The Art of War by active 6th century B.C. Sunzi

INTRODUCTION

6439 words  |  Chapter 4

Sun Wu and his Book Ssu-ma Ch’ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzŭ: [1] Sun Tzŭ Wu was a native of the Ch’i State. His _Art of War_ brought him to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu. Ho Lu said to him: "I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your theory of managing soldiers to a slight test?" Sun Tzŭ replied: "You may." Ho Lu asked: "May the test be applied to women?" The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made to bring 180 ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzŭ divided them into two companies, and placed one of the King’s favourite concubines at the head of each. He then bade them all take spears in their hands, and addressed them thus: "I presume you know the difference between front and back, right hand and left hand?" The girls replied: Yes. Sun Tzŭ went on: "When I say "Eyes front," you must look straight ahead. When I say "Left turn," you must face towards your left hand. When I say "Right turn," you must face towards your right hand. When I say "About turn," you must face right round towards your back." Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus explained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to begin the drill. Then, to the sound of drums, he gave the order "Right turn." But the girls only burst out laughing. Sun Tzŭ said: "If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame." So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order "Left turn," whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of laughter. Sun Tzŭ: "If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, the general is to blame. But if his orders _are_ clear, and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers." So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be beheaded. Now the king of Wu was watching the scene from the top of a raised pavilion; and when he saw that his favourite concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following message: "We are now quite satisfied as to our general’s ability to handle troops. If we are bereft of these two concubines, our meat and drink will lose their savor. It is our wish that they shall not be beheaded." Sun Tzŭ replied: "Having once received His Majesty’s commission to be the general of his forces, there are certain commands of His Majesty which, acting in that capacity, I am unable to accept." Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway installed the pair next in order as leaders in their place. When this had been done, the drum was sounded for the drill once more; and the girls went through all the evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, marching ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or standing, with perfect accuracy and precision, not venturing to utter a sound. Then Sun Tzŭ sent a messenger to the King saying: "Your soldiers, Sire, are now properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for your majesty’s inspection. They can be put to any use that their sovereign may desire; bid them go through fire and water, and they will not disobey." But the King replied: "Let our general cease drilling and return to camp. As for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the troops." Thereupon Sun Tzŭ said: "The King is only fond of words, and cannot translate them into deeds." After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzŭ was one who knew how to handle an army, and finally appointed him general. In the west, he defeated the Ch’u State and forced his way into Ying, the capital; to the north he put fear into the States of Ch’i and Chin, and spread his fame abroad amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tzŭ shared in the might of the King. About Sun Tzŭ himself this is all that Ssu-ma Ch’ien has to tell us in this chapter. But he proceeds to give a biography of his descendant, Sun Pin, born about a hundred years after his famous ancestor’s death, and also the outstanding military genius of his time. The historian speaks of him too as Sun Tzŭ, and in his preface we read: "Sun Tzŭ had his feet cut off and yet continued to discuss the art of war." [3] It seems likely, then, that "Pin" was a nickname bestowed on him after his mutilation, unless the story was invented in order to account for the name. The crowning incident of his career, the crushing defeat of his treacherous rival P’ang Chuan, will be found briefly related in Chapter V. § 19, note. To return to the elder Sun Tzŭ. He is mentioned in two other passages of the _Shih Chi:_— In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, king of Wu, took the field with Tzŭ-hsu [i.e. Wu Yuan] and Po P’ei, and attacked Ch’u. He captured the town of Shu and slew the two prince’s sons who had formerly been generals of Wu. He was then meditating a descent on Ying [the capital]; but the general Sun Wu said: "The army is exhausted. It is not yet possible. We must wait"…. [After further successful fighting,] "in the ninth year [506 B.C.], King Ho Lu addressed Wu Tzŭ-hsu and Sun Wu, saying: "Formerly, you declared that it was not yet possible for us to enter Ying. Is the time ripe now?" The two men replied: "Ch’u’s general Tzŭ-ch’ang, [4] is grasping and covetous, and the princes of T’ang and Ts’ai both have a grudge against him. If Your Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must win over T’ang and Ts’ai, and then you may succeed." Ho Lu followed this advice, [beat Ch’u in five pitched battles and marched into Ying.] [5] This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun Wu. He does not appear to have survived his patron, who died from the effects of a wound in 496. In another chapter there occurs this passage:[6] From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after the other: Kao-fan, [7] who was employed by the Chin State; Wang-tzu, [8] in the service of Ch’i; and Sun Wu, in the service of Wu. These men developed and threw light upon the principles