The Art of War by active 6th century B.C. Sunzi

11. CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no great

2481 words  |  Chapter 15

originality perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid exposition. His commentator is based on that of Ts’ao Kung, whose terse sentences he contrives to expand and develop in masterly fashion. Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say that much of Ts’ao Kung’s commentary would have remained cloaked in its pristine obscurity and therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the Sung history, the _T’ung K’ao_, or the _Yu Hai_, but it finds a niche in the _T’ung Chih_, which also names him as the author of the "Lives of Famous Generals." [46] It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all have flourished within so short a space of time. Ch’ao Kung-wu accounts for it by saying: "During the early years of the Sung dynasty the Empire enjoyed a long spell of peace, and men ceased to practice the art of war. but when [Chao] Yuan-hao’s rebellion came [1038-42] and the frontier generals were defeated time after time, the Court made strenuous inquiry for men skilled in war, and military topics became the vogue amongst all the high officials. Hence it is that the commentators of Sun Tzŭ in our dynasty belong mainly to that period. [47] Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose work has not come down to us. The _Sui Shu_ mentions four, namely Wang Ling (often quoted by Tu Yu as Wang Tzŭ); Chang Tzŭ-shang; Chia Hsu of Wei; [48] and Shen Yu of Wu. The _T’ang Shu_ adds Sun Hao, and the _T’ung Chih_ Hsiao Chi, while the _T’u Shu_ mentions a Ming commentator, Huang Jun-yu. It is possible that some of these may have been merely collectors and editors of other commentaries, like Chi T’ien-pao and Chi Hsieh, mentioned above. Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ Sun Tzŭ has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some of China’s greatest men. Among the famous generals who are known to have studied his pages with enthusiasm may be mentioned Han Hsin (_d_. 196 B.C.), [49] Feng I (_d_. 34 A.D.), [50] Lu Meng (_d_. 219), [51] and Yo Fei (1103-1141). [52] The opinion of Ts’ao Kung, who disputes with Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese military annals, has already been recorded. [53] Still more remarkable, in one way, is the testimony of purely literary men, such as Su Hsun (the father of Su Tung-p’o), who wrote several essays on military topics, all of which owe their chief inspiration to Sun Tzŭ. The following short passage by him is preserved in the _Yu Hai:_ [54]— Sun Wu’s saying, that in war one cannot make certain of conquering, [55] is very different indeed from what other books tell us. [56] Wu Ch’i was a man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they both wrote books on war, and they are linked together in popular speech as "Sun and Wu." But Wu Ch’i’s remarks on war are less weighty, his rules are rougher and more crudely stated, and there is not the same unity of plan as in Sun Tzŭ’s work, where the style is terse, but the meaning fully brought out. The following is an extract from the "Impartial Judgments in the Garden of Literature" by Cheng Hou:— Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all military men’s training, but also compel the most careful attention of scholars and men of letters. His sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet profound, perspicuous and eminently practical. Such works as the _Lun Yu_, the _I Ching_ and the great Commentary, [57] as well as the writings of Mencius, Hsun K’uang and Yang Chu, all fall below the level of Sun Tzŭ. Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the criticism, although he dislikes the audacious comparison with the venerated classical works. Language of this sort, he says, "encourages a ruler’s bent towards unrelenting warfare and reckless militarism." Apologies for War Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving nation on earth, we are in some danger of forgetting that her experience of war in all its phases has also been such as no modern State can parallel. Her long military annals stretch back to a point at which they are lost in the mists of time. She had built the Great Wall and was maintaining a huge standing army along her frontier centuries before the first Roman legionary was seen on the Danube. What with the perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal States, the grim conflicts with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralization of government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the overthrow of so many dynasties, besides the countless rebellions and minor disturbances that have flamed up and flickered out again one by one, it is hardly too much to say that the clash of arms has never ceased to resound in one portion or another of the Empire. No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains to whom China can point with pride. As in all countries, the greatest are fond of emerging at the most fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po Ch’i stands out conspicuous in the period when Ch’in was entering upon her final struggle with the remaining independent states. The stormy years which followed the break-up of the Ch’in dynasty are illuminated by the transcendent genius of Han Hsin. When the House of Han in turn is tottering to its fall, the great and baleful figure of Ts’ao Ts’ao dominates the scene. And in the establishment of the T’ang dynasty, one of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the superhuman energy of Li Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T’ai Tsung) was seconded by the brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need fear comparison with the greatest names in the military history of Europe. In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, from Lao Tzŭ downwards, and especially as reflected in the standard literature of Confucianism, has been consistently pacific and intensely opposed to militarism in any form. It is such an uncommon thing to find any of the literati defending warfare on principle, that I have thought it worth while to collect and translate a few passages in which the unorthodox view is upheld. The following, by Ssu-ma Ch’ien, shows that for all his ardent admiration of Confucius, he was yet no advocate of peace at any price:— Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish violence and cruelty, to give peace to troublous times, to remove difficulties and dangers, and to succour those who are in peril. Every animal with blood in its veins and horns on its head will fight when it is attacked. How much more so will man, who carries in his breast the faculties of love and hatred, joy and anger! When he is pleased, a feeling of affection springs up within him; when angry, his poisoned sting is brought into play. That is the natural law which governs his being…. What then shall be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all great issues, and without any appreciation of relative values, who can only bark out their stale formulas about "virtue" and "civilization," condemning the use of military weapons? They will surely bring our country to impotence and dishonour and the loss of her rightful heritage; or, at the very least, they will bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice of territory and general enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately refuse to modify the position they have taken up. The truth is that, just as in the family the teacher must not spare the rod, and punishments cannot be dispensed with in the State, so military chastisement can never be allowed to fall into abeyance in the Empire. All one can say is that this power will be exercised wisely by some, foolishly by others, and that among those who bear arms some will be loyal and others rebellious. [58] The next piece is taken from Tu Mu’s preface to his commentary on Sun Tzŭ:— War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of government. It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch’iu, both disciples of Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and hearing of litigation, the imprisonment of offenders and their execution by flogging in the market-place, are all done by officials. But the wielding of huge armies, the throwing down of fortified cities, the hauling of women and children into captivity, and the beheading of traitors—this is also work which is done by officials. The objects of the rack and of military weapons are essentially the same. There is no intrinsic difference between the punishment of flogging and cutting off heads in war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt with, only a small amount of force need be employed: hence the use of military weapons and wholesale decapitation. In both cases, however, the end in view is to get rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the good…. Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: "Have you, Sir, acquired your military aptitude by study, or is it innate?" Jan Yu replied: "It has been acquired by study." [59] "How can that be so," said Chi-sun, "seeing that you are a disciple of Confucius?" "It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; "I was taught by Confucius. It is fitting that the great Sage should exercise both civil and military functions, though to be sure my instruction in the art of fighting has not yet gone very far." Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the "civil" and the "military," and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of action, or in what year of which dynasty it was first introduced, is more than I can say. But, at any rate, it has come about that the members of the governing class are quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or do so only in a shamefaced manner. If any are bold enough to discuss the subject, they are at once set down as eccentric individuals of coarse and brutal propensities. This is an extraordinary instance in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily lose sight of fundamental principles. When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch’eng Wang, he regulated ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of scholarship and learning; yet when the barbarians of the River Huai revolted, [60] he sallied forth and chastised them. When Confucius held office under the Duke of Lu, and a meeting was convened at Chia-ku, [61] he said: "If pacific negotiations are in progress, warlike preparations should have been made beforehand." He rebuked and shamed the Marquis of Ch’i, who cowered under him and dared not proceed to violence. How can it be said that these two great Sages had no knowledge of military matters? We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzŭ in high esteem. He also appeals to the authority of the Classics:— Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: "I have never studied matters connected with armies and battalions." [62] Replying to K’ung Wen-tzu, he said: I have not been instructed about buff-coats and weapons." But if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, we find that he used armed force against the men of Lai, so that the marquis of Ch’i was overawed. Again, when the inhabitants of Pi revolted; he ordered his officers to attack them, whereupon they were defeated and fled in confusion. He once uttered the words: "If I fight, I conquer." [63] And Jan Yu also said: "The Sage exercises both civil and military functions." [64] Can it be a fact that Confucius never studied or received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he did not specially choose matters connected with armies and fighting to be the subject of his teaching. Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzŭ, writes in similar strain:— Confucius said: "I am unversed in military matters." [65] He also said: "If I fight, I conquer." Confucius ordered ceremonies and regulated music. Now war constitutes one of the five classes of State ceremonial, [66] and must not be treated as an independent branch of study. Hence, the words "I am unversed in" must be taken to mean that there are things which even an inspired Teacher does not know. Those who have to lead an army and devise stratagems, must learn the art of war. But if one can command the services of a good general like Sun Tzŭ, who was employed by Wu Tzŭ-hsu, there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the remark added by Confucius: "If I fight, I conquer." The men of the present day, however, willfully interpret these words of Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant that books on the art of war were not worth reading. With blind persistency, they adduce the example of Chao Kua, who pored over his father’s books to no purpose, [67] as a proof that all military theory is useless. Again, seeing that books on war have to do with such things as opportunism in designing plans, and the conversion of spies, they hold that the art is immoral and unworthy of a sage. These people ignore the fact that the studies of our scholars and the civil administration of our officials also require steady application and practice before efficiency is reached. The ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere novices to botch their work. [68] Weapons are baneful [69] and fighting perilous; and useless unless a general is in constant practice, he ought not to hazard other men’s lives in battle. [70] Hence it is essential that Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters should be studied. Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi [71] in the art of war. Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but would not pursue his studies to their proper outcome, the consequence being that he was finally defeated and overthrown. He did not realize that the tricks and artifices of war are beyond verbal computation. Duke Hsiang of Sung and King Yen of Hsu were brought to destruction by their misplaced humanity. The treacherous and underhand nature of war necessitates the use of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. There is a case on record of Confucius himself having violated an extorted oath, [72] and also of his having left the Sung State in disguise. [73] Can we then recklessly arraign Sun Tzŭ for disregarding truth and honesty? Bibliography The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tzŭ. The notes on each have been drawn principally from the _Ssu k’u ch’uan shu chien ming mu lu_, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq.

Chapters

1. Chapter 1 2. INTRODUCTION 3. Chapter XIII. The Use of Spies 4. INTRODUCTION 5. 1. TS’AO TS’AO or Ts’ao Kung, afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti [A.D. 6. 2. MENG SHIH. The commentary which has come down to us under this name 7. 3. LI CH’UAN of the 8th century was a well-known writer on military 8. 4. TU YU (died 812) did not publish a separate commentary on Sun Tzŭ, 9. 5. TU MU (803-852) is perhaps the best known as a poet—a bright star 10. 6. CH’EN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch’ao 11. 7. CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the T’ang dynasty, for his 12. 8. MEI YAO-CH’EN (1002-1060), commonly known by his "style" as Mei 13. 9. WANG HSI, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original in some of 14. 10. HO YEN-HSI of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this 15. 11. CHANG YU. The list closes with a commentator of no great 16. 1. _Wu Tzŭ_, in 1 _chuan_ or 6 chapters. By Wu Ch’i (_d_. 381 B.C.). A 17. 2. _Ssu-ma Fa_, in 1 _chuan_ or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to 18. 3. _Liu T’ao_, in 6 _chuan_, or 60 chapters. Attributed to Lu Wang (or 19. 4. _Wei Liao Tzŭ_, in 5 _chuan_. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent. 20. 5. _San Lueh_ in 3 _chuan_. Attributed to Huang-shih Kung, a legendary 21. 6. _Li Wei Kung Wen Tui_, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a 22. 7. _Li Ching Ping Fa_ (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is a 23. 8. _Wu Ch’i Ching_, in 1 _chuan_. Attributed to the legendary minister 24. 9. The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to a work of the 25. 10. "They attached strings to wood to make bows, and sharpened wood to 26. 11. The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and 27. 12. King Yen of Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says in 28. 13. The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the _T’u Shu_, and 29. 14. Ts’ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. II, 30. 16. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that _Wu Tzŭ_, which is not in 31. 20. See Chapter 11, § 28. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his 32. 22. The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large 33. 24. I do not know what this work, unless it be the last chapter of 34. 28. Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was T’ien, lived in the latter 35. 29. See Legge’s Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks that 36. 31. When Wu first appears in the _Ch’un Ch’iu_ in 584, it is already at 37. 33. There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would 38. 34. With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse:—a spurious 39. 35. From _Tso Chuan:_ "From the date of King Chao’s accession [515] 40. 36. Preface ad fin: "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are really 41. 37. Hoa-yin is about 14 miles from T’ung-kuan on the eastern border of 42. 40. Cf. Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo: "His 43. 42. It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently discovered 44. 43. The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was 45. 46. This appears to be still extant. See Wylie’s "Notes," p. 91 (new 46. 48. A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the _San Kuo 47. 53. The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of acquainting 48. 66. The other four being worship, mourning, entertainment of guests, 49. 68. This is a rather obscure allusion to the _Tso Chuan_, where 50. 70. Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See _Lun Yu_, 51. 74. See XIII. § 27, note. Further details on T’ai Kung will be found in 52. Chapter I. LAYING PLANS 53. 2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to 54. 3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be 55. 4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The 56. 7. _Heaven_ signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. 57. 8. _Earth_ comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; 58. 9. _The Commander_ stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, 59. 10. By _Method and discipline_ are to be understood the marshalling of 60. 11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows 61. 12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the 62. 13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law? 63. 14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or 64. 15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will 65. 16. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any 66. 17. According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s 67. 18. All warfare is based on deception. 68. 19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our 69. 20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. 70. 21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in 71. 22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. 72. 23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. 73. 24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not 74. 25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged 75. 26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his 76. Chapter II. WAGING WAR 77. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field 78. 2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, 79. 3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State 80. 4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength 81. 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has 82. 6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged 83. 7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war 84. 8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his 85. 9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus 86. 10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by 87. 11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; 88. 12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be 89. 15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One 90. 16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; 91. 17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been 92. 18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own 93. 19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy 94. 20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of 95. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is 96. 2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme 97. 3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy’s plans; 98. 4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be 99. 5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men 100. 6. Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any 101. 7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, 102. 8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to 103. 9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; 104. 10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in 105. 11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is 106. 12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his 107. 13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant 108. 14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he 109. 15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, 110. 16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to 111. 17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He 112. 18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need 113. Chapter IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS 114. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond 115. 2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the 116. 3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, 117. 4. Hence the saying: One may _know_ how to conquer without being able 118. 5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat 119. 6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; 120. 7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret 121. 8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is 122. 9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and 123. 10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; 124. 11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, 125. 12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor 126. 13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. 127. 14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes 128. 15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle 129. 16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly 130. 17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; 131. 18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to 132. 19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight 133. 20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up 134. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the same principle as 135. 2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different 136. 3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the 137. 4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against 138. 5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, 139. 6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven 140. 7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of 141. 8. There are not more than five primary colours (blue, yellow, red, 142. 10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct 143. 11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is 144. 12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even 145. 13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon 146. 14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and 147. 15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to 148. 16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming 149. 17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear 150. 18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of 151. 19. Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains 152. 20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body 153. 21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and 154. 22. When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it 155. 23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum 156. Chapter VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG 157. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of 158. 2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but 159. 3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach 160. 4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; 161. 5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march 162. 6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches 163. 7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack 164. 8. Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not 165. 9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be 166. 10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the 167. 