7in. barbettes with 6in. K.C. flat-sided gunhouses. Both were given a mixed installation of Babcock and cylindrical boilers. A novelty was the standardisation of all their machinery, a very valuable innovation, which has been followed ever since. Parts of any one ship’s machinery can be used for any other of her class, thus facilitating rapid repairs and requiring a considerably reduced stock of spares. On trials the _Duke of Edinburgh_ did on her eight hours’ full power trial I.H.P. 23,685 = 22.84 knots, the _Black Prince_ 23,939 = 23.6 knots. In service, however, the former has generally proved the better steamer. Another innovation in these ships was the re-appearance of the stern torpedo tube, first introduced in the _Centurions_. As re-introduced it was built submerged, a feature long desired, but which had previously presented innumerable difficulties in design. [Illustration: SWIFTSURE. WATTS ERA. LORD NELSON. BLACK PRINCE. WARRIOR. MINOTAUR. PRE-DREADNOUGHTS OF THE WATTS ERA.] For the Estimates of the following year (1903–04) four more ships of the same type were provided-- ===========+============+===========+============= Name. | Laid down. | Builders. | Engines by. -----------+------------+-----------+------------- _Achilles_ | Feb. ’04 | Elswick | Hawthorn _Cochrane_ | Mar. ’04 | Fairfield | Fairfield _Warrior_ | Jan. ’04 | Vickers | Vickers _Natal_ | Nov. ’03 | Pembroke | Wallsend Co. ===========+============+===========+============= In these the defect of the low 6-in. battery of the _Black Princes_ was anticipated, and instead of ten 6-inch guns, four 7.5 were mounted in gun-houses on the upper deck amidships. Yarrow and cylindrical boilers mixed were installed. Otherwise no change was made. On trial the _Achilles_ reached a maximum of 23.27, the other three ships all made their contracts or over. These four, generally known as the _Warriors_, proved to be the finest cruisers as sea-boats ever built for the British Navy. They have always proved most remarkably steady gun platforms. Shooting from them is invariably good--they have always been near the top of the list in gunnery returns. For a single ship in a single commission good shooting is attributable to causes other than the ship; but with four ships and different crews at different times the effect of the design is obvious. Apparently the extra weight on their upper decks is responsible; for their dimensions are identical with those of the unsatisfactory _Black Princes_. In all these ships, as in the _Devonshires_ which preceded them, raking masts and stumpy funnels were introduced. The latter proved most inconvenient for navigating purposes, and in 1911 all the _Warriors_ had their funnels considerably heightened. In these four latter the “dove-cot” platform fire-controls first appeared; they were fitted also to the three latest ships of the _King Edward_ class. The main defect of all six is the trivial anti-torpedo armament. The 3-pounders are perfectly useless against destroyers. Incidentally it may be noticed that the class signalled the scientific placing of such guns for control purposes. In the _Warriors_ some guns were mounted on turret tops also, this being with a view to their survival after an action. It was contended that an actual hit was extremely improbable on any anti-t.b. guns, but that shells bursting underneath might easily disable them. Hence the search for an armoured base. This idea seems to have originated in the German Navy, though the Germans never adopted the turret-top position. The Estimates (1904–05) provided for two battleships and three armoured cruisers. The latter of these, the _Minotaur_ class, were “improved _Warriors_”; but, as a matter of fact, except for a larger armament, they proved somewhat inferior to their immediate predecessors:-- Details are: Displacement--14,600 tons (as against 13,550). Length (between perpendiculars)--490ft., (over all) 525ft. Beam--74½ft. (but a foot more in _Shannon_). Draught--(maximum) 28ft. (but a foot less in _Shannon_). Armament--Four 9.2, 50 cal., ten 7.5, fourteen 12-pounders, five 18in. tubes (submerged). Horse-power--27,000 = 23 knots. Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons (950 only in _Shannon_); (maximum) 2,000, also 400 tons oil. [Illustration: SIR PHILIP WATTS.] The 9.2 were placed in double turrets fore and aft. For those of the _Minotaur_ electric manœuvring was substituted for the usual hydraulic. The 7.5’s are disposed in ten single gun houses on the upper deck, _Warrior_ fashion. The armour belt is of the same maximum thickness, but only 3in. for 50ft. from the bow. Thereafter it thickens gradually for the next 75ft. then reaches its maximum. Vertical armour above the main deck was given up in order to allow for the increased weight of armament and its protection--a total of 2,073 tons. The _Minotaur_ has Babcock, the other two Yarrow large-tube boilers. No cylindricals were fitted; the opponents of the water-tube system having lost their influence by 1905, when the ships were laid down. None of these ships came up to expectations on trial, though they developed considerably more than the contract horse-power. The _Minotaur_ just made her speed, the _Defence_ just failed to reach it, the _Shannon_ failed by half-a-knot. This last ship had been varied from the others with an idea that a new form of hull, would produce better speed--an unfortunate surmise. Shortly after completion all had 15ft. added to their funnels. The increased draught added to their power somewhat, but did not materially better their speeds. Further details of these three ships are:-- ============+============+===========+================== Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engined by. ------------+------------+-----------+------------------ _Minotaur_ | Jan. ’05 | Devonport | Harland & Wolff _Defence_ | Feb. ’05 | Pembroke | Scott S. & E. Co. _Shannon_ | Jan. ’05 | Chatham | Humphrys ============+============+===========+================== All were completed in 1908. Average cost, £1,400,000 per ship. In them solid bulkheads first appear, their engine-rooms having no water-tight doors. The battleships of the same programme (1904–05) were the _Lord Nelson_ and _Agamemnon_. Details are:-- Displacement--16,500 tons. Length (between perpendiculars)--410 ft., (over all) 445ft. Beam--79½ft. Draught--(mean) 27ft. Armament--Four 12-inch, 45 cal., ten 9.2, 50 cal. fifteen 12-pounders, sixteen 3-pounders, five submerged tubes (18in.). Horse-power--16,750 = 18.5 knots. Coal--(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,000 tons; also 400 tons oil. The _Lord Nelson_ was built and engined by Palmer, the _Agamemnon_ by Beardmore and engined by Hawthorn. The former was given Babcock, the latter Yarrow boilers. Both on trial easily exceeded the contract speed, and proved abnormally handy ships. They cost £1,500,000 or only a little more than the _Minotaurs_. The _Nelsons_ are often counted as “Dreadnoughts”; but their only claim to the position is they do not happen to carry any 6-inch guns. Actually they are nothing but improved _King Edwards_, bearing to those ships very much the same relation as the _Warriors_ to the _Black Princes_. Their comparatively slow speeds and their mixed armaments entirely differentiate them from the swifter “all-big-gun” ship which followed, and, for that matter, caught them up.[23] The _Nelsons_ were never really successful ships outside the points alluded to above. Eight of their ten 9.2’s were placed in twin turrets, and in many circumstances two 9.2 so mounted proved very little superior in efficiency to a similar single gun in an isolated gun-house.[24] In the matter of protection the _Nelsons_ far exceeded the _King Edwards_. In place of a 9in. belt amidships they were given a 12in. one, while the 8in. and 6in. strakes above of the earlier ships became a uniform 8in. The bow belt forward was also augmented to 6in. on the water-line, surmounted by 4in., instead of a belt uniformly increasing from 2in. to 6in. further aft. But none of this made them “Dreadnoughts,” and the absence of “Dreadnought” features relegated them to the second line very soon after they were completed. In these ships the tripod mast, the idea of which dates back to the _Captain_ era, re-appeared. The _Nelsons_ were given as mainmasts the first of those modern tripods which have characterised nearly every British capital ship since built till the _Lion_ was altered. The idea of the tripod mast is to avoid the many shrouds of an ordinary mast; and so give greater training to the guns. Whether the idea be of use is another matter. Generally speaking ideas abandoned by our forefathers have failed to live long if resuscitated. In the 1902–03 and 1903–04 Estimates provision was