of war. It is obvious enough that Ssu-ma Ch’ien at least had no doubt about the reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage; and with one exception, to be noticed presently, he is by far the most important authority on the period in question. It will not be necessary, therefore, to say much of such a work as the _Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu_, which is supposed to have been written by Chao Yeh of the 1st century A.D. The attribution is somewhat doubtful; but even if it were otherwise, his account would be of little value, based as it is on the _Shih Chi_ and expanded with romantic details. The story of Sun Tzŭ will be found, for what it is worth, in chapter 2. The only new points in it worth noting are: (1) Sun Tzŭ was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu Tzŭ-hsu. (2) He is called a native of Wu. (3) He had previously lived a retired life, and his contemporaries were unaware of his ability. The following passage occurs in the Huai-nan Tzŭ: "When sovereign and ministers show perversity of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun Tzŭ to encounter the foe." Assuming that this work is genuine (and hitherto no doubt has been cast upon it), we have here the earliest direct reference for Sun Tzŭ, for Huai-nan Tzŭ died in 122 B.C., many years before the _Shih Chi_ was given to the world. Liu Hsiang (80-9 B.C.) says: "The reason why Sun Tzŭ at the head of 30,000 men beat Ch’u with 200,000 is that the latter were undisciplined." Teng Ming-shih informs us that the surname "Sun" was bestowed on Sun Wu’s grandfather by Duke Ching of Ch’i [547-490 B.C.]. Sun Wu’s father Sun P’ing, rose to be a Minister of State in Ch’i, and Sun Wu himself, whose style was Ch’ang-ch’ing, fled to Wu on account of the rebellion which was being fomented by the kindred of T’ien Pao. He had three sons, of whom the second, named Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. According to this account then, Pin was the grandson of Wu, which, considering that Sun Pin’s victory over Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may be dismissed as chronologically impossible. Whence these data were obtained by Teng Ming-shih I do not know, but of course no reliance whatever can be placed in them. An interesting document which has survived from the close of the Han period is the short preface written by the Great Ts’ao Ts’ao, or Wei Wu Ti, for his edition of Sun Tzŭ. I shall give it in full:— I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their advantage. [10] The _Lun Yu_ says: “There must be a sufficiency of military strength.” The _Shu Ching_ mentions "the army" among the "eight objects of government." The _I Ching_ says: "‘army’ indicates firmness and justice; the experienced leader will have good fortune." The _Shih Ching_ says: "The King rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshalled his troops." The Yellow Emperor, T’ang the Completer and Wu Wang all used spears and battle-axes in order to succour their generation. The _Ssu-ma Fa_ says: "If one man slay another of set purpose, he himself may rightfully be slain." He who relies solely on warlike measures shall be exterminated; he who relies solely on peaceful measures shall perish. Instances of this are Fu Ch’ai [11] on the one hand and Yen Wang on the other. [12] In military matters, the Sage’s rule is normally to keep the peace, and to move his forces only when occasion requires. He will not use armed force unless driven to it by necessity. Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting; but the work composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. [Sun Tzŭ was a native of the Ch’i state, his personal name was Wu. He wrote the _Art of War_ in 13 chapters for Ho Lu, King of Wu. Its principles were tested on women, and he was subsequently made a general. He led an army westwards, crushed the Ch’u state and entered Ying the capital. In the north, he kept Ch’i and Chin in awe. A hundred years and more after his time, Sun Pin lived. He was a descendant of Wu.] [13] In his treatment of deliberation and planning, the importance of rapidity in taking the field, [14] clearness of conception, and depth of design, Sun Tzŭ stands beyond the reach of carping criticism. My contemporaries, however, have failed to grasp the full meaning of his instructions, and while putting into practice the smaller details in which his work abounds, they have overlooked its essential purport. That is the motive which has led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole. One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit statement that the 13 chapters were specially composed for King Ho Lu. This is supported by the internal evidence of I. § 15, in which it seems clear that some ruler is addressed. In the bibliographic section of the _Han Shu_, there is an entry which has given rise to much discussion: "The works of Sun Tzŭ of Wu in 82 _p’ien_ (or chapters), with diagrams in 9 _chuan_." It is evident that this cannot be merely the 13 chapters known to Ssu-ma Ch’ien, or those we possess today. Chang Shou-chieh refers to an edition of Sun Tzŭ’s _Art of War_ of which the "13 chapters" formed the first _chuan_, adding that there were two other _chuan_ besides. This has brought forth a theory, that the bulk of these 82 chapters consisted of other writings of Sun Tzŭ—we should call them apocryphal—similar to the _Wen Ta_, of which a specimen dealing with the Nine Situations [15] is preserved in the _T’ung Tien_, and another in Ho Shin’s commentary. It is suggested that before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun Tzŭ had only written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed a sort of exegesis in the form of question and answer between himself and the King. Pi I-hsun, the author of the _Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu_, backs this up with a quotation from the _Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu:_ "The King of Wu summoned Sun Tzŭ, and asked him questions about the art