1828. Considering the intensity of his partisan feelings, his refusal to

vote, during nearly all the long period when he was Chief Justice, was a real sacrifice, the extent of which may be measured by the fact that, according to his letter to Story, he did not even vote against Madison in 1812, notwithstanding the violence of his emotions aroused by the war.[1275] On March 4, 1829, Marshall administered the oath of office to the newly elected President, Andrew Jackson. No two men ever faced one another more unlike in personality and character. The mild, gentle, benignant features of the Chief Justice contrasted strongly with the stern, rigid, and aggressive countenance of "Old Hickory." The one stood for the reign of law; the other for autocratic administration. In Jackson, whim, prejudice, hatred, and fierce affections were dominant; in Marshall, steady, level views of life and government, devotion to order and regularity, abhorrence of quarrel and feud, constancy and evenness in friendship or conviction, were the chief elements of character. Moreover, the Chief Justice personified the static forces of society; the new President was the product of a fresh upheaval of democracy, not unlike that which had placed Jefferson in power. Marshall had administered the Presidential oath seven times before--twice each to Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, and once to John Quincy Adams. And now he was reading the solemn words to the passionate frontier soldier from whose wild, undisciplined character he feared so much. Marshall briefly writes his wife about the inauguration: "We had yesterday a most busy and crowded day. People have flocked to Washington from every quarter of the United States. When the oath was administered to the President the computation is that 12 or 15000 people were present--a great number of them ladies. A great ball was given at night to celebrate the election. I of course did not attend it. The affliction of our son[1276] would have been sufficient to restrain me had I even felt a desire to go."[1277] In a previous letter to his wife he forecast the crowds and commotion: "The whole world it is said will be here.... I wish I could leave it all and come to you. How much more delightful would it be to me to sit by your side than to witness all the pomp and parade of the inauguration."[1278] Much as he had come to dislike taking part in politics or in public affairs, except in the discharge of his judicial duties, Marshall was prevailed upon to be a delegate to the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1829-30. He refused, at first, to stand for the place and hastened to reassure his "dearest Polly." "I am told," he continues in his letter describing Jackson's induction into office, "by several that I am held up as a candidate for the convention. I have no desire to be in the convention and do not mean to be a candidate. I should not trouble you with this did I not apprehend that the idea of my wishing to be in the convention might prevent some of my friends who are themselves desirous of being in it from becoming candidates. I therefore wish you to give this information to Mr. Harvie.[1279]... Farewell my dearest Polly. Your happiness is always nearest the heart of your J. Marshall."[1280] He yielded, however, and wrote Story of his disgust at having done so: "I am almost ashamed of my weakness and irresolution when I tell you that I am a member of our convention. I was in earnest when I told you that I would not come into that body, and really believed that I should adhere to that determination; but I have acted like a girl addressed by a gentleman she does not positively dislike, but is unwilling to marry. She is sure to yield to the advice and persuasion of her friends.... The body will contain a great deal of eloquence as well as talent, and yet will do, I fear, much harm with some good. Our freehold suffrage is, I believe, gone past redemption. It is impossible to resist the influence, I had almost said contagion of universal example."[1281] For fifty-three years Virginia had been governed under the constitution adopted at the beginning of the Revolution. As early as the close of this war the injustice and inadequacy of the Constitution of 1776 had become evident, and, as a member of the House of Delegates, Marshall apparently had favored the adoption of a new fundamental law for the State.[1282] Almost continuously thereafter the subject had been brought forward, but the conservatives always had been strong enough to defeat constitutional reform. On July 12, 1816, in a letter to Samuel Kercheval, one of the ablest documents he ever produced, Jefferson had exposed the defects of Virginia's constitution which, he truly said, was without "leading principles." It denied equality of representation; the Governor was neither elected nor controlled by the people; the higher judges were "dependent on none but themselves." With unsparing severity Jefferson denounces the County Court system. Clearly and simply he enumerates the constructive reforms imperatively demanded, beginning with "General Suffrage" and "Equal representation," on which, however, he says that he wishes "to take no public share" because that question "has become a party one." Indeed, at the very beginning of this brilliant and well-reasoned letter, Jefferson tells Kercheval that it is "for your satisfaction only, and not to be quoted before the public."[1283] But Kercheval handed the letter around freely and proposed to print it for general circulation. On hearing of this, Jefferson was "alarmed" and wrote Kercheval harshly, repeating that the letter was not to be given out and demanding that the original and copies be recalled.[1284] This uncharacteristic perturbation of the former President reveals in startling fashion the bitterness of the strife over the calling of the convention, and over the issues confronting that body in making a new constitution for Virginia. Of the serious problems to be solved by the Convention of 1829-30, that of suffrage was the most important. Up to that time nobody could vote in Virginia except white owners of freehold estates. Counties, regardless of size, had equal representation in the House of Delegates. This gave to the eastern and southern slaveholding sections of the State, with small counties having few voters, an immense preponderance over the western and northwestern sections, with large counties having many voters. On the other hand, the rich slavery districts paid much heavier taxes than the poorer free counties.[1285] Marshall was distressed by every issue, to settle which the convention had been called. The question of the qualification for suffrage especially agitated him. Immediately after his election to the convention, he wrote Story of his troubles and misgivings: "We shall have a good deal of division and a good deal of heat, I fear, in our convention. The freehold principle will, I believe, be lost. It will, however, be supported with zeal. If that zeal should be successful I should not regret it. If we find that a decided majority is against retaining it I should prefer making a compromise by which a substantial property qualification may be preserved in exchange for it. "I fear the excessive [torn--probably, democratic spirit, coin]cident to victory after a hard fought battle continued to the last extremity may lead to universal suffrage or something very near it. What is the prop[erty] qualification for your Senate? How are your Senators apportioned on the State? And how does your system work? The question whether white population alone, or white population compounded with taxation, shall form the basis of representation will excite perhaps more interest than even the freehold suffrage. I wish we were well through the difficulty."[1286] The Massachusetts Constitutional Convention had been held nearly a decade before that of Virginia. The problem of suffrage had troubled the delegates almost as much as it now perplexed Marshall. The reminiscent Pickering writes the Chief Justice of the fight made in 1820 by the Massachusetts conservatives against "the conceited innovators." Story had been a delegate, and so had John Adams, fainting with extreme age, but rich with the wisdom of his eighty-five years: "He made a short, but very good speech," begging the convention to retain the State Senate as "the representative of _property_; ... the number of Senators in each district was proportioned to its direct taxes to the State revenue--and not to its population. Some democrats desired that the number of Senators should be apportioned not according to the taxation, but exclusively to the population. This, Mr. Adams and all the most intelligent and considerate members opposed."[1287] Ultra-conservative as Marshall was, strongly as he felt the great body of the people incapable of self-government, he was deeply concerned for the well-being of what he called "the mass of the people." The best that can be done for them, he says in a letter to Charles F. Mercer, is to educate them. "In governments entirely popular" general education "is more indispensable ... than in an other." The labor problem troubles him sorely. When population becomes so great that "the surplus hands" must turn to other employment, a grave situation will arise. "As the supply exceeds the demand the price of labour will cheapen until it affords a bare subsistence to the labourer. The superadded demands of a family can scarcely be satisfied and a slight indisposition, one which suspends labour and compensation for a few days produces famine and pauperism. How is this to be prevented?" Education may be relied on "in the present state of our population, and for a long time to come.... But as our country fills up how shall we escape the evils which have followed a dense population?"[1288] The Chief Justice went to the Virginia Convention a firm supporter of the strongest possible property qualification for suffrage. On the question of slavery, which arose in various forms, he had not made his position clear. The slavery question, as a National matter, perplexed and disturbed Marshall. There was nothing in him of the humanitarian reformer, but there was everything of the statesman. He never had but one, and that a splendid, vision. The American Nation was his dream; and to the realization of it he consecrated his life. A full generation after Marshall wrote his last despairing word on slavery, Abraham Lincoln expressed the conviction which the great Chief Justice had entertained: "I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution.... If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union."