11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even 168. 12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging 169. 13. By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible 170. 14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up 171. 15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior 172. 16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then 173. 17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; 174. 18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible 175. 19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may 176. 20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be 177. 21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own 178. 22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from 179. 23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. 180. 24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may 181. 25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain 182. 26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own 183. 27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can 184. 28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but 185. 29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural 186. 30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what 187. 31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over 188. 32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare 189. 33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and 190. 34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always 191. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the 192. 2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend 193. 3. After that, comes tactical manœuvering, than which there is nothing 194. 4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy 195. 5. Manœuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined 196. 6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an 197. 7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make 198. 8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, 199. 9. If you march fifty _li_ in order to outmanœuver the enemy, you will 200. 10. If you march thirty _li_ with the same object, two-thirds of your 201. 11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; 202. 12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the 203. 13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar 204. 14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we 205. 15. In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed. 206. 16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by 207. 17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, 208. 18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, 209. 19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you 210. 20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst 211. 21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. 212. 22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. 213. 23. The Book of Army Management says: 214. 24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and 215. 25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either 216. 26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, 217. 27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; 218. 28. Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; 219. 29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is 220. 30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and 221. 31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait 222. 32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect 223. 33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor 224. 34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers 225. 35. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy. 226. 36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. 227. 37. Such is the art of warfare. 228. Chapter VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS 229. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the 230. 2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high 231. 3. There are roads which must not be followed, 232. 4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany 233. 5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted 234. 6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying 235. 7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of 236. 8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may 237. 9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always 238. 10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; 239. 11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the 240. 12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1) 241. 13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the 242. 14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will 243. Chapter IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH 244. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and 245. 2. Camp in high places, 246. 3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. 247. 4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not 248. 5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader 249. 6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. 250. 7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over 251. 8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass 252. 9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with 253. 10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge 254. 11. All armies prefer high ground to low, 255. 12. If you are careful of your men, 256. 13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the 257. 14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you 258. 15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running 259. 16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to 260. 17. If in the neighbourhood of your camp there should be any hilly 261. 18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on 262. 19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious 263. 20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a 264. 21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is 265. 22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. 266. 23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of 267. 24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is 268. 25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on 269. 26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot. 270. 27. When there is much running about 271. 29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint 272. 30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, 273. 31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to 274. 32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. 275. 33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is 276. 34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for 277. 35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in 278. 36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his 279. 37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s 280. 38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign 281. 39. If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a 282. 40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply 283. 41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is 284. 42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, 285. 43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with 286. 44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army 287. 45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his 288. Chapter X. TERRAIN 289. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) 290. 2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called 291. 3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in 292. 4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called 293. 5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may 294. 6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the 295. 7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an 296. 8. With regard to _narrow passes_, if you can occupy them first, let 297. 9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after 298. 10. With regard to _precipitous heights_, if you are beforehand with 299. 11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but 300. 12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the 301. 13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. 302. 14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from 303. 