of war. Each time he set forth a chapter of his work, the King could not find words enough to praise him." As he points out, if the whole work was expounded on the same scale as in the above-mentioned fragments, the total number of chapters could not fail to be considerable. Then the numerous other treatises attributed to Sun Tzŭ might be included. The fact that the _Han Chih_ mentions no work of Sun Tzŭ except the 82 _p’ien_, whereas the Sui and T’ang bibliographies give the titles of others in addition to the "13 chapters," is good proof, Pi I-hsun thinks, that all of these were contained in the 82 _p’ien_. Without pinning our faith to the accuracy of details supplied by the _Wu Yüeh Ch’un Ch’iu_, or admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi I-hsun, we may see in this theory a probable solution of the mystery. Between Ssu-ma Ch’ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of time for a luxuriant crop of forgeries to have grown up under the magic name of Sun Tzŭ, and the 82 _p’ien_ may very well represent a collected edition of these lumped together with the original work. It is also possible, though less likely, that some of them existed in the time of the earlier historian and were purposely ignored by him. [16] Tu Mu’s conjecture seems to be based on a passage which states: "Wei Wu Ti strung together Sun Wu’s _Art of War_," which in turn may have resulted from a misunderstanding of the final words of Ts’ao King’s preface. This, as Sun Hsing-yen points out, is only a modest way of saying that he made an explanatory paraphrase, or in other words, wrote a commentary on it. On the whole, this theory has met with very little acceptance. Thus, the _Ssu K’u Ch’uan Shu_ says: "The mention of the 13 chapters in the _Shih Chi_ shows that they were in existence before the _Han Chih_, and that latter accretions are not to be considered part of the original work. Tu Mu’s assertion can certainly not be taken as proof." There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13 chapters existed in the time of Ssu-ma Ch’ien practically as we have them now. That the work was then well known he tells us in so many words. "Sun Tzŭ’s _13 Chapters_ and Wu Ch’i’s _Art of War_ are the two books that people commonly refer to on the subject of military matters. Both of them are widely distributed, so I will not discuss them here." But as we go further back, serious difficulties begin to arise. The salient fact which has to be faced is that the _Tso Chuan_, the greatest contemporary record, makes no mention whatsoever of Sun Wu, either as a general or as a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward circumstance, that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the story of Sun Wu as given in the _Shih Chi_, but even show themselves frankly skeptical as to the existence of the man at all. The most powerful presentment of this side of the case is to be found in the following disposition by Yeh Shui-hsin: [17]— It is stated in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s history that Sun Wu was a native of the Ch’i State, and employed by Wu; and that in the reign of Ho Lu he crushed Ch’u, entered Ying, and was a great general. But in Tso’s Commentary no Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that Tso’s Commentary need not contain absolutely everything that other histories contain. But Tso has not omitted to mention vulgar plebeians and hireling ruffians such as Ying K’ao-shu, [18] Ts’ao Kuei, [19], Chu Chih-wu and Chuan She-chu [20]. In the case of Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements were so brilliant, the omission is much more glaring. Again, details are given, in their due order, about his contemporaries Wu Yuan and the Minister P’ei. [21] Is it credible that Sun Wu alone should have been passed over? In point of literary style, Sun Tzŭ’s work belongs to the same school as _Kuan Tzŭ_, [22] _Liu T’ao_, [23] and the _Yüeh Yu_ [24] and may have been the production of some private scholar living towards the end of the "Spring and Autumn" or the beginning of the "Warring States" period. [25] The story that his precepts were actually applied by the Wu State, is merely the outcome of big talk on the part of his followers. From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty [26] down to the time of the "Spring and Autumn," all military commanders were statesmen as well, and the class of professional generals, for conducting external campaigns, did not then exist. It was not until the period of the "Six States" [27] that this custom changed. Now although Wu was an uncivilized State, it is conceivable that Tso should have left unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general and yet held no civil office? What we are told, therefore, about Jang-chu [28] and Sun Wu, is not authentic matter, but the reckless fabrication of theorizing pundits. The story of Ho Lu’s experiment on the women, in particular, is utterly preposterous and incredible. Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Ch’ien as having said that Sun Wu crushed Ch’u and entered Ying. This is not quite correct. No doubt the impression left on the reader’s mind is that he at least shared in these exploits. The fact may or may not be significant; but it is nowhere explicitly stated in the _Shih Chi_ either that Sun Tzŭ was general on the occasion of the taking of Ying, or that he even went there at all. Moreover, as we know that Wu Yuan and Po P’ei both took part in the expedition, and also that its success was largely due to the dash and enterprise of Fu Kai, Ho Lu’s younger brother, it is not easy to see how yet another general could have played a very prominent part in the same campaign. Ch’en Chen-sun of the Sung dynasty has the note:— Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art. But the fact that he does not appear in the _Tso Chuan_, although he is said to have served under Ho Lu King of Wu, makes it uncertain what period he really belonged to. He also says:— The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch’i