[1289] Pickering, the incessant, in one of his many and voluminous letters to Marshall which the ancient New Englander continued to write as long as he lived, had bemoaned the existence of slavery--one of the rare exhibitions of Liberalism displayed by that adamantine Federalist conservative. Marshall answered: "I concur with you in thinking that nothing portends more calamity & mischief to the Southern States than their slave population. Yet they seem to cherish the evil and to view with immovable prejudice & dislike every thing which may tend to diminish it. I do not wonder that they should resist any attempt, should one be made, to interfere with the rights of property, but they have a feverish jealousy of measures which may do good without the hazard of harm that is, I think, very unwise."[1290] Marshall heartily approved the plan of the American Colonization Society to send free negroes back to Africa. The Virginia branch of that organization was formed in 1829, the year of the State Constitutional Convention, and Marshall became a member. Two years later he became President of the Virginia branch, with James Madison, John Tyler, Abel P. Upshur, and other prominent Virginians as Vice-Presidents.[1291] In 1831, Marshall was elected one of twenty-four Vice-Presidents of the National society, among whom were Webster, Clay, Crawford, and Lafayette.[1292] The Reverend R. R. Gurley, Secretary of this organization, wrote to the more eminent members asking for their views. Among those who replied were Lafayette, Madison, and Marshall. The Chief Justice says that he feels a "deep interest in the ... society," but refuses to "prepare any thing for publication." The cause of this refusal is "the present state of [his] family"[1293] and a determination "long since formed ... against appearing in print on any occasion." Nevertheless, he writes Gurley a letter nearly seven hundred words in length. Marshall thinks it "extremely desirable" that the States shall pass "permanent laws" affording financial aid to the colonization project. It will be "also desirable" if this legislation can be secured "to incline the people of color to migrate." He had thought for a long time that it was just possible that more negroes might like to go to Liberia than "can be provided for with the funds [of] the Society"; therefore he had "suggested, some years past," to the managers, "to allow a small additional bounty in lands to those who would pay their passage in whole or in part." To Marshall it appears to be of "great importance to retain the countenance and protection of the General Government. Some of our cruizers stationed on the coast of Africa would, at the same time, interrupt the slave trade--a horrid traffic detested by all good men--and would protect the vessels and commerce of the Colony from pirates who infest those seas. The power of the government to afford this aid is not, I believe, contested." He thinks the plan of Rufus King to devote part of the proceeds from the sale of public lands to a fund for the colonization scheme, "the most effective that can be devised," Marshall makes a brief but dreary argument for this method of raising funds for the exportation of the freed blacks. He thus closes this eminently practical letter: "The removal of our colored population is, I think, a common object, by no means confined to the slave States, although they are more immediately interested in it. The whole Union would be strengthened by it, and relieved from a danger, whose extent can scarcely be estimated." Furthermore, says the Chief Justice, "it lessens very much ... the objection in a political view to the application of this ample fund [from the sale of the public domain], that our lands are becoming an object for which the States are to scramble, and which threatens to sow the seeds of discord among us instead of being what they might be--a source of national wealth."[1294] Marshall delivered two opinions in which the question of slavery was involved, but they throw little light on his sentiments. In the case of the Antelope he held that the slave trade was not prohibited by international law as it then existed; but since the court, including Story and Thompson, both bitter antagonists of slavery, was unanimous, the views of Marshall cannot be differentiated from those of his associates. Spain and Portugal claimed certain negroes forcibly taken from Spanish and Portuguese slavers by an American slaver off the coast of Africa. After picturesque vicissitudes the vessel containing the blacks was captured by an American revenue cutter and taken to Savannah for adjudication. In due course the case reached the Supreme Court and was elaborately argued. The Government insisted that the captured negroes should be given their liberty, since they had been brought into the country in violation of the statutes against the importation of slaves. Spain and Portugal demanded them as slaves "acquired as property ... in the regular course of legitimate commerce."[1295] It was not surprising that opinion on the slave trade was "unsettled," said Marshall in delivering the opinion of the court. All "Christian and civilized nations ... have been engaged in it.... Long usage, and general acquiescence" have sanctioned it.[1296] America had been the first to "check" the monstrous traffic. But, whatever its feelings or the state of public opinion, the court "must obey the mandate of the law."[1297] He cites four English decisions, especially a recent one by Sir William Scott, the effect of all being that the slave trade "could not be pronounced contrary to the law of nations."[1298] Every nation, therefore, has a right to engage in it. Some nations may renounce that right sanctioned by "universal assent." But other nations cannot be bound by such "renunciation." For all nations, large and small, are equal--"Russia and Geneva have equal rights." No one nation "can rightfully impose a rule on another ... none can make a law of nations; and this traffic remains lawful to those whose governments have not forbidden it.... It follows, that a foreign vessel engaged in the African slave trade, captured on the high seas in time of peace, by an American cruiser, and brought in for adjudication, would be restored."[1299] Four months before Marshall was elected a member of the Virginia Constitutional Convention, he delivered another opinion involving the legal status of slaves. Several negroes, the property of one Robert Boyce, were on a steamboat, the Teche, which was descending the Mississippi. The vessel took fire and those on board, including the negroes, escaped to the shore. Another steamboat, the Washington, was coming up the river at the time, and her captain, in response to appeals from the stranded passengers of the burning vessel, sent a yawl to bring them to the Washington. The yawl was upset and the slaves drowned. The owner of them sued the owner of the Washington for their value. The District Court held that the doctrine of common carriers did not apply to human beings; and this was the only question before the Supreme Court, to which Boyce appealed. "A slave ... cannot be stowed away as a common package," said Marshall in his brief opinion. "The responsibility of the carrier should be measured by the law which is applicable to passengers, rather than by that which is applicable to the carriage of common goods.... The law applicable to common carriers is one of great rigor.... It has not been applied to living men, and ... ought not to be applied to them." Nevertheless, "the ancient rule 'that the carrier is liable only for ordinary neglect,' still applies" to slaves. Therefore the District Court was right in its instructions to the jury.[1300] The two letters quoted and the opinions expressing the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court are all the data we have as to Marshall's views on slavery. It appears that he regretted the existence of slavery, feared the results of it, saw no way of getting rid of it, but hoped to lessen the evil by colonizing in Africa such free black people as were willing to go there. In short, Marshall held the opinion on slavery generally prevailing at that time. He was far more concerned that the Union should be strengthened, and dissension in Virginia quieted, than he was over the problem of human bondage, of which he saw no solution. When he took his seat as a delegate to the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1829-30, a more determined conservative than Marshall did not live. Apparently he did not want anything changed--especially if the change involved conflict--except, of course, the relation of the States to the Nation. He was against a new constitution for Virginia; against any extension of suffrage; against any modification of the County Court system except to strengthen it; against a free white basis of representation; against legislative interference with business. His attitude was not new, nor had he ever concealed his views. His opinions of legislation and corporate property, for instance, are revealed in a letter written twenty years before the Convention of 1829-30. In withdrawing from some Virginia corporation because the General Assembly of the State had passed a law for the control of it, Marshall wrote: "I consider the interference of the legislature in the management of our private affairs, whether those affairs are committed to a company or remain under individual direction, as equally dangerous and unwise. I have always thought so and I still think so. I may be compelled to subject my property to these interferences, and when compelled I shall submit; but I will not voluntarily expose myself to the exercise of a power which I think so improperly usurped."[1301] Two years before the convention was called, Marshall's unyielding conservatism was displayed in a most conspicuous manner. In Sturges _vs._ Crowninshield,[1302] a State law had been held invalid which relieved creditors from contracts made before the passage of that law. But, in his opinion in that case, Marshall used language that also applied to contracts made after the enactment of insolvency statutes; and the bench and bar generally had accepted his statement as the settled opinion of the Supreme Court. But so acute had public discontent become over this rigid doctrine, so strident the demand for bankrupt laws relieving insolvents, at least from contracts made after such statutes were enacted, that the majority of the Supreme Court yielded to popular insistence and, in Ogden _vs._ Saunders,[1303] held that "an insolvent law of a State does not impair the obligation of future contracts between its citizens."[1304] For the first time in twenty-seven years the majority of the court opposed Marshall on a question of Constitutional law. The Chief Justice dissented and delivered one of the most powerful opinions he ever wrote. The very "nature of our Union," he says, makes us "one people, as to commercial objects."