Railroad Reorganization by Stuart Daggett

15. Depositors of all classes of Terminal securities and of all classes

1043 words  |  Chapter 20

of readjusted securities of the other systems were allowed to subscribe to the extent of $1000 in a new bond and $4000 in new stock trust certificates for each $22,000 par value of stocks or bonds deposited. The balance of the issues was looked after by an underwriting syndicate.[379] Future capital requirements were provided for mainly by new bonds. $35,383,000 in new 5 per cents were set aside to be used only for new construction, betterments, purchase of rolling stock, and extensions and additions to the system. Not over $2,500,000 of these were to be used in any one calendar year; except that, in addition to this annual appropriation, a total of $3,000,000 in bonds might be specifically appropriated with the unanimous consent of the stock trustees, for the building of branches or extensions, if undertaken within three years after the creation of the new mortgage. All property acquired with these bonds was to be brought under the lien of the new mortgage. $8,000,000 of the cash raised by assessment and sale of securities, moreover, were to be available for new construction and equipment on the Richmond & Danville and the East Tennessee. And, finally, there was provision for the limitation of new bond issues, for a voting trust and for the consolidation of the Terminal system. “The ultimate object of the reorganization,” said the plan “(excluding the Georgia Central Company from consideration), is to have the new company acquire, so far as practicable, the ownership of the Richmond & Danville and East Tennessee systems, including the various securities now owned by the Terminal Company ... and the securities pledged for the Richmond & Danville and East Tennessee floating debt.... “Both classes of stock of the new company ... are to be issued to three Stock Trustees, who shall be appointed, on or before completion of reorganization, by Messrs. Drexel, Morgan & Co. The stock shall be held by the Stock Trustees and their successors, jointly, for five years, and for such further period (if any) as shall elapse before the preferred stock shall have paid 5 per cent cash dividend in one year, although the Stock Trustees may, in their discretion, deliver the stock at an earlier date.... “No additional mortgage shall be put upon the property to be acquired hereunder by the new company, nor shall the authorized amount of the preferred stock be increased without the consent in each case of the majority in amount of the preferred stockholders.”[380] The result of all these provisions was to be a cancellation of the floating debt, a reduction in fixed charges, and a decrease in mortgage bonds; though inevitably also an increase in stock outstanding. The plan proposed to disturb $49,117,900 of outstanding bonds, or, including the Richmond Terminal 5s and 6s, a total of $65,617,900. But the new bonds which it offered in exchange amounted to $19,806,700 only. On the other hand it took $111,819,550 in stock from the hands of the public, and offered $165,559,514 new stock in the course of the exchanges.[381] This was very conservative, since the increase in total capitalization through these exchanges was less than 4½ per cent; and less too than the cash assessment for which preferred stock was allowed. Somewhat greater increase in securities appears if we consider, not only the exchanges, but the provisions of the plan as a whole; for here we must include $33,300,000 new common stock and $8,000,000 new bonds issued to retire in part the $12,900,000 of floating debt and for other purposes. Even so the net increase was only 6 per cent.[382] The natural result was a considerable reduction in fixed charges. The absolute fixed charges of the system in 1893 the plan stated to be $9,900,000. The fixed charges under the plan were to be $6,789,000. This was certainly a step in the right direction. It was the point, nevertheless, at which the plan was weakest. The clauses which have been outlined made abundant and conservative provision for cash requirements; and the sums which they allowed for future development were not on their face inadequate; but the reduction in fixed charges was less than should have been ensured. The net earnings for the year ending June 30, 1892, were $7,725,000, and those for 1893 were estimated by the plan itself as not likely to exceed $7,000,000. This would have left $936,000 over the proposed fixed charges in 1892 and $211,000 in 1893:—or a surplus of some 3 per cent in the latter year. This was altogether insufficient. It not only put out of the question dividends on the $200,000,000 of stock, but it precluded the partial improvement of the road from earnings, and left the system at the mercy of the slightest decrease in the annual returns. Compared with previous fixed charges the plan proposed noteworthy reductions; compared with the earnings of the lines involved it did not go far enough.[383] The reception of the Drexel-Morgan plan was, nevertheless, satisfactory. Certain concessions were made to various classes of bonds, and by June 17, over 95 per cent of the securityholders had given their assent.[384] Unfortunately the earnings of the property now steadily decreased. The gross receipts of the Richmond & Danville proper were 15 per cent less in 1893 than in 1892; and Terminal system lines which had earned $6,100,000 in 1892 earned $5,300,000 in 1893, and promised to earn some $4,250,000 only in 1894. This decrease was common to the country at large. It was of peculiar importance, however, in emphasizing the weak point in the Drexel plan. From January 1 to July 1, 1893, the Terminal floating debt, exclusive of car trusts, increased $2,600,000. From July 1 to March 1 it increased at least a million more. The reorganization plan had been prepared “on the assumption that, during reorganization, the receivers of the various properties could provide for the interest charges on the undisturbed securities, as well as accumulate a sum sufficient for the interest accruing on the ‘disturbed securities’ as readjusted.”[385] As it turned out, the receivers were obliged to make many defaults among the undisturbed securities, and saved nothing for the disturbed. Some modification of the published plan had perforce to be arranged. These modifications were detailed in a pamphlet dated February 20,