may be of genuine antiquity. It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch’en Chen-sun, while rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s history, are inclined to accept the date traditionally assigned to the work which passes under his name. The author of the _Hsu Lu_ fails to appreciate this distinction, and consequently his bitter attack on Ch’en Chen-sun really misses its mark. He makes one of two points, however, which certainly tell in favour of the high antiquity of our "13 chapters." "Sun Tzŭ," he says, "must have lived in the age of Ching Wang [519-476], because he is frequently plagiarized in subsequent works of the Chou, Ch’in and Han dynasties." The two most shameless offenders in this respect are Wu Ch’i and Huai-nan Tzŭ, both of them important historical personages in their day. The former lived only a century after the alleged date of Sun Tzŭ, and his death is known to have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to Liu Hsiang, that Tseng Shen delivered the _Tso Chuan_, which had been entrusted to him by its author. [29] Now the fact that quotations from the _Art of War_, acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found in so many authors of different epochs, establishes a very strong anterior to them all,—in other words, that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was already in existence towards the end of the 5th century B.C. Further proof of Sun Tzŭ’s antiquity is furnished by the archaic or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to a number of the words he uses. A list of these, which might perhaps be extended, is given in the _Hsu Lu;_ and though some of the interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is hardly affected thereby. Again, it must not be forgotten that Yeh Shui-hsin, a scholar and critic of the first rank, deliberately pronounces the style of the 13 chapters to belong to the early part of the fifth century. Seeing that he is actually engaged in an attempt to disprove the existence of Sun Wu himself, we may be sure that he would not have hesitated to assign the work to a later date had he not honestly believed the contrary. And it is precisely on such a point that the judgment of an educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal evidence is not far to seek. Thus in XIII. § 1, there is an unmistakable allusion to the ancient system of land-tenure which had already passed away by the time of Mencius, who was anxious to see it revived in a modified form. [30] The only warfare Sun Tzŭ knows is that carried on between the various feudal princes, in which armored chariots play a large part. Their use seems to have entirely died out before the end of the Chou dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu, a state which ceased to exist as early as 473 B.C. On this I shall touch presently. But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier, and the chances of its being other than a _bonâ fide_ production are sensibly diminished. The great age of forgeries did not come until long after. That it should have been forged in the period immediately following 473 is particularly unlikely, for no one, as a rule, hastens to identify himself with a lost cause. As for Yeh Shui-hsin’s theory, that the author was a literary recluse, that seems to me quite untenable. If one thing is more apparent than another after reading the maxims of Sun Tzŭ, it is that their essence has been distilled from a large store of personal observation and experience. They reflect the mind not only of a born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of generalization, but also of a practical soldier closely acquainted with the military conditions of his time. To say nothing of the fact that these sayings have been accepted and endorsed by all the greatest captains of Chinese history, they offer a combination of freshness and sincerity, acuteness and common sense, which quite excludes the idea that they were artificially concocted in the study. If we admit, then, that the 13 chapters were the genuine production of a military man living towards the end of the "_Ch’un Ch’iu_" period, are we not bound, in spite of the silence of the _Tso Chuan_, to accept Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s account in its entirety? In view of his high repute as a sober historian, must we not hesitate to assume that the records he drew upon for Sun Wu’s biography were false and untrustworthy? The answer, I fear, must be in the negative. There is still one grave, if not fatal, objection to the chronology involved in the story as told in the _Shih Chi_, which, so far as I am aware, nobody has yet pointed out. There are two passages in Sun Tzŭ in which he alludes to contemporary affairs. The first in in VI. § 21:— Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved. The other is in XI. § 30:— Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_, I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the right. These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of the date of composition. They assign the work to the period of the struggle between Wu and Yüeh. So much has been observed by Pi I-hsun. But what has hitherto escaped notice is that they also seriously impair the credibility of Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s narrative. As we have seen above, the first positive date given in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He is then spoken of as a general, acting as confidential adviser to Ho Lu, so that his alleged introduction to that monarch had already taken place, and of course the 13 chapters must have been written earlier still. But at that time, and for several years after, down to the capture of Ying in 506, Ch’u and not Yüeh, was the great hereditary enemy of Wu. The two states, Ch’u and Wu, had been constantly at war for over half a century, [31] whereas the first war between Wu and Yüeh was waged only in 510, [32] and even then was no more than a short interlude sandwiched in the midst of the fierce struggle with Ch’u. Now Ch’u is not mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The natural inference is that they were written at a time when Yüeh had become the prime antagonist of Wu, that is, after Ch’u had suffered the great humiliation of 506. At this point, a table of dates may be found useful. B.C. 514 Accession of Ho Lu. 512 Ho Lu attacks Ch’u, but is dissuaded from entering Ying, the capital. Shih Chi mentions Sun Wu as general. 