[1305] The prohibition in the contract clause "is complete and total. There is no exception from it.[1306]... Insolvent laws are to operate on a future, contingent unforseen event."[1307] Yet the majority of the court hold that such legislation enters into subsequent contracts "so completely as to become a ... part" of them. If this is true of one law, it is true of "every other law which relates to the subject." But this would mean, contends Marshall, that a vital provision of the Constitution, "one on which the good and the wise reposed confidently for securing the prosperity and harmony of our citizens, would lie prostrate, and be construed into an inanimate, inoperative, unmeaning clause." The construction of the majority of the court would "convert an inhibition to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts into an inhibition to pass retrospective laws."[1308] If the Constitution means this, why is it not so expressed? The mischievous laws which caused the insertion of the contract clause "embraced future contracts, as well as those previously formed."[1309] The gist of Marshall's voluminous opinion in Ogden _vs._ Saunders is that the Constitution protects all contracts, past or future, from State legislation which in any manner impairs their obligation.[1310] Considering that even the rigidly conservative Bushrod Washington, Marshall's stanch supporter, refused to follow his stern philosophy, in this case, the measure and character of Marshall's conservatism are seen when, in his seventy-fifth year, he helped to frame a new constitution for Virginia. Still another example of Marshall's rock-like conservatism and of the persistence with which he held fast to his views is afforded by a second dissent from the majority of the court at the same session. This time every one of the Associate Justices was against him, and Story delivered their unanimous opinion. The Bank of the United States had sued Julius B. Dandridge, cashier of the Richmond branch, and his sureties, on his official bond. Marshall, sitting as Circuit Judge, had held that only the written record of the bank's board of directors, that they approved and accepted the bond, could be received to prove that Dandridge had been legally authorized to act as cashier. The Supreme Court reversed Marshall's judgment, holding that the authorization of an agent by a corporation can be established by presumptive evidence,[1311] an opinion that was plainly sound and which stated the law as it has continued to be ever since. But despite the unanimity of his brethren, the clear and convincing opinion of Story, the disapproval of his own views by the bench, bar, and business men of the whole country, Marshall would not yield. "The Ch: Jus: I fear will _die hard_," wrote Webster, who was of counsel for the bank.[1312] In a very long opinion Marshall insists that his decision in the Circuit Court was right, fortifying his argument by more than thirty citations. He begins by frank acknowledgment of the discontent his decision in the Circuit Court has aroused: "I should now, as is my custom, when I have the misfortune to differ with this court, acquiesce silently in its opinion, did I not believe that the judgment of the circuit court of Virginia gave general surprise to the profession, and was generally condemned." Corporations, "being destitute of human organs," can express themselves only by writing. They must act through agents; but the agency can be created and proved only by writing. Marshall points out the serious possibilities to those with whom corporations deal, as well as to the corporations themselves, of the acts of persons serving as agents without authority of record.[1313] Powerful as his reasoning is, it is based on mistaken premises inapplicable to modern corporate transactions; but his position, his method, his very style, reveal the stubborn conservative at bay, bravely defending himself and his views. This, then, was the John Marshall, who, in his old age, accepted the call of men as conservative as himself to help frame a new constitution for Virginia, On Monday, October 5, 1829, the convention met in the House of Delegates at Richmond. James Madison, then in his seventy-ninth year, feeble and wizened, called the members to order and nominated James Monroe for President of the convention. This nomination was seconded by Marshall. These three men, whose careers since before the Revolution and throughout our formative period, had been more distinguished, up to that time, than had that of any American then living, were the most conspicuous persons in that notable Assembly. Giles, now Governor of the State, was also a member; so were Randolph, Tyler, Philip P. Barbour, Upshur, and Tazewell. Indeed, the very ablest men in Virginia had been chosen to make a new constitution for the State. In the people's anxiety to select the best men to do that important work, delegates were chosen regardless of the districts in which they lived.[1314] To Marshall, who naturally was appointed to the Judiciary Committee,[1315] fell the task of presenting to the convention the first petition of non-freeholders for suffrage.[1316] No more impressive document was read before that body. It stated the whole democratic argument clearly and boldly.[1317] The first report received from any committee was made by Marshall and also was written by him.[1318] It provided for the organization of the State Judiciary, but did not seek materially to change the system of appointments of judges. Two sentences of this report are important: "No modification or abolition of any Court, shall be construed to deprive any Judge thereof of his office"; and, "Judges may be removed from office by a vote of the General Assembly: but two-thirds of the whole number of each House must concur in such vote."[1319] Marshall promptly moved that this report be made the order of the day and this was done. Ranking next to the question of the basis of suffrage and of representation was that of judiciary reform. To accomplish this reform was one of the objects for which the convention had been called. At that time the Judiciary of Virginia was not merely a matter of courts and judges; it involved the entire social and political organization of that State. No more essentially aristocratic scheme of government ever existed in America. Coming down from Colonial times, it had been perpetuated by the Revolutionary Constitution of 1776. It had, in practical results, some good qualities and others that were evil, among the latter a well-nigh faultless political mechanism.[1320] The heart of this system was the County Courts. Too much emphasis cannot be placed on this fact. These local tribunals consisted of justices of the peace who sat together as County Courts for the hearing and decision of the more important cases. They were almost always the first men of their counties, appointed by the Governor for life; vacancies were, in practice, filled only on the recommendation of the remaining justices. While the Constitution of 1776 did not require the Governor to accept the nominations of the County Courts for vacancies in these offices, to do so had been a custom long established.[1321] For this acquiescence of the Governor in the recommendation of the County Courts, there was a very human reason of even weightier influence than that of immemorial practice. The Legislature chose the Governor; and the justices of the peace selected, in most cases, the candidates for the Legislature--seldom was any man elected by the people to the State Senate or House of Delegates who was not approved by the County Courts. Moreover, the other county offices, such as county clerks and sheriffs, were appointed by the Governor only on the suggestion of the justices of the peace; and these officials worked in absolute agreement with the local judicial oligarchy. In this wise members of Congress were, in effect, named by the County Courts, and the Legislature dared not and did not elect United States Senators of whom the justices of the peace disapproved. The members of the Court of Appeals, appointed by the Governor, were never offensive to these minor county magistrates, although the judges of this highest tribunal in Virginia, always able and learned men holding their places for life, had great influence over the County Courts, and, therefore, over the Governor and General Assembly also. Nor was this the limit of the powers of the County Courts. They fixed the county rate of taxation and exercised all local legislative and executive as well as judicial power.[1322] In theory, a more oligarchic system never was devised for the government of a free state; but in practice, it responded to the variations of public opinion with almost the precision of a thermometer. For example, nearly all the justices of the peace were Federalists during the first two years of Washington's Administration; yet the State supported Henry against Assumption, and, later, went over to Jefferson as against Washington and Henry combined.[1323] Rigid and self-perpetuating as was the official aristocracy which the Virginia judicial system had created, its members generally attended to their duties and did well their public work.[1324] They lived among the people, looked after the common good, composed disputes between individuals; soothed local animosities, prevented litigation; and administered justice satisfactorily when, despite their preventive efforts, men would bring suits. But the whole scheme was the very negation of democracy.[1325] While, therefore, this judicial-social-political plan worked well for the most part, the idea of it was offensive to liberal-minded men who believed in democracy as a principle. Moreover, the official oligarchy was more powerful in the heavy slaveholding, than in the comparatively "free labor," sections; it had been longer established, and it better fitted conditions, east of the mountains. So it came about that there was, at last, a demand for judicial reform. Seemingly this demand was not radical--it was only that the self-perpetuating County Court system should be changed to appointments by the Governor without regard to recommendations of the local justices; but, in reality, this change would have destroyed the traditional aristocratic organization of the political, social, and to a great extent the economic, life of Virginia. On every issue over which the factions of this convention fought, Marshall was reactionary and employed all his skill to defeat, whenever possible, the plans and purposes of the radicals. In pursuing this course he brought to bear the power of his now immense reputation for wisdom and justice. Perhaps no other phase of his life displays more strikingly his intense conservatism. The conclusion of his early manhood--reluctantly avowed after Washington, following the Revolution, had bitterly expressed the same opinion,[1326] that the people, left to themselves, are not capable of self-government--had now become a profound moral belief. It should again be stated that most of Marshall's views, formed as a young lawyer during the riotous years between the achievement of Independence and the adoption of the Constitution, had hardened, as life advanced, into something like religious convictions. It is noteworthy, too, that, in general, Madison, Giles, and even Monroe, now stood with Marshall. The most conspicuous feature of those fourteen weeks of tumultuous contest, as far as it reveals Marshall's personal standing in Virginia, was the trust, reverence, and affection in which he was held by all members, young and old, radical and conservative, from every part of the State. Speaker after speaker, even in the fiercest debates, went out of his way to pay tribute to Marshall's uprightness and wisdom.