made for four vessels each year of a new type, known as “Scouts.” These were the _Adventure_ and _Attentive_ (Elswick), _Forward_ and _Foresight_ (Fairfield), _Pathfinder_ and _Patrol_ (Laird), _Sentinel_ and _Skirmisher_ (Vickers-Maxim). One was awarded each year to each of the firms mentioned, but all were actually laid down between June, 1903, and January, 1904. The first four to be given out to contract were originally named _Eddystone_, _Nore_, _Fastnet_, and _Inchkeith_. These vessels came to be built owing to an appreciation of the fact that destroyers had altogether lost their original rôle and had become torpedo-boats, pure and simple. The “Scouts,” though from three to four times the size, were the old “catchers” re-introduced. They compared with these as follows:-- =========+===============+==========+==================== | Average | Average | | Displacement. | Designed | Armament. | | Speed. | ---------+---------------+----------+-------------------- “Scouts” | 2850 | 25 | 12 to 14--12pdr., | | | 2--14in. tubes[25] Halcyons | 1070 | 18.5 | 2--4.7, 4--6pdr., | | | 5--18in. tubes =========+===============+==========+==================== A 1½ deck on slopes amidships was provided for the “Scouts,” which incidentally were designed for ten 12-pounders only. By the year 1912 it became abundantly clear that, like their predecessors the “catchers,” they were doomed to pass quickly into the “little use” category on account of their weak armaments and small sea-keeping capacity. _TORPEDO CRAFT._ It has already been mentioned that Sir William White’s period of office saw the coming of the destroyer. The origin of this craft is to be found in a public agitation, which arose out of the tremendous attention paid to torpedo boats by the French, who were then our most likely enemy, and who had an overwhelming superiority in torpedo craft. Some years before a type of craft, the torpedo gunboats already referred to, which were first known as “torpedo boat catchers” and subsequently as “catchers” had been introduced. It soon, however, became very clear that they were little likely to achieve this end, and the doctrine that “the torpedo boat is the answer to the torpedo boat” was being steadily preached. At that time (1892) the then insignificant navy of Germany was in possession of eight very large torpedo boats, which were known as “division boats.” Austria also had one or two fast craft, capable of dealing with torpedo boats. Upon these existing lines a new type of craft was developed for the British Navy. The first two to be built were the _Havock_ and _Hornet_, which were launched in

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1. Chapter 1 2. 1885. She differed from the _Conqueror_ only in that all four of her 3. 1893. In substance they were very large torpedo boats of about 250 4. 1889. German SIEGFRIED. 5. 1. A big Zeppelin type naval airship was built in 1909–1911. It proved 6. 2. In 1911 four naval officers were appointed to learn aeroplane work. 7. 3. In practice it proved a failure; so the Naval Air Service was formed 8. 1. The naval services and forces of the Dominions of Canada and 9. 2. The training and discipline of the naval forces of the Dominions 10. 3. The ships of each Dominion naval force will hoist at the stern the 11. 4. The Canadian and Australian Governments will have their own 12. 5. In the event of the Canadian or Australian Government desiring 13. 6. In the event of the Canadian or Australian Government desiring to 14. 7. While ships of the Dominions are at a foreign port a report of 15. 8. The commanding officer of a Dominion ship having to put into a 16. 9. When a ship of the British Admiralty meets a ship of the Dominions, 17. 10. In foreign ports the senior officer will take command, but not so 18. 11. When a court-martial has to be ordered by a Dominion and a 19. 12. The British Admiralty undertakes to lend to the Dominions during 20. 13. The service of officers of the British Fleet in the Dominion naval 21. 14. In order to determine all questions of seniority that may arise, 22. 15. It is desirable in the interests of efficiency and co-operation 23. 16. In time of war, when the naval service of a Dominion or any part 24. 17. The Dominions having applied to their naval forces the King’s 25. Introduction of 13.5-inch Gun, 175, v. ii

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