511 Another attack on Ch’u. 510 Wu makes a successful attack on Yüeh. This is the first war between the two states. 509 or 508 Ch’u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at Yu-chang. 506 Ho Lu attacks Ch’u with the aid of T’ang and Ts’ai. Decisive battle of Po-chu, and capture of Ying. Last mention of Sun Wu in Shih Chi. 505 Yüeh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. Wu is beaten by Ch’in and evacuates Ying. 504 Ho Lu sends Fu Ch’ai to attack Ch’u. 497 Kou Chien becomes King of Yüeh. 496 Wu attacks Yüeh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at Tsui-li. Ho Lu is killed. 494 Fu Ch’ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of Fu- chaio, and enters the capital of Yüeh. 485 or 484 Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu Tzŭ-hsu. 482 Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu Ch’ai. 478 to 476 Further attacks by Yüeh on Wu. 475 Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu. 473 Final defeat and extinction of Wu. The sentence quoted above from VI. § 21 hardly strikes me as one that could have been written in the full flush of victory. It seems rather to imply that, for the moment at least, the tide had turned against Wu, and that she was getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may conclude that our treatise was not in existence in 505, before which date Yüeh does not appear to have scored any notable success against Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so that if the book was written for him, it must have been during the period 505-496, when there was a lull in the hostilities, Wu having presumably exhausted by its supreme effort against Ch’u. On the other hand, if we choose to disregard the tradition connecting Sun Wu’s name with Ho Lu, it might equally well have seen the light between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period 482-473, when Yüeh was once again becoming a very serious menace. [33] We may feel fairly certain that the author, whoever he may have been, was not a man of any great eminence in his own day. On this point the negative testimony of the _Tso Chuan_ far outweighs any shred of authority still attaching to the _Shih Chi_, if once its other facts are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, makes a feeble attempt to explain the omission of his name from the great commentary. It was Wu Tzŭ-hsu, he says, who got all the credit of Sun Wu’s exploits, because the latter (being an alien) was not rewarded with an office in the State. How then did the Sun Tzŭ legend originate? It may be that the growing celebrity of the book imparted by degrees a kind of factitious renown to its author. It was felt to be only right and proper that one so well versed in the science of war should have solid achievements to his credit as well. Now the capture of Ying was undoubtedly the greatest feat of arms in Ho Lu’s reign; it made a deep and lasting impression on all the surrounding states, and raised Wu to the short-lived zenith of her power. Hence, what more natural, as time went on, than that the acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly identified with that campaign, at first perhaps only in the sense that his brain conceived and planned it; afterwards, that it was actually carried out by him in conjunction with Wu Yuan, [34] Po P’ei and Fu Kai? It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the outline of Sun Tzŭ’s life must be based almost wholly on conjecture. With this necessary proviso, I should say that he probably entered the service of Wu about the time of Ho Lu’s accession, and gathered experience, though only in the capacity of a subordinate officer, during the intense military activity which marked the first half of the prince’s reign. [35] If he rose to be a general at all, he certainly was never on an equal footing with the three above mentioned. He was doubtless present at the investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu’s sudden collapse in the following year. Yüeh’s attack at this critical juncture, when her rival was embarrassed on every side, seems to have convinced him that this upstart kingdom was the great enemy against whom every effort would henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was thus a well-seasoned warrior when he sat down to write his famous book, which according to my reckoning must have appeared towards the end, rather than the beginning of Ho Lu’s reign. The story of the women may possibly have grown out of some real incident occurring about the same time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is hardly likely to have survived his patron or to have taken part in the death-struggle with Yüeh, which began with the disaster at Tsui-li. If these inferences are approximately correct, there is a certain irony in the fate which decreed that China’s most illustrious man of peace should be contemporary with her greatest writer on war. The Text of Sun Tzŭ I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of Sun Tzŭ’s text. The quotations that occur in early authors go to show that the "13 chapters" of which Ssu-ma Ch’ien speaks were essentially the same as those now extant. We have his word for it that they were widely circulated in his day, and can only regret that he refrained from discussing them on that account. Sun Hsing-yen says in his preface:— During the Ch’in and Han dynasties Sun Tzŭ’s _Art of War_ was in general use amongst military commanders, but they seem to have treated it as a work of mysterious import, and were unwilling to expound it for the benefit