[1327] Marshall spoke frequently on the Judiciary; and, at one point in a debate on the removal of judges, disclosed opinions of historical importance. Although twenty-seven years had passed since the repeal of the Federalist Judiciary Act of 1801,[1328] Marshall would not, even now, admit that repeal to be Constitutional. Littleton W. Tazewell, also a member of the Judiciary Committee, asserted that, under the proposed new State Constitution, the Legislature could remove judges from office by abolishing the courts. John Scott of Fauquier County asked Marshall what he thought of the ousting of Federalist judges by the Republicans in 1802. The Chief Justice answered, "with great, very great repugnance," that throughout the debate he had "most carefully avoided" expressing any opinion on that subject. He would say, however, that "he did not conceive the Constitution to have been at all definitely expounded by a single act of Congress." Especially when "there was no union of Departments, but the Legislative Department alone had acted, and acted but once," ignoring the Judicial Department, such an act, "even admitting that act not to have passed in times of high political and party excitement, could never be admitted as final and conclusive."[1329] Tazewell was of "an exactly opposite opinion"--the Repeal Act of 1802 "was perfectly constitutional and proper." Giles also disagreed with Marshall. Should "a public officer ... receive the public money any longer than he renders service to the public"?[1330] Marshall replied with spirit. No serious question can be settled, he declared, by mere "confidence of conviction, but on the reason of the case." All that he asked was that the Judiciary Article of the proposed State Constitution should go forth, "uninfluenced by the opinion of any individual: let those, whose duty it was to settle the interpretation of the Constitution, decide on the Constitution itself."[1331] After extended debate[1332] and some wrangling, Marshall's idea on this particular phase of the subject prevailed.[1333] The debate over the preservation of the County Court system, for which Marshall's report provided, was long and acrimonious, and a résumé of it is impossible here. Marshall stoutly supported these local tribunals; their "abolition will affect our whole internal police.... No State in the Union, has hitherto enjoyed more complete internal quiet than Virginia. There is no part of America, where ... less of ill-feeling between man and man is to be found than in this Commonwealth, and I believe most firmly that this state of things is mainly to be ascribed to the practical operation of our County Courts." The county judges "consist in general of the best men in their respective counties. They act in the spirit of peace-makers, and allay, rather than excite the small disputes ... which will sometimes arise among neighbours."[1334] Giles now aligned himself with Marshall as a champion of the County Court system. In an earnest defense of it he went so far as to reflect on the good sense of Jefferson. Everybody, said Giles, knew that that "highly respectable man ... dealt very much in theories."[1335] During the remainder of the discussion on this subject, Marshall rose frequently, chiefly, however, to guide the debate.[1336] He insisted that the custom of appointing justices of the peace only on nomination of the County Courts should be written into the constitution. The Executive ought to appoint _all_ persons recommended by "a County Court, taken as a whole." Marshall then moved an amendment to that effect.[1337] This was a far more conservative idea than was contained in the old constitution itself. "Let the County Court who now recommended, have power also to appoint: for there it ended at last," said William Campbell of Bedford County. Giles was for Marshall's plan: "The existing County Court system" threw "power into the hands of the middle class of the community," he said; and it ought to be fortified rather than weakened. Marshall then withdrew his astonishing amendment and proposed, instead, that the advice and "consent of the Senate" should not be required for appointments of county justices, thus utterly eliminating all legislative control over these important appointments; and this extreme conservative proposition was actually adopted without dissent.[1338] Thus the very foundation of Virginia's aristocratic political organization was greatly strengthened. Concerning the retention of his office by a judge after the court had been abolished, Marshall made an earnest and impressive speech. What were the duties of a judge? "He has to pass between the Government and the man whom that Government is prosecuting: between the most powerful individual in the community, and the poorest and most unpopular. It is of the last importance, that in the exercise of these duties, he should observe the utmost fairness. Need I press the necessity of this? Does not every man feel that his own personal security and the security of his property depends on that fairness? "The Judicial Department comes home in its effects to every man's fireside: it passes on his property, his reputation, his life, his all. Is it not, to the last degree important, that he should be rendered perfectly and completely independent, with nothing to influence or control him but God and his conscience? "You do not allow a man to perform the duties of a juryman or a Judge, if he has one dollar of interest in the matter to be decided: and will you allow a Judge to give a decision when his office may depend upon it? when his decision may offend a powerful and influential man? "Your salaries do not allow any of your Judges to lay up for his old age: the longer he remains in office, the more dependant he becomes upon his office. He wishes to retain it; if he did not wish to retain it, he would not have accepted it. And will you make me believe that if the manner of his decision may affect the tenure of that office, the man himself will not be affected by that consideration?... The whole good which may grow out of this Convention, be it what it may, will never compensate for the evil of changing the tenure of the Judicial office." Barbour had said that to presume that the Legislature would oust judges because of unpopular decisions, was to make an unthinkable imputation. But "for what do you make a Constitution?" countered Marshall. Why provide that "no bill of attainder, or an _ex post facto_ law, shall be passed? What a calumny is here upon the Legislature," he sarcastically exclaimed. "Do you believe, that the Legislature will pass a bill of attainder, or an _ex post facto_ law? Do you believe, that they will pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts? If not, why provide against it?... "You declare, that the Legislature shall not take private property for the public use, without just compensation. Do you believe, that the Legislature will put forth their grasp upon private property, without compensation? Certainly I do not. There is as little reason to believe they will do such an act as this, as there is to believe, that a Legislature will offend against a Judge who has given a decision against some favourite opinion and favourite measure of theirs, or against a popular individual who has almost led the Legislature by his talents and influence. "I am persuaded, there is at least as much danger that they will lay hold on such an individual, as that they will condemn a man to death for doing that which, when he committed it, was no crime. The gentleman says, it is impossible the Legislature should ever think of doing such a thing. Why then expunge the prohibition?... This Convention can do nothing that would entail a more serious evil upon Virginia, than to destroy the tenure by which her Judges hold their offices."[1339] An hour later, the Chief Justice again addressed the convention on the independence of the Judiciary. Tazewell had spoken much in the vein of the Republicans of 1802.[1340] "The independence of all those who try causes between man and man, and between a man and his Government," answered Marshall, "can be maintained only by the tenure of their office. Is not their independence preserved under the present system? None can doubt it. Such an idea was never heard of in Virginia, as to remove a Judge from office." Suppose the courts at the mercy of the Legislature? "What would then be the condition of the court, should the Legislature prosecute a man, with an earnest wish to convict him?... If they may be removed at pleasure, will any lawyer of distinction come upon your bench? "No, Sir. I have always thought, from my earliest youth till now, that the greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and a sinning people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent Judiciary. Will you draw down this curse upon Virginia? Our ancestors thought so: we thought so till very lately; and I trust the vote of this day will shew that we think so still."[1341] Seldom in any parliamentary body has an appeal been so fruitful of votes. Marshall's idea of the inviolability of judicial tenure was sustained by a vote of 56 to 29, Madison voting with him.[1342] Lucas P. Thompson of Amherst County moved to strike out the provision in Marshall's Judiciary Article that the abolition of a court should not "deprive any Judge thereof of his office."