15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against 304. 16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too 305. 17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on 306. 18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are 307. 19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an 308. 20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully 309. 21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally; 310. 22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into 311. 23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even 312. 24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without 313. 25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you 314. 26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority 315. 27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are 316. 28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that 317. 29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our 318. 30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; 319. 31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your 320. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: 321. 2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive 322. 3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great 323. 4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either 324. 5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. 325. 6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, 326. 7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, 327. 8. Mountain forests, 328. 9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can 329. 10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting 330. 11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt 331. 12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way. 332. 13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. 333. 14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. 334. 15. Those who were called skilful leaders of old knew how to drive a 335. 16. When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from 336. 17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when 337. 18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly 338. 19. Rapidity is the essence of war: 339. 20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading 340. 21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with 341. 22. Carefully study the well-being of your men, 342. 23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and 343. 24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there 344. 25. Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be 345. 26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious 346. 27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because 347. 28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, 348. 29. The skilful tactician may be likened to the _shuai-jan_. Now the 349. 30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_, 350. 31. Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of 351. 32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard 352. 33. How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question 353. 34. Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were 354. 35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure 355. 36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports 356. 37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, 357. 38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has 358. 39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd 359. 40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the 360. 41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; 361. 42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that 362. 43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across 363. 44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. 364. 45. When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow 365. 46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity 366. 47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. 367. 48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences. On 368. 49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of 369. 50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. 370. 51. For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate 371. 52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are 372. 53. To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles 373. 54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship 374. 55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor 375. 56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, 376. 57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know 377. 58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it 378. 59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that is 379. 60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves 380. 61. By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank, 381. 63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier 382. 64. Be stern in the council-chamber, 383. 66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, 384. 67. Walk in the path defined by rule, 385. 68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy 386. Chapter XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE 387. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first 388. 2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. 389. 3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special 390. 4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days 391. 5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible 392. 6. (1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once 393. 7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain 394. 8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it 395. 9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do 396. 10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from 397. 11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze 398. 12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be 399. 13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; 400. 14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of 401. 15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed 402. 16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; 403. 17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless 404. 18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own 405. 19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where 406. 20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by 407. 21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again 408. 22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full 409. 1. Sun Tzŭ said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching 410. 2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the 411. 3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his 412. 4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike 413. 5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be 414. 6. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from 415. 7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local 416. 8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the 417. 9. Having _local spies_ means employing the services of the inhabitants 418. 10. Having _inward spies_, making use of officials of the enemy. 419. 11. Having _converted spies_, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and 420. 12. Having _doomed spies_, doing certain things openly for purposes of 421. 13. _Surviving spies_, finally, are those who bring back news from the 422. 14. Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate 423. 15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive 424. 16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and 425. 17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the 426. 18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of 427. 19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is 428. 20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to 429. 21. The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, 430. 22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we 431. 23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed 432. 24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used 433. 25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of 434. 26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty 435. 27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who

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