of posterity. Thus it came about that Wei Wu was the first to write a commentary on it. As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground to suppose that Ts’ao Kung tampered with the text. But the text itself is often so obscure, and the number of editions which appeared from that time onward so great, especially during the T’ang and Sung dynasties, that it would be surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed to creep in. Towards the middle of the Sung period, by which time all the chief commentaries on Sun Tzŭ were in existence, a certain Chi T’ien-pao published a work in 15 _chuan_ entitled "Sun Tzŭ with the collected commentaries of ten writers." There was another text, with variant readings put forward by Chu Fu of Ta-hsing, which also had supporters among the scholars of that period; but in the Ming editions, Sun Hsing-yen tells us, these readings were for some reason or other no longer put into circulation. Thus, until the end of the 18th century, the text in sole possession of the field was one derived from Chi T’ien-pao’s edition, although no actual copy of that important work was known to have survived. That, therefore, is the text of Sun Tzŭ which appears in the War section of the great Imperial encyclopedia printed in 1726, the _Ku Chin T’u Shu Chi Ch’eng_. Another copy at my disposal of what is practically the same text, with slight variations, is that contained in the "Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch’in dynasties" [1758]. And the Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop’s first edition is evidently a similar version which has filtered through Japanese channels. So things remained until Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar, who claimed to be an actual descendant of Sun Wu, [36] accidentally discovered a copy of Chi T’ien-pao’s long-lost work, when on a visit to the library of the Hua-yin temple. [37] Appended to it was the _I Shuo_ of Cheng Yu-Hsien, mentioned in the _T’ung Chih_, and also believed to have perished. This is what Sun Hsing-yen designates as the "original edition (or text)"—a rather misleading name, for it cannot by any means claim to set before us the text of Sun Tzŭ in its pristine purity. Chi T’ien-pao was a careless compiler, and appears to have been content to reproduce the somewhat debased version current in his day, without troubling to collate it with the earliest editions then available. Fortunately, two versions of Sun Tzŭ, even older than the newly discovered work, were still extant, one buried in the _T’ung Tien_, Tu Yu’s great treatise on the Constitution, the other similarly enshrined in the _T’ai P’ing Yu Lan_ encyclopedia. In both the complete text is to be found, though split up into fragments, intermixed with other matter, and scattered piecemeal over a number of different sections. Considering that the _Yu Lan_ takes us back to the year 983, and the _T’ung Tien_ about 200 years further still, to the middle of the T’ang dynasty, the value of these early transcripts of Sun Tzŭ can hardly be overestimated. Yet the idea of utilizing them does not seem to have occurred to anyone until Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Government instructions, undertook a thorough recension of the text. This is his own account:— Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzŭ which his editors had handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient edition [of Chi T’ien-pao] should be used, and that the text should be revised and corrected throughout. It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the Governor Pi Kua, and Hsi, a graduate of the second degree, had all devoted themselves to this study, probably surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I have had the whole work cut on blocks as a textbook for military men. The three individuals here referred to had evidently been occupied on the text of Sun Tzŭ prior to Sun Hsing-yen’s commission, but we are left in doubt as to the work they really accomplished. At any rate, the new edition, when ultimately produced, appeared in the names of Sun Hsing-yen and only one co-editor Wu Jen-shi. They took the "original edition" as their basis, and by careful comparison with older versions, as well as the extant commentaries and other sources of information such as the _I Shuo_, succeeded in restoring a very large number of doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what must be accepted as the closest approximation we are ever likely to get to Sun Tzŭ’s original work. This is what will hereafter be denominated the "standard text." The copy which I have used belongs to a reissue dated 1877. It is in 6 _pen_, forming part of a well-printed set of 23 early philosophical works in 83 _pen_. [38] It opens with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen (largely quoted in this introduction), vindicating the traditional view of Sun Tzŭ’s life and performances, and summing up in remarkably concise fashion the evidence in its favour. This is followed by Ts’ao Kung’s preface to his edition, and the biography of Sun Tzŭ from the _Shih Chi_, both translated above. Then come, firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien’s _I Shuo_, [39] with author’s preface, and next, a short miscellany of historical and bibliographical information entitled _Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu_, compiled by Pi I-hsun. As regards the body of the work, each separate sentence is followed by a note on the text, if required, and then by the various commentaries appertaining to it, arranged in chronological order. These we shall now proceed to discuss briefly, one by one. The Commentators Sun Tzŭ can boast an exceptionally long distinguished roll of commentators, which would do honour to any classic. Ou-yang Hsiu remarks on this fact, though he wrote before the tale was complete, and rather ingeniously explains it by saying that the artifices of war, being inexhaustible, must therefore be susceptible of treatment in a great variety of ways.