[1343] Thus the direct question, so fiercely debated in Congress twenty-seven years earlier,[1344] was brought before the convention. It was promptly decided, and against the views and action of Jefferson and the Republicans of 1802. By a majority of 8 out of a total of 96,[1345] the convention sustained the old Federalist idea that judges should continue to hold their positions and receive their salaries, even though their offices were abolished. Before the vote was taken, however, a sharp debate occurred between Marshall and Giles. To keep judges in office, although that office be destroyed, "was nothing less than to establish a privileged corps in a free community," said Giles. Marshall had said "that a Judge ought to be responsible only to God and to his own conscience." Although "one of the first objects in view, in calling this Convention, was to make the Judges responsible--not nominally, but really responsible," Marshall actually proposed to establish "a _privileged order_ of men." Another part of Marshall's plan, said Giles, required the concurrent vote of both Houses of the Legislature to remove a judge from the bench. "This was inserted, for what?" To prevent the Legislature from removing a judge "whenever his conduct had been such, that he became unpopular and odious to the people"--the very power the Legislature ought to have.[1346] In reply, Marshall said that he would not, at that time, discuss the removal of judges by the Legislature, but would confine himself "directly to the object before him," as to whether the abolition of a court should not deprive the judge of his office. Giles had fallen into a strange confusion--he had treated "the office of a Judge, and the Court in which he sat, as being ... indissolubly united." But, asked Marshall, were the words "office and Court synonymes"? By no means. The proposed Judiciary Article makes the distinction when it declares that though the _court_ be abolished, the judge still holds his _office_. "In what does the office of a Judge consist? ... in his constitutional capacity to receive Judicial power, and to perform Judicial Duties.... "If the Constitution shall declare that when the court is abolished, he shall still hold" his office, "there is no inconsistency in the declaration.... What creates the office?" An election to it by the Legislature and a commission by the Governor. "When these acts have been performed, the Judges are in office. Now, if the Constitution shall say that his office shall continue, and he shall perform Judicial duties, though his court may be abolished, does he, because of any modification that may be made in that court, cease to be a Judge?... "The question constantly recurs--do you mean that the Judges shall be removable at the will of the Legislature? The gentleman talks of responsibility. Responsibility to what? to the will of the Legislature? can there be no responsibility, unless your Judges shall be removable at pleasure? will nothing short of this satisfy gentlemen? Then, indeed, there is an end to independence. The tenure during good behaviour, is a mere imposition on the public belief--a sound that is kept to the ear--and nothing else. The consequences must present themselves to every mind. There can be no member of this body who does not feel them. "If your Judges are to be removable at the will of the Legislature, all that you look for from fidelity, from knowledge, from capacity, is gone and gone forever." Seldom did Marshall show more feeling than when pressing this point; he could not "sit down," he said, without "noticing the morality" of giving the Legislature power to remove judges from office. "Gentlemen talk of sinecures, and privileged orders--with a view, as it would seem, to cast odium on those who are in office. "You seduce a lawyer from his practice, by which he is earning a comfortable independence, by promising him a certain support for life, unless he shall be guilty of misconduct in his office. And after thus seducing him, when his independence is gone, and the means of supporting his family relinquished, you will suffer him to be displaced and turned loose on the world with the odious brand of sinecure-pensioner--privileged order--put upon him, as a lazy drone who seeks to live upon the labour of others. This is the course you are asked to pursue." The provisions of the Judiciary Article before the convention secure ample responsibility. "If not, they can be made [to do] so. But is it not new doctrine to declare, that the Legislature by merely changing the name of a court or the place of its meeting, may remove any Judge from his office? The question to be decided is, and it is one to which we must come, whether the Judges shall be permanent in their office, or shall be dependent altogether upon the breath of the Legislature."[1347] Giles answered on the instant. In doing so, he began by a tribute to Marshall's "standing and personal excellence" which were so great "that he was willing to throw himself into the background, as to any weight to be attached to his [Giles's] own opinion." Therefore, he would "rely exclusively on the merits" of the controversy. Marshall had not shown "that it was not an anomaly to have the court out of being, and an office pertain[ing] to the court in being.... It was an anomaly in terms." Giles "had, however, such high respect" for Marshall's standing, "that he always doubted his own opinion when put in opposition" to that of the Chief Justice. He had not intended, he avowed, "to throw reproach upon the Judges in office." Far be it from him to reflect "in the least degree on their honour and integrity." His point was that, by Marshall's plan, "responsibility was rather avoided than sought to be secured." Giles was willing to risk his liberty thus far--"if a Judge became odious to the people, let him be removed from office."[1348] The debate continued upon another amendment by Thompson. Viewing the contest as a sheer struggle of minds, the conservatives were superior to the reformers,[1349] and steadily they gained votes.[1350] Again Marshall spoke, this time crossing swords with Benjamin W. S. Cabell and James Madison, over a motion of the former that judges whose courts were abolished, and to whom the Legislature assigned no new duties, should not receive salaries: "There were upwards of one hundred Inferior Courts in Virginia.... No gentleman could look at the dockets of these courts, and possibly think" that the judges would ever have no business to transact. Cabell's amendment "stated an impossible case," said Marshall,--a "case where there should be no controversies between man and man, and no crimes committed against society. It stated a case that could not happen--and would the convention encounter the real hazard of putting almost every Judge in the Commonwealth in the power of the Legislature, for the sake of providing for an impossible case?"[1351] But in spite of Marshall's opposition, Cabell's amendment was adopted by a vote of 59 to 36.[1352] Two weeks later, however, the convention reversed itself by two curious and contradictory votes.[1353] So in the end Marshall won. The subject of the Judiciary did not seriously arise again until the vote on the adoption of the entire constitution was imminent. As it turned out, the constitution, when adopted, contained, in substance, the Judiciary provisions which Marshall had written and reported at the beginning of that body's deliberations.[1354] The other and the commanding problem, for the solution of which the contention had been called, was made up of the associated questions of suffrage, taxation, and representation. Broadly speaking, the issue was that of white manhood suffrage and representation based upon the enumeration of whites, as against suffrage determined by property and taxation, representation to be based on an enumeration which included three fifths of the slave population.[1355] In these complex and tangled questions the State and the convention were divided; so fierce were the contending factions, and so diverse were opinions on various elements of the confused problem, especially among those demanding reform, that at times no solution seemed possible. The friends of reform were fairly well organized and coöperated in a spirit of unity uncommon to liberals. But, as generally happens, the conservatives had much better discipline, far more harmony of opinion and conduct. The debate on both sides was able and brilliant.[1356] Finally the convention seemingly became deadlocked. Each side declared it would not yield.[1357] Then came the inevitable reaction--a spirit of conciliation mellowed everybody. Sheer human nature, wearied of strife, sought the escape that mutual accommodation alone afforded. The moment came for which Marshall had been patiently waiting. Rising slowly, as was his wont, until his great height seemed to the convention to be increased, his soothing voice, in the very gentleness of its timbre, gave a sense of restfulness and agreement so grateful to, and so desired by, even the sternest of the combatants. "No person in the House," began the Chief Justice, "can be more truly gratified than I am, at seeing the spirit that has been manifested here to-day; and it is my earnest wish that this spirit of conciliation may be acted upon in a fair, equal and honest manner, adapted to the situation of the different parts of the Commonwealth, which are to be affected." The warring factions, said Marshall, were at last in substantial accord. "That the Federal numbers [the enumeration of slaves as fixed in the National Constitution] and the plan of the white basis shall be blended together so as to allow each an equal portion of power, seems to be very generally agreed to." The only difference now was that one faction insisted on applying this plan to both Houses of the Legislature, while the other faction would restrict the white basis to the popular branch, leaving the Senate to be chosen on the combined free white and black slave enumeration. This involves the whole theory of property. One gentleman, in particular, "seems to imagine that we claim nothing of republican principles, when we claim a representation for property." But "republican principles" do not depend on "the naked principle of numbers." On the contrary, "the soundest principles of republicanism do sanction some relation between representation and taxation.... The two ought to be connected.... This was the principle of the revolution.... This basis of Representation is ... so important to Virginia" that everybody had thought about it before this convention was called. "Several different plans were contemplated. The basis of white population alone; the basis of free population alone; a basis of population alone; a basis compounded of taxation and white population, (or which is the same thing, a basis of Federal numbers:).... Now, of these various propositions, the basis of white population, and the basis of taxation alone are the two extremes." But, "between the free population, and the white population, there is almost no difference: Between the basis of total population and the basis of taxation, there is but little difference." Frankly and without the least disguise of his opinions, Marshall admitted that he was a conservative of conservatives: "The people of the East," of whom he avowed himself to be one, "thought that they offered a fair compromise, when they proposed the compound basis of population and taxation, or the basis of the Federal numbers. We thought that we had republican precedent for this--a precedent given us by the wisest and truest patriots that ever were assembled: but that is now past. "We are now willing to meet on a new middle ground." Between the two extremes "the majority is too small to calculate upon.... We are all uncertain as to the issue. But all know this, that if either extreme is carried, it must leave a wound in the breast of the opposite party which will fester and rankle, and produce I know not what mischief." The conservatives were now the majority of the convention, yet they were again willing to make concessions. Avoiding both extremes, Marshall proposed, "as a compromise," that the basis of representation "shall be made according to an exact compound of the two principles, of the white basis and of the Federal numbers, according to the Census of 1820."