Chapters

1. Chapter 1 2. INTRODUCTION 3. Chapter XIII. The Use of Spies 4. INTRODUCTION 5. 1. TS’AO TS’AO or Ts’ao Kung, afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti [A.D. 6. 2. MENG SHIH. The commentary which has come down to us under this name 7. 3. LI CH’UAN of the 8th century was a well-known writer on military 8. 4. TU YU (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary on Sun Tzŭ, 9. 5. TU MU (803-852) is perhaps the best known as a poet—a bright star 10. 6. CH’EN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch’ao 11. 7. CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the T’ang dynasty, for his 12. 8. MEI YAO-CH’EN (1002-1060), commonly known by his "style" as Mei 13. 9. WANG HSI, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original in some of 14. 10. HO YEN-HSI of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this 15. 11. CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no great 16. 1. _Wu Tzŭ_, in 1 _chuan_ or 6 chapters. By Wu Ch’i (_d_. 381 B.C.). A 17. 2. _Ssu-ma Fa_, in 1 _chuan_ or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to 18. 3. _Liu T’ao_, in 6 _chuan_, or 60 chapters. Attributed to Lu Wang (or 19. 4. _Wei Liao Tzŭ_, in 5 _chuan_. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent. 20. 5. _San Lueh_ in 3 _chuan_. Attributed to Huang-shih Kung, a legendary 21. 6. _Li Wei Kung Wen Tui_, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a 22. 7. _Li Ching Ping Fa_ (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is a 23. 8. _Wu Ch’i Ching_, in 1 _chuan_. Attributed to the legendary minister 24. 9. The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to a work of the 25. 10. "They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened wood to 26. 11. The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and 27. 12. King Yen of Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says in 28. 13. The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the _T’u Shu_, and 29. 14. Ts’ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. II, 30. 16. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that _Wu Tzŭ_, which is not in 31. 20. See Chapter 11, § 28. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his 32. 22. The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large 33. 24. I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter of 34. 28. Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was T’ien, lived in the latter 35. 29. See Legge’s Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks that 36. 31. When Wu first appears in the _Ch’un Ch’iu_ in 584, it is already at 37. 33. There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would 38. 34. With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse:—a spurious 39. 35. From _Tso Chuan:_ "From the date of King Chao’s accession [515] 40. 36. Preface ad fin: "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are really 41. 37. Hoa-yin is about 14 miles from T’ung-kuan on the eastern border of 42. 40. Cf. Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo: "His 43. 42. It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently discovered 44. 43. The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was 45. 46. This appears to be still extant. See Wylie’s "Notes," p. 91 (new 46. 48. A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the _San Kuo 47. 53. The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of acquainting 48. 66. The other four being worship, mourning, entertainment of guests, 49. 68. This is a rather obscure allusion to the _Tso Chuan_, where 50. 70. Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See _Lun Yu_, 51. 74. See XIII. § 27, note. Further details on T’ai Kung will be found in 52. Chapter I. LAYING PLANS 53. 2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to 54. 3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be 55. 4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The 56. 7. _Heaven_ signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. 57. 8. _Earth_ comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; 58. 9. _The Commander_ stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, 59. 10. By _Method and discipline_ are to be understood the marshalling of 60. 11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows 61. 12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the 62. 13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law? 63. 14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or 64. 15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will 65. 16. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any 66. 17. According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s 67. 18. All warfare is based on deception. 68. 19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our 69. 20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. 70. 21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in 71. 22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. 72. 23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. 73. 24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not 74. 25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged 75. 26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his 76. Chapter II. WAGING WAR 77. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field 78. 2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, 79. 3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State 80. 4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength 81. 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has 82. 6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged 83. 7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war 84. 8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his 85. 9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus 86. 10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by 87. 11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; 88. 12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be 89. 15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One 90. 16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; 91. 17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been 92. 18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own 93. 19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy 94. 20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of 95. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is 96. 2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme 97. 3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy’s plans; 98. 4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be 99. 5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men 100. 6. Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any 101. 7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, 102. 8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to 103. 9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; 104. 10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in 105. 11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is 106. 12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his 107. 13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant 108. 14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he 109. 15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, 110. 16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to 111. 17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He 112. 18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need 113. Chapter IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS 114. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond 115. 2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the 116. 3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, 117. 4. Hence the saying: One may _know_ how to conquer without being able 118. 5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat 119. 6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; 120. 7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret 121. 8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is 122. 9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and 123. 10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; 124. 11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, 125. 12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor 126. 13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. 127. 14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes 128. 15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle 129. 16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly 130. 17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; 131. 18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to 132. 19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight 133. 20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up 134. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the same principle as 135. 2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different 136. 3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the 137. 4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against 138. 5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, 139. 6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven 140. 7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of 141. 8. There are not more than five primary colours (blue, yellow, red, 142. 10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct 143. 11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is 144. 12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even 145. 13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon 146. 14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and 147. 15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to 148. 16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming 149. 17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear 150. 18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of 151. 19. Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains 152. 20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body 153. 21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and 154. 22. When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it 155. 23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum 156. Chapter VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG 157. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of 158. 2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but 159. 3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach 160. 4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; 161. 5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march 162. 6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches 163. 7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack 164. 8. Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not 165. 9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be 166. 10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the 167. 11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even 168. 12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging 169. 13. By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible 170. 14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up 171. 15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior 172. 16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then 173. 17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; 174. 18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible 175. 19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may 176. 20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be 177. 21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own 178. 22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from 179. 23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. 180. 24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may 181. 25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain 182. 26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own 183. 27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can 184. 28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but 185. 29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural 186. 30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what 187. 31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over 188. 32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare 189. 33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and 190. 34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always 191. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the 192. 2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend 193. 3. After that, comes tactical manœuvering, than which there is nothing 194. 4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy 195. 5. Manœuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined 196. 6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an 197. 7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make 198. 8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, 199. 9. If you march fifty _li_ in order to outmanœuver the enemy, you will 200. 10. If you march thirty _li_ with the same object, two-thirds of your 201. 11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; 202. 12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the 203. 13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar 204. 14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we 205. 15. In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed. 206. 16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by 207. 17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, 208. 18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, 209. 19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you 210. 20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst 211. 21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. 212. 22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. 213. 23. The Book of Army Management says: 214. 