[1358] Further debate ensued, during which animosity seemed about to come to life again, when the Chief Justice once more exerted his mollifying influence. "Two propositions respecting the basis of Representation have divided this Convention almost equally," he said. "The question has been discussed, until discussion has become useless. It has been argued, until argument is exhausted. We have now met on the ground of compromise." It is no longer a matter of the triumph of either side. The only consideration now is whether the convention can agree on some plan to lay before the people "with a reasonable hope that it may be adopted. Some concession must be made on both sides.... What is the real situation of the parties?" Unquestionably both are sincere. "To attempt now to throw considerations of principle into either scale, is to add fuel to a flame which it is our purpose to extinguish. We must lose sight of the situation of parties and state of opinion, if we make this attempt." The convention is nearly evenly balanced. At this moment those favoring a white basis only have a trembling majority of two. This may change--the reversal of a single vote would leave the House "equally divided." The question must be decided "one way or the other"; but, if either faction prevails by a bare majority, the proposed constitution will go to the people from an almost equally divided convention. That means a tremendous struggle, a riven State. Interests in certain parts of the Commonwealth will surely resist "with great force" a purely white basis of representation, especially if no effective property qualification for suffrage is provided. This opposition is absolutely certain "unless human nature shall cease to be what it has been in all time." No human power can forecast the result of further contest. But one thing is certain: "To obtain a just compromise, concession must not only be mutual--it must be equal also.... Each ought to concede to the other as much as he demands from that other.... There can be no hope that either will yield more than it gets in return." The proposal that white population and taxation "mixed" with Federal numbers in "equal proportions" shall "form the basis of Representation in both Houses," is equal and just. "All feel it to be equal." Yet the conservatives now go still further--they are willing to place the House on the white basis and apply the mixed basis to the Senate only. Why refuse this adjustment? Plainly it will work well for everybody: "If the Senate would protect the East, will it not protect the West also?" Marshall's satisfaction was "inexpressible" when he heard from both sides the language of conciliation. "I hailed these auspicious appearances with as much joy, as the inhabitant of the polar regions hails the re-appearance of the sun after his long absence of six tedious months. Can these appearances prove fallacious? Is it a meteor we have seen and mistaken for that splendid luminary which dispenses light and gladness throughout creation? It must be so, if we cannot meet on equal ground. If we cannot meet on the line that divides us equally, then take the hand of friendship, and make an equal compromise; it is vain to hope that any compromise can be made."[1359] The basis of representation does not appear in the constitution, the number of Senators and Representatives being arbitrarily fixed by districts and counties; but this plan, in reality, gave the slaveholding sections almost the same preponderance over the comparatively non-slaveholding sections as would have resulted from the enumeration of three fifths of all slaves in addition to all whites.[1360] While the freehold principle was abandoned, as Marshall foresaw that it would be, the principle of property qualification as against manhood suffrage was triumphant.[1361] With a majority against them, the conservatives won by better management, assisted by the personal influence of the Chief Justice, to which, on most phases of the struggle, was added that of Madison and Giles. Nearly a century has passed since these happenings, and Marshall's attitude now appears to have been that of cold reaction; but he was as honest as he was outspoken in his resistance to democratic reforms. He wanted good government, safe government. He was not in the least concerned in the rule of the people as such. Indeed, he believed that the more they directly controlled public affairs the worse the business of government would be conducted. He feared that sheer majorities would be unjust, intolerant, tyrannical; and he was certain that they would be untrustworthy and freakishly changeable. These convictions would surely have dictated his course in the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1829-30, had no other considerations influenced him. But, in addition to his long settled and ever-petrifying conservative views, we must also take into account the conditions and public temper existing in Virginia ninety years ago. Had the convention reached any other conclusion than that to which Marshall gently guided it, it is certain that the State would have been torn by dissension, and it is not improbable that there would have been bloodshed. All things considered, it seems unsafe to affirm that Marshall's course was not the wisest for that immediate period and for that particular State. Displaying no vision, no aspiration, no devotion to human rights, he merely acted the uninspiring but necessary part of the practical statesman dealing with an existing and a very grave situation. If Jefferson could be so frightened in 1816 that he forbade the public circulation of his perfectly sound views on the wretched Virginia Constitution of 1776,[1362] can it be wondered at that the conservative Marshall in 1830 wished to compose the antagonisms of the warring factions? The fact that the Nation was then facing the possibility of dissolution[1363] must also be taken into account. That circumstance, indeed, influenced Marshall even more than did his profound conservatism. There can be little doubt that, had either the radicals or the conservatives achieved an outright victory, one part of Virginia would have separated from the other and the growing sentiment for disunion would have received a powerful impulse. Hurrying from Richmond to Washington when the convention adjourned, Marshall listened to the argument of Craig _vs._ Missouri; and then delivered one of the strongest opinions he ever wrote--the only one of his Constitutional expositions to be entirely repudiated by the Supreme Court after his death. The case grew out of the financial conditions described in the fourth chapter of this volume. When Missouri became a State in 1821, her people found themselves in desperate case. There was no money. Banks had suspended, and specie had been drained to the Eastern commercial centers. The simplest business transactions were difficult, almost impossible. Even taxes could not be paid. The Legislature, therefore, established loan offices where citizens, by giving promissory notes, secured by mortgage or pledge of personal property, could purchase loan certificates issued by the State. These certificates were receivable for taxes and other public debts and for salt from the State salt mines. The faith and resources of Missouri were pledged for the redemption of the certificates which were negotiable and issued in denominations not exceeding ten dollars or less than fifty cents. In effect and in intention, the State thus created a local circulating medium of exchange. On August 1, 1822, Hiram Craig and two others gave their promissory notes for $199.99 in payment for loan certificates. On maturity of these notes the borrowers refused to pay, and the State sued them; judgment against them was rendered in the trial court and this judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missouri. The case was taken, by writ of error, to the Supreme Court of the United States, where the sole question to be decided was the constitutionality of the Missouri loan office statutes. Marshall's associates were now Johnson, Duval, Story, Thompson, McLean, and Baldwin; the last two recently appointed by Jackson. It was becoming apparent that the court was growing restive under the rigid practice of the austere theory of government and business which the Chief Justice had maintained for nearly a generation. This tendency was shown in this case by the stand taken by three of the Associate Justices. Marshall was in his seventy-sixth year, but never did his genius shine more resplendently than in his announcement of the opinion of the Supreme Court in Craig _vs._ Missouri.[1364] He held that the Missouri loan certificates were bills of credit, which the National Constitution prohibited any State to issue. "What is a bill of credit?" It is "any instrument by which a state engages to pay money at a future day; thus including a certificate given for money borrowed.... To 'emit bills of credit' conveys to the mind the idea of issuing paper intended to circulate through the community, for its ordinary purposes, as money, which paper is redeemable at a future day."[1365] The Chief Justice goes into the history of the paper money evil that caused the framers of the Constitution to forbid the States to "emit bills of credit." Such currency always fluctuates. "Its value is continually changing; and these changes, often great and sudden, expose individuals to immense loss, are the sources of ruinous speculations, and destroy all confidence between man and man." To "cut up this mischief by the roots ... the people declared, in their Constitution, that no state should emit bills of credit. If the prohibition means anything, if the words are not empty sounds, it must comprehend the emission of any paper medium by a state government, for the purpose of common circulation."[1366] Incontestably the Missouri loan certificates are just such bills of credit. Indeed, the State law itself "speaks of them in this character." That the statute calls them certificates instead of bills of credit does not change the fact. How absurd to claim that the Constitution "meant to prohibit names and not things! That a very important act, big with great and ruinous mischief, which is expressly forbidden ... may be performed by the substitution of a name." The Constitution is not to be evaded "by giving a new name to an old thing."[1367] It is nonsense to say that these particular bills of credit are lawful because they are not made legal tender, since a separate provision applies to legal tender. The issue of legal tender currency, and also bills of credit, is equally and separately forbidden: "To sustain the one because it is not also the other; to say that bills of credit may be emitted if they be not made a tender in payment of debts; is ... to expunge that distinct, independent prohibition."[1368] In a well-nigh perfect historical summary, Marshall reviews experiments before and during the Revolution in bills of credit that were made legal tender, and in others that were not--all "productive of the same effects," all equally ruinous in results.[1369] The Missouri law authorizing the loan certificates, for which Craig gave his promissory note, is "against the highest law of the land, and ... the note itself is utterly void."[1370] The Chief Justice closes with a brief paragraph splendid in its simple dignity and power. In his argument for Missouri, Senator Thomas H. Benton had used violent language of the kind frequently employed by the champions of State Rights: "If ... the character of a sovereign State shall be impugned," he cried, "contests about civil rights would be settled amid the din of arms, rather than in these halls of national justice."[1371] To this outburst Marshall replies: The court has been told of "the dangers which may result from" offending a sovereign State. If obedience to the Constitution and laws of the Nation "shall be calculated to bring on those dangers ... or if it shall be indispensable to the preservation of the union, and consequently of the independence and liberty of these states; these are considerations which address themselves to those departments which may with perfect propriety be influenced by them. This department can listen only to the mandates of law; and can tread only that path which is marked out by duty."[1372] In this noble passage Marshall is not only rebuking Benton; he is also speaking to the advocates of Nullification, then becoming clamorous and threatening; he is pointing out to Andrew Jackson the path of duty.[1373] Justices Johnson, Thompson, and McLean afterwards filed dissenting opinions, thus beginning the departure, within the Supreme Court, from the stern Constitutional Nationalism of Marshall. This breach in the court deeply troubled the Chief Justice during the remaining four years of his life. Johnson thought "that these certificates are of a truly amphibious character." The Missouri law "does indeed approach as near to a violation of the Constitution as it can well go without violating its prohibition, but it is in the exercise of an unquestionable right, although in rather a questionable form." So, on the whole, Johnson concluded that the Supreme Court had better hold the statute valid.[1374] "The right of a State to borrow money cannot be questioned," said Thompson; that is all the Missouri scheme amounts to. If these loan certificates are bills of credit, so are "all bank notes, issued either by the States, or under their authority."[1375] Justice McLean pointed out that Craig's case was only one of many of the same kind. "The solemn act of a State ... cannot be set aside ... under a doubtful construction of the Constitution.[1376]... It would be as gross usurpation on the part of the federal government to interfere with State rights by an exercise of powers not delegated, as it would be for a State to interpose its authority against a law of the Union."[1377] In Congress attacks upon Marshall and the Supreme Court now were renewed--but they grew continuously feebler. At the first session after the decision of the Missouri loan certificate case, a bill was introduced to repeal the provision of the Judiciary Act upon which the National powers of the Supreme Court so largely depended. "If the twenty-fifth section is repealed, the Constitution is practically gone," declared Story. "Our wisest friends look with great gloom to the future."[1378] Marshall was equally despondent, but his political vision was clearer. When he read the dissenting opinions of Johnson, Thompson, and McLean, he wrote Story: "It requires no prophet to predict that the 25th section [of the Judiciary Act] is to be repealed, or to use a more fashionable phrase to be nullified by the Supreme Court of the United States."[1379] He realized clearly that the great tribunal, the power and dignity of which he had done so much to create, would soon be brought under the control of those who, for some years at least, would reject that broad and vigorous Nationalism which he had steadily and effectively asserted during almost a third of a century. One more vacancy on the Supreme Bench and a single new appointment by Jackson would give the court to the opponents of Marshall's views. Before he died, the Chief Justice was to behold two such vacancies.[1380] On January 24, 1831, William R. Davis of South Carolina presented the majority report of the Judiciary Committee favoring the repeal of that section of the Judiciary Act under which the Supreme Court had demolished State laws and annihilated the decisions of State courts.[1381] James Buchanan presented the minority report.[1382] A few minutes' preliminary discussion revealed the deep feeling on both sides. Philip Doddridge of Virginia declared that the bill was of "as much importance as if it were a proposition to repeal the Union of these States." William W. Ellsworth of Connecticut avowed that it was of "overwhelming magnitude."[1383] Thereupon the subject was furiously debated. Thomas H. Crawford of Pennsylvania considered Section 25 of the Judiciary Act, to be as "sacred" as the Constitution itself.[1384] Henry Daniel of Kentucky asserted that the Supreme Court "stops at nothing to obtain power." Let the "States ... prepare for the worst, and protect themselves against the assaults of this gigantic tribunal."[1385] William Fitzhugh Gordon of Virginia, recently elected, but already a member of the Judiciary Committee, stoutly defended the report of the majority: "When a committee of the House had given to a subject the calmest and maturest investigation, and a motion is made to print their report, a gentleman gets up, and, in a tone of alarm, denounces the proposition as tantamount to a motion to repeal the Union." Gordon repudiated the very thought of dismemberment of the Republic--that "palladium of our hopes, and of the liberties of mankind." As to the constitutionality of Section 25 of the Judiciary Act--"could it be new, especially to a Virginia lawyer"? when the Virginia Judiciary, with Roane at its head, had solemnly proclaimed the illegality of that section. And had not Georgia ordered her Governor to resist the enforcement of that provision of that ancient act of Congress? "I declare to God ... that I believe nothing would tend so much to compose the present agitation of the country ... as the repeal of that portion of the judiciary act." Gordon was about to discuss the nefarious case of Cohens _vs._ Virginia when his emotions overcame him--"he did not wish ... to go into the merits of the question."[1386] Thomas F. Foster of Georgia said that the Judiciary Committee had reported under a "galling fire from the press"; quoted Marshall's unfortunate language in the Convention of 1788;[1387] and insisted that the "vast and alarming" powers of the Supreme Court must be bridled.[1388] But the friends of the court overwhelmed the supporters of the bill, which was rejected by a vote of 138 to 51.[1389] It was ominous, however, that the South stood almost solid against the court and Nationalism. FOOTNOTES: [1269] Marshall to his wife, March 12, 1826, MS. [1270] Nevertheless he watched the course of politics closely. For instance: immediately after the House had elected John Quincy Adams to the Presidency, Marshall writes his brother a letter full of political gossip. He is surprised that Adams was chosen on the first ballot; many think Kremer's letter attacking Clay caused this unexpectedly quick decision, since it "was & is thought a sheer calumny; & the resentment of Clay's friends probably determined some of the western members who were hesitating. It is supposed to have had some influence elsewhere. The vote of New York was not decided five minutes before the ballots were taken." Marshall tells his brother about Cabinet rumors--Crawford has refused the Treasury and Clay has been offered the office of Secretary of State. "It is meer [_sic_] common rumor" that Clay will accept. "Mr. Adams will undoubtedly wish to strengthen himself in the west," and Clay is strong in that section unless Kremer's letter has weakened him. The Chief Justice at first thought it had, but "on reflection" doubts whether it will "make any difference." (Marshall to his brother, Feb. 14, 1825, MS.) Marshall here refers to the letter of George Kremer, a Representative in Congress from Pennsylvania. Kremer wrote an anonymous letter to the _Columbian Observer_ in which he asserted that Clay had agreed to deliver votes to Adams as the price of Clay's appointment to the office of Secretary of State. After much bluster, Kremer admitted that he had no evidence whatever to support his charge; yet his accusation permanently besmirched Clay's reputation. (For an account of the Kremer incident see Sargent, I, 67-74, 123-24.) Out of the Kremer letter grew a distrust of Clay which he never really lived down. Some time later, John Randolph seized an opportunity to call the relation between President Adams and his Secretary of State "the coalition of Blifil and Black George--the combination, unheard of till then, of the Puritan with the blackleg." The bloodless, but not the less real duel, that followed, ended this quarrel, though the unjust charges never quite died out. (Schurz: _Henry Clay_, I, 273-74.) [1271] Baltimore _Marylander_, March 22, 1828. [1272] _Enquirer_, April 4, 1828. [1273] Meaning Jackson. Clay to Marshall, April 8, 1828, MS. [1274] Marshall to Story, May 1, 1828, _Proceedings, Mass. Hist. Soc._ 2d Series, XIV, 336-37. [1275] See