24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and 215. 25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either 216. 26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, 217. 27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; 218. 28. Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; 219. 29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is 220. 30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and 221. 31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait 222. 32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect 223. 33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor 224. 34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers 225. 35. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy. 226. 36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. 227. 37. Such is the art of warfare. 228. Chapter VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS 229. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the 230. 2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high 231. 3. There are roads which must not be followed, 232. 4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany 233. 5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted 234. 6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying 235. 7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of 236. 8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may 237. 9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always 238. 10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; 239. 11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the 240. 12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1) 241. 13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the 242. 14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will 243. Chapter IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH 244. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and 245. 2. Camp in high places, 246. 3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. 247. 4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not 248. 5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader 249. 6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. 250. 7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over 251. 8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass 252. 9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with 253. 10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge 254. 11. All armies prefer high ground to low, 255. 12. If you are careful of your men, 256. 13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the 257. 14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you 258. 15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running 259. 16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to 260. 17. If in the neighbourhood of your camp there should be any hilly 261. 18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on 262. 19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious 263. 20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a 264. 21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is 265. 22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. 266. 23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of 267. 24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is 268. 25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on 269. 26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot. 270. 27. When there is much running about 271. 29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint 272. 30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, 273. 31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to 274. 32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. 275. 33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is 276. 34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for 277. 35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in 278. 36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his 279. 37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s 280. 38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign 281. 39. If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a 282. 40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply 283. 41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is 284. 42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, 285. 43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with 286. 44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army 287. 45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his 288. Chapter X. TERRAIN 289. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) 290. 2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called 291. 3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in 292. 4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called 293. 5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may 294. 6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the 295. 7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an 296. 8. With regard to _narrow passes_, if you can occupy them first, let 297. 9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after 298. 10. With regard to _precipitous heights_, if you are beforehand with 299. 11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but 300. 12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the 301. 13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. 302. 14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from 303. 15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against 304. 16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too 305. 17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on 306. 18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are 307. 19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an 308. 20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully 309. 21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally; 310. 22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into 311. 23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even 312. 24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without 313. 25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you 314. 26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority 315. 27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are 316. 28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that 317. 29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our 318. 30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; 319. 31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your 320. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: 321. 2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive 322. 3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great 323. 4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either 324. 5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. 325. 6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, 326. 7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, 327. 8. Mountain forests, 328. 9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can 329. 10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting 330. 11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt 331. 12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way. 332. 13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. 333. 14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. 334. 15. Those who were called skilful leaders of old knew how to drive a 335. 16. When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from 336. 17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when 337. 18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly 338. 19. Rapidity is the essence of war: 339. 20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading 340. 21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with 341. 22. Carefully study the well-being of your men, 342. 23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and 343. 24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there 344. 25. Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be 345. 26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious 346. 27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because 347. 28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, 348. 29. The skilful tactician may be likened to the _shuai-jan_. Now the 349. 30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_, 350. 31. Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of 351. 32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard 352. 33. How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question 353. 34. Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were 354. 35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure 355. 36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports 356. 37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, 357. 38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has 358. 39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd 359. 40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the 360. 41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; 361. 42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that 362. 43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across 363. 44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. 364. 45. When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow 365. 46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity 366. 47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. 367. 48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences. On 368. 49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of 369. 50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. 370. 51. For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate 371. 52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are 372. 53. To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles 373. 54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship 374. 55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor 375. 56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, 376. 57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know 377. 58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it 378. 59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that is 379. 60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves 380. 61. By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank, 381. 63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier 382. 64. Be stern in the council-chamber, 383. 66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, 384. 67. Walk in the path defined by rule, 385. 68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy 386. Chapter XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE 387. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first 388. 2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. 389. 3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special 390. 4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days 391. 5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible 392. 6. (1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once 393. 7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain 394. 8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it 395. 9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do 396. 10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from 397. 11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze 398. 12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be 399. 13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; 400. 14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of 401. 15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed 402. 16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; 403. 17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless 404. 18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own 405. 19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where 406. 20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by 407. 21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again 408. 22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full 409. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching 410. 2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the 411. 3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his 412. 4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike 413. 5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be 414. 6. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from 415. 7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local 416. 8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the 417. 9. Having _local spies_ means employing the services of the inhabitants 418. 10. Having _inward spies_, making use of officials of the enemy. 419. 11. Having _converted spies_, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and 420. 12. Having _doomed spies_, doing certain things openly for purposes of 421. 13. _Surviving spies_, finally, are those who bring back news from the 422. 14. Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate 423. 15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive 424. 16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and 425. 17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the 426. 18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of 427. 19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is 428. 20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to 429. 21. The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, 430. 22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we 431. 23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed 432. 24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used 433. 25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of 434. 26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty 435. 27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who

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