chap. I of this volume. [1276] Thomas, whose wife died Feb. 2, 1829. (Paxton, 92.) [1277] Marshall to his wife, March 5 [1829], MS. [1278] Same to same, Feb. 1, 1829, MS. [1279] Jacquelin B. Harvie, who married Marshall's daughter, Mary. [1280] Marshall to his wife, March 5 [1829], MS. [1281] Marshall to Story, June 11, 1829, _Proceedings, Mass. Hist. Soc._ 2d Series, XIV, 338-39. [1282] See vol. I, 216-17, of this work. [1283] Jefferson to Kercheval, July 12, 1816, _Works_: Ford, XII, 3-15. [1284] Same to same, Oct. 8, 1816, _ib._ footnote to 17. [1285] At the time of the convention the eastern part of the State paid, on the average, more than three times as much in taxes per acre as the west. The extremes were startling--the trans-Alleghany section (West Virginia) paid only 92 cents for every $8.43 paid by the Tidewater. (_Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829-30_, 214, 258, 660-61.) [1286] Marshall to Story, July 3, 1829, _Proceedings, Mass. Hist. Soc._ 2d Series, XIV, 340-41. [1287] Pickering to Marshall, Dec. 26, 1828, Pickering MSS. Mass. Hist. Soc.; see also Story, I, 386-96. [1288] Marshall to Mercer, April 7, 1827, Chamberlain MSS. Boston Pub. Lib. [1289] Lincoln to Greeley, Aug. 22, 1862, _Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln_: Nicolay and Hay, II, 227-28. [1290] Marshall to Pickering, March 20, 1826, _Proceedings, Mass. Hist. Soc._ 2d Series, XIV, 321. [1291] _Fifteenth Annual Report, Proceedings, American Colonization Society._ The abolitionists, later, mercilessly attacked the Colonization Society. (See Wilson: _Rise of the Slave Power_, I, 208 _et seq._) [1292] _Fourteenth Annual Report, Proceedings, American Colonization Society._ [1293] His wife's illness. She died soon afterwards. See _infra_, 524-25. [1294] Marshall to Gurley, Dec. 14, 1831, _Fifteenth Annual Report, Proceedings, American Colonization Society_, pp. vi-viii. In a letter even less emotional than Marshall's, Madison favored the same plan. (_Ib._ pp. v, vi.) Lafayette, with his unfailing floridity, says that he is "proud ... of the honor of being one of the Vice Presidents of the Society," and that "the progressing state of our Liberia establishment is ... a source of enjoyment, and the most lively interest" to him. (_Ib._ p. v.) At the time of his death, Marshall was President of the Virginia branch of the Society, and his ancient enemy, John Tyler, who succeeded him in that office, paid a remarkable tribute to the goodness and greatness of the man he had so long opposed. (Tyler: _Tyler_, I, 567-68.) [1295] 10 Wheaton, 114. [1296] _Ib._ 115. Marshall delivered this opinion March 15, 1825. [1297] _Ib._ 114. [1298] _Ib._ 118-19. [1299] _Ib._ 122-23. [1300] 2 Peters, 150-56. [1301] Marshall to Greenhow, Oct. 17, 1809, MSS. "Judges and Eminent Lawyers," Mass. Hist. Soc. [1302] See _supra_, 209-18, of this volume. [1303] 12 Wheaton, 214 _et seq._ John Saunders, a citizen of Kentucky, sued George M. Ogden, a citizen of Louisiana, on bills of exchange which Ogden, then a citizen of New York, had accepted in 1806, but which were protested for non-payment. The defendant pleaded a discharge granted by a New York court under the insolvent law of that State enacted in 1801. (_Ib._) On the manuscript records of the Supreme Court, Saunders is spelled _Sanders_. After the case was filed, the death of Ogden was suggested, and his executors, Charles Harrod and Francis B. Ogden, were substituted. [1304] Washington, Johnson, Thompson, and Trimble each delivered long opinions supporting this view. (12 Wheaton, 254-331, 358-369.) [1305] _Ib._ 334. [1306] _Ib._ 335. [1307] _Ib._ 337. [1308] _Ib._ 356. [1309] _Ib._ 357. [1310] Story and Duval concurred with Marshall. [1311] 12 Wheaton, 65-90. [1312] Webster to Biddle, Feb. 20, 1827, _Writings and Speeches of Webster_: (Nat. ed.) XVI, 140. [1313] 12 Wheaton, 90-116. [1314] Grigsby: _Virginia Convention of 1829-30_; and see Ambler: _Sectionalism in Virginia_, 145. Chapter V of Professor Ambler's book is devoted exclusively to the convention. Also see preface to _Debates Va. Conv._ iii; and see Dodd, in _American Journal of Sociology_, XXVI, no. 6, 735 _et seq._; and Anderson, 229-36. [1315] _Debates, Va. Conv._ 23. [1316] _Ib._ 25. [1317] _Ib._ 25-31. [1318] Statement of Marshall. (_Ib._ 872.) [1319] _Debates, Va. Conv._ 33. [1320] See _supra_, 146, 147. [1321] See Giles's speech, _Debates, Va. Conv._ 604-05. [1322] See Ambler: _Sectionalism in Virginia_, 139. [1323] See vol. II, 62-69, of this work. [1324] Serious abuses sprang up, however. In the convention, William Naylor of Hampshire County charged that the office of sheriff was sold to the highest bidder, sometimes at public auction. (_Debates, Va. Conv._ 486; and see Anderson, 229.) [1325] See Marshall's defense of the County Court system, _infra_, 491. [1326] See vol. I, 302, of this work. [1327] For example, Thomas R. Joynes of Accomack County, who earnestly opposed Marshall in the Judiciary debate, said that no man felt "more respect" than he for Marshall's opinions which are justly esteemed "not only in this Convention, but throughout the United States." (_Debates, Va. Conv._ 505.) Randolph spoke of "the very great weight" which Marshall had in the convention, in Virginia, and throughout the Nation. (_Ib._ 500.) Thomas M. Bayly of Accomack County, while utterly disagreeing with the Chief Justice on the County Court system, declared that Marshall, "as a lawyer and Judge, is without a rival." (_Ib._ 510.) Richard H. Henderson of Loudoun County called the Chief Justice his "political father" whose lessons he delighted to follow, and upon whose "wisdom, ... virtue, ... prudence" he implicitly relied. (Henderson's statement as repeated by Benjamin W. Leigh, _ib._ 544.) Charles F. Mercer of the same county "expressed toward Judge Marshall a filial respect and veneration not surpassed by the ties which had bound him to a natural parent." (_Ib._ 563.) Such are examples of the expressions toward Marshall throughout the prolonged sessions of the convention. [1328] See vol. III, chap, II, of this work. [1329] _Debates, Va. Conv._ 871-72. [1330] _Ib._ 872-74. [1331] _Debates, Va. Conv._ 873. [1332] See _infra_, 493-501. [1333] Accordingly the following provision was inserted into the Constitution: "No law abolishing any court shall be construed to deprive a Judge thereof of his office, unless two-thirds of the members of each House present concur in the passing thereof; but the Legislature may assign other Judicial duties to the Judges of courts abolished by any law enacted by less than two-thirds of the members of each House present." (Article V, Section 2, Constitution of Virginia, 1830.) [1334] _Debates, Va. Conv._ 505. [1335] _Debates, Va. Conv._ 509. [1336] _Ib._ 524, 530, 531, 533, 534. [1337] _Ib._ 604-05. [1338] _Ib._ 605. The provision as it finally appeared in the constitution was that these "appointments shall be made by the Governor, on the recommendation of the respective County Courts." (Article V, Section 7, Constitution of Virginia, 1830.) [1339] _Debates, Va. Conv._ 615-17. [1340] See vol. III, chap. II, of this work. [1341] _Debates, Va. Conv._ 619. [1342] _Ib._ 618-19. [1343] _Ib._ 726. [1344] See vol. III, chap. II, of this work. [1345] _Debates, Va. Conv._ 731. [1346] _Debates, Va. Conv._ 726-27. [1347] _Debates, Va. Conv._ 727-29. [1348] _Debates, Va. Conv._ 729-30. [1349] See especially the speech of Benjamin Watkins Leigh, _ib._ 733-37. [1350] See _ib._ for ayes and noes, 740, 741, 742, 744, 748. [1351] _Ib._ 764. [1352] _Debates, Va. Conv._ 767. [1353] _Ib._ 880. [1354] Compare Marshall's report (_ib._ 33) with Article V of the constitution (_ib._ 901-02; and see _supra_, 491, note 2.) [1355] Contrast Marshall's resolutions (_Debates, Va. Conv._ 39-40), which expressed the conservative stand, with those of William H. Fitzhugh of Fairfax County (_ib._ 41-42), of Samuel Clayton of Campbell County (_ib._ 42), of Charles S. Morgan of Monongalia (_ib._ 43-44), and of Alexander Campbell of Brooke County (_ib._ 45-46), which state the views of the radicals. [1356] See, for instance, the speech of John R. Cooke of Frederick County for the radicals (_Debates, Va. Conv._ 54-65), of Abel P. Upshur of Northampton for the conservatives (_ib._ 65-79), of Philip Doddridge of Brooke County for the radicals (_ib._ 79-89), of Philip P. Barbour of Orange County for the conservatives (_ib._ 90-98), and especially the speeches of Benjamin Watkins Leigh for the conservatives (_ib._ 151-74, 544-48). Indeed, the student cannot well afford to omit any one of the addresses in this remarkable contest. [1357] It is at this point that we see the reason for Jefferson's alarm thirteen years before the convention was called. (_See supra_, 469.) [1358] _Debates, Va. Conv._ 497-500. [1359] _Debates, Va. Conv._ 561-62. [1360] Constitution of Virginia, 1830, Article III, Sections 1 and 2. [1361] _Ib._ Article III, Section 14. [1362] See _supra_, 469. [1363] See next chapter. [1364] March 12, 1830. [1365] 4 Peters, 432. [1366] 4 Peters, 432. [1367] _Ib._ 433. [1368] _Ib._ 434. [1369] 4 Peters, 434-36. [1370] _Ib._ 437. [1371] _Ib._ 420. [1372] _Ib._ 438. [1373] See 552-58. [1374] 4 Peters, 438-44. [1375] _Ib._ 445-50. [1376] _Ib._ 458. [1377] 4 Peters, 464. [1378] Story to Ticknor, Jan. 22, 1831, Story, II, 49. Nevertheless Story did not despair. "It is now whispered, that the demonstrations of public opinion are so strong, that the majority [of the Judiciary Committee] will conclude not to present their report." (_Ib._) [1379] Marshall to Story, Oct. 15, 1830, _Proceedings, Mass. Hist. Soc._ 2d Series, XIV, 342. [1380] See _infra_, 584. [1381] _Debates_, 21st Cong. 2d Sess. 532. [1382] _Ib._ 535. [1383] _Ib._ 534. [1384] _Ib._ 659. [1385] _Ib._ 665. [1386] _Debates_, 21st Cong. 2d Sess. 620-21. [1387] _Ib._ 731, 748; and see vol. I, 454-55, of this work. [1388] _Debates_, 21st Cong. 2d Sess. 739. [1389] _Debates_, 21st Cong. 2d Sess. 542. This was the last formal attempt, but one, made in Congress during Marshall's lifetime, to impair the efficiency of National courts. The final attack was made by Joseph Lecompte, a Representative from Kentucky, who on January 27, 1832, offered a resolution instructing the Judiciary Committee to "inquire into the expediency of amending the constitution ... so that the judges of the Supreme Court, and of the inferior courts, shall hold their offices for a limited term of years." On February 24, the House, by a vote of 141 to 27, refused to consider Lecompte's resolution, ignoring his plea to be allowed to explain it. (_Debates_, 22d Cong. 1st Sess. 1856-57.) So summary and brusque--almost contemptuous--was the rejection of Lecompte's proposal, as almost to suggest that personal